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




# POLAND

AND

CENTRAL EUROPE  
AFTER THE WAR



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
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POLAND  
AND  
CENTRAL EUROPE  
AFTER THE WAR

*some reflections*  
by

TYTUS FILIPOWICZ

*Former Ambassador of Poland  
to the United States*



*Gift To PNA Library  
E. Ryzanowski*

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TYTUS FILIPOWICZ  
49, Hallam Street, London, W.1

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WOKING

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“I am living in Belgium as an emigrant. The Austrian populace does not understand me. It is now being decided here whether the government should have a monarchial or a democratic form. However, this is a secondary matter. I am looking towards the east bank of the Rhine and have come to the conclusion that if the Germans do not swallow up the Prussians, but, on the contrary, the Prussians absorb the Germans—a European catastrophe is unavoidable.”

(Prince Metternich in a letter to  
Baron Kuebeck<sup>1</sup> written in 1850.)



# I

## POLAND AND THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN THE OPINION, during the debates on the Treaty of Versailles, of Englishmen, Frenchmen or Italians in regard to the future boundaries and the future structure of emerging Poland is aside from the subject. Our purpose is to revive here what the Poles themselves thought of the advantages and disadvantages of the Polish state as re-established within the boundaries wrought in the Forge of Versailles.

\* \* \*

Attempts at the beginning of the 19th century to restore the Polish state in the shape of the "Duchy of Warsaw"<sup>2</sup> and "Congress Poland"<sup>3</sup> have shown that a small and weak Poland lying between two powerful neighbours has little prospect of enduring. The failure of these efforts was proof that in this part of Europe, between Russia and Germany, only a state capable of developing adequate military force, namely a state having a large population and broad territories, can subsist permanently. Thus, efforts to restore Poland within the boundaries of 1771—Kościuszko's insurrection of 1794,<sup>4</sup> attempts during the time of Napoleon,<sup>5</sup> the insurrection of 1830<sup>6</sup> and of 1863<sup>7</sup>, Piłsudski's Legions during the World War<sup>8</sup>—had well-founded reasons.

In Paris, during the Peace Conference, this persistent stubbornness of the Poles, which was the outcome

of historical experience written with blood and based upon intuitive apprehension of events which have subsequently occurred in Europe, met with opposition by some of the delegates and with lack of understanding on the part of others. The result was a compromise in the form of a Polish state within boundaries prescribed in Articles 27, 28 and 87 of the Treaty of Versailles.<sup>9</sup>

When a state is being called to life on exceptionally difficult territory, ravaged by war, particularly a state whose administrative life and historical traditions were interrupted for long years, sober-minded judgment would dictate that the protectors and organizers of this enterprise provide at least the minimum means of a security enabling the new state to begin a normal existence. In practice this would mean: To back up the authority of the new state, to furnish it with adequate military material, to supply the means necessary to establish a sound financial policy. Such was the attitude taken at the end of the 19th century in an analogical case by the governments interested in the rebuilding of Rumania<sup>10</sup> and Bulgaria.<sup>11</sup> Was such a rational method, however, applied in Paris by the "Big Five" when reconstructing Poland?

Let us try to answer this question.

\* \* \*

East of the River Bug, a tributary of the Vistula, between a territory ethnologically Polish and a territory surrounding Moscow, ethnologically Great Russian, lies a stretch of land about 500 kilometres wide, with an element idiomatically Polish, which—if we proceed from the west towards the east—slowly and imperceptibly gives way to the White Russian-speaking

element,<sup>12</sup> while this in turn decreases in favour of the Russian-speaking element. Further towards the south a similar transient language is the Ