

UKRAINE'S
CLAIM TO FREEDOM

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UKRAINE'S CLAIM TO FREEDOM

AN APPEAL FOR JUSTICE
ON BEHALF OF THIRTY-FIVE MILLIONS

ARTICLES BY

EDWIN BJÖRKMAN, SIMON O. POLLOCK,
PROF. M. HRUSHEVSKY, PROF. O. HOETZSCH,
AND OTHERS

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TRUSTEES
CLAIM TO EREBODON



ERRATA.

- Page 21, line 19 For **they** read the.
.. 45, .. 3 For **Ustyalov** read Ustryalov.
.. 48, .. 21 For **etsablished** read established.
.. 55, .. 37 The last sentence should read: "While the Ukrainian schools are exclusively confined to one or two classes, which is an inferior type of school, the Poles have secondary schools, composed of no less than four classes."
.. 58, .. 19 For **Ukrainians** read Ukrainian.
.. 58, .. 28 For **emancipation**, etc. read: "upon the Ukrainians and deprives them of all political independence."
.. 58, .. 32 For **form** read from.
.. 61, .. 17 For **the** read time.
.. 68, .. 11 For **Galisian** read Galician.
.. 69, .. 4 For (**a florin is 20 cents**) read (a florin is 40 cents).
.. 69, .. 29 "paid between", etc. omit this line.
.. 80, .. 39 For **local Diet**, etc. read: "Galician representation."
.. 124, .. 7 For **was** read has been.

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PREFACE.

The European War has brought to the attention of the civilized world the submerged nationalities and their struggles for independence. Terms of peace have been mentioned, from time to time, since the war began, and it seems to be the universal sentiment that in the discussion of such terms, which sooner or later must take place, the rights of these nationalities will form an important part and create a new and a great historical issue. While little has been forcibly advanced with regard to the permanent conquest of new territories, promises of independence to various nationalities have been repeatedly held out.

This situation is undoubtedly due to the fact that the movements for national and political independence in behalf of these submerged nationalities had been growing prior to the war, and had become factors in the internal affairs of the great nations of Europe.

The cry for autonomy or independence had mostly been heard from Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Balkan Peninsula, and particularly from the Slavonic nationalities.

However, the struggles of one nationality, which numbers 35,000,000, and which inhabits South Russia and Eastern Austria, have been particularly bitter. These are the Ukrainians, in Austria known as "Ruthenians", in Russia as "Little Russians".

In Russia the Ukrainians are not only subject to the general conditions prevailing in the country, but they have also been made the target of special restrictions.

There, while following their national aspirations for autonomy and independence, they have played an important rôle in the general movements for the democratization of the Russian Empire, and have supplied a substantial number of recruits to Liberal movements.

In Austria, however, having in theory the rights which the Constitution of 1867 gave to the nine nationalities of the Empire, and being entitled to equality before the law, *de facto*, the Ukrainians, on the one hand, find themselves to a great degree deprived of the practical exercise of these rights, and on the other hand, have become the actual slaves of a nobility alien to them in origin, historical traditions, and future aspirations.

We refer to the Polish nobility who, by a coincidence of historical events, have intrenched themselves in Eastern Galicia, and, strange as it may seem, continue as of yore, with privileges and monopolies, their existence as a feudal aristocracy.

Thus we see, in the beginning of the 20th century, a state of affairs entirely foreign to modern ideas.

The predominance of this aristocracy has resulted in the absolute control of all organs of public life, as well as of all sources of information. It is because of this that the cry of Ukraine and its dramatic struggles have not reached the ear of the world.

Within the last fifteen years, however, the revival of the national spirit among the Ukrainians has engendered the movement for independence and created a literature capable of supplying full information about the conditions under which they live. It is the object of those responsible for the following pages to place before the American people such data as may be found among the authorities on this subject in different languages and countries.

The various organizations of Ukrainians in the United States, composed of naturalized American citizens and of men and women not yet citizens, men and women who are proud of their adopted country, cannot fail to heed the

plea of their enslaved motherland for aid. They consider it their duty to share with the American people their knowledge of conditions in the land of their birth, so that at the proper time the voice of American opinion may be heard in behalf of Ukraine.

Presenting the cause of their nationality in Europe—in Austria and in Russia—the publishers trust that they will also render a service to the cause of the liberation of other oppressed nationalities in Europe.

The Ukrainians have no quarrel with the Poles as a nation, but they oppose the rule of a foreign aristocracy over them. Whether in Austria-Hungary or in Russia, they seek equality in citizenship and an independent Ukrainian state in the land of their birth.

Ukrainian National Association,

Jersey City, N. J.

Ruthenian National Union,

Scranton, Pa.

CHAPTER I.

THE CRY OF UKRAINE

BY

EDWIN BJÖRKMAN

[Edwin Björkman; born at Stockholm, Sweden, 1866; formerly on editorial staff, New York Evening Post and World's Work; editor, Modern Drama series, 1912. Author: *Is There Anything New Under the Sun?* 1911; *Gleams*, 1912; *Voices of To-morrow*, 1913. Translator of "Plays" by Strindberg, Björnson, and Bergström.]

"There never has been and never will be a Ukrainian language or nationality," a Russian minister of state declared in 1863. Yet there are to-day 35,000,000 people who passionately contest that assertion and claim the right to exist as a separate racial and social group. And to-day, when the great war seems to have thrown all the races of the earth into the melting pot, the Ukrainians are struggling as never before to make the rest of the world aware not only of their existence, but of their plight.

For centuries the Ukrainian has been the step-child of Europe, his very presence on this globe being overlooked or ignored. For centuries he has been oppressed and exploited by Pole and Magyar and Russian. For centuries he has been denied not only self-government, but the use of his native tongue. For centuries he has been kept poor

and ignorant, lest he grow strong enough to throw off the masters ruling him without his own consent. For centuries he has been told that his one chance of life lay in becoming a Russian or a Pole. For centuries he has been suffering a pressure in comparison with which that exerted against Poles or Alsatians or the Danes of Schleswig may be reckoned as nothing. And yet he has neither been exterminated nor assimilated.

There is an old Arab proverb saying that "a well-loved child has many names." But when the Ukrainian is known under half-a-dozen names, it means chiefly that his masters will not grant him the only one he cares for. In Russia he is known as a Little Russian or *Maloross* after the region—once the Sarmatia of the Ancients—where he has been at home since the early centuries of this era. In Austria and Hungary he is called a Ruthenian or *Rusniak*, both words being alternate forms of Russian. Colloquially he is named a *khokhol*, which means "one with hair on the top of his head." The word harks back to the days when the untamed Ukrainian Cossacks used to shave their heads in the manner of some of our own Indians, leaving only a scalp lock at the top. Should you call him a Cossack, he will not be displeased, for, strange as it may seem now, it was the peaceful population of the rich "black belt" that gave birth to the first Cossack organization. But the name he prefers to all others is that of Ukrainian.

Ukraine means "borderland." The name was first applied to the steppes along the southern Polish frontier, where the Tartar was a constant menace. Large numbers of peasants fled to these steppes to escape the tyranny of Polish *pans* or Russian *boyars*, and there they began to form nomadic organizations with a minimum of discipline. From their hostile neighbors, the Tartars, they borrowed the name of *kazak*, which comes from the Turkish *qussaq* and means adventurer or free-booter. As they grew in numbers and became hardened by their

strenuous life, their former masters conceived the idea of granting them land and a large degree of self-government under elected *hetmans*, on the condition that they should furnish an every-ready force of defense against the marauding Tartar. Both land and freedom were taken back long ago, the Tartar menace having disappeared, but the man of the old frontiers still dreams of the bygone days of free fighting. Still he likes to call himself a Ukrainian, and still he insists on considering himself a man having a race, a language, a history, and a future of his own.

One of the main reasons why all efforts at assimilation have proved futile, must probably be sought in the numerousness of the Ukrainian people. Exact figures are hard to find, as the falsifying of census reports has been one of the favorite methods employed by the oppressors. Nevertheless official figures have had to admit that, as far back as 1897, there were 22,000,000 Ukrainians in Russia alone. It seems safe to place their total present numbers in all the world at 35,000,000, distributed as follows: Southern Russia, 28,000,000; the rest of European and Asiatic Russia, 2,000,000; Galicia, 3,500,000; Hungary, 500,000; Bukovina, 400,000; the United States, 500,000; Canada, 300,000; South America, 50,000.

The European territory where the Ukrainians constitute an overwhelming majority or a considerable percentage of the population is larger than Germany and twice as large as France. It is divided between three powers—Russia, Austria, and Hungary—and stretches from the Carpathians to the Black Sea and the Caucasus. Through the middle of it runs the river Dniپر like a spinal cord. It embraces the eastern two-thirds of Galicia and the entire governments of Podolia, Volhynia, Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava and Kharkov in Russia. In these districts the Ukrainians form 70% or more of the population, while they average about 40% in northwestern Bukovina, in four of the Carpathian districts of Hungary, and in several Russian governments. They have a large colony by the river Kuban in the Cau-

casus, where the Zaporogian Cossacks of Byron's "Mazepa" were finally permitted to settle, after Catharine II had rooted them out of their stronghold on an island in the Dniper.

The original and principal home regions of the Ukrainians are among the richest known to man. Since the days of ancient Greece, they have been one of the world's main granaries. They comprise the better part of that black-earth belt (*chornozem*), which reaches from the foot-hills of the Carpathians to the Ural Mountains. The peculiar color and almost unequalled fertility of its soil are caused by the presence in its upper layers of an unusually large proportion—from five to seventeen per cent.—of humus, or decaying vegetable matter. As the climate is milder, too, the Ukrainians are able to harvest immense annual crops of every sort of grain, of Indian corn and beet-root, of water-melons and pumpkins, of tobacco and grapes. And their territory is also rich in mineral resources. Left to themselves, they would be wealthy as Iowa farmers. Instead they are poor—beyond description in some districts—and getting poorer every year.

Official Russia has sedulously fostered the impression that, no matter how many races or nationalities may be represented within the empire, the Russians properly so-called form a homogeneous ethnic and lingual group. This, however, is merely a political theory, developed to serve the centralizing and levelling process which, for good or ill, has made Russia what it is to-day. The fact is that European Russia to-day, as always, holds three ethnically distinct groups of Eastern Slavs, each one of which has a language of its own. These groups are known as Great Russians (*Vyelikorossi*), Little Russians (*Malorossi*), and White Russians (*Byelorossi*).

The White Russians, of whom there are only about 6,000,000, hold an intermediate position. Historically they belong rather to the Little Russians. Ethnically and lingually they are nearer to the Great Russians. Their

language may properly be defined as a dialect of Great Russian. They live along the western border, where they adjoin Lithuanians and Poles. So far they have not created any burning question of their own, but this may come.

"The Little Russians differ from the Great Russians not only in language but in physical type, customs, domestic architecture and folk-lore," says the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. The physical differences are marked enough to be noted by every traveller. The Ukrainians have broader and shorter heads, for one thing. They are darker, looking more like Serbs than Russians, and they are considerably taller, although they don't equal the short-set Great Russians in muscular strength. An English writer, W. Barnes Steveni, has described them as "bullet-headed and bull-necked." And I have heard it said that the late Prince Bismarck, though sprung from a northern Slavic strain, looked the typical Little Russian.

The psychological differences between the Ukrainians and the Great Russians are equally marked. "They seem to surpass the Great Russians in natural intellect, good taste and poetical fancy, but they are less practical, solid and persevering," writes the noted French geographer, *Elisée Reclus*. They are gayer and gentler than their brothers to the northward. Their women are soft-voiced and picturesquely dressed. Art and poetry, music and craftsmanship have always been at home among them—in so far as their rulers have permitted. They love the theatre. Their folk melodies are admired throughout Russia and ought to be known everywhere. "The national poetry of few languages excels that of the Ukrainians in energy of expression and depth of feeling," says *Reclus*. They are good workmen, too, and great gardeners. Even a very poor Ukrainian home looks like a house rather than a hut, is kept scrupulously clean, contains some touch of beauty, and possesses a garden patch that yields flowers as well as vegetables.



Love matches, so rare among the Great Russians, are common among the Ukrainians. Their whole outlook on life is democratic. There is a strain of the nomad in most of them, and they are likely to over-estimate freedom of movement and external equality. For these reasons they are not as good organizers or colonizers as the Great Russians, to whom autocratic centralization has always seemed an inevitable accompaniment of any organization, whether in the form of a family or of a state. There is, nevertheless, a strong tendency toward democracy in the Great Russian, too, but it is rather communistic, while the same tendency in the Ukrainian appears to be individualistic, with a strong objection to any kind of discipline except in cases of emergency. The old Cossack Hetmans used to be as absolute in war as they were powerless in peace.

When we turn to the Ukrainian tongue, we find that its position as an independent language—not a mere dialect—was officially recognized by the Imperial Russian Academy of Sciences in 1905, when that body, after a most careful study of every question involved, recommended that the people of Little Russia be granted the long denied right of using their mother tongue for educational, scientific, social and artistic purposes. At the same time the myth of the "Pan-Russian" language, of which Ukrainian had been declared a dialect, was unequivocally denounced. When analyzed, Ukrainian shows radical deviation from the Great Russian, both in grammar and vocabulary. The words for many common objects or actions are totally different. Still more confusing is the fact that words common to both languages frequently have different meanings. Thus, for instance, the same word means "charming" in Ukrainian and "ugly" in Great Russian. Consequently, a peasant from Poltava or Eastern Galicia can no more understand a man from Moscow than a Pole or a Slovak. In fact, Ukrainian has more points in common with Serbian than with any other Slavonic language.

The nature of the differences enumerated above suggests that the initial point of divergence from a common Slav stock must be placed very far back in time. It certainly ante-dates the return of the Eastern Slavs from Central Europe to their present territories, whence they had been driven during the early centuries of our era—probably by Ugrian and Finnish tribes. Their return was gradual and followed several routes, and there is reason to believe that Great and Little Russians represent separate migratory waves, one taking a northerly and the other a much more southerly route.

The earliest efforts at state building among the new settlers were made by Swedish vikings, who first established themselves at Novgorod and Kiev. From the ninth to the eleventh centuries, innumerable small states of this kind sprang into being, all of which formed a loose confederacy with the Grand Duke of Kiev at its head. For several centuries Kiev was the political and intellectual centre of Eastern Slavdom, representing the entire territory in its dealings with the outside world. It was from Kiev that Christianity spread eastward and northward. And to-day Kiev is still the "holy city," to which thousands make pilgrimage annually from all over Russia. It is also called "the mother of Russian cities."

With the advent of Jenghiz Khan's Tartar hordes, the glory and power of Kiev came to an end. The city was razed in 1240, and the fertile plains along the middle Dniپر were laid waste and depopulated. The southern Slavs were again driven westward, where independent principalities remained in Galicia and Volhynia. These regions were the first to be named Little Russia, and in 1334 we find a Duke of Halicz and Vladimir proclaiming himself "Lord of All the Little Russians." As the Tartar invasion ebbed, the Slavs flowed back once more, carrying the new name of their country with them. But meanwhile their chance of ever building an empire of their own had been lost. Poland and Lithuania had been growing

rapidly, and the Grand Dukes of Moscow were already laying the foundations of modern Russia. Galicia soon fell into the hands of Poland, while Volhynia and Podolia became Lithuanian. Then (about the year 1400) a union was formed between Lithuania and Poland, and Little Russia became a part of that Greater Poland which for a time reached from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

The Lithuanians made Little Russian the language of their court and of their public administration. The Poles tried to force not only their language but their religion on all the peoples subject to them. They were Roman Catholics, while the Lithuanians and the Little Russians were members of the Orthodox Greek Church. The two religions were guaranteed equal standing and equal rights, but the guarantee was disregarded as soon as this could be done with impunity. The process of polonisation and romanisation proved an utter failure with the mass of the people, especially in Little Russia. But it succeeded splendidly with the land-owning nobility, who found themselves excluded from the diets unless they appeared there as Polish-speaking Roman Catholics. To this day the nobility of Little Russia, when not russified, have remained Polish in their culture, and totally foreign, if not hostile, to the nationalistic aspirations of the bulk of the people.

For a brief while, however, it looked as if the course of events might take a new turn. The first Cossack organizations appeared as autonomous communities in the sixteenth century. By the beginning of the next century they had increased tremendously in numbers and power. At that time already they were able to raise an army of 60,000 men, and had established a strongly fortified central camp, the *sitch*, on an island below the Dniper Falls, whence their name of Zaporogians, or "men living below the falls." Among them the religious intolerance of the Poles was deeply resented, and about the middle of the seventeenth century an unusually able and popular Hetman, Bohdan Khmelnitzky, succeeded in arousing all Ukra-

ine and wresting it from the Poles. But he found his people too weak to stand alone, and was thus forced to arrange a union with Moscow (in 1654). The step proved fatal, and it was only rendered more so by an effort to undo it. In spite of the guarantee of autonomy given the Ukrainian people, the rulers of the rising empire in the north proceeded quickly to make a mere province out of their new territory. A Ukrainian attempt to win freedom through an alliance with Charles XII accomplished nothing but the reduction of Sweden to the position of a minor power. Before the end of the eighteenth century Russia was absolute master of the main parts of Ukraine. After the final division of Poland, it held all the Little Russian territory except Galicia, which had fallen to Austria.

As soon as the Russians had the upper hand, the work of russification began. The native tongue was prohibited, the first ukase against its use being issued in 1690. The schools were closed or forced to adopt Russian. The indigenous literature was destroyed as far as possible. The final resistance of the Cossacks was beaten down with force, their fortified camp was destroyed, their autonomous institutions were abolished, and they themselves were deported to new homes in the Caucasus, or sent northward to die by thousands in the swamps in Lake Ladoga, where the new capital was being built. The magnates were easily coaxed into siding with the new rulers by grants of additional power over the peasants. The Polish policy of creating a commercial and industrial middle-class of imported Germans and Jews was continued, thus widening the distance between the mass of the people and those who should have been their leaders. Many scholars were lured or driven into adopting the Russian language and moving to Moscow or the new capital in the north. In this connection we must remember that the Ukrainians, up to the very last, had remained ahead of their conquerors in many matters of learning.

The first Little Russian version of the Bible was printed in 1580-81, while no Great Russian edition appeared until 1663. While we know of sixty-seven prints in Little Russian dated prior to 1600, we have records of only sixteen such prints in Great Russian. Normal schools were established at Lemberg in 1586, at Kiev and Vilna in 1588, and so on. In 1631 the school at Kiev was developed into a university that long remained the finest in Russia. A higher school of any kind was not established at Moscow until 1679. When Peter the Great began his enormous task of turning Russia into a civilized country, he had to draw his staff of Slav assistants almost wholly from Ukraine. And up to the middle of the eighteenth century there was hardly to be found a single Great Russian bishop in any part of the country (*cf.* Harald Hjarne Oestanifran, Stockholm, 1905).

During a brief period it looked as if the national aspirations of the Ukrainian people had been crushed forever, and as if their complete assimilation would only be a question of time. But that period was miraculously brief, considering the force and the nature of the pressure exerted. The people, which a friendly observer like Reclus has deemed lacking in perseverance, continued to cherish their native tongue and their historical inheritance with a pertinacity that is almost without parallel in history. A few comparisons will shed light on the wonderful character of their struggle. The Finlanders, whose fight for national self-preservation has been followed with intense interest all over the world, were left unmolested until a couple of decades ago. The efforts to turn Poland into a truly Russian territory did not begin in earnest until after the rising of 1830. But the Ukrainians in Russia have been the object of a merciless process of russification for nearly two hundred and fifty years, while their brothers in Galicia have successfully resisted a no less desperate process of polonisation for six centuries.

The stronghold of the Zaporogians was destroyed in 1775. Ivan Kotliarevsky, whose travesty of the "Aeneid" in the vernacular may be regarded as the starting-point of the neo-Ukrainian movement, was already born at that time. At first, however, the assailed nationalism of the Ukrainians found its only refuge among poor and ignorant peasants, who seemed to cling to it out of blind racial instinct. From those layers nearest the soil it spread gradually upwards, gaining in clearness and intensity as it took new hold of the intellectual classes that had once deserted it. The earlier movement had been political. But the futility of resistance along such lines had become thoroughly realized, and so the new movement took a literary and spiritual aspect from the first. It was a question, above all, of preventing the people from ever losing its sense of racial distinction. With this purpose in mind, the songs and tales and legends of the Ukrainians—their *kazky* and *dumy*—were collected and studied. The language itself was analysed and assigned its proper place in relation to other Slav languages. Scientific societies were founded to carry on the new work—and were generally dissolved as soon as they began to show any genuine activity. Finally, groping efforts were made to build up a new indigenous literature, and not without success.

At the very heart of this movement we find the picturesque and pathetic figure of the poet-painter Taras Shevchenko, its foremost prophet, martyr, and genius. Born a serf in the government of Kiev, he was of age before he was set free—and we should bear in mind that his freedom was obtained by the generosity of Russian literary men who had come to admire his gifts. Yet the one object of his glowing poetry was to make his own people realize and cherish their essential distinction from the ruling branch of Eastern Slavs. For this purpose he pictured their life as it had been and as he found it. His poems were spread broadcast. Then the inevitable happened. He was arrested, put into a disciplinary regiment

and sent to Orenburg in Siberia. On the order for his deportation the Czar wrote with his own hand: "Must not be allowed to paint or write." Set free after ten years, he returned to his native land a mere ruin of his former self, within which hardly a spark of the old flame could be discerned. Three years later, in 1861, he died at the age of forty-seven. But his work had been done. His name had already become the rallying cry of his people. On the banks of his beloved Dniper they raised a simple monument in memory of his faith, his martyrdom, and his achievement. When, a year ago, the Ukrainians wished to celebrate the centenary of his birth, the Russian government placed a military guard around the monument.

Many others have worked in the spirit of Shevchenko—political writers, historians, philologists, folk-lorists, poets. It would be meaningless to mention their names here. Some suffered as did Shevchenko; some grew tired and surrendered; some went abroad or moved into Galicia in order to be able to continue their work. Always the work went on and gained in momentum—until the war broke out. But our concern here is less with the heroic struggle of those men than with the conditions under and against which it was carried out.

The first ukase aimed at the Ukrainian language was issued in 1690. The final and most sweeping one appeared in 1876. From that time up to the present, conditions in Ukraine have remained practically unaltered, although certain ameliorations were supposed to have accompanied the calling of the first Duma in 1905.

There has been a standing prohibition, minutely enforced, against sermons, lectures or addresses of any kind in Ukrainian. The same prohibition has operated against the publishing of scientific or historical works. Such works in Russian, but dealing with Ukrainian subjects, have fared but little better. When, in 1887, a Kiev philologist submitted the manuscript of a Little Russian grammar, the censor forbade its publication on the ground

that "it would be impossible to print the grammar of a language doomed to extinction." During the war against Japan, the government would not let the British and Foreign Bible Association distribute New Testaments in Little Russian among the soldiers speaking no other language. Not even circulars issued by the health authorities to instruct the people how to meet a possible cholera epidemic have been allowed to appear in the only language understood by the population concerned. An exception has been supposed to exist in the case of literature designed for entertainment only, but it has been largely annulled by the activity of the censor. Theatrical performances in Ukrainian have either been prohibited or put under restrictions rendering them practically impossible. The printing of Ukrainian text to music of any kind has been forbidden. The importation of Ukrainian literature from abroad—which means from Galicia, where Lemberg has more and more become a centre of Ukrainian culture and agitation—has been made a criminal offence. The very use of the native tongue in conversation has been frowned on and often made the excuse for arrests. I have no figures as to the part played by arrests, fines and deportations in connection with this policy of suppression, but I know that it has been important and horrible.

No use of the Ukrainian tongue in any school has been permitted under any circumstances. In general, Great Russians have been preferred as teachers, and the child of seven, who has never heard any Russian, has been expected to use a primer where, out of forty-seven words contained in the first five lessons, thirty are unintelligible to a Ukrainian. The direct result of this policy—against which even Russian bishops of the Orthodox Church have protested—may be found in the number of analphabets among the Ukrainians of the present day. In the rest of Russia there are many peasant districts to-day where the number of those unable to read and write has been reduced to twenty per cent. There are no such Ukrainian

districts where it falls below fifty per cent. When a ukase was issued in 1905, ordering the establishment of Lithuanian and Polish schools, not a word was said about Ukrainian.

Nearly all officials, and particularly most of the judges, have been and are Great Russians or russified, of course. And it has been a common occurrence to find a judge and prisoner utterly unable to communicate intelligently with each other. There is a story afloat about an old Ukrainian peasant woman who, when addressed by the judge, threw up her hands in horror and exclaimed: "Here in court? No, I can't!" She thought she had been ordered to undress.

After 1905 permission was issued for the printing of newspapers in the native tongue, and a number of these sprang up at once, and with them many bright hopes. Again the censor took back what the law was supposed to grant, and the police took care of anything that might be overlooked by the censor. This is the record of suppression established by the governors of three governments, Kiev, Kherson and Kharkov, in a single year (1913): twenty-one editors arrested; twenty-six newspapers confiscated; eighty-five fines inflicted, aggregating a sum of 20,525 rubles. To what extent a press will be able to speak freely under such circumstances may be easily imagined.

At the same time everything has been done to divert the natural wealth of Ukraine to the rest of the empire. Out of the taxes collected within the purely Ukrainian territory, nearly one-half has been spent elsewhere. No efforts have been spared to improve the conditions of the Great Russian peasants at the expense of their Ukrainian brothers. Strange to say, the abolishment of serfdom seems to have hurt instead of improved the economical condition of the peasant throughout Russia. This decline has been more marked in Ukraine than in the Great Russian districts. The fertility of the Ukrainian soil is such, how-

ever, that its humblest tillers so far have remained better off than the northern peasants, in spite of heavier taxation and other adverse factors. But their advantage has been steadily reduced.

Ukraine sent forty representatives to the first Duma, who stood for home rule of a kind that could not possibly menace the coherence of the empire. Their demands won the approval of many radical and Liberal members of that Duma, without regard to race or creed or nationality. But in official circles those demands were branded as "Mazeppism," which is the established Russian term for Ukrainian separatism. Their bitterest opponents were found in the Polish group of representatives, composed exclusively of big aristocratic landowners. One of these announced publicly that "if the government would only grant autonomy to a Greater Poland, including Lithuania, White Russia and Ukraine, the Poles would undertake to butcher every revolutionist within that territory inside of two months." Two facts should be clearly focussed in this connection: first, that the non-Polish territory indicated holds less than a million Poles to nearly forty millions of Ukrainians, White Russians and Lithuanians; and secondly, that, since the outbreak of the present war began to raise new hopes for an autonomous Poland, the Poles all too often have insisted that their ambitions will remain unachieved unless they are given control of all provinces that, at one time or another, used to be Polish—provinces, that means, where the majority of the population hate a Polish nobleman as much as the devil and much more than a Russian.

Since the dissolution of the second Duma, Ukraine has had no representation that could be called nationalistic. In this respect they have been much more fortunate in Galicia, although economically they are worse off under Austrian—that is, Polish—and Magyar rule than anywhere else. The Ruthenian peasant of Eastern Galicia is one of the poorest creatures in the whole world. He is not at all

a peasant in the true sense, but merely a farm-hand, who gets about twenty cents a day and remains practically tied to the soil which he has to till without any profit to himself. 45% of the land is owned by the Polish gentry, of whom Björnstjerne Björnson once wrote that, "in their understanding, liberty means nothing but license for themselves to do what they please." Trade and industry are in the hands of Germans and Jews, who care as little as the Poles for the poverty-stricken mass. "Therefore," says the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, "the Ruthenians are under an alien yoke both politically and economically." What has enabled the Poles to remain absolute masters within a state supposed to treat all races alike is an old bargain, whereby they undertook to support the Hapsburg dynasty as long as the Austrian government did not interfere with their exploitation of the Ruthenians. That bargain was scrupulously carried out until 1907, when a democratic reorganization of Austria was begun on the basis of universal suffrage and equal rights for all nationalities embraced within the monarchy. Since then things have not appeared quite satisfactory to the Poles—and yet they had not had time to change materially when the war swept over the province.

The Poles, holding practically all administrative posts, have published statistics showing their own race in the majority within Galicia. Their figures were obtained by counting 800,000 Jews and 200,000 Roman Catholic Ruthenians as Poles—the bulk of the Ruthenians belonging to the Uniate Church, which means that they acknowledge the Pope, but retain the outward forms of the Greek Church and have married priests. The true figures show that, about ten years ago, the Poles in Galicia numbered less than three millions, while there were fully 3,300,000 Ruthenians. On the strength of their own statistics, the Poles obtained seventy-eight seats when the allotments were made for the new parliament in 1907, while the Ruthenians were given only twenty-eight. In other words,

there was to be—and has been—one representative for every 51,000 Poles as against one for every 110,000 Ruthenians. In the provincial legislature conditions have been still worse, the representation of the Ruthenians falling at times as low as ten per cent, of the total membership. In February, 1914, the Poles were forced into a compromise, whereby the Ruthenian majority of the population was solemnly guaranteed a representation of twenty-seven per cent. in the legislature!

Nevertheless the Ruthenians have in many respects been better off than under Russian rule. They have had schools and clubs and a literature of their own—about 2,500 of the schools—and they have generally been allowed to discuss their own affairs in their own language. Thanks to this fact, much of the Ukrainian propaganda in Russia has been directed from Lemberg in recent years. Their schools have been of the lowest grade, however, while the Poles have used every possible method to keep the Ruthenian language out of the higher schools. At the beginning of the war, there was only one Ruthenian secondary school to every 681,556 people using that language, while there was one secondary school to every 49,753 Poles. The university of Lemberg, established by the Emperor Joseph II for the use of the Ruthenians alone, was at once seized and appropriated by the Poles. On one occasion, when the Ruthenian students dared to protest openly against the unfair conduct of this university, one hundred of them were arrested and kept in jail for weeks on trumped-up charges. In recent years, however, the number of Ruthenian professors has been gradually increased.

Attempts have been made from time to time to start a Russophile, Pan-Slavistic propaganda among the Ruthenians. A great deal of money and disingenuous oratory have been spent for this purpose. In so far as the movement has made any progress at all, its very limited success must be laid to the Ruthenian hatred of the Poles.

Anything to get rid of the old oppressors, has been a tempting slogan at times. Out of twenty-eight nationalist Ruthenians elected to the Austrian parliament in 1907, five were avowed Russophiles, and there is at least one instance on record of their views having been aired openly in the parliament at Vienna. But in the last elections only two Russophiles were returned. On the whole, the Ruthenians have felt in recent years that there was hope for their cause within the Austrian monarchy.

The war proved a blow to all their new hopes. Official Russia had long been viewing the increasing freedom of the Ruthenians with alarm. Their fear that a movement for national independence might sooner or later spread to Ukraine was, of course, well grounded. One of their first administrative measures after the successful invasion of Eastern Galicia was to close every Ruthenian school, and to prohibit the Ruthenian language for any public purpose. Two days after the occupation of Lemberg, they closed all the Ruthenian book-stores, which meanwhile had been crowded with Russian officers and soldiers eager to buy the literature forbidden at home. Under such circumstances one may well doubt the Russian claims of having been greeted as liberators by the Slav population of the province. In fact, it has been asserted that no Austrian regiments have fought with more stubbornness or bitterness than those composed of Ruthenians.

What the state of affairs may have been in Ukraine proper since the outbreak of the war no one seems to know. There have been some reports of suppressive measures, but no rumor of serious popular unrest. It may be assumed that the repeated Austrian drives at the Bessarabian border have been accompanied, if not prompted, by hopes of a popular insurrection in the adjoining districts of Little Russia. The Ukrainians are naturally a peaceful people, however, and they have learned the cost of open resistance to Russian rule.

Taking it all in all, the outlook for the Ukrainians in Russia seems rather gloomy just now. Yet they are asking for so little: the free use of their own language, and a reasonable amount of local self-government. The Ukrainian dream in Russia for many years has been the reorganization of the Russian Empire into a federation based on the American model. As far back as 1825, they sent delegates to this country for the purpose of studying our political institutions, and especially the relationship between the states and the federal government. If, as it has been rumored from time to time lately, Russia should actually decide to reconstruct the empire into a federation of locally autonomous and centrally represented nationalities, and if the new principles should be applied squarely, then the Ukrainians would become no less loyal than the people of Great Russia. But the one thing they fear most of all is their own inclusion within an autonomous Greater Poland—an alternative that is not very likely to materialize.



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CHAPTER II.

THE UKRAINIAN REVIVAL

BY

PROF. MICHAEL HRUSHEVSKY

(From "An Outline of the History of the Ukrainian Nation",
Petrograd, 1904)

[Michael Hrushevsky. Professor of history at the Polish-Ukrainian University in Lemberg. Awarded gold medal by the Russian Academy of Sciences, Petrograd. One of the leaders of the Ukrainian movement both in Austria and in Russia.]

My task would not have been complete had I not added to the review of the historical past of the Ukrainian nationality an outline of its condition at the present time. This sketch of course will be short and incomplete, as there are many subjects which I cannot here discuss in detail.

I shall begin with Galicia, which stands foremost in the Ukrainian national movement and represents the centre of the Ukrainian regeneration. This position, however, is anomalous, because, as I have already mentioned, the social and economic conditions of Galicia are not of a kind favorable to her assuming this leading part. Moreover, the geographical centre of the Ukrainian country is on the Dniper, while the historical centre is in Kiev. The age-long domination of the Poles in Galicia has ruined this unfortunate land, without giving it any benefit in return. All the old Ukrainian noble families, which were the land owners, have become entirely polonized. The

towns and villages are swamped with Jews, who have driven the local inhabitants out of commerce and trade. In towns of greater size the Ukrainians of the middle class have also become polonized. The only ones to remain faithful to their nationality have been the peasants, and partly the lower classes of the less important towns and villages. Numerically they total about three millions—but in what a pitiable condition!

Ruling without restriction, seizing all the land—which is the wealth of the country, the Polish nobility, who hold even now more than one half of the cultivated ground, have done nothing but pillage in the most barbarous, grasping way the natural resources of the country,—a country described by ancient writers as a land flowing with milk and honey. They have exterminated the forests and devastated the soil, they have made a pauper out of the peasant, teaching him nothing, they have not introduced any new progressive methods of agriculture, nor have they inaugurated any industries, with the exception of distilleries, the products of which are being used by them to intoxicate the peasants, the sale of liquor being leased as a monopoly to the Jews. Nor has anything been done by the Austrian government to improve the farms and develop manufactures and industry, though it had taken over from the Polish kingdom large tracts of state land in Galicia. At the present moment the country is devoid of any kind of factory or mill industry, the development of which encounters now immense difficulties. This is not only due to the inertia of the ruling class and the trickery of the local Polish administration, but also to the confiscatory tendencies of the Austrian administrative system, and furthermore to the competition of other Austrian provinces, which are defending their own economic interests. The aims of the nobles representing Galicia are meanwhile directed only to the preservation of their control of the country, and they are wholly indifferent to the welfare of the population. On the other hand, the

continued existence of a pauperized peasantry is actually of advantage to the agrarian nobles.

According to the census of 1890, 76.9% of Galicia's population lived by farming. But there are not more than 10—12% of peasant farms having tracts of land which could, in the face of the very primitive methods of farming and the low prices on products (caused by the competition of the adjacent agricultural countries, Russia and Hungary), yield a livelihood to the owners' families and supply all their very limited wants. The average size of a peasant's plot of land, except in the mountainous districts, where agriculture is feebly developed, is about 3 to 5 morgues (between 2 and 3 acres), which is wholly insufficient for the maintenance of a peasant's family. The immense bulk of the peasantry must therefore look for outside earnings. In the absence of industry and owing to the obstacles put up by the administration to prevent the absenting of peasants for outside occupations elsewhere, the peasants are compelled to ask their landlords for employment; and the latter, with no fear of competition and by mismanaging their estates, keep the prices for labor on a very low level. During the farming months, a farm-hand's pay is between 25 and 75 kreutzers (10 to 30 cents), the laborers providing their own food, while during the other months the price goes down to 10—20 kreutzers. Peasants' strikes, which were organized in 1902, were declared criminal, and on the slightest pretext, and often without any pretext at all, resulted therefore in arrests, lawsuits, and indictments, by which means they were finally suppressed. All attempts at the uplift of the national welfare meet with obstacles. As a result the peasants are growing poorer, and in masses emigrate to North America. There is no nation in Europe more unfortunate, except perhaps Ireland; and now, since a better future is dawning upon Ireland, Galicia is in danger of being the only country of its kind in Europe.

The Ukrainian intellectual class is as yet very weak. Its first ranks were made up from the clergy in the beginning of the 19th century, when the educational requirements were raised. Only in the last quarter of the 19th century did there appear some few secular intellectuals, among the state employees, and later on among members of the learned professions. But this intellectual class, originating among the peasantry and clergy, is poor and dependent. The majority of the state employees, fearing persecution on the part of the higher authorities, participate but slightly either in the political or the cultural life, because even upon work of enlightenment among the Ukrainian population the Polish administration looks with disfavor. The bulk of political and educational work in the political and national struggle is even now borne by the clergy of the villages, who still have not, in spite of all attempts to tear them away from the people, lost their connection with the masses. From them spring a great number of strong defenders of the people's interests, devoted to their progress.

The Ukrainians are debarred from all offices of any importance whatever. The whole administration is in the hands of Poles, and it carefully preserves the rule of the Polish nationality in general and of the Polish nobility in particular.

The election of representatives is carried on under the heaviest pressure, with corruption of all kinds, including open violence. Because of this, the Ukrainians are but very slightly represented in the parliamentary institutions. In the Local Assembly, they have hardly ten representatives, freely elected, among the entire number of 161. In Parliament, at Vienna, they have 7 members, including the representation from Bukovina, while the Poles, whom they equal numerically, have about 70*. Having found the Polish delegates subservient to its will,

*) This was the case before the electoral reform of 1907. Conditions were then changed. The Ukrainian representation has now risen, in accordance with the law, from 7 to 28. — Ed.

the Government ignores the Ukrainian vote and leaves the Ukrainians at the mercy of the Poles.

The schools also serve the purpose of the Poles in their nationalistic aims. On the whole, Galicia can boast of no good public school system; but the Ukrainian villages are in a worse condition in this respect than the Polish. The study of Polish is supposed to be optional, but in reality it is not only compulsory but it is imposed upon the teachers to give particular attention to the acquisition of Polish by the pupils. Any other positive knowledge the school furnishes only in a slight degree. Very often teachers of Polish nationality are appointed to Ukrainian villages, without knowing or understanding a word of Ukrainian. The University of Lemberg, which should have been entirely Ukrainian, because it is established for the Ukrainian part of Galicia, has altogether but six chairs with instruction in Ukrainian, and all petitions for the increase of such chairs have been defeated by the resistance of the Polish representatives. The demand for a separate Ukrainian university has met with the same fate. Every acquisition in this sphere by the Ukrainians is regarded by the Poles as a loss to them, and for each high school or other school the Ukrainians have to struggle with all the powers of Polish rule.

I have had to present a general picture of the condition of the Ukrainian nation in Galicia, in order that whatever has been achieved for the Ukrainian principle might be properly appreciated. It must be remembered that the Ukrainians have an enemy in their very midst, the so-called "Russophiles." This current of opinion is growing weaker with the cultural growth of the Ukrainian nation, but it still has strength enough to hinder the constructive work of the Ukrainian national groups; the more so as it receives aid from Russia, and has in recent times possessed the support of the Polish nobility*. Denying their

*) The most striking example of a Polish-Russian alliance against the Ukrainian revival was the agreement between Count Potocki, Polish Governor of Galicia under the Austrian Government, and Stolypin, Premier of Russia. — Ed.

nationality, they prefer Polish schools to Ukrainian, Polish culture to their own. As a conservative, reactionary and clerical element, they have all the sympathies of the dominant Polish party, and they are actually trying to influence the masses in a manner and spirit favorable to the interests of the Polish nobles, as, for instance when, in 1902, they dissuaded the peasants from striking. They are extremely valuable to the Poles as their allies against the Ukrainian national movement and its political development, and in this respect they act with an entire disregard for true values.

If therefore, in spite of all, in the face of such untold obstacles, so much has been accomplished in Galicia in so short a time as regards the Ukrainian national development, and with resources purely local, moreover, except for some slight assistance from Russian Ukraine—it serves as a very eloquent proof of the vitality and endurance of the Ukrainian nation, which has not degenerated under an oppression of five hundred years' duration, and of its ancient civilization, which has not been lost during so many centuries of slavery and decadence.

This proof is displayed conspicuously in the recent spread of literature and science. In the direction of an all-round development of the nation, and the satisfying of all its spiritual demands, this movement has expanded broadly. It has formulated a fixed purpose towards which this national movement is advancing, insistently and regardless of all obstacles. In a very short time a voluminous literature has developed, which has deprived Polish books of their ascendancy over the Ukrainian public. "The Publishing Company" was organized five years ago, on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the Ukrainian renaissance and has published 150 works of various types, original and translated; all this in spite of its very modest financial resources. While this is the largest publishing concern there are a score of others. A literary magazine "The Literary-Scientific Messenger," although

barred from Russia, is kept on a secure basis by local subscribers. It appears monthly; it is in the style of the European reviews, and informs its readers of all the important occurrences in European literary and cultural life. All the prominent forces in the literary field of Galicia, and to a great extent also of Russian Ukraine, are assembled about this magazine. The nineties of the last century produced in the field of letters quite a number of new and extremely varied talents, reviving this branch of art. Writers of fiction like Neehuy-Levitzky, Franko, Kobylanska, Stefanyk, (I mention only living writers of Austrian and Russian Ukraine, not intending to enumerate them all—that would take too long), dramatists like Kropivnitzky and Tobylevych, poets like Franko and Samiyenko, would all have been prominent in any literature.

Gifted poets and writers could be mentioned here by dozens. They have a manner of expression entirely their own, a large variety of themes, and a special way of working them out. Above all, this entire little literary world has a charm peculiar to itself, and unlike that of any other European literature. Its themes are all odd and original, largely based on types and scenes from national life of a sort which, with the exception perhaps of Great Russian literature, cannot be found elsewhere in Europe. Its tone, its background is unique. Had a talented and popular interpreter been found to do for this literature what de Vogüé did for the Great Russian and Brandes for the Scandinavian, Europe would have gained a new source of literary enjoyment.

All the scientific work is pivoted around the organization called the "Shevchenko Scientific Society," in Lemberg. The circumstances of its origin have been mentioned above. After dragging along a difficult existence it began to develop only in the nineties. A series of fundamental reforms was undertaken in 1892 and 1898 which changed its character into a strictly scientific one. As an institution it is modelled on the style of an academy of sciences, and should have been given this title; but as to

attain this, a special bill has to be passed, a subsidy from the state funds has to be appropriated, and finally a member of the Imperial family has to take such an academy under his protection, the society remains content for the present with its existing academic organization. It contains three faculties: one for history, jurisprudence and philosophy, one for philology, and the third for the natural sciences and medicine. There are also five commissions: archaeographical, ethnographical, linguistic, legal and medical. Each section publishes annually a collective report of its labors. Besides this a general bulletin is issued in Ukrainian and German, "The Chronicle of the Shevchenko Scientific Society," and also a scientific magazine, devoted to the publication of research work. The total publications are:

1. *Fontes historiae Ukraino-Russicae*. (Sources of Ukraino-Russian history). 6 volumes.

2. *Monumenta linguae et litterarum Ukraino-Russicarum*. Monuments of the Ukraino-Russian language and literature. 4 volumes.

3. Historical Library. 24 volumes.

4. Ukraino-Ruthenian Library (contains editions of the most prominent Ukrainian authors, with a scientific department; this is a new publication). 4 volumes.

5. Ethnographical Collection. 15 volumes.

6. Materials for Ukraino-Ruthenian Ethnology. 6 volumes.

7. Periodical of Law and Economics. 15 volumes.

8. Law Library. 3 volumes.

9. Medical Collection. 8 volumes.

Finally this same Society publishes the literary and scientific magazine described above. Taken together as many as 20 volumes of a scientific character are issued annually, aside from the magazine and the bulletins.

In spite of its comparatively recent origin, the publications of the Scientific Society have already acquired an

honorable standing among specialists. They are, of course, mainly occupied with the study of the past and present of the Ukrainian nation and its territory—their history, archaeology, ethnology, national lore, language and literature. The Scientific Society is, after all, the only national learned institution, and should naturally give its utmost attention to the solution of questions having the closest connection with the destinies of the Ukrainian nation,—the more so as it is not only of purely scientific but also of nationalistic sociological importance.

The absence of Ukrainian institutions for higher education is a serious obstacle to the development of science. Lemberg University, as I have already observed, has but six Ukrainian chairs*, and aside from these no Ukrainian can occupy any chair. Men gifted for scientific work must therefore look for occupation in other fields of endeavor or turn for chairs to other universities. The question of Ukrainian chairs and of a separate Ukrainian university in Lemberg has lately become a very burning issue. In the fall of 1901, the Ukrainian students came out with a demand for an extension of the rights of the Ukrainian language in the University. Meeting with a vigorous refusal, on the part of the Polish authorities of the University, they organized a secession, resigning from the University to a man, 600 strong, and enlisting with other universities. This manifestation was readily and strongly endorsed by the entire Ukrainian population of Galicia, in the shape of a collection of funds for the secessionists, and of a repeated demand at every opportunity for the establishment of a separate Ukrainian university at Lemberg, because of the inimical attitude of the present Lemberg University to the national demands of the Ukrainians. But neither these demonstrations nor these demands have brought any positive results. The Poles have placed the question of submitting to the Ukrainians in such a menacing light that the Government has not dared to grant the Ukrainian demands. The whole incident has

*) Fourteen, since the writing of this article 1904.

served only to make the question more bitter and the relations between Poles and Ukrainians more acute.

In the same way, the absence of necessary institutions makes it impossible for the Ukrainian nation to assert itself in the sphere of the arts. The Ukrainians have produced quite a number of talented painters, and some of these are producing honorable work even at present. But owing to the lack of an academy of arts and national associations of painters, they have attached themselves to other schools, Russian, Polish and German, for example, and are lost to Ukrainian culture. Music fares no better. As there are no permanent national theatrical companies on a large scale and no conservatories, operatic and symphonic music has never had a chance to develop, although the Ukrainians are known for their musical inclinations. Their popular songs are noted not only for their poetical qualities and their immense variety (Ukrainian folk poetry is the richest in Europe), but also for the high degree of their melodious qualities. They have served as sources not only to Ukrainian composers, but even to Russian and Polish. Ukrainian singers are engaged in foreign countries, while at home music has had to adapt itself to the purposes of light opera and minor vocal compositions.

Since the administrative order of 1881, Ukrainian concerts and performances are tolerated in Russia, and with respect to the development of drama, theatrical art, and music Russian Ukraine is more advanced than poor and little Galicia. Nevertheless, the ordinances prohibiting *separate, exclusive* Ukrainian performances, permanent Ukrainian theatres, and special Ukrainian companies are still in force, and the staging of Ukrainian operas therefore meets with insurmountable obstacles.

In Galicia, the Ukrainians, though having *de jure* freedom of national development, are in fact placed economically, socially, and politically in conditions which tend to make free national development impossible. Conse-

quently the Ukrainians of Galicia have to bear, and bear with the utmost difficulty, the weight of the present cultural work, and have yet before them a whole series of very complicated political problems to be solved before their national self-consciousness can finally attain its full freedom. In Russia, on the contrary, the development of the Ukrainians is hindered, generally speaking, only by external restrictions and prohibitions.

An immense country, with inexhaustible natural resources, though being exploited in a very disastrous manner, with indications of a future highly-developed state of factory and mill industry, and a commerce possessing very important transit facilities and the proximity of the sea, Ukraine has every chance for material, and subsequently for spiritual, development. The masses are distinguished by tremendous physical vitality (statistical records show a very high birth-rate), energy, and assimilating power. Within recent memory large Ukrainian colonies have been created, and are in fact being created right along. An example of this is the colonization of the Ussurian country near the Pacific Ocean, where statistics show from 1883—1900 the presence of 97% of Ukrainian settlers. Elements artificially injected into the body of Russian Ukraine in the form of Serbian and Bulgarian settlements of considerable extent have been entirely absorbed.

The widely circulated opinion that the Ukrainian nation is ill fitted for self-organization is contradicted by historical facts. That it possesses natural gifts there can be no doubt, for the nation has given birth to Gogol and Shevchenko and an endless row of lesser lights in all spheres of culture.

Under such conditions, occupying an undivided territory without admixture of foreign elements able to infringe to any extent upon this territorial unity, the Ukrainian nation has every chance to develop a high national civilization. The Jews alone constitute a numerically

considerable foreign element, but there can be no danger whatever from them in this matter.

The great percentage of Poles in the so-called South-Western districts is made up largely of polonized local inhabitants.

The intellectual classes and the urban middle classes in Ukraine are even now under the influence of Russian culture, but this is simply due to the fact that there is not and cannot be, under the conditions outlined here, any Ukrainian city culture of its own. The only manifestation of the latter is displayed in the Ukrainian theatre, and its widespread and lasting popularity and the living interest in it shown by the intelligent and middle classes, argues eloquently for the future. I personally have met people who had evidently entirely lost their Ukrainian nationality, people little if at all educated, who, during their travels, would make a considerable *détour*, in order to visit a town where a performance by "Little Russians" was to be seen. There is great demand for Ukrainian books, though printing in Ukrainian is still partly under the ban. "Kobsar," by Shevchenko, and Kosarevsky's works have been sold in hundreds of thousands. A reader containing selections from Ukrainian writers (a low-grade substitute for a history of literature), a publication allowed by the Russian censor in 1898, was exhausted in a few months, despite the high price and the large size of the edition.

All these facts enable one to conclude convincingly that, when governmental restrictions are removed, the Ukrainian nation will enter upon the stage of intensive development, a preliminary condition the way for which has already been prepared by the successes of the Ukrainians in Galicia.

One argument raised against the bringing into existence of a national culture, in its full sense, is that while the Ukrainian nation can assert itself in its ethnographical manifestations, the Ukrainian language is fitted only for

home use by people unfamiliar with the Russian tongue, the latter language alone being of a quality to satisfy the demands of an intellectual class and suitable for use in literature and science. This argument, brought forward by a conservative press and repeated by various Ukrainian individuals of moderate tendencies, serves as a motive, a motive in force up to the present, for the prohibition of scientific books and scientific lectures in the Ukrainian language and also of literary translations and the production of plays and works of fiction, in which individuals of the intelligent classes are portrayed.

All measures of this kind have certainly a serious influence; they hinder and obstruct the national movement, but only to a certain degree. The wide and all-round development of the Ukrainian nation is only a question of time, perhaps even of a time not very remote.

[1904.]

[Concerning the later development of the Ukrainian revival in Russia, see the article by Prof. Hoetzsch.]

CHAPTER III.

**THE END OF THE IDEA OF POLISH
EMPIRE**

BY

CARL LEUTHNER.

(From "Socialistische Monatshefte", Stuttgart, 1908.)

[Carl Leuthner. Prominent Austrian political writer. Member of the Social-Democratic group in the Parliament at Vienna.]

To most politicians in the German Empire the Polish question has become merely a problem of Prussian methods of administration. The feeling that we had before us a European problem inseparably intertwined with the Prussian ill-treatment of the Poles was still alive in the sixties of the last century. It seems now to have completely vanished. The adherents as well as the opponents of what is known as Hakatism agree in the one essential point. But one may cry out against Polish treason or deny it altogether; one may attempt by German instruction to convert the Poles into good Prussians or Germans or one may insist that friendly treatment is all that is needed to make them loyal; is not the one error as ridiculous as the other? Would it not be better if both the friends and the enemies of the Poles were to inquire first whether the Pole understands the term "treason" in the same way as the member of a national state, and whether

it is really possible—either by means of the whip or by a softer treatment—to uproot the longing for independence from the heart of a people strong in its self-consciousness and the sense of its great past?

The fact is that the essential aim of Polish aspiration is the state. What they were struggling for up to 1863, in the main, and what they are partly struggling for still is not their own national liberty but the dream of the old Polish Empire, the Empire that was built up on a basis of the most monstrous political, economic, and national suppression of two-thirds of its inhabitants, the Little Russians (Ukrainians), White Russians, Lithuanians and Germans, by the ruling one-third, the Poles themselves.

Anyone looking over the newspapers and writings of the sixties of the last century, will at once be struck with the overwhelming feeling of disillusionment created among public men of Western Europe when that fact was borne in upon them. The attitude of the Little Russians and Lithuanians during the revolt of 1863 tore to pieces the legend of a POLISH Empire. When writers of the rank of a Leroy-Beaulieu then assumed an attitude all too friendly toward Russia there may have contributed to it something like a feeling of shame over the fact that all the lyrical and rhetorical outbursts friendly to the Poles had had their origin in the enthusiasm of Inpes, who had reversed the ideal of liberty in a matter which, in the language of the Ukrainian revolutionist Dragomanow, would have been "for the immense majority of the Western Russian population merely the exchange of the Russian for the Polish rule of force." Of course, this realization has since been lost again to many people. Men who love to make up for a lack of real knowledge by a surplus of "tendency" still speak of the partition of Poland in accordance with the old Polish National myth, just as if they did not know that in the Prussian section almost as many Germans were freed from the Polish yoke as Poles were brought under the German yoke; that in Galicia the first conditions for a really humane existence for half of

the population, the three and a half million Ukrainians, were created only through Austria.

But nowadays the error does not spring from enthusiasm but from a lack of interest, most easily hidden behind well-meaning phrases.

Still it would seem that just now is the time to give most careful attention to this matter because clearer thinking is now beginning to spread among the Polish people themselves, a process that must result in separating Polish national thought from the idea of Polish Empire still clinging to it.

On Russian soil, the revolution has given the impetus; on Galician, the growth of the Ukrainian (Little Russian) movement. In this connection alone the killing of the Galician Governor Count Potocki by the Ukrainian Sichinsky, which made such a deep impression everywhere, will be seen in its proper significance. This event could never have struck the Poles a harder blow than at the very time when they were appealing for compassion on behalf of their brothers oppressed in Germany. It revealed to all the world the fact that the Poles, oppressed in Posen, kept another nation within the grasp of their fists in Galicia. The purely national character of the act could not be denied. Though the Ukrainian Socialist organ "Semla e Vola" claimed Sichinsky as a comrade, it censured this act from the point of view both of tactics and principle precisely as did the bourgeois-democratic organ "Dilo", while both papers highly praised the young man as a human being and held him, as the representative and executor of the wrath of an oppressed nation, excusable. The whole Ukrainian people looked upon the act in the same way, particularly its leading element—the young intellectuals to whom Sichinsky himself belonged and whose sentiments he and his act incarnated. It is of no use for the Poles to point out that the recent election reform had considerably increased the rights of the Ukrainians, for in the assassination are really reflected only the excitements and methods of the Russian revolutionary

guerilla warfare. What little the Ukrainians had gained by the electoral reform had had to be wrung from the unwilling Shlakhta. The example of the Polish revolutionaries in Russia alone could never have had such an infectious influence upon the Ukrainians in Galicia. In both cases it was the wrath stored up for a century that brought about such a terrific explosion.

One can only comprehend the depth of that hatred by recalling the history of both peoples. A comparison may serve here as illustration. Peoples who have not yet realized an incarnation into states are peoples of longing and recollection. The German Empire once founded, the glory of the Hohenstaufen epoch paled gradually, while with the Poles the picture of the victory of Tannenberg has been renewed in lurid colors during a century of dismemberment and powerlessness. In the souls of the Ukrainians the Cossack republic likewise still lives in tale and song recalling the bloody struggles against the Poles and a long and terrible series of cruel revolts and cruel defeats.

But the Poles did not content themselves with merely murdering the body, they wanted to kill the soul also. At the time the Polish Empire was divided, the Little Russian and Lithuanian book language and culture was already a thing of the past. The nobility had been polonized, the free peasant reduced to a "khlop," a serf. Even the recollection of the national existence of the Little Russians had been blotted out.

Maria Theresa and Catharine considered the newly acquired territories—half in our case, two thirds in the other, not Polish—as really Polish country, just as the Liberal lyricism did later on in its zeal for their "liberation." Alexander I, influenced by Speranski, and in order to show his own Liberalism in a spectacular manner, experimented with a Kingdom of Poland, retaining its ancient boundaries, and established the second Polish university in the capital of Lithuania. The revolt of 1830, in the course of which occurred a rising of Lithuanian

peasants against the Polish "Pani", did really change the Russian official view, but at first only in literature through the work of the historian Ustyalov; later on, in practice, the great Russian principle of denationalization supplanted the Polish principle. Up to the days of the Revolution of 1904, the Little Russian, the White Russian, and the Lithuanian languages were legally prohibited; no periodical, no scientific or popular work, no translation, not even that of the New Testament, was permitted to appear in any of those languages. Even today they occupy a sad and so to speak pariah position. The brief springtime of freedom is gone. Although they no longer dare to place the Little Russian language under lock and key, the Little Russian press is sorely persecuted, the Little Russian societies in Kiev and Charkov may only, according to report in the "Ryech", arrange theatricals; lectures are limited to the utmost; the dissemination of literature in the country districts is made impossible.

Under what conditions did the Little Russian literature and book language develop from the thirties and forties of the last century when Kostomarov, Bodyansky and the prominent poet Shevchenko built the foundation? In addition to the shackles of the censor there was a still more rigid barrier in the fact that among the plain peasants with their polonized nobility and russianized intellectuals there were scarcely any readers. Still less was there a standard form of the common language. Education and instruction forced the Little Russian writer to use the Great Russian idiom. From Bogdanovich to Kovalenko and Potapenko, a long line of Little Russians have enriched the Great Russian literature with some of its finest products. In the person of Gogol, the creator of the Great Russian novel—in whose writings the feeling against the Great Russians is as manifest as in his "Taras Bulba," the hatred of the free Cossacks against the Polish oppressors—this condition assumes the exalted form of real tragedy.

Once the Great Russians had entered into the heritage of Polish methods of oppression, the behavior of the two master nations towards the literature of Little Russia proceeded along parallel lines. Nicholas I sent Kostomarov and Shevchenko into exile. Polish society and the Polish press even twenty years later ostracised Antonovich and his friends because as Ukrainian noblemen they thought and felt as Ukrainians instead of as Poles. For the awakener of Ukraine they invented the derisive expression *khlopamanie* (*khlop*, serf, peasant), which Great Russian superciliousness re-coined in to "khakh-lomanie" (*khakhol*, equivalent to pigtail-man), in order to express contempt for the Little Russians. And just as the Great Russian critic Bielinsky upbraided Gogol for his Ukrainian sympathies, so also the Polish critics abused Shevchenko in the grossest manner as a glorifier of the "barbarism and inhumanity" of the Cossack wars.

The attitude of the Russian government is reflected in the ideas of the Russian Pan-Slavists, Liberals and revolutionaries. They also are dominated by the spirit of their time in regard to the concept of a national state which misled even a Marx in his judgment as to the future of the Slavonic smaller peoples of Austria. In the conferences of the Decabrists with the Poles, Muraviev represented the integrity of the Russian Empire (which he wished to federalize), the Pole Krzyzanovski insisted on the restoration of Poland with its ancient boundaries. There was no mention of the other nationalities. But in the revolutionary sphere, the realm of dreams glorified by a glimmer of liberty appeared stronger than the realm of reality. That manifests itself in Herzen. In the celebrated series of articles *Russia and Poland*, which inaugurated the Revolution of 1863, he raises the question as to what might happen if the Little Russians were to acknowledge neither the Russian nor the Polish leadership; in which case they would have to be left independent. But more and more he allowed himself subsequently to be dragged into the Polish scheme, influenced

partly by Bakunin who, like his Socialist opponents, had no proper understanding of the importance and peculiarity of nationalism and expected Russian freedom from a Polish revolt, whereas it was self-evident that a co-operation of the Russian Liberals with the Poles must rouse all the Nationalist sentiments of the Russians against Liberalism. The Russian revolutionists, like all the others, had taken over the inheritance of the Polish ideal of freedom. They closed their eyes in the face of patent facts. Dragomanow relates how the emissaries of "Semla e Vola", negotiating in Volhynia with Polish revolutionists before the Polish rising, took no heed of the fact that Polish nobles had delivered into the nets of the Russian police partisans of Little Russia because they had refused to join the Polish cause.

This, of course, was a correct action from the point of view of the idea of Polish Empire for which the oppression of Ukrainians and Lithuanians is as essential as Polish liberty. The Shlakhta in Austria had likewise persecuted its opponents, now as enemies of Poland, now as enemies of Austria. Nor shall we forget an article of Chernishevski, harshly upbraiding the Galician Ukrainians for their "national lack of tact" and advising them to make common cause with the Poles against the "common German enemy," which would have meant going with the Polish Shlakhta that exploits them and the Polish bureaucracy that oppresses them. But Chernishevski, like other Great Russian revolutionaries, was amazingly ignorant of Western Slavic conditions and—by the side of his writing desk stood the Pole Syerakovski! And who has ever better understood the art of influencing others than the Poles?—they for whom even today industrious pens are working in the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* and in the *Novoye Vremya*, in the *Osservatore Romano*, and in the Vienna semi-official press. Great is the advantage when leadership and representation are in the hands of aristocrats. Even the anti-Polish peasant reforms after the Revolution of 1863 did not prevent the

Poles having a certain favorable position in Russia in spite of all oppression, a position as favorable as that of the Baltic nobility. In Austria, the Shlakhta gained a share in the government even before the Czechs. At the London memorial banquets in honor of the Polish revolt, Marx and the other official speakers, in a similar vein, spoke of Polish freedom; but the other subject nationalities of Russia, though far more oppressed, were scarcely mentioned. The aristocratic manner of life and thought of all Poles brings into greater relief their revolutionary romanticism. How much time did it take for the much more numerous people of Little Russia, democratic but of peasant manners, to obtain a standing of equality in the ceremonial code of revolutionaries!

The last Polish revolt, as a matter of fact, annihilated the idea of a Polish Empire without, however, dislodging it from the heads of the Poles themselves. True, at times even in Warsaw, sensible voices have been heard, but they have found scant echo in Wilna and still less in Cracow and Lemberg, where, since the restoration through Golukhovski, the Polish republic has been again established under Austrian suzerainty. The meaning of the Polish idea of empire, of Polish freedom, need not be looked for in theories and books: forty years of practice in the history of Galicia show it. But we do not wish to speak here at all of the exploitation of the Ukrainian peasants, of the arbitrariness of the Polish officials and courts, of the once existing curial electoral vote that gave to the Poles eighty, to the equally numerous Ukrainians ten, deputies in the Reichsrath, and in the Diet to the former one hundred and twenty, the latter twenty, representatives; in all these things one may say the class interest of the ruling Shlakhta is involved. We merely point to the purely national problems. *There* the Pole acts as a Pole, and there all Poles are of one mind.

Of course, the Galician governors and officials could not follow the Russian model and simply prohibit the Ukrainian language, for that was impossible under the funda-

mental laws of Austria; but how they deliberately neglected the Ukrainian schools; how they even wanted to prohibit the Ukrainians from using the Russian writing alphabet and informed against them on that score in Vienna; how they mobilized clericalism with Roman support against the Ukrainian national aspirations; how they favored now the Great Russian current in certain Ukrainian circles and then again the Ukrainian national one in order to play one against the other and subsequently denounce to the government the one as a Pan-Russian, the other as a revolutionary menace—all *that* sprang from the same spirit which also animates the Russian administration in Kiev and Charkov, except that in Galicia corruption must make up for what is lacking possibly in the way of force. And that comes right down to daily events. Because frightened by the successes of the Ukrainian National Party at the elections to the Reichsrath, he supported the Russophiles at the elections to the Galician Diet—for that, really, Potocki met his death.

Here now we have a turning point all the more significant because of its resemblance to a similar turning point in the history of the Poles in Russia. For decades the Russian as well as the Polish revolutionaries stuck to the centralistic tendency in spite of some isolated concessions to the federal principle. Only since the labor movement took hold of the masses and the "proletarian character" of the Russian Social Democracy became a reality instead of being a mere item in a platform, when practical agitation made it necessary to proceed in every territory according to its local conditions, when the Lettish, the Lithuanian, and the Armenian Social Democracy became the real representatives of the national idea of the respective peoples and the Bund as the best equipped organization included the cities of the West, the Russian idea of the state has become extinct in the minds of Socialists, the first Semstvo Congresses showing the entrance of the federalistic (Dragomanow) concept even among bour-

geois circles. As for the Poles, the dream of their empire now broke down altogether. The prophetic word of Antonovich: "For us of the Shlakhta in the Little Russian and Lithuanian country, there will remain nothing hereafter but to merge with the people over whom we have ruled thus far, or to flee to Warsaw," became a living reality in the days of the Lithuanian and Little Russian peasant movement, even if the Czar seemed to restore for the moment the appearance of Polish supremacy in the West by means of the Witte electoral law and its favoring of the aristocracy, subsequently destroyed entirely by the electoral system of Stolypin. Beside economic and social considerations, the Polish bourgeoisie were determined in their extraordinary passivity no doubt also by the idea that the Revolution was shaking no less the foundations of the dreamer of Polish Empire as well as those of the real Empire of the Czar. In other ways the Poles have met with the same experience in Galicia. One may say that they already know, though they may not yet say it aloud, that Polish Galicia, that last remnant of the Polish Empire, is a thing of the past; even if the successor of Potocki, Bobrzynski, has been brought forth from the most conservative corner of the Shlakhta Party, even if Polish Liberal papers like the "Nowa Reforma" speak of the Galician governor openly and in so many words as a representative of the Polish people, responsible only to the Poles. They shout thus loudly only to get rid of their fear, which breaks out all too plainly in the same Polish papers whenever they publish rumors of a Ukrainian peasant revolt, or of the burning of houses of Polish grandees,—rumors altogether false, but for that reason all the more significant.

The idea of the Polish Empire is on the point of dying. In ten years, it will have disappeared from the political thought of the Poles as it is already eliminated in the political practice of the Polish Social Democracy in Austria and likely enough in Russia also. Few recent sentimental manifestations in behalf of this idea are worth

considering seriously. But this is a fact of the utmost importance. The idea of Polish independence is debatable from the point of view of German Social Democrats, both from the German and the Socialist standpoint (since it implies only the freedom of the Poles, and not as heretofore the oppression of other nationalities), only when the Polish demands stop at the boundaries of the Polish language; when the Pole gives up his dream of the Baltic Sea as well as of the Black Sea; when his hopes take leave of Danzig as well as of Wilna. The idea of a Polish state on Polish soil is debatable, but from the German point of view is still very far from being a practical issue. The Hakatists will not exterminate the Poles; the Centre will not conciliate them; the German Social Democracy will not liberate them. Such a liberation can only be accomplished by each people for itself.

The Polish question is a European question, strictly included in the tremendous problem presented by the Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian-White-Russian-Jewish-Roumanian mass of Western Russia in its fermentation and its changes. We have here a meeting of "questions and question marks." None of these nationalities is cleanly separated from the others, all are mixed up together. Some of them are only beginning to rise, like the largest one among them, the Ukrainians, to more compact forms of self-consciousness. Even theoretically the problem of their mutual separation and their boundary with respect to the Great Russians offers tremendous difficulties. Besides, most of them reach out in considerable numbers into neighboring states, where, as in Austria, in Hungary, and in the Balkans, a similar fermentation is going on, so that the circle of connected actions is infinitely enlarged. Taken together, they are far too big a weight to justify the assumption that Russia would be able to rule this whole non-Russian West with its more than forty million inhabitants according to the now prevailing centralistic formulas, once the national self-consciousness has penetrated deeply into these peoples. On

the other hand the Russian state idea is too strong and supported by too powerful a nation to justify the other assumption that Russia would gradually disintegrate, as it is prophesied at times in regard to Austria and Hungary. Once the conflict of dualism between the Russian and Polish ideas of Empire disappears, the forces thus freed from the former tension may group themselves in manifold forms. A dissolution of the Russian state into a loose federalism may be considered remotely possible just as well as the forcible rejuvenation of the Pan-Slavic idea of conquest for which the possibilities are coming with the vanishing of the conflict between the Russians and the Little Russians, and the change from the democratic socialistic nationalism to a simple nationalism.

Where there are so many possibilities, all conclusions must be dropped. Only one thing must be taken for granted. Only through a change in the whole status of East European affairs is there any chance for the final solution of the Polish question. The Germans in the Empire and in Austria, no matter of what party, will then be so much occupied with guarding their own independence and existence that no time will remain for them to fashion the destinies of other peoples.

CHAPTER IV.

**POSITION OF THE UKRAINIANS
IN GALICIA**

BY

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Let us now consider the Ukrainians that belong to Austria-Hungary. Although since 1772 they have been Austrian, they have, as a matter of fact, remained under Polish "patronage."

The Austrian Government, after its occupation of Galicia, attempted the task of helping the Rutheno-Ukrainians to organize themselves. They limited the power which the great Polish landowners exercised over their Ukrainians serfs; they opened Ukrainian schools and gave them a first bishopric of their own. During the revolution of 1848 the Austrian Government sought, against the Poles and the Hungarians, the support of the Ukrainians, and promised them the division of Galicia into two parts nationally distinct, the introduction of teaching in the Ukrainian language throughout their own schools, and finally the enfranchisement of the peasants from a state of serfdom.

Having crushed the revolution the Government abolished serfdom, but took no further notice of the other

Ukrainian claims. The Poles extended in the meantime their hold over Galicia, and in 1873 they made a secret compact with the Government, which assured them the supremacy in Galicia. The Government appointed to the Cabinet a Polish minister without portfolio, who is dependent entirely upon the Polish deputies and is responsible to them. Thus, without any constitutional decision and without the sanction of Parliament, the Poles have been granted a Polish minister who represents the Polish interests in Galicia. The Ukrainians are regarded as being a part of the Polish nation, and subject to the sovereignty of the Poles.

The Ukrainians of Austria are treated as a second-rate nationality, and the Poles exploit their privileged position. The Emperor Francis Joseph has remained throughout his life under the influence of the Polish noblemen, who have calumniated the Ukrainian movement and denounced it as dangerous to the security of the state. All the economic forces of the provinces are utilized by the Poles to weaken the Ukrainians, to maintain them in a state of subjection and of economic, intellectual, and political inferiority. The Austrian Government have a secret fund at their disposal, and have dispensed during the last seven years four million crowns to help the Polish deputies against the Ukrainian deputies. The Governor of Galicia, Bobrzynski, did not hide the fact that during the last elections he spent only 1,100,000 crowns while his predecessor had spent 1,300,000. Such facts are but an episode illustrating the corruption of political life in Austria. The governmental majority in Parliament rests upon the delegates of the great nationalities, while the smaller nationalities are handed over to the others to be exterminated. For the slightest criticism of this intolerable situation the Ukrainian newspapers are confiscated by order of the Polish judges. From the political sphere in the control of the country the Ukrainians are excluded, not having even the power to defend themselves against the Polish major-

ity either in the Executive Council or in the Diet of the province.

From the administrative point of view the Ukrainian language is hardly tolerated, in spite of all the laws which guarantee the use of that language in all the provincial and governmental departments.

In the intellectual domain it is enough to consider the Ukrainian scholastic situation. The Poles have fifty-one official secondary schools of their own; the Ukrainians five. Of Polish technical schools there are fourteen, while the Ukrainians have none. There are seventeen Polish and Polono-Ukrainian training colleges for teachers; the Ukrainians have none of their own. The Poles have two commercial institutes; the Ukrainians have none. The Poles have seven official industrial schools; the Ukrainians have none. The Poles have eighty supplementary industrial schools; the Ukrainians have none. The Poles have eighteen agricultural schools; the Ukrainians have none. As to the high schools, this is how they stand:—

Having 5 forms—Poles, 82; Ukrainians, 0

Having 6 forms—Poles, 113; Ukrainians, 0

Having 8 forms—Poles, 102; Ukrainians, 0

In Austria education is free and compulsory, and is* given in the mother tongue of each nationality. We see therefore the shameful results of the Polish policy, which refuses the right to be taught in their mother tongue to the Ukrainians, who constitute, moreover, according to the Polish statistics, 42.04 per cent. of the total population of Galicia. The Poles have imposed on the Ukrainians, in their elementary schools, the obligation of learning Polish, which is a real penance to the Ukrainian boy or girl.

There are in Galicia 5391 elementary schools, of which 2457 are Ukrainian and 2909 Polish. There are schools which have but one class and others which have two, three, four, and as many as eight classes. While the Ukrainian schools are exclusively confined to one or secon-

*) Officially. — Ed.

dary schools composed of no less than four classes. Moreover, the Ukrainian schoolboys who leave the village elementary school are refused the right to enter the Polish secondary school in the town. There is one Ukrainian secondary school for every 681,556 Ukrainians, while the Polish school is but for every 49,753. The Board of Education or School Council of the province is composed of 27 Poles and 5 Ukrainians, who are, of course, unable to resist such a crushing majority.

The Ukrainians demand, therefore, the division of the School Council into two parts—Polish and Ukrainian—so as to bring to an end the unfair system of Polish education for the Ukrainians. The Poles have also the advantage of a Hakatist law of 1867, which forbids the erection of any secondary school unless it has the sanction of the Diet. The Polish schools of the same degree can, on the other hand, dispense with this formality; their opening is subject to a decree of the Minister for Public Education, who need not seek the authorization of the Diet. These two unconstitutional measures are obviously directed against the Ukrainians, and the privilege they confer upon the Poles stands to the shame of the Austrian Government which tolerates it. There is a second Hakatist law of 1907, according to which neither public nor private training colleges can exist if they have a Ukrainian character and cannot deliver valid documents.

No less serious is the question of Lemberg University. The teaching which was previously delivered there in German was to be henceforth delivered in Ukrainian. Gradually professors were found able to deliver the courses in Ukrainian. In 1848 the Ukrainians obtained two chairs at Lemberg University. At that period there was as yet no question of the Polish language there. In 1862 two more Ukrainian chairs were created, the other courses being still delivered in German. The Poles took advantage of their privileged situation in the province, and benefitted from the imperial rescript of 1871, which replaced the teaching in German by teaching in the two

languages of the province. The Poles took possession of all the chairs for their countrymen, leaving none to the Ukrainians. They even tried to take away the Ukrainian chairs already existing.

Owing to the development of Ukrainian sentiment, the situation was becoming intolerable in the University, and in 1900 an open struggle began.

All the Ukrainian students left Lemberg University. The Austrian Government declared itself prepared to create in Lemberg a university apart for the Ukrainians on condition that the Polish consent could be obtained. The Lemberg Town Council at a solemn sitting refused to sanction the creation of a Ukrainian university in the town. The same Council refused to assign a place in the town where the Ukrainians could raise a monument to their greatest patriot and poet, Taras Shevchenko. The Senate of the University and the Polish students declared that they would never allow the setting up of a Ukrainian university in Lemberg. The conflict, which broke out in the University, brought about the death of a Ukrainian student, who was struck by a bullet from a revolver belonging to a Polish student. The police arrested three hundred Ukrainian students, while not one Pole was molested. The courts of the province, being in Polish hands, were led by their hatred to the Ukrainians.

Following the Prussian methods of colonization, the great Polish landlords, who own land in the Ukrainian part of Galicia, dare not sell their land to the Ukrainian peasants. When they do they are considered as traitors and are boycotted by the Poles, the Polish motto being: "Not one foot of ground to the Ukrainians." The Ukrainian peasants, the proletariat of the agricultural life, are obliged to work, for a miserable pittance, the Ukrainian ground, which constitutes the domain of the Polish noblemen. They are shamefully exploited, and in case of resistance or boycott they are treated like bandits; they are chained, flogged, brought barefoot to the town prisons, and finally sentenced.

In order to find more humane conditions, the Ukrainian peasants seek work in Germany, where they are better treated and better paid. The local administration of Galicia, which is controlled by the Poles, does everything in its power to prevent the Ukrainian workers leaving the country.

The representation of the Ukrainian nation in Parliament includes, since 1907, the twenty-eight members from Galicia (26.4 per cent.). One Ukrainian member represents 110,000 inhabitants. The Poles have seventy-eight members (73.6 per cent.), each Polish member representing 51,000 Polish inhabitants. The Province of Bukovina sends five Ukrainian members to the same Vienna Parliament.

In the Lemberg Diet the electoral law of 1861 granted the Ukrainians forty-seven deputies, that is, 33.33 per cent. Today, after the compromise arrived at between the Poles and Ukrainians, the latter will have only 27.2 per cent.; that is, 62 Ukrainians deputies out of a total number of 228 deputies in the Diet. In Bukovina the Ukrainians have but 17 deputies of their own, in spite of their numerical superiority, while the Roumanians have twenty-three.

On February 15th, 1914, a scheme of electoral reform for the Lemberg Diet was passed, but does not constitute, properly speaking, a Ukraino-Polish agreement. It does not remove the Polish domination, which weighs heavily emancipation of the Ukrainians from the Polish political independence. The struggle will be carried on according to circumstances, and more or less bitterly in proportion to the degree of Polish resistance against the gradual emancipation of the Ukrainians from the Polish political supremacy. For many centuries the Polish Republic refused to recognize the existence of a distinct Ukrainian nationality. Today the Poles find themselves in the presence of a *fait accompli*. They must needs bow before the evidence that the Ukrainian nationality is freeing itself from their domination.

The new electoral reform of February, 1914, has not changed the old forms of the Curiae, in spite of the Ukrainian demand for electoral reform based upon the democratic principle of universal suffrage.

In Western Galicia, the Polish half of the province, each district has a member to itself. In Eastern Galicia the Poles have taken pains to save the Polish minorities. This electoral reform of February, 1914, guarantees to an infinitesimal Polish minority, which inhabits Ukrainian soil, an aggregate of eighty-seven Polish seats against sixty-two for the Ukrainians. On their own territory the Ukrainians are reduced to a minority in the representation.



CHAPTER V.

UKRAINIAN ASPIRATIONS IN AUSTRIA

BY

DR. LONGIN TZEGLSKY.

a Representative in the Austrian Parliament.

(Les annales des nationalités, Paris, March-April, 1913).

There are more than four million Ukrainians in Austro-Hungary. They number about 500,000 in the north-east provinces of Hungary and about 300,000 in the north-west of Bukovina, while the remainder live in Eastern Galicia. They are officially called Ruthenians in Austria, from the Latin word "Rutheni," which has preserved itself since the Middle Ages. Divided by the political régime, the Ukrainians of Hungary and those of Austria live under entirely different conditions. On one hand they are oppressed by the brutality of the centralistic tendencies of the Hungarians; on the other, they enjoy some liberty under the Austrian government, which recognizes to some extent the right of autonomy of various nationalities living within its boundaries. Owing to these different political systems, each of the three parts of Ukraine in Austria-Hungary leads a different life. The bulk of the Ukrainians of these two countries occupy Galicia, and for this reason we shall discuss here matters principally concerning the Ukrainians of Austria, mentioning those of Hungary only as occasion arises.

The Ukrainians are not the sole inhabitants of Galicia; there are Poles, Jews and Germans also living in this province. The Poles predominate to the west of the rivers San and Vistula, in the territory which after the partition of Poland was artificially annexed to Galicia proper, or the ancient municipality of Halich. They are spread over Eastern Galicia as great estate owners, as middle class, and as officials, and there they form 24% of the entire population.

The Jews, whose language is a mixture of a German jargon with Slavonic and old Hebrew words, constitute an isolated nationalistic group, and make their living by engaging in petty and wholesale trade. Their total number in Galicia is 900,000, or about 11%. The Germans form but a hundredth part of the whole population. The territory to the east of the San and Vistula has been occupied by the Ukrainian masses exclusively since the immemorial, but at present they form 63% of the population. Here historical causes have created a vast mass of complicated social relations on account of different religions, nationalities and social conditions. Up to the present time, the dominant classes, the well-to-do and middle classes and the land owners, consist of Poles, adherents of the Catholic faith, while the Ukrainians are Uniats; that is to say, while they are of the Catholic religion, and united to Rome, they still have Slavonic rites. They are mainly soil-tillers of the villages and farms and they work on the fields of the great Polish landowners.

Lately, however, this social, national, and religious distribution has begun to change slightly because the Ukrainians show a tendency to forsake the village and give themselves to trades and professions; they enter the State service, flock to the cities, and study arts. In spite of all this, the relations between the various nationalities, religions, and classes remain as they were destined to be by history. Austrian policy has yielded to these historical facts and has placed the government of Galicia into Polish hands.

During the very first years which followed the occupation of the province by Austrians, just as in 1848, when the Poles proclaimed their revolutionary demands, the Austrian government set out to support the Ukrainians, looking for their aid against the Polish revolutionists. After the Crimean War, the relations between Russia and Austria became hostile. The Poles, whose revolution of 1863 had failed, were now soliciting Austria's aid. These two causes have produced a new change in the political conditions and the lives of the two Galician nations. The Austrian constitution of 1867 tries to reconcile the power of the State with the principle of local autonomy; but the local government is vested in the hands of the Poles, who dominate the *Krayovy Seym* (Provincial Diet) and who for a long time have remained the chief representatives of Galicia in the Vienna Parliament. Owing to certain election privileges granted to the Poles, the local assembly continued to be the Assembly of Nobility (or the "Shlakhta"), which has in view the interests of their own class only. It is true that the election laws awarded to the Ukrainians from 47 to 49 places among the 161 members of the Diet. But during election time the Poles have known how to terrorize the Ukrainians, to assault them, and to remove all desire on their part to resist this ill treatment, so that there have been years when the number of Ukrainians in those local organizations was reduced to one single representative of a population which had a predominance both in number and in historical rights. There are at present 18 Ukrainians, 15 elects, and 3 archbishops in the local provincial Assembly. The administration in the province of the Governor of Galicia is also in the hands of Poles, who are always chosen from among his Polish supporters. Owing to this régime, the national education, the University of Lemberg, and the middle schools are completely polonized.

The Poles exclude from the schools everything that is Ukrainian and uphold only the Polish interests.

The Ukrainians are permitted by law to employ their national language in all their relations with the authorities. but nothing but Polish is spoken in these institutions. Galicia is being transformed into a Polish country which plays the same part for Poland that Piedmont played for Italy in the beginning of the 19th century. The Ukrainians are being sacrificed to the welfare of the Poles. This state of affairs is in complete contradiction to the fundamental laws of the Austrian Empire, and it has on the one hand provoked a feeling of sympathy towards Russia, which manifests itself in a current of pro-Russian sentiment, and on the other created a lively national movement, the popular and revolutionary movement of 1900-1908. It is this movement that has brought the masses into action, has made it possible for them to acquire education, and started thousands of small national institutions for education, co-operation, and national unification; and the movement has subdivided into numerous and very active political parties (national democrats, radicals, clericals, social-democrats, etc.) and finally brought about the admission into Parliament of 28 Ukrainian deputies from Galicia and 5 from Bukovina. These representatives have presented to the Austrian Government the grave and burning questions relative to the awakening of the Ukrainians, questions which, in these latter days, have become of international importance. We have but to recall here the bloody struggle during the elections of 1895-1897, the struggles of the Ukrainian students to obtain in Lemberg University instruction in the national Ukrainian language, the struggle of the Ukrainian peasants against their Polish lords in 1902, the strike of the agricultural laborers in Eastern Galicia, the colossal uprising of the popular masses in 1906-1907 for election reforms, the heated election of 1908, the attack upon the life of the Governor of Galicia—Count Potocki—and the obstructions created by the Ukrainians in the Galician Diet in 1910-1912. At present, the Ukrainians enjoy all the advantages gained by the parliamentary electoral re-

form; they have now six times as many representatives in Parliament as at any previous time. They have placed on the order of the day the questions of a Ukrainian university at Lemberg and the reform of the law governing elections to the Diet. These two questions demand a speedy and definite solution, as the geographical proximity of Galicia to the Russian boundary makes the situation grave and places them within the range of international diplomacy.

At the present moment, the national Ukrainian movement of Galicia shows every sign of being a very energetic attempt for national emancipation along the lines of democracy.

The dearest ambitions of all intelligent Ukrainians are reduced to the following demand: the autonomy of Austro-Hungarian Ukraine, i. e., the autonomy of the territory ethnographically known as Ukrainian in Eastern Galicia, Eastern Bukovina, and Northern Hungary, as a self-governing unit, with a national Ukrainian Assembly in Lemberg, with a Ukrainian administration, with the Ukrainian language introduced into all governmental institutions, the courts, and the schools. The program of all Ukrainians concedes to the demands of all the other nationalities which inhabit Ukrainian territory their right to use their national language in schools and administrative institutions, their right to school autonomy, etc.

CHAPTER VI.

**THE MISRULE OF THE POLISH
ARISTOCRACY**

BY

SIMON O. POLLOCK.

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I. THE POLISH LANDLORD AND THE UKRAINIAN PEASANT.

The conclusions reached by the foregoing authorities are based on historical data, a review of which becomes necessary for the proper understanding of present-day conditions in Galicia.

These are a result of acts of legislation and of administrative regulations in agrarian matters enacted by the Polish nobility in the past, mostly with the acquiescence of the Austrian Government. Consequently, the forests and the pastures formerly owned in common by the nobility and peasantry have gradually become the property of the members of the Shlakhta (Polish nobility).

This concentration of the pastures and forests necessarily led to an easier acquisition of the lands of the peasantry by the Shlakhta.

Deputy V. Budzynowsky, in a speech in the Austrian Parliament, called this policy a "robbers' policy." It began with the Law of the 10th of September, 1782, which placed the management of the common rural properties in the hands of the rich landlords, who were nobles.

Subsequently, by trick and subterfuge, the peasants were induced to abandon some of the rights they had in these properties. The tax officials often announced heavy taxes upon such lands, to avoid payment of which the peasants were compelled to abandon their rights of ownership or possession. After the abandonment had taken place, and the lands had passed into the possession of the nobles, the threatened taxes were not imposed. This so-called tax policy was begun in 1786, when a revision of the land taxes had been made in Galicia.

At the beginning, of course, the peasants were still allowed the use of the forests and the pastures for individual purposes. These rights continued up to the middle of the last century.

Now the peasantry own only 16% of the total forest-area of the country. Since the 10th of February, 1789, when a general reapportionment of lands took place, the peasantry have had only rights of usage left.

When the rights of the nobility to labor which the peasants as serfs had to perform had been terminated, a valuation was placed upon such labor to the extent of 70% of the value of the nobles' land. This standard had not been applied when the peasants were to be compensated for the loss of their servitudes. Every peasant in order to establish the value of his rights had to go to court. The local administration and most of the judicial functions having been placed in the hands of the members of the Shlakhta, it could not be expected that the peasants would succeed in this litigation, and indeed history records that not less than 32,000 law-suits brought by peasants against the nobles had been decided against the former. The various commissions, from time to time appointed by the Austrian Government for the purpose of

adjusting the difficulties thus created, had invariably sided with the nobility.

The Reform of 1848—the abolition of serfdom—had thus simply increased the economic power of the Shlakhta (the nobility). The Law of 1853 and the Order of 1857 allowed the Shlakhta the alternative of either paying the peasants in cash, or of compensating them with an allotment of land for the loss of their rights. But the law also provided that if the compensation allowed the peasants would result in the weakening of the domain of the nobility, then the peasants were compelled to accept a smaller compensation. Of course, this regulation was largely abused by the interested parties.

These methods have been minutely described in an article "Expropriation without Law" by Deputy V. Budzynowsky, in the "Ukrainische Rundschau" a magazine in German, published in Vienna (No. 5, 1908). The number was confiscated by the censor. When it subsequently appeared in a censored edition, not less than five parts of the article bearing upon the policy of expropriation had been stricken out by the censor, and instead of the erased parts appeared the word "Konfisziert"—confiscated!

The representatives of the Ukrainian peasantry had often protested to the central Government against the unjust and illegal methods adopted by the administration, but without result. In 1862, Minister Schmerling issued an order directing that the adjustment of servitudes be made "according to law," but he did nothing else in the matter of the complaints. Minister Belchredi went further, and openly aided the Shlakhta in the process of expropriating the peasantry's properties.

One of the results of this policy has been the complete disappearance in some districts of cattle-raising among the peasants. The former cattle-raisers have become employees on the cattle-lands of other traders. A large portion of the peasantry have become farm-hands on the estates of the nobility, and even those who have continued

to till their soil have been compelled to look for outside work in order to exist.

Having thus deprived the Ukrainian peasant in Galicia of his pastures and lands, the Polish nobility made him economically and politically dependent. As laborer and as citizen, he became subject to the whims and caprices of his masters. The process of expropriation had reached its culminating point in the early nineties. According to Prof. Hrushevsky, whose paper is given above, almost 50% of the valuable land is now in the hands of the nobility; while 76% of the Galisian population is compelled to live on the proceeds of their farms, hardly 12% having parcels sufficient to yield a living. The average peasant, not able to realize enough to support himself and his family, is compelled to look for outside employment, and when such employment is found the wage is such a pittance that even the downtrodden farm-hands were forced in 1902 to strike for a living wage and for more tolerable conditions (cf. "History of Ukraine", pp. 368—370).

It is not the object of this publication to give a history of the industrial strife on the great latifundias of Galicia. The strike of 1902, however, is an event of immense importance, because for the first time in history it attracted the attention of the world to this modern bondage in Eastern Galicia. The Vienna Parliament was compelled to take notice of the strike, since according to many, for example Maurice Lair, the noted French economist, over a hundred thousand men had taken part in it, and it extended throughout the whole of Eastern Galicia (cf. *Annales des sciences politiques*, Paris, 1903, 1904, pp. 553, 702).

In a speech delivered by Ignatz Dashynski, M. P., in the Austrian Parliament, on October 28th, 1902, in which an interpellation had been made to the government about the strike, the impartial Polish orator had portrayed a state of affairs hardly to be forgotten. With figures taken from conservative Polish sources, he proved that the peasants have been pauperized; that they can hardly

pay the smallest land tax; that some of their holdings hardly reach $1\frac{1}{2}$ acres; that 94% of the peasants in some districts have a net income from their farms of only from 10 to 50 florins (a florin is 20 cents); that in some districts the class of the very poor totals 86%, and that the candidates for starvation in the average Galician village average as high as 86% to 94%; that out of 7,200,000 people, there are only 65,000 who possess an income of over 500 florins (\$100) a year; that of every 1000 persons only nine can contribute the tax; and that the number of people whose yearly income reaches 5,000 florins (\$1,000) totals altogether 1,933 out of 7,000,000. This last figure includes the nobility!

Dashynski also proved that many of the peasants do not eat bread, at least during one half of the year, and that during the other half they eat little of it, and that of the worst sort. A specimen of this bread the orator exhibited to the members of Parliament.

Not surprising then is the statement of Duke de Puzina Kozielko, President of the Scientific Academy in Cracow, that in some parts of the country a new kind of serfdom has been introduced by the noblemen systematically as a class that "as a plague it spreads from one individual to another and disfigures the entire territory and the districts of the eastern part of the country."

The wages on the various estates ranged from 12 to 45 kreutzers per day, without board (a kreutzer is $\frac{1}{2}$ cent), while where peasants were employed by the year they paid between 18 and 25 florins (a florin is 20 cents), were paid between 18 and 25 florins *for the entire year*,

The strike broke out spontaneously, and Dashynski shows that the laborers had been summarily treated by the district supreme officials; that men, women and children were placed under arrest, brought in irons to prison, kept there for months, and, when finally tried, either discharged or found guilty of trivial violations of the so-called Laws of Assembly and fined. At times, they were prosecuted under statutes long repealed.

When Deputy Vitik published a booklet in which he instructed the farm-hands as to their rights in these matters, it was confiscated by the gendarmes, although no order for its confiscation had been issued by the censor. The speaker quotes numerous orders of the district officials forbidding meetings and shows that these orders had been issued in violation of law and without authority.

Time and again, when individual owners expressed their willingness to grant the demands of the strikers, or had granted them, the district officials had forbidden the carrying out of the arrangements.

One need not wonder at this servility. The supreme administrative officials and the great majority of the judges are members of the Shlakhta. The leading noblemen controlled the elections and were in the majority in the Diet, since 2000 nobles had the right to elect more representatives to the Diet than the 6,000,000 peasants. Noblemen were in this way elected by a mere handful of votes. Thus David Abrahamovitch, president of the Polish Club, was elected by 31 voters, Eugen Abrahamovitch by 48 voters, Blashovski by 30 voters, Chaykovsky by 24 voters, Check by 27 voters, Gurski by 32 voters, Appolinar von Yavorski by 43 voters, Yendzeyovich by 43 voters, Kozlovski by 20 voters and Count Vodzytski by 37 voters, while a deputy of the peasantry often represented not less than 100,000 peasants.

The cry raised during the strike was so impossible to ignore that the Governor demanded from every district supreme officer a report on its causes, progress, and results. But when Mr. Vienarski of the District of Peremishlany wrote that misery was the cause of the strike and that unheard-of abuses had been practised, the Governor sent the report back (cf. Records of the Austrian Parliament, Lower House, Oct. 28, 1902).

II. GALICIAN ELECTIONS.

The agricultural strike resulted in some improvements in the lot of the farm-hands. The peasants were encouraged in their national aspirations. A new era seemed to be dawning upon them. The Galician administration, however, continued to serve the nobility in its crusade to frustrate any new efforts towards amelioration. The Polish aristocracy never ceased to realize that should the Ukrainians be allowed full exercise of their suffrage, its power would eventually be curtailed. Hence the continuous and unscrupulous efforts to keep the peasant representatives from the Diet and from Parliament, efforts which made the Galician elections a by-word.

Fraud of all kinds, violence, corruption, forgery, stealing of votes, abuse of power, abuse of judicial proceedings, use of gendarmes and of soldiers, and violations of every rule and regulation of the election laws have been systematic throughout the land and have been reduced to a science. Protests to the Governors, in the press and at public meetings, to the Prime Ministers and to the Emperor in the Diet and in Parliament have been repeatedly made, but with no result.

A literature has grown up round the subject of the Galician elections, consisting of books, pamphlets and treatises, in which some give their own personal experiences as candidates, others the results of their research. The most noted of these books is that written by the Rev. Dr. Rappaport, a candidate in one of the districts in Galicia. But the most remarkable presentation was made by Mr. G. Tzehlynsky, M. P., a Deputy from the Peremysl District in Parliament, on May 20th, 1908, on an urgent motion addressed to the government on the subject of the Galician administrative system of elections and its abuses (cf. Records of the Austrian Parliament, Lower House, May 20, 1908, p. 4683). This motion was rejected owing to the vote of the Polish Club (i. e. the

Polish representatives in Parliament, excluding the Socialists).

Referring to the other protests made by him and other representatives on previous occasions, he calls the evil "the Galician Maladministration," and claims that compliance with the law in Galicia is an exception and a favor. He defines the conditions in Galicia as feudal; shows that there are only a few Ukrainian judges in the territory and that all administrative offices are filled by men who do not represent the Ukrainians; that even in local communities where a Ukrainian mayor may be elected, the district administration interferes with the elections and the mayor continues in office after his successor has been elected, if the latter is not agreeable to the higher administration. The Deputy shows that such officials form a large percentage. Decisions rendered by the local administration are repealed by the higher authorities, if these decisions disagree with their policy.

The Deputy quotes an order issued by Governor Potocki in 1907, in which a direction has been made for new elections in all places where these "perpetual" local Councils and mayors were found. But the elections to the Diet and to Parliament were drawing near and the District Administrators, were they to obey the Governor's order, would have deprived themselves of most valuable helpers. The Governor therefore did not press his order and conditions remained as they were before.

Referring to previous similar interpellations the Deputy says: "But what is most disgusting, to use a mild expression, is the fact that the Galician administration, through the Supreme Administrators and District Councils, has not hesitated to utilize the greatest misery of the people for their party purposes."

The speaker recites misappropriation of funds, assigned for the aid of the poor who had sustained damage through hail-storms or other disasters of the kind, for political purposes. He quotes instances in fourteen villages of

such misappropriations of funds designated to help the poor.

The Deputy says frankly that he does not entertain any hope of putting an immediate end to the abuses, but he looks at least for temporary relief.

Coming down to the description of the system of election funds, the speaker says, "History cannot show the remotest analogy to it. The elections are only a shameful, brutal game played at the expense of a defenceless people by the nobility; a game that can be compared with the Spanish bull-fights."

The following are the methods used in Galicia:

The lists of voters are falsified. *This has been found to be a fact in every place of Eastern Galicia.*

In villages where the administrators know that their influence will extend to a large number of voters, the list will contain names of those who under the law are not entitled to a vote. On the other hand, where this contingency does not exist, the list of voters will contain a number of voters substantially smaller than the number allowed by law. Thus in many localities many thousands of voters lose their vote.

The voters' lists are not exhibited for public inspection as the law requires and the inhabitants time and again threaten force to procure lists from the village secretaries, only to learn that while some of them are not on the list others not entitled to vote are. When on the appeal to the Supreme Administrators the lists are protested, the illegal list is sustained. On one occasion an appeal was taken to the Governor, who sent a delegate to correct the list; the correction resulted in retaining on the list the people who had no right to vote, while forty who were entitled to the vote were stricken off the register.

In some villages, the Ukrainians in disgust have refused to avail themselves of the suffrage.

In a great many villages, the officials have kept two registers, one for exhibition, another for official use.

In one district, 32 protests against the register were filed. The Mayor disregarded the protest, as did also the District Administrator. When the villagers became indignant, the administrator sent the tax collector to appease them. The result was that all were dispersed and the elections once more took a turn favorable to the nobility. In some places, the register did not contain one Ukrainian voter.

To a complaint of Dr. Savchak, the people's candidate, the District Supreme Administrator, replied that the method appealed from was approved by the Governor. Many times the registers had been changed during or after election. Many registers contained names of people long before naturalized in the United States and residing there. In some cases, dead men were on the list. The speaker notes as a remarkable fact that the dead were unanimous in voting for the nobility's candidate.

Another method in the administration of elections is the forcible refusal of their votes to many voters, if on previous occasions they have not voted for the nobility's candidates.

The officers who conduct the elections are always armed and accompanied by gendarmes. They arrive at the voting-places unexpectedly and take the peasants unawares, seldom coming at the time announced for the election—all for the purpose of meeting the smallest number of voters; and in that way, as it were, stab the community. According to the law, all voters must be admitted to the polling places; the peasants, however, are driven out. As soon as the desired candidate receives the necessary majority, the elections are closed. But should the voters cast their ballots as a unit and in favor of their own candidate, the elections are postponed, only to be renewed when the desired proper support is at hand.

At the count, the majority becomes the minority. It has become a proverb that during election time two and two make eighteen. Time and again, the election has

not taken place on the day announced in the order, or the day has been known to the desired contingent only. On many occasions, the election of the people's candidate has been announced upon the count, but the administrator has reported the election of the nobility's candidate.

Deputy Tzehlinsky says: "On many occasions the inefficiency of the Galician Administration has been proved also by a lack of paper. In one village, the officer conducting the election ordered everyone to vote for one candidate only, namely the candidate of the Mayor, giving as a reason that he did not have enough paper to enter all voters."

In many instances, the place of the election has not been mentioned in the order.

Where the indignation caused by such methods has run high, the gendarmes with bayonets have been on the spot to dampen it. In a few instances, the local mayors have refused to certify the results by their signature. In such cases, their seal has been forcibly attached to the paper instead of their signature.

Under the law, every party has a right to send a representative to be present at the counting of the votes. But often they have not been admitted to the count.

The gendarmes have been a useful asset to the administration during elections in checking the indignation of the people, and in enforcing the illegal methods practised by it.

As a result of the use of the gendarmes, in one town, Peremishlany, 97 per cent. of the local voters were excluded; which means that out of 500 men only 15 voted. The cheated voters appealed by telegraph to the Prime Minister and to their leader in Parliament, but in vain. In other instances, judicial proceedings of various kinds and of an annoying character have been invoked to keep undesirable voters from the ballot-box, and they have been either subpoenaed as defendants or as witnesses, under a penalty of 10 crowns or a day's imprisonment.

Prior to elections concessions enjoyed by certain peasants would be taken away for the purpose of embarrassing the voters, or a high tax would be threatened.

The methods described, according to this speaker, prevail in hundreds of villages. He shows that these methods have been inspired by the Supreme Administrators of the districts, and time and again rehearsed before election, to assure their continuance in office.

These methods, intended to defeat the oppositional delegates and displace them by such as are friendly towards the Government, have taken place everywhere.

"In my description thus far," he says, "I have drawn only a rough sketch of bare facts, without going into disgusting details, such as threats on the part of the administrative authorities, numerous arrests, the suspension of disobedient mayors, corruption with money and material promises, more drastic collection of taxes and more seizures at the time of election; incidents that form part of the spectacle played during the Galician elections.

"The Ukrainians, having advanced in the consciousness of their nationality and their rights, have felt more and more deeply the lawlessness with which elections have been carried on. The Galician Administration still imagine that they have to do with serfs of the Middle Ages, addled, poor, and without will of their own.

"When the results of the election in the group of the Galician rural communities had been published, the Polish press, especially the Pan-Polish or so-called National Democratic press, rejoiced loudly that the Polish civilization, thousands of years old, had defeated the barbarism of the Ukrainians; that the rays of Polish enlightenment had thus permeated the remotest and deepest stratum, and had done away with the Ukrainian opposition."

III. THE UKRAINIAN REVOLT IN GALICIA.

The Ukrainians of Galicia have not remained silent in their endeavor to create an independent national life. Efforts on behalf of national education have created a large number of intellectuals who have dedicated themselves to various professions and subsequently became leaders in the national revival.

Oppressed and persecuted, deprived of all opportunities enjoyed by other nationalities in Austria, the Ukrainians did not at first enjoy a widespread movement. Scattered throughout the land, the small groups however grew in numbers and in influence, and in the year 1890, M. Draho-manov, a prominent professor and Russian exile, residing in Switzerland, founded the Ukrainian Radical Party of Galicia. This was the beginning of a real democratic movement among the Ukrainians in Galicia. The party demanded a democratic reorganization of Austria on federal lines with national autonomy for every race which inhabits Austria. It had branches in various cities of Galicia and developed a lively agitation.

Simultaneously, an unsuccessful effort was made by the Ukrainians under the leadership of Representatives J. Romanchuk, Rev. Nicholas Sichinsky, and M. Telichevsky to compromise with the Polish Administration of the province, with the view of obtaining concessions and securing honest elections. Following the failure to effect a compromise, a great deputation of Ukrainian peasants came to the Emperor's palace in 1895 asking for help and begging for the rights of man. Count Badeni, then Governor of Galicia, and Minister Belinski did not allow the peasants to present their petition to the Emperor, and dismissed them with the advice "to go home." This preceded the bloodshed of 1897, when under Count Badeni, as Prime Minister, the first conflict between the Polish Administration and the Ukrainian peasantry took place, during the elections to the Diet. Eight Ukrainians were killed by the gendarmes, many wounded, and seven hundred arrested.

The nobility triumphed at the election (cf. Records of the Austrian Parliament, Lower House, May 26, 1908).

In 1900, the Ukrainian National Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party of Galicia were organized. The Radical Ukrainian Party and the National Democratic Party are represented in the so-called Ukrainian Club in Parliament. While the Social Democratic Party is not represented in the Club, it has always sided with it in all matters pertaining to the rights of the Ukrainian nationality.

These parties demand the division of Galicia into two provinces, Eastern and Western, with two Diets, the Eastern being generally Ukrainian, the Western mostly Polish. They also demand universal, direct, and secret suffrage for the local, county, provincial, and state legislative bodies, freedom of speech, press, assembly, and organization; agricultural reforms aiming at the uplifting of the peasantry, and the extension of its holdings.

* * *

The Ukrainian organizations in Galicia soon became factors in the province. The great strike of the farmhands in 1902, which was so minutely described by Deputy Dashynski in Parliament, was partly due to their agitation. In this apparently industrial movement the nobility, through the efforts of Count Potocki, followed methods of oppression, not only with the view of suppressing the strike but largely because the strike had a strong national color.

The measures adopted by the nobility were not forgotten.

Ukrainian intellectuals did not fail to respond to the general upheaval. Students' and teachers' organizations had been founded and educational demands of a national character promulgated.

The city of Lemberg, capital of Galicia, had become a hotbed of political demonstrations organized by the

Ukrainian parties. These took place at the University in 1900, 1902, 1905, 1906, 1907, and 1908 and have continued in recent years, resulting in blood conflicts with the upholders of the Polish régime, and in numerous arrests, fines, and penalties.

The political demonstration of 1904 was particularly noteworthy. Complaint had been made to Prime Minister Koerber, then visiting Galicia, of the abuses of power by Count Potocki and his Supreme Administrators. The complaints were not heeded. Representatives of all parties of the country, who then met in Lemberg, went in a body to the palace of the Governor, where the Prime Minister was stopping. The demonstration was dispersed by gendarmes and many were arrested.

During these years the Galician Administration was particularly interested in the prohibition and persecution of the Ukrainian association, "Sitch," whose object was to organize volunteer fire-guards, and to spread popular education. The administration believed that these organizations enhanced the movements of the peasantry and would eventually endanger the predominance of the nobility. Following the prohibition of these organizations, proceedings were inaugurated against their members on various charges as inciting to riot, *Lèse Majesté* and other offences of a political character. These persecutions spread so widely that interpellations were made in the Diet by Deputy Dr. Olesnitzky and in Parliament by Deputy B. Yavorsky, and by others, of course without avail. (*Politische Prozesse gegen die Ruthenen in Galizien, Ruthenische Revue, 1905. No. 1, Vienna*).

With the year 1906 came the great movement for universal suffrage. There is no doubt that this movement was an echo of the establishment of a certain degree of constitutional government in Russia, in 1905. It had resulted in the passing of the law which granted universal parliamentary suffrage to all nationalities in Austria and was approved by the Emperor.

The Polish Club in Parliament, backed by Governor Potocki, consented to the law only on condition that the Ukrainians should be entitled to not more than one-third of the number of deputies who were to represent Galicia in Parliament, although the Ukrainians were in a majority. In that way 3,500,000 Ukrainians obtained 28 mandates while the same number of Polish citizens had 78.

The so-called "petrification"* of the reform, moreover, made its democratic extension in the future impossible, without the consent of the Poles.

While meetings and manifestations were held all over the empire, blood was shed only in Galicia. For example, in the village of Ladske, four men were killed and nine mortally wounded, among them a woman, by the gendarmes, who without cause were brought into the district.

Following the affair many were tried for riot, but they were acquitted. An interpellation in Parliament brought no result (cf. Records of the Austrian Parliament, Lower House, May 26, 1908).

In the year 1907, the first election to Parliament under the new law took place. The Ukrainians believed that the inauguration of the new election law would open a new era in the administration of Galicia and that the old methods would not be used. They were mistaken. Not only were the old methods followed, but in the village of Horutzko four men lost their lives and nine were wounded because they demanded a new election owing to a fraudulent count. In another district, the population was so aroused by the frauds that one of the election officials was attacked (cf. Records of the Austrian Parliament, Lower House, June 27, 1907, p. 180).

An interpellation about the Horutzko affair was again made in Parliament. On this occasion Dr. Teophile

*) Referring to the fact that the laws were passed with the proviso that they could not in future be altered without the consent of three-quarters of the local Diet, which is Polish and aristocratic in majority.

Okunevsky, Deputy, made the following statement:

"Mr. Secretary of the Interior:

"I call your attention to the fact that in Galicia they began shooting at the officials. We do not live far from Russia, and we may reach something worse. I do not threaten anyone. I consider it my duty to give warning when matters go so far."

Dr. N. Lieberman, a Polish representative of the Social Democratic Party in Parliament, at a session on the 3rd of July of the same year, said:

"Once more I ask you to accept our interpellation because, by rejecting it, you give us the right to rebel, the right to employ force, that the enslaved masses may get rid of their oppressors, the violators of law. This is not a threat. When neither the Government nor Parliament has power enough to put the hands of justice on the criminal in high position,—the Governor of Galicia, when neither the Government nor Parliament feels itself powerful enough to safeguard the people against the assaults of the criminal officials; when the Governor of Galicia cannot be compelled to bow his head before the authority of Parliament, then by this you foster—I say it once more—the spirit and the right of revolution" (cf. Records of the Austrian Parliament, Lower House, July 3, 1907, page 560.)

Again the interpellations had no effect. The Central Government proved powerless in the matter.

However, in the autumn of 1907, the Central Government saw fit to promise the Ukrainian deputies that it would urge the Governor of Galicia to direct his subordinates to refrain from the abuses during elections. This promise was made in view of the arrangement by which the Ukrainians agreed not to obstruct the business in Parliament. All hoped that the promise would be carried out.

It is already known how the Governor disposed of this promise.

Deputy Tzehlinsky in the speech quoted in this chapter amply showed how the very next year—1908—the climax in the frauds had been reached. A prominent Ukrainian peasant named Marko Kahanetz, who represented his village in the Board of Elections, was killed, while making a protest, by the gendarmes.

Deputy Eugen Levitzky, in a speech made in Parliament on the 26th of May, 1908, produced an original death sentence against Kahanetz, issued by the Polish Fighting Organization at Stanislavov, dated May 27th, 1907, against the peasant, should he interfere with the elections. He produced similar death warrants against other active peasants in the district. These documents were widely published in the Ukrainian press at the time.

The excitement and indignation which followed the affair were widespread; mass meetings were organized; high mass was held in Ukrainian churches for Marko Kahanetz. The gendarmes, however, were not punished. No investigation of the affair occurred, although an urgent motion to that effect was made. On the 20th of February, 1908, a deputation of peasants from Solotvina called upon Count Potocki, and in the course of the discussion the chairman of the delegation asked the Governor "whether he preferred the appointment of representatives to their election and whether he preferred violence to law" (cf. *Semla e Vola*, Lemberg, 1908).

It was then that the Ukrainian Club in Vienna called upon the Prime Minister to present a demand that Governor Potocki be dismissed for misconduct in office, for the frauds permitted by him, and for failure to punish the gendarmes and other officials responsible for the killing of Marko Kahanetz.

On the 5th of April, Dr. W. Okhrimowich, a Ukrainian Deputy, the President of the Peasants' Co-operative Fire Insurance Company (Dnister), published a letter in which he said that his experience in Parliament convinced him of the impossibility of accomplishing anything for Ukraine by parliamentary efforts and that he there-

fore resigned the office of deputy (cf. *Ukrainische Rundschau*, April, 1908.)

In the general upheaval which took place at that time, Count Potocki was shot by Miroslav Sichinsky, a Ukrainian student.

The indictment in the case recognizes the fact that the shooting was due to the strife between the Ukrainian peasantry and the Polish aristocracy, and also admits that the Governor supported the Russophile agitation in Galicia furthered by the Russian Government.

This was quite a new phase in the Polish policy. The Polish nobility and the Russian bureaucracy have for many centuries been rivals for the control of the rich Ukrainian South. According to Professor Anthony Brückner*, the Polish historian, this rivalry was the principal cause of the downfall of Poland. The reason why these two forces began in 1908 to work together was in a large degree due to the Ukrainian democratic movement, which was a menace to both of them equally. Count Andreas Potocki in this policy was following in the footsteps of his ancestor Nicholas Potocki who, in 1658, first urged the division of Ukraine between Poland and Russia, since it refused to be polonized. Nothing could more bitterly arouse the indignation of the Ukrainian people than this policy, either in 1658 or in 1908: the more so as the same Polish aristocrats, while by electoral frauds causing the election of Pro-Russian agitators in Galicia, falsely denounced the Ukrainian movement to the Central Government in Vienna as hostile to the Empire and in favor of Russia.

In 1913, this new policy was confirmed by the semi-official Russian *Novoye Vremya* (No. 13,550, 1913) which said that the support was due to a secret compact between the Polish leaders, headed by Potocki, and the Russian Prime Minister Stolypin.

The activities of this Governor are typical of those of all Polish governors in Galicia. They exercised ex-

*) Cf. Pflugk-Harttung's *Weltgeschichte*, vol. II.

traordinary prerogatives, more extensive than those of the Emperor or of the Central Government, and were controlled by the irresistible power of the Shlakhta. The activities of the Shlakhta against the endeavors of the Ukrainians on behalf of political equality were clearly due to the efforts to maintain their economic predominance.

The Ukrainian peasantry were on the side of law. They constantly demanded during elections and at other times that the law of the province be complied with. But the Galician governors and their subordinates ignored both the laws and the constitution of the land as well as the persistent demands for their enforcement. These tactics and the power of the officials made it impossible for the Ukrainians to obtain the redress to which under the laws they were entitled. In the last instance Governor Potocki and the aristocracy had even violated their oath of office and of allegiance to Austria, making common cause with official Russia—its enemy—in the endeavor to crush the legitimate aspirations of the Ukrainians on both sides of the Austro-Russian frontier.

The political struggles between the two nationalities have not ceased. The awakened Ukrainians continued with more vigor and perseverance in the pursuit of their objects. Being in a minority in the Diet, they adopted the only weapon known to minorities in their dealings with obstinate majorities—the weapon of obstruction, and time and again the Ukrainian group made it impossible for the Polish majority to transact any legislative matters in the Diet. On the other hand, public opinion in the Empire, once aroused, was heeded by the Galician Administration, and the electoral frauds have decreased substantially. For example, in the year 1913, on account of the diminution of the frauds, the number of Ukrainian deputies in the Diet reached 31—instead of the previous 12. Following this result, a compromise has been finally effected in the reform of the Galician constitution. The electoral law has become more liberal and democratic. It has provided

for the separation of the Polish districts from the Ukrainian districts and for separate elections, and in that way the influence of the Polish administration in the Ukrainian districts has been reduced. This took effect in 1914.

CHAPTER VII

A GALICIAN GOVERNOR.

(From "Ukrainische Rundschau", No. 4, 1908.)

The appointment of Count Andreas Potocki as Governor occurred under remarkable circumstances. The governorship became vacant through the retirement of Count Pininski. As soon as the news about the proposed appointment of Count Potocki, who was then "Landmarschall", appeared, the Ukrainians objected to the idea of promoting to the highest office in the province a man whose program was the oppression of the Ukrainian people. Count Potocki's past was a very sad one for the Ukrainians. As a representative to the Diet he had many times distinguished himself as their enemy. When in 1902 he became "Landmarschall" he presented his platform at a banquet arranged in his honor at Bouchach. Referring to the deeds of one of his ancestors, who carried on war with the Ukrainians, he promised to have the Ukrainians suppressed. ("A New Berestechko may be prepared for the Ukrainians").* His opening address in the Diet was also a war declaration against the Ukrainians.

Potocki's appointment was effected in April, 1903, in spite of the energetic protests of the Ukrainian popul-

*) Berestechko is a village in Volhynia (Russian Ukraine) where during the Revolution of Khmelnitzky in 1651 the Ukrainian rebels, betrayed by their Tartar allies, were destroyed by the Polish army under a Potocki.

ation; in spite also of the representations made by the Ukrainian section in Parliament, which demanded the appointment of any official not a member of the Polish aristocracy. The power vested in him, far greater than that of his predecessors, made him unrestricted ruler of Galicia. How powerful Governor Potocki was in Galicia, and how powerless as compared with him was the Central Government, is proved by statements made by agents of the Government as well as by Potocki himself. It was during the well-known journey of Prime Minister Koerber through Galicia that Governor Potocki arranged with the aid of the police and the army a massacre of the Ukrainians because of a demonstration by the Ukrainians against them. The omnipotence of Governor Potocki as compared with the Government at Vienna came conspicuously to light, however, only later. The point in question was the establishment of a Ukrainian savings bank, the first Ukrainian institution of this kind with governmental security, for which the Ukrainians had been waiting for years. The Central Government authorized the bank to be opened in Lemberg. Contrary however to the wish of the Government, Potocki selected Przemyśl as a location for the Savings Bank, to which the Central Government objected because there were already too many banks in that small town. The representative, Dr. K. Levitzky, went to see the Governor in this matter. He received the following answer: "What right has Vienna to give me orders?" Finally things went as Potocki wanted and not as the Central Government had decreed.

Still more glaring appears Potocki's defiance of the Government at Vienna in the matter of the governmental estates. He refused on general principles to accept orders from the Minister of Agriculture, Count Auersperg, bearing upon the subject. Auersperg then wrote through the medium of the Prime Minister Von Beck. Even to the latter Potocki did not reply. The governmental estates Potocki considered his own personal dominion, where he might rule as he pleased, without regard to the Central

Government. The personnel of the estates furnished during elections the most zealous agitators for the Polish candidates. Further to show his independence of the Central Government Potocki also defied it on the following occasion. The Central Government promised the Ukrainian representatives to induce the Governor to issue an order to the Galician officials directing them to eliminate electoral abuses. Potocki was several weeks late in issuing the order, and finally published it, not in the official paper *Gazeta Lwowska*, but in a small paper, thus robbing the circular of its official character. Naturally corruption continued, as in olden times.

With regard to the negotiations of the parliamentary section of Ukrainians with the Government, Potocki announced that the Ukrainians did wrong in communicating directly with the Central Government. To what limit his power reached he displayed in dealing with the Prime Minister Gautsch, whose downfall he finally caused.*

Once nevertheless Potocki had to give in to the Government. The cause of this was the arrest of one hundred Ukrainian students, who, as was generally asserted, were arrested on his specific orders. The Government could not allow itself to be trampled on in this manner, and for better or worse had to set all the arrested free. On the other hand the Government's promises resulting from its negotiations with the Ukrainian section could not be fulfilled, because Potocki did not wish to give his assent to them. He was unwilling to approve even of such con-

*) It happened in 1907, when the Bill for universal suffrage came up in Parliament. The Bill was favored by the progressive parties, by the Prime Minister Gautsch, and by the Emperor. The Polish aristocracy opposed it. When the law finally passed it contained provisions favorable to the aristocracy, giving 78 seats in Parliament to the 3,500,000 Poles and 28 seats to the 3,500,000 Ukrainians. After this Count Potocki demanded of the Emperor the resignation of the Prime Minister Gautsch and the latter resigned. He was disliked by the Galician Governor, having on the floor of Parliament remarked that the Polish aristocrats for their loyalty to Austria have been richly compensated by their absolute rule in Galicia.

cessions of the Government to the Ukrainians as were agreeable to the rest of the Polish aristocracy.*

* * *

His opposition to the Ukrainians will be seen from the following examples: For several years the Ukrainians were organizing the emigration to Germany of Ukrainian farm-hands in search of work. This emigration was very displeasing to the Polish landowners, who were losing cheap labor. Potocki therefore resisted all Ukrainian demands for permission to establish an emigration employment agency. This was denied to the Ukrainian educational society, "Prosvita". The Governor expressed himself in the following manner to a Ukrainian delegation: "I would rather let you have a university than an employment agency". In 1904 he illegally ordered all district administrators to detain every Ukrainian peasant emigrating to Germany. Seven hundred peasants were therefore forcibly held back and sent home. Many others were refused passports.

After the Governor had prevented the opening of an employment bureau the society asked him to approve legally an emigration bureau with information facilities. Although there was already in existence a Polish institution of the same kind, having the very same by-laws, the Ukrainian bureau was not permitted. Well known is Count Potocki's opposition to Ukrainian associations of volunteer firemen. Once he said openly: "I must destroy those associations," and a number of them were dissolved. On another occasion he refused to issue a permit to open a Ukrainian printing shop. All requests to that effect were categorically denied. The distribution of funds for the relief of peasants who had suffered damages from natural causes was managed by Potocki according to his will and pleasure, and not as laid down by the Government. In the last year there were two and a half million crowns assigned for this purpose, but only

*) Concessions referring merely to the establishment of a Ukrainian university.

12,000 crowns were distributed among the peasants. The rest went to the support of the friends of the Governor's party. One of the moves in the direction of political oppression of the Ukrainians was the support given by him to the Russophiles* at the elections, an act through which the Ukrainians were weakened and he himself proved his loyalty to Russia, whose subject he also was, and where, in Russian Ukraine, he had immense possessions.

Count Potocki, "the iron hand", "in appearance a fine, pleasant gentleman," was unscrupulous and immoderate as a political opponent. His entire period of administration was a continuous war of repression against the Ukrainians. In his days most of the killings of Ukrainian peasants** took place; during his administration a new species of political chicanery was introduced, namely, the promulgating of false reports about pogroms on Jews and Poles by the Ukrainians. Such manoeuvres were often repeated in Potocki's time. Every time rumors were circulated that the Ukrainian peasants were murdering, burning, and plundering soldiers were called out and arrests made, while in fact nobody was ever wronged in the slightest degree. But the reports, once spread, could not be retracted. Count Potocki had no means for pacifying the Ukrainian peasants except soldiers and martial law. He threatened to declare the latter during the last strike of farm laborers, and when Deputy Olesnitzky called the attention of the Governor to the popular discontent on account of official abuses, Potocki exclaimed: "Do you threaten me with a Ukrainian rebellion? I'll

*) See page 83.

**) In 1906, during the agitation for the introduction of general suffrage, in the village of Ladske in Eastern Galicia, four were killed and nine mortally wounded, among them a woman, by the gendarmes, who without cause were brought into the district.

In 1907 during the election to Parliament in the village of Horutzko four men lost their lives and nine were wounded because they demanded a new election owing to fraudulent count.

In 1908 during the election to the Diet in the village of Koropetz a peasant lost his life because he stood in the way of electoral frauds. He was killed by three gendarmes, though entirely peaceable himself. (cf. Records of the Austrian Parliament, Lower House, June 27, 1907, p. 180).

send several regiments of soldiers and the Ukrainian rebellion will come to an end."

In this light Potocki understood his duties as Governor. In the same spirit his subordinates understood their duties. They could not act otherwise. In a momentary fit of candor the District Administrator of Przemysl, Mr. Lanikevich, whose attention to official abuses had been called by Deputy Tzehlinsky, said: "Mr. Representative, would you act otherwise if you were in my position"?

CHAPTER VIII.

THE UKRAINIAN MOVEMENT
IN RUSSIA

BY

OTTO HOETZSCH.

(From "Russland", Berlin, 1913.)

[Otto Hoetzsch, Professor of History, Posen and Berlin. Author: Die Vereinigten Staaten v. Nord Amerika, 1913; Beitrage zur Russischen Geschichte, 1907; Russland, 1913].

It was manifest during the debates of the first Duma on the agrarian question that all the Ukrainian parties and representatives, without exception, joined the Great Russian Liberals and Socialists. This occurred in spite of the fact that agrarian relations in the Ukraine differ considerably from those in Russia proper, perhaps the most remarkable feature of the Ukraine in this respect being that the Ukrainians have never possessed the institution of the *mir*. But the social antagonism with regard to the Ukraine was aggravated also by the national antagonism of the Ukrainians against the landlords who, almost without exception, are Poles or Great Russians. As compulsory expropriation was liable to injure the Poles the Ukrainians were in favor of it. That this opinion had taken deep root in the Ukrainian masses was made evident by the result of the elections and the addresses of the peasant representatives. Were Polish landlordism to fall,

there would disappear with it the dream of a "historic Poland," that Jagellonian Poland which was to comprise not only Lithuania but also a great part of Little Russia, the part at least that lies on the right bank of the River Dniپر. This is the reason why the Ukrainian parties were thoroughly democratic and in favor of compulsory expropriation. A coincidence of national and social interests made this antagonism stronger and exceedingly rigid, as was likewise the case in White Russia and Lithuania.

Anyone travelling through the Ukraine provinces would notice little difference between the Ukrainian race and the Great Russian, since it has long been a deliberate policy of the Russian government to minimize this difference. On May 30th, 1876, the following *ukaz* was issued:

I. The importation into Russia of any Ukrainian publications issued abroad is hereby prohibited.

II. It is likewise prohibited to print or publish original works or translations into this language, with the exception:

(a) Of historical documents;

(b) Of works of fiction; provided that in the historical documents the orthography of the original, and in the works of fiction, the Russian orthography, are used. The permission to print a Ukrainian book, moreover, will be granted only after the manuscript has been examined by the Supreme Press authorities.

III. Likewise it is prohibited to play theatrical performances of any kind, or to hold lectures, in the Ukrainian language, or to publish music with Ukrainian words.

To use the Ukrainian language was forbidden by this regulation. The schools of all kinds were to be exclusively Russian. The rich Ukrainian literature and the theatre were suppressed. The Ukrainians became, as they used to call it, "a people without a country,"—the Ukrainian nation simply ceased to exist, and their language was looked upon as a corrupt dialect of an inferior class. Owing to this policy in the matter of language and schools, the num-

ber of illiterates among the Ukrainians nowhere falls below 50%, because the Russian language is not easily mastered by a Ukrainian child in spite of the resemblance between the languages. This also explains the absence of a Ukrainian educated class inasmuch as the Ukrainian educated people are forced to become Russian professors, physicians, editors, and so on. For this reason it was a very difficult task for this nationality, at the time of the outbreak of the revolution, to secure a hearing, so little having been heard of it abroad, though there are twice as many Ukrainians as Poles.....

The russification of different nationalities living in Russia was always carried on with the greatest harshness, but neither in Poland nor in the Baltic provinces had it gone so far as to prohibit the language. This happened only in the case of the Ukrainians, though of all Russia's nationalities they are the most closely affiliated with the Great Russians and though neither a separatistic nor a revolutionary movement *at that time* had afforded any reason for a policy of this kind.

As we have said, the number of the Ukrainians cannot be ascertained accurately. If we take as a basis the number given by the census of population, 22,300,000, the present Ukrainian population would amount to 32 million, occupying almost the whole of the provinces of Volhynia, Podolya, Chernihov, Kiev, Poltava, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Kharkov, and considerable parts of the provinces of Lublin, Sydletz, Horodno, Minsk, Bessarabia, Tavria, Kursk, Voronej, Don, and Kuban.

The oppression of the Ukrainians in Russia, which was a suppression of culture at the same time, resulted in the exodus of many educated Ukrainians to Galicia, where they enjoyed more freedom. Lemberg became a centre where the poems of Shevchenko and Kotliarevsky could be freely read, where historical researches of a really national kind, unlike those made by the Great Russians, could be carried on, where, in the course of time, a kind of scientific academy was created in the "Shevchenko

Scientific Society," and where the political ideal and aims were devised which were to be realized first in Galicia, afterwards in Russia. From Lemberg the world's attention was called to the Ukrainian question. Without this preparatory work, the influence of which necessarily reached over into Russian Ukraine, the high maturity of the movement, which manifested itself at the time when the revolution lost its old force, would have been impossible.

It was the martyrdom of the oppression which lasted for so many years that apparently prepared the ground for the movement of liberation in which many Ukrainian names are to be met with among those of old revolutionaries. The rebellious marines in the navy in 1905 were mostly Ukrainians; Ukrainians were in the majority in the agrarian riots in the black earth district, half of these districts being more or less Ukrainian country.

Owing to the degree of emancipation actually won, the fetters of the Ukrainian language were broken. The *ukaz* of 1876 was never repealed officially, but the Committee of Ministers found themselves compelled to act in accordance with the opinion of the universities of Kiev and Kharkov, and that of the Russian Scientific Academy, which in March, 1905, declared the Ukrainian language to be an independent idiom and then continued as follows: "What has been quoted above has led the Scientific Academy to the opinion that the Little Russian population should have the same right as the Great Russian to use their mother tongue in public life and in printing."

The political life of Ukraine rose very rapidly. The parties which until then were working in secret came forward: a revolutionary, a radical, a democratic, a national Ukrainian party, corresponding to that of the Russian Cadets (constitutional democrats). Not less quickly a Ukrainian press emerged. Although the press had to suffer very much from the restriction due to martial law, nevertheless in the autumn of 1905 there were already 34 Ukrainian publications. There were in the first

Duma 63 Ukrainian representatives, forty of whom belonged to a Ukrainian parliamentary club, and most of them being from the provinces of Chernihov, Poltava, Kharkov, Kiev, Podolya, and Volhynia. The same was the case with the second Duma.

What, now, were their political demands?

The political aims of the Ukrainians were obscured during the first two Dumas by the fact that the Ukrainian deputies acted together during the elections with Cadets, (constitutional democrats), Poles, and Jews, and belonged to different parties. But their aims were clear, for all that, as they were clearly formulated in the minds of the peasants whose communities uttered them. These demands were: land and autonomy. Nothing needs to be said about the first demand. But autonomy meant: the negation of the so-called "historical Poland," and full self-government of the country within the Russian federation which was hoped for. The seed of political and historical ideas sown by Drahomanov would thus bear its fruit in the fact that Russia as a nation is based on the treaty of 1654, made between its Great Russian and Little Russian halves, Poland having nothing to look for in the Ukraine, which though once conquered by the Poles has always belonged naturally to the Ukrainian cossacks and peasants. In accordance with that theory the Ukrainians demanded from their old enemies only their old historical and national rights. In this program the principle of federalism found its purest and its extreme expression.

The program with which Ukrainians entered the Duma election of 1912 best illustrates their demand. They asked for: the control of the Ukrainian soil; equal rights for the Ukrainian language with those of the Great Russian, the privilege, that is to say, to have it used in the courts, the churches, and the administration; a change of the system robbing the Ukraine for the benefit of Russia proper which had come to prevail; the independence of the Ukrainian church and full autonomy of the

administration of Ukraine,—all in accordance with the treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654.

This program was not consistent with the existence of the Russian Empire and it was bitterly opposed not only by the government but also by the Russian Liberals, who have always been strongly in favor of centralization and make concessions to the demands for autonomy only where they are compelled to do so, as in Poland and Finland. Centralistic were the "Union of Unions" and the party of Constitutional Democrats (but not chauvinistic) and Peter Struve's* publication called "Liberation" has never acknowledged the justice of the Ukrainian demand for autonomy. In 1912 Struve wrote: "I am convinced that beside the Russian civilization and language the Little Russian is only a provincial branch. The position of the latter is conceivable only as a derivation from the former; a change of the *status quo* is possible only in this matter through a disruption of the political and social body of Russia." This was the opinion of the Russian Liberals and many of the extreme "left." To ally themselves with the revolutionaries was thus the only course left to the Ukrainians. But the government soon wiped out for a time almost the whole revolutionary movement, and thus the Ukrainians found themselves without support, the more so as the new act with regard to suffrage almost entirely disfranchised them. In this way it happened that neither the third nor the fourth Duma included a single Ukrainian representative and that the Ukrainian interests accordingly, far from being discussed, were suppressed altogether. The growing societies and the newspapers which had been started were persecuted, the scanty beginnings of the Ukrainian public instruction were destroyed. Whereas in 1907 even the Holy Synod had permitted the Ukrainian language to be used in the clerical seminary for the province of Podolya, the permission was withdrawn in 1912.

*) A prominent leader of Great Russian Liberalism.

Nowadays once more, the superficial observer notices as little of the Ukrainian movement in that country as in pre-revolutionary times. Yet the movement is not dead. On the contrary, it is alive and strengthened by its struggles. Notwithstanding all the restrictions of suffrage, thousands of Ukrainian votes have been cast and several representatives from the parties of the Cadets and social-democrats have undertaken to defend the Ukrainian cause. Milukoff, having protested against the oppression of the Little Russians in a way that showed the danger of the Ukrainian movement, said, "not among us but in Austria there has been built up a center of culture which with every year is winning more influence upon the national life of our Ukraine."

CHAPTER IX.

**THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN RUSSIAN
UKRAINE**

BY

W. DOROSCHENKO.

(From No. 4 of the "Ukrainische Nachrichten", Vienna).

Political thought and political aspirations were not extinguished in Ukraine after the rule of the "Hetmans" had been abolished and Ukraine was "tamed," as Catherine II expressed it. One hundred and fifty years have elapsed since the abolition of Ukrainian autonomy, but the struggle for liberty has been kept alive, being transmitted from generation to generation as a sacred legacy. Immediately after the loss of Ukraine's independence, there were among the Ukrainian nobles malcontents, who, in spite of the pressure brought upon them, and in spite of all attempts to gain their favor, longed for the old freedom of Ukraine, and were even then dreaming of its restoration. Among such "left" (radical) groups of the nobility, the one that delegated Count W. Kapnist as representative of Ukrainian national interests to the European courts must be mentioned in the first place.

Although this effort met with failure, and although the russification of the Ukrainian upper classes kept pace with the gradual general introduction of Russian methods, the idea of freeing Ukraine did not die. In the beginning of the 19th century this idea was revived among the Ukrai-

nians, who organized themselves into masonic lodges, and later we find the same idea in the secret organizations of the Decembrists. The prominent landowner and marshal of nobility, Lukashovich, conceived at that time the idea of forming a secret society for the "deliverance of Ukraine." In the autumn of 1825 the Ukrainian patriot N. Markevich wrote to the Russian Decembrist K. Rylyev: "We have never lost sight of the history of the Ukrainian great men, and the strength of our sense of love for our country has not diminished in our hearts. You will find among us the spirit of Polubotok still alive." The influence of literature with its romantic tendencies, by stimulating the sense of nationality, prevented the fading away of those ambitions and furthermore strengthened the national consciousness and helped the people to tide over the difficult period. The ideas of the first quarter of the 19th century became later on the inheritance of the well-known "Cyrillo-Methodic Society" (which included Shevchenko, Kostomarov and others), the members of which dreamt of making Ukraine a separate unit in the general federation of Slavic states. The heavy punishment dealt out to the "brethren" (as the members of the society were called) by order of the Czar Nicholas I could not exterminate the idea of national freedom from Ukrainian society.

With the close of the Crimean War, the Ukrainian national idea raised its voice again. Ukrainian "communities" sprang up in the larger towns, in which all nationally-conscious Ukrainians joined. The "communities" of Petersburg and Kiev made themselves prominent by the work done in the interests of the Ukrainian national cause. They became for those days as it were nursing and educational institutions for the Ukrainian nationalistic idea. A number of Ukrainians, anxious for a quick dismemberment of Russia, took active part in the Polish rebellion of 1863, while others were active in the organization of Russian revolutionary parties, especially during the seventies. Towards the end of the seventies, and at the beginning of the eighties, strong radical and social-revolutionary ten-

dencies manifested themselves among the Ukrainian younger generation, owing partly to the influence of the general Russian revolutionary movement.

But while the Russian revolutionary organizations were favoring the idea of a central governmental power, the Ukrainian revolutionists were aiming at the reorganization of Russia on a basis of federation. At that time Professor Michael Drahomanov was the exponent of Ukrainian social and political radical thought. An exile, barred from Ukraine by the Russian Government, he acquired everywhere through his personality, his works and letters, a tremendous influence over Ukrainian society in general, and over the younger generation in Russia and Galicia especially. Groups of Ukrainian Socialists-Federalists came into existence among the students, groups which later on assumed the name of "Radicals," a Radical Party of Galicia being, in the beginning of the nineties, founded through the direct influence of the same Drahomanov. There were no political parties at that time in Russian Ukraine; there were only tendencies and currents, which organized themselves into isolated groups. The first political party with a corresponding platform and organization was founded in 1900, and was known as the "Ukrainian Revolutionary Party." The first pamphlet issued by the party was "Independent Ukraine" (*Samostiy-na Ukraina*), in which the historical rights of Ukraine to an independent existence are brought out. The Ukrainian Revolutionary Party thereby soon came into general favor, and in a short time its branches, the so-called "free communities," were organized in all larger sections of Ukraine. At the head of the party stood a Central Committee, and alongside of this was the Foreign Committee in Lemberg. The party inaugurated an energetic revolutionary activity, which gained for it a prominent place in the general history of the Russian revolutionary movement. Suffice it to mention here the peasant riots in the Government of Poltava in 1902, a whole series of strikes, participation in the Revolution, etc. The activity of the Ukrainian

Revolutionary Party was of immense importance for the Ukrainian national movement. It spread Ukrainian political ideas widely among the masses, it brought to the people the free Ukrainian book and the free Ukrainian paper. During the period of its activity the people began to be organized and to make their first appearance in the political and economic field. Between 1900 and 1915 the party published in Czernowitz and Lemberg a series of pamphlets and two newspapers, which had a wide circulation in Russian Ukraine. The party also injected life into the older Ukrainian groups, creating by its very existence a spirit of optimism, and stimulating energy. The party initiated a considerable illegal Ukrainian literature.

While the membership of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party was growing continually, it underwent an internal evolution. In 1902, the conservatives of the party separated and formed the "Ukrainian People's Party." This new party acquired no influence worth mentioning, yet by upholding the demand for the political independence of Ukraine it contributed in a great measure to foster national consciousness among the Ukrainian intellectuals. The ideology of the Russian Social Democrats gained a strong foothold in the party at the very outset. Its influence increased in course of time, but, adjusting itself to circumstances, it had to undergo various modifications. As a result of its influence there originated in 1905, in the very midst of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, a political organization called the "Ukrainian Social-Democratic Alliance" (Spilka). Although this Alliance, conforming with the general demands of the Russian Revolution, paid little attention to the national question, still it was a strictly Ukrainian organization, which, as representative of the Ukrainian agricultural proletariat, has played an important part in the revolutionary movement of Ukraine.

In 1905 the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party officially adopted the platform of the Social-Democrats, and was reorganized into the "Ukrainian Social-Democratic Work-

ingmen's Party." The first plank in its platform was the autonomy of Ukraine.

In the same year, which was generally marked by the commencement of a vigorous campaign for the freedom of Ukraine, a second Ukrainian party, known as the "Ukrainian Democratic Party" was formed. It was composed mainly of old Ukrainian patriots. Its program was similar to those of other European democratic parties. Among Russian parties it most resembles the party of "Cadets" (Constitutional Democrats), in regard to its program and tactics, and besides it really has a close connection with the latter. Prominent members of the Ukrainian Democratic Party are at the same time on the leading committees of the party of Cadets, where they represent the national interests of Ukraine. At the top of their program the Ukrainian Democratic party puts the demand for the autonomy of Ukraine and the demand for the reconstruction of Russia into a federation of states.

Closely following its formation the Ukrainian Democratic Party amalgamated itself with the Ukrainian Radical Party under the name of the "Ukrainian Democratic Radical Party." The Radical Party, or properly speaking the radical group, consisted of radically inclined intellectuals, who did not fully approve of the social-democratic program of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workingmen's Party, leaned more towards the ideology of the Russian radical "Narodniki" (adherents of the People's Party) and resembled the Russian Party of the "Popular Socialists", which was founded later on. In 1905 this group published a series of pamphlets in Lemberg. At one time the policy of this party was under the direct influence of Drahomanov. Aside from these parties, the "Union of Ukrainian Progressives" deserves to be mentioned. This Union exercises a powerful influence over the lawful cultural life of Ukraine. Both the Democratic Radical and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workingmen's parties are to be regarded as the actual upholders of the ambitions and the political views of Ukrainian society.

Parties of other tendencies which have been active in Ukrainian society have never appeared as organized, well-formed entities, and have never gained any publicity. All these parties hold the ideal of an independent Ukraine in view, but in practice they have only been able to put forth a demand for a more or less autonomous Ukraine, the achievement of which was considered a stepping-stone on the way towards the realization of their ultimate ideal.

Both of the above parties have played an important part in the political life of Ukraine. During the years 1905-1907, a preponderant part of the Ukrainian nationally-conscious elements in the cities and the country was organized into branches of these two parties. By utilizing the relatively slight legal privileges they possess for political activity, both parties have during this period instituted quite a number of mass meetings, through which they have succeeded in spreading the Ukrainian national demands among the masses. Owing to this circumstance the Ukrainians obtained a large representation in the first and second Russian Dumas. Even the newly born Ukrainian press bore the political aspects of the two parties, mainly, however, that of the Democratic Radical Party. During the post-revolutionary period the party of Ukrainian Social-Revolutionists was founded, and this has adopted the ideology of the Russian Social-Revolutionists. Up to the present time this new party has not gained any considerable influence in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Social-Revolutionists have also held out a demand for the general autonomy of Ukraine; their goal, however, is the independence of Ukraine as a state.

The open legal activity of the Ukrainian parties was brutally suppressed by the Russian reaction in 1907. But "ideas cannot be pierced by bayonets." Their activities, now under cover, were successfully continued by the newly emancipated press, which remained as the sole binding element. Life did not stand still. Like a torrent, regardless of obstacles, the Ukrainian movement kept pressing forward.

The years 1907-1914 have wrought considerable changes in Ukrainian national life. The Ukrainian national idea has suffered a violent evolution, and from a nationalistic point of view has been strengthened immensely. A "re-valuation of all values" has taken place. Experience and the influence of political life have gradually removed all hopes for outside adherence and assistance, even on the part of Russian Liberals. Ever stronger has grown the conviction that hopes of this kind are entirely unfounded. Simultaneously the ranks of Ukrainian patriots have grown continually. Aside from the younger elements, many russianized Ukrainians have severed their Russian party affiliations and returned to the fold of Ukraine. Even in the midst of the Ukrainian parties themselves, especially in the Ukrainian Social Democracy, spiritual evolution has been in progress. In all fields of public life, of political, literary, and economic activity, we see everywhere alongside of the representatives of the old generation swarms of young active Ukrainian intellectuals, who have already passed through periods of adherence to the school of the Ukrainian revolutionaries and that of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workingmen's Party. Efforts to organize and consolidate are apparent everywhere. The Ukrainian emigrants, in predominant numbers, belong directly to the young intellectuals. These emigrants were and are still in close relation to the Russian Ukrainians, with whom they are intimately connected by purely personal ties and those of organizations for spiritual advancement. Among the younger generation of Ukrainian intellectuals the idea of founding a society for the liberation of Ukraine originated in 1912.

Now, in the turmoil of the present occurrences, this society, uniting all the parties working for the independence of Russian Ukraine, already appears as a serious national-political factor.



CHAPTER X.

MILUKOFF'S DEFENSE OF UKRAINIAN HOME RULE

"SHEVCHENKO DEBATE" IN THE RUSSIAN DUMA.

(From "Ukrainische Rundschau", 1914, No. 3—4).

[Paul Milukoff, Professor of History at the University of Petrograd. Leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party, Member of Duma. Author: *History of Russian Civilization; Russia and its Crisis* (in English), 1905.]

During the session of February 24th, 1914, an urgent interpellation to the government was brought in by the Cadets (Constitutional Democrats) and the Labor Party, in substance as follows: "Is it known to the Prime Minister that the Minister of the Interior, manifestly abusing his authority, commanded the governors to annul the resolutions of many cities regarding the celebration of Shevchenko, and that further he forbade all the public meetings on the occasion of this celebration, in direct opposition to the regulation of the law about the right of assembly? Is it known to the Prime Minister that the clergy of several provinces were directed not to read masses for the late Shevchenko, a command that must deeply wound the emotional sentiments of all who are orthodox? What does the Prime Minister intend to do in order that the jubilee of the poet may be celebrated and the masses for his soul properly read?"

The social-democratic faction of the Duma, taking advantage of the prohibition to celebrate the Shevchenko

jubilee, brought forward at the same time an interpellation about the prosecution of the Ukrainian movement.

In the debate, which continued for several sessions, upwards of twenty speakers addressed the Duma.

Prof. Paul Milukoff, the leader of the Cadets, attacked the nationalistic speakers whose attitude towards the Ukrainian question is, in his opinion, unusually injurious to the interests of Russia, and also the attempt, on the part of the Count Kapnists, to show that the Ukrainian movement should be considered as not a popular movement. "In reality," said he, "we have here to do with a national movement the object of which is autonomy, the rebuilding of Russia on federalistic lines. In the same fashion as the present nationalistic speakers, Mr. Rodzyanko, once the president of the Duma, himself of Ukrainian descent, distinguished between the people and the national movement when he averred that the Ukrainian people do not want their own literary language. Before three days had elapsed after this speech a protest signed with the names of 1700 peasants and laborers from Mr. Rodzyanko's constituency came to the Duma.

"You can clearly understand the significance of this fact," Prof. Milukoff continued, "only when you realize what a dangerous undertaking it is for a Ukrainian village to manifest its national character. The mere obtaining of a Ukrainian newspaper is construed as a manifestation of treacherous disposition. Every subscriber of a Ukrainian newspaper is closely watched by the post office officials and no such subscriber can ever hope to obtain an official position himself. In spite of this Ukrainian books find their way readily to the villagers while Russian books are rejected. In the course of the 18 years of its existence the educational Society of Kharkov published four million copies of Russian books and tried to distribute them among the people at reduced prices, and even free of charge. But what was the result? Not even 18% of them were circulated in the Ukraine,—the remainder went to Siberia. During ten years of its existence the society re-

ceived not so much as one communication from its circle of readers. When afterwards the shackles fettering the Ukrainian language were removed for a short time Ukrainian pamphlets on agriculture, by Chikalenko, were circulated to the extent of half a million copies, the popular almanacs reached a circulation of several hundred thousand copies, and two hundred thousand copies of Shevchenko's poems were sold. Here a vital work is in progress; in these works the national culture is really being promoted. Shall I mention those numerous people's educational societies which were established almost without any support from the educated classes and are now mercilessly persecuted; shall I point out the interest in the Ukrainian theater which manifests itself plainly when in February, in weather of unusual severity, the peasants march 45 versts to see a Ukrainian play? All sides of life are penetrated by the national element. The Russian army, the Russian school, the Russian authorities create a national reaction and inflame the national feeling of the Ukrainians. At the same time, the Ukrainian movement is thoroughly democratic; it is, so to say, carried on by the people itself. For this reason it is impossible to crush it. But it is very easy to set it on fire and in this way direct it against ourselves, and our authorities are successful in their work in this direction."

Prof. Milukoff then related how the police in one city ordered the removal of the national (blue and yellow) Ukrainian flags which had been used as decoration for a children's Christmas tree. The little separatists concealed the flags which are so obnoxious to the state under their clothing and took them home triumphantly, convinced that they had committed a great patriotic deed. Thus the people are educated to be Ukrainian patriots by the over-zealous work of the police. Since the Ukrainians have been robbed time and again of their last hope that their lot could be better under Russia, the separatistic sentiment is taking deep roots.

CHAPTER XI.

RUSSIA'S EXPANSION TOWARDS GALICIA

(From "Krig och Kultur", by Prof. Gustav Steffen, Stockholm, 1914).

[Gustav F. Steffen, Professor of Economics and Sociology in the University of Gothenburg; Member of the first chamber of the Swedish Parliament.]

Why did Russia need to expand in the direction of Eastern Galicia?

In the January number of *Der Kampf*, the Austrian social-democratic periodical, Otto Bauer has the following to say on this point:*

"In Eastern Galicia the peasant is a Ukrainian, but the landed proprietor, the official, and the burgher are Poles. As long as the peasant remained uneducated, poor, and weak, a small Polish minority ruled over the Ukrainian masses. But when the peasant's self-consciousness awakened and his economic position improved, he began to assert his national affiliations. The educated classes among the Ukrainians, who are themselves of peasant origin, are the leaders of this peasant movement. Thus they state their national program: a Ukrainian university, Ukrainians in administrative public office, greater influence for their people in the province as well as in the (Austrian) empire. By filibuster-

*) See also "Tiden", No. 2, 1914, "Polen och Ukrajna" p. 4.

ing tactics, they gain a hearing in the Diet. The government and the Polish politicians are obliged to make concessions. They are not without influence even on the general policies of the whole empire. This policy may inconvenience us, for obstruction in the Diet hinders our activities. And it may mislead the energies of the peasant movement in the interests of the intellectual classes. Yet it is a striking spectacle to behold a people, three and a half millions in number, awakening from a century of slumber and developing a will of their own.

"The consequences of this awakening pass beyond the boundaries of Austria; they rouse an echo in the great Russian Empire and influence the relations between Russia and Austria. This becomes one of the determining factors in the European situation. The stronger the Ukrainian people become in Austria, the more difficult it is for Russia to fight the Ukrainian movement within its own boundaries.

"The Russo-Austrian enmity produced in the Balkan Peninsula becomes more acute and more dangerous, owing to this battle carried on by the Ukrainians for the continuation of peace, and for Austria's existence as a nation. Possibly bloody battlefields may decide whether the Russian gendarmes are to force the Russian language on Eastern Galicia also, or whether Russia is to lose control of the Ukraine, which would result in a division of the Russian people (as at present defined by Russia) into two nations. It is perhaps not incorrect to say that the awakening of the Galician peasant makes up the most significant chapter in the history of democracy in Austria."

The same question is discussed from a Russian point of view in an article written for the *Deutsches Volksblatt* (an Austrian Journal), January 17, 1914, by L. Voronin, the Vienna correspondent of a number of Russian newspapers. Of this article the following is a paraphrase: "Is Russia to become a national state, or a federation of nationalities? This has become a question of the utmost

importance since the Revolution of 1905. If Russia should follow the example set in Western Europe, we may expect to behold a new edition of Austria. But that is not what we want. The Russian nationalism born after the Revolution of 1905 asks that Russia remain a national state and that it be not altered into a federation of nationalities. To what extent is this desire likely to be realized? Humanitarians and Liberals declare that the values that determine who is to succeed in international contentions are moral and spiritual values. This we deny. Of what use is it to the Austrian Germans that they possess a higher culture than all the other Austrians? If, instead of amounting to 35% of the population, the German element in Austria were 65%, it would be the ruling power of the nation. Austria would then be a homogeneous national state, and the other races making up the remaining 35% would then be forced to remain silent, as is the case with the Alsatians and Poles in the German Empire.

"An estimate of the Russian population that seems very reasonable puts it at 175 million inhabitants. Of these, 70%, or 120 million, are Russians, White Russians, and Ukrainians (Little Russians).* As long as we remain as numerous as we are, Russia remains Russian. But suppose that, as a consequence of revolution or of a disastrous war—and such things may happen to any state—the White Russians and the Ukrainians (the writer always says *Little Russians*) cast off their Russian affiliations and declare themselves a White Russian and a Ukrainian nation? For us that would mean a loss of 35 million inhabitants; and then the Russian element would constitute a minority in the Russian state. To prevent this we must take steps in advance to prevent the Ukrainians from deserting the *Russian cause*. Russian diplomacy was guilty of a fatal error in the 1772 Partition of Poland. Instead of Eastern Galicia we should have ceded to Austria what is now Russian Poland. Austria and Russia might then have been friends and both profited

*) These statistics have been added to Mr. Voronin's article.

by conditions in the Balkan Peninsula. But as that was not the thing that happened, we are now enemies. The four million Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina are now often called the Piedmont of the Ukrainian national renaissance. A new nation is being born—the Ukrainian. It would be a veritable ostrich policy to deny the danger that is thus made to threaten the unity of Russia. Evidently Austria has no reason to care for our fears, and we know that a Ukrainian and Polish revolution would break out in Galicia if Austria should favor the Russo-philic agitation being carried on there.

But the Russian conception of conditions in Austria is exactly paralleled by the Austrian notion of conditions in Russia. We cannot stand by idly when we behold our 28 million Ukrainians slowly but surely imbibing, from Galicia, the doctrine that they are not Russians. That is the kernel of the Russo-Austrian difficulty. And as there is absolutely no hope that either Russia or Austria will alter its position, the state of affairs is truly tragical. Under these circumstances even the love of peace evinced by the two nations is likely to have but little weight."

But the Russian conception of conditions in Austria is more clearly expressed in the Russian newspapers in the years 1908-1914. *Sviet*, *Kiyevlanin*, *Novoye Zveno*, *Kiev*, and, particularly, *Novoye Vremya*, have been calling for a conquest of Galicia for the last six years. These periodicals have been openly maintaining, particularly after the outbreak of the Balkan Crisis in 1912, that the Eastern Galician Ukrainian territory is a Russian country, which must be liberated from the Austrian tyranny. "We forgot," says a number of *Novoye Vremya* in the fall of 1912, "when we began the fight for an 'All-Russian Empire,' that four millions of Russians are languishing under a heavy foreign yoke."

All that this means is that the four million Austrian Ruthenians (Little Russians or Ukrainians) should, in the interests of the Russian Pan-Slavic movement, be deprived

of the possibilities of working forward towards a national Ukrainian culture which have been foreshadowed under the Austrian constitution. They must be brought under the Great Russian sceptre, must be forbidden to be anything else than Great Russians, and, like the Russian Ukrainians, must be deprived of all their schools, where they teach the mother-tongue, and lose their comparatively free press and their right of association, together with all the other rights of nationality they have won in Austria.

CHAPTER XII.

THE CZAR'S RULE IN GALICIA, 1914

(A collection of passages reprinted from American newspapers, 1914—1915, dealing with the recent Russian conquest of Galicia and exhibiting the effects of this conquest upon the Ukrainian population.)

PETROGRAD, via London, Wednesday.—Dispatches received here from Lemberg declare that Count Bobrinsky, just appointed Russian governor-general, after thanking the Mayor for keeping order in the town, said:—

“I think it necessary to acquaint you with the leading principles of my policy. I consider Lemberg and East Galicia the real cradle of Great Russia, since the original population was Russian. The reorganization will be based on Russian ideals. We will immediately introduce the Russian language and Russian customs. These steps will be taken with the necessary care.

“We shall at first limit this to the appointment of Russian governors and other officials. Many of the present executives will not be replaced. We shall forbid the convocation of your legislature during the war. All social and political organizations must be discontinued, and may resume their activities only by permission. These precepts obtain only in East Galicia; West Galicia will be treated differently.”

(New York Evening Telegram, September 30, 1914).

THE RUTHENIAN LANGUAGE PROHIBITED.

BERLIN, June 25 (via London).—The Berlin *Tageblatt* has received a dispatch from its correspondent at Lemberg

descriptive of the situation in that city which reads as follows:

“Regular Russian policemen and cossacks patrolled the city. The schools were permitted to stay open only with the express consent of the Military Governor. At least five hours every week had to be devoted to the study of the Russian language. Only textbooks approved for use in Russian schools were permitted in Lemberg. The Russian calendar was introduced. Certain prominent residents favorable to Russia assisted the invaders, and one of these, M. Gluszkiewicz, a well-known Russophile leader, was later rewarded by being named Mayor of Przemyśl.

* * *

“Emperor Nicholas paid one visit to the Galician capital while it was under Russian control. Ruthenian books were destroyed by the Russian authorities, and the exchange of telegrams and letters in the Ruthenian language was prohibited.”

(New York Times, June 26, 1915.)

ARREST OF PROFESSOR HRUSHEVSKY.

The well-known Ukrainian leader and professor in the University of Lemberg, Michael Hrushevsky, was recently arrested in Kiev, through which he passed on his return from Venice. Professor Hrushevsky lectured on history in the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) language. He is a Russian subject.

(New York Evening Post, January 19, 1915.)

The members of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a majority of whom not long ago protested against the oppression of the minor nationalities of Russia, and who are still being attacked by the “Novoye Vremya” for their stand, recently attempted, under the leadership of M. Shakhmatov, to obtain a commutation of the sentence of Professor Hrushevsky, a native of the Ukraine, who had

been condemned to exile to Siberia. Their efforts, however, proved unavailing, and, according to the Russian papers, Professor Hrushevsky has been sent to Symbirsk.

(New York Evening Post, July 10, 1915).

RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION.

One of the first acts of the Russian conquerors in Galicia was the banishment of the head of the Ruthenian Uniate Church, Count Andrew Sheptitsky, the Metropolitan of Lemberg.

* * *

More than once, in the columns of the "Cerkovniya Vyedomosti," the official organ of the Holy Governing Synod, we have read violent diatribes against Count Sheptitsky, whom Russians hate as a man who has contributed greatly to the strengthening of the Ukrainophile party.

But the Russian conquerors of Galicia have not confined themselves to tearing Count Sheptitsky from his church. All the literary and artistic treasures accumulated by the venerable prelate, the precious documents stored in his archives, have been seized. Thus a large part of the historical life of the Ruthenian Uniate Church has fallen into Russian hands.

(From an article by F. A. Palmieri, entitled "Galicia and the Russian Church", The Catholic World, New York, June, 1915).

As a result of the hostility of the Russian Archbishop of Kursk, M. Tikhon, the Austrian Archbishop, Count Sheptitsky, who had been forcibly taken from Lemberg to Kursk, is no longer even allowed to attend church. The "Russkoye Slovo" is authority for the statement that he is kept in rigorous confinement. The Commissioner of Police, who allowed Count Sheptitsky to visit a monastery at Snamensk during religious services, in the company of a guard, was punished by the Governor by several days' confinement in jail.

(New York Evening Post, July 10, 1915).

PROTESTS AGAINST RUSSIAN RULE IN GALICIA.

Made by Representatives of the Ukrainians in the Austrian Parliament.

A protest against the occupation of the newly seized territory of Galicia by the armies of the Czar is made by Dr. C. Levitsky, President of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Delegation in Austria, in a communication to the "*Journal de Genève*":

"Eastern Galicia," he says, "the northwest of Bukovina, and the northeast of Hungary, are inhabited by 4,200,000 Ukrainians, (generally known in this country as Ruthenians.) More than 30,000,000 Ukrainians live in the Russian Governments (provinces) of Kholm, Volhynia, Podolia, Kherson, Kiev, Chernihov, Poltava, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Tauria, Kuban, and a part of the Governments of Bessarabia, Grodno, Minsk, Kursk, &c.

"These are not 'Little Russians'. That name was imposed upon them by the Russian Government in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the Ukrainians inhabiting Austria did not begin to be called Ruthenians until the eighteenth century. The names of Ukraine and Ukrainians are the only ones in actual use among the 'intellectuals' of the nation over a territory of about 850,000 square kilometers (about 328,185 square miles).

"The Ukrainians are not a branch of the Russian people. They are a nation as independent and as different from the Russians as the Poles or the Bulgars. Their great popular art and poetry are entirely original. The Ruthenian language is more different from Russian than Bohemian is from Polish. Because of the Ruthenians' ignorance of Russian, which is the language exclusively used in the schools, there is a fearfully high proportion of illiterates in the Ukrainian provinces of Russia.

"Russia's claims upon the Ukraine are justified only in so far as are those of France upon Germany, and *vice versa*. These latter states were once part of the empire of Charlemagne, as Russia and the Ukraine were of that of Vladimir the Great of Kiev. But Russia claims all of the

old inheritance, and since the sixteenth century has been making a collection of Russian countries. The Ukrainians in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries formed a war-like organization of the Cossacks of Zaporozhe, and in 1648 wrested their independence from the Poles. Menaced on every side, the young Ukrainian State in 1654 had to join itself to Russia as a tributary but autonomous State. But Russia betrayed the unsuspecting Ukrainians. She divided the Ukraine with Poland, restricted the freedom which had been accorded to the country, russified the Ukrainian Church, which had before been independent, and began a war of extermination against the language, customs, literature, and culture of the Ukraine. In 1876 the Czar issued a decree forbidding the printing of any work in the Ukrainian language—a measure unparalleled in history, which enslaved the second Slav nation for thirty years.

“Now the collectors of Russian countries have arrived in Eastern Galicia as its deliverers. For the Ukrainians of Galicia the Russian occupation is no doubt a liberation,—only from their national and political life. They are condemned by the Russians to national death. The Austrian Government has, as a matter of law, accorded to Ukrainians in Galicia the same guarantees as other Austrian nationalities. But in fact they have been oppressed by the more powerful Poles and have been hampered in their development. Notwithstanding all this, the Ukrainians in Galicia have been able to maintain their language in official usage, in the church, in the schools, and in the university.

“The Russian invasion of Galicia destroyed at a blow all this work of many years. The Ukrainian language has been forbidden as an official medium of communication and in the services of the church and in the schools. All the Ukrainian newspapers in Galicia have been suppressed, the libraries destroyed, the Ukrainian books belonging to individuals confiscated, and the collections of the museums sent to Russia. All Ukrainian associations have

been dissolved. Hundreds of Galician notables of Ukrainian nationality have been sent to Siberia.

"The United Greek Church, to which for more than two centuries all the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia have belonged—which has become a national church—is now persecuted in every way. Its head, the Metropolitan Archbishop, Count Andrew Sheptitsky, has been taken into the interior of Russia; many priests have been exiled, the people terrorized, and in their half-famished state converted by the aid of threats and promises by the Orthodox popes imported from Russia. In the United Greek and Catholic churches Orthodox masses are celebrated in accordance with the precept and example of Eulogius, Bishop of Volhynia, the celebrated proselytizer. Now they are beginning to transform by force the Greek-Catholic churches into Orthodox, because, they say, they were Orthodox two or three hundred years ago and ought to become so again.

"The introduction of Russian Orthodoxy, with its Russian sermons which are impossible of comprehension by the people, with the interdict of the mother tongue even in converse with God—is this really synonymous with 'the return to the religion of our fathers?'"

(New York Times, May 22, 1915).

[The effect of the Russian invasion of Galicia upon the Jews and the destructive persecution resulting in wholesale massacres of the race are well known. The editors hope that those directly interested in the emancipation of the Jews in Eastern Europe will present their cause to the civilized world in a substantial publication.]

CONCLUSION

From the short review of the history of the Ukrainians and their movements in modern times, described in the foregoing pages, it is manifest that their ultimate goal is the establishment of an independent Ukrainian State which would comprise the Ukrainians now inhabiting the countries of Eastern Europe. But realizing that this ultimate aim may not be accomplished in the near future and not unmindful of present-day conditions, which present problems of immediate importance, they demand that in Austria-Hungary the Ukrainian territory be organized into a self-governed province on federal lines where the Ukrainian population, not dominated by the Poles or their aristocracy, shall solve its own national and economic problems. They demand also that the Russian Ukraine, in fulfilment of the treaty of Perejaslaw, which is still on the Statute Books of Russia and has not been abrogated, be granted autonomy.

It is needless to say that the Ukrainians demand that their language be used not only in educational and religious matters but also in executive, legislative, and judicial institutions, since only by this means will they be in a position to achieve and enjoy real democracy.

The Ukrainians hope that the other submerged nationalities in Europe will succeed in the attainment of similar aims and objects in their march towards the achievement of that fuller national life without which constant inter-racial struggles must in the future become even more frequent than in the past. Only when all nations are free and none oppressed will it be possible for them to meet in a generous and active co-operation.

APPENDIX

I. A BRITISH CONCEPTION OF GALICIA.

[From "Austria Hungary", by Geoffrey Drage, M. P. Author of Cambridge Modern History, vol. XI, sections on Russia.]

The Poles are a race divided by a sharp cleavage between noble and peasant.

In Galicia, the middle class is non-existent, their place being filled by the Jews. The nobles and the peasants are on the worst possible terms with one another. The former are oppressive and selfish: the latter are sunk in physical and moral degradation, a state of which they are conscious, but which they attribute to their lords.

The Ruthenians again, who are in fact the Little Russians, and frequently fellow-peasants to the Poles, under Polish landlords, are characterized by a natural capacity and manliness in spite of a backwardness and poverty in their case largely due to the minute subdivision of their properties.

II. A FRENCH CONCEPTION OF GALICIA.

[From "Noblesse polonaise et paysan ruthenes", by Maurice Lair; Annales des sciences politiques, 1903, 1904, pages 553, 702].

The Ukrainians, or Little Russians, have long occupied the Eastern part of Galicia, Volhynia, Ukraine, and a part of Lithuania. Overrun at times by several states, ravaged by the Tartars, an independent kingdom in the 14th cen-

ture, these provinces finally succumbed to the Polish yoke. In 1648 the hetman of the Ukrainian cossacks, Khmelnitzky, finally succeeded in shaking off this yoke. But the Ukrainians gained nothing except a change of masters. In 1654 Ukraine, Podolya, and Volhynia recognized the sovereignty of the Czar of Russia, while the Ukrainians of Galicia remained by themselves, annexed to Poland. They were massed with these provinces under the sceptre of Maria Theresa, in 1772, and later on under that of Joseph II of Austro-Hungary.

An Austrian province, but a Slavic country, Galicia is governed by an aristocracy of the Polish race, which is true to the memories of the great disrupted fatherland. To a great extent, this province is inhabited by the Ukrainians, or Little Russians, of different origin from the Poles, of other traditions, and of a lower social scale.

By all possible means, the Polish nobility, the "Shlakh-ta," tries hard to transform this province into a stronghold of the Yagello idea. The Poles still dream of the idea of restoring their ancient kingdom, extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, encircling, together with the Polish provinces proper, the eastern part of Prussia and the Ukraine as well.

III. THE UKRAINIANS OF GALICIA.

[From "A Lecture Delivered on Ukrainian History and Present-Day Political Problems", by Bedwin Sands (George Raffalovich); published by Francis Griffiths, London, 1914].

As recently as 1897 barely twenty great landowners were the political and economic masters of Galicia. The Polish nobility could boast once that it alone upheld the loyalist and national ideals.

For thirty years the Poles and the Ukrainians were bitterly antagonistic, and the few Ukrainians in the House of Representatives were divided. The Poles ruled in the name of the whole province. To them belonged every-

thing that was not Ukrainian. There was no third party. There was a time when the leader of the Polish Club in Vienna could proudly assert: "When I speak, I speak for the whole of Galicia." Now the Ukrainians have appeared in the field. They are a much sought-after article in the Polish market.

It is also certain that the object of the Young Ruthenians is solely and simply to regain their independence and free their brothers from the oppression of the stupid and cruel (more stupid than cruel) bureaucracy from Petersburg. Ukrainians have, comparatively speaking, less members in the Austrian Parliament than any other nationality in Austria. There has been an improvement, but there is no doubt that, in proportion, they are not represented to the same extent as the other races of the Empire. When they obtain an equal system of representation with the others, the Ukrainians will soon become the most important race in the country.

Since their political and economic rights have been flouted every day by the Poles, the Ukrainians have resorted to obstruction in the Galician Diet. For some years now no business of any importance has been transacted there. At the time of writing (November, 1913), the Ukrainians have carried these methods into the Austrian Reichsrath. There is danger, of course, of the appointment of a Commission of Administration or a military governorship which would suspend the autonomy of Galicia. Personally, I am convinced that any régime would be better than the present one for the Ukrainians. A perpetual minority is useless in a Diet where there are only two forces present, and the ruling element refuses to give up any of its unjustifiable privileges.

IV. A BRITISH CONCEPTION OF THE RACIAL PROBLEM IN AUSTRIA.

[The quoted passages in this note are taken from "The Round Table", a semi-official political quarterly published in London, December, 1914].

Austria is composed of eight very different racial territories; Austria is not a nation but a federation of nations each of which has its history and hopes, its literature and ideals and culture.

Since no nationality in Austria is great and strong enough to assimilate and absolutely rule all others, self-government was granted to the Poles in Western and Eastern Galicia; the Czechs in Bohemia have won nearly as much autonomy, and the other Slavonic (Ruthenians and Slovenes) and Latin nationalities (Italians and Roumanians) have been well on the way toward winning it. "While the waves of chauvinism were beating higher and higher in Hungary, Austria has been making steady progress toward the ideal of racial toleration". "A whole school of political theory has grown up on the vexed question of racial minorities and their representation."*

"There has been a growing inclination to make Austria the centre of experiments which, if successful, might have transformed the whole problem of nationalism in Europe."

There actually has been a question of a Federation of Middle European nationalities and their realization of an equal liberty for all nationalities, whether they were great or small. That has been one of the most important European problems. For an Austrian federation of eight free nationalities, strong forces have been working in Austria: the Social Democratic party, and the oppressed nationalities.

But the opponents, viz., the ruling classes of those nationalities (German, Polish, and Czechish) which have not only enjoyed self-government, but also the right to govern

*) The most prominent works being those of Rudolf Springer (Dr. Carl Renner), Aurel Popovici, Otto Bauer, and Professor Samassa.

other smaller races, have been stronger. In 1907, when Austria had received universal suffrage, they were compelled to give in to some extent. It was apparent that the Austrian problem could be solved only by a further extension of equal political rights.

A similar task of uniting different racial territories into a federation of free states has been solved only by democratic Switzerland. Austria, ruled by bureaucracy and feudal landlords, could not do it, though the principles of a federation of equal nationalities were recognized by the Austrian Constitution as the goal of Austria. Section 19 of this Constitution runs as follows: "All races of the State enjoy equal rights and every race has an inviolable right to assert its nationality and to cultivate its language. The equal rights of all languages of the country in school, office and public life, are recognized by the State."

Austrian practice however has been as far from the Austrian theory of Government as the Russian practice from the Austrian practice. This is well shown by the example of the Ukrainians. In Austria, according to theory, they should already possess home rule; in practice, they have a chance to fight for it. In Russia they possess neither.



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
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
The object of this map is merely to present the broad outlines of racial distribution in Central and Eastern Europe. Any attempt to indicate the numerous racial minorities and scattered enclaves in Hungary and the Balkans would necessitate treatment on a far larger scale than the scope of the Round Table permits.

Some of the racial boundaries in the Balkans are of necessity somewhat arbitrary, in view of recent events.

In order to help the reader's eye, the Teutonic districts have been left unshaded, while the Slavonic districts are shaded by sloping lines.



Racial & National Boundaries
in
CENTRAL EUROPE



1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

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
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EUROPEAN RUSSIA. Distribution of Soils

Note. The clayey & Sandy Soils of the Southern Steppe are distinguished thus |||||.



English 0 500 Miles

EUROPEAN RUSSIA. Distribution of Soils.




	Swamp & mountain
	Clayey & sandy soils
	Black & brown earth
	Sand
	Siliceous rocks
	Alluvial soil

Note: The clayey & sandy soils of the Southern steppe are distinguished thus: //

Muzeum im Kozim. i. s. o. Puskiego
 Warszawa
 1914

Das
Wohnggebiet der
UKRAINER
in Europa.
(THE UKRAINIAN
TERRITORY
IN EUROPE)



SCALE OF MILES: 20,000,000.
in Old Lange's Geograph.

SADAG.




Музей им. Казимира Пуляского
Варшава
144

Музей им. Казимира Пуляского
Варшава



Line shown in red outlining UKRAINIAN TERRITORY is compiled from "CARTE DE LA NATION RUTHENOE UKRAINIENNE" published in BULLETIN DE LA SOCIÉTÉ D'ANTHROPOLOGIE DE PARIS 1897, F. 2. P. 150, and from "Ethnographische ÜBERSICHTSKARTE DER UKRAINA" published by KARTOGR. ANSTALT G. FREYTAG & BERNDT, WIEN.



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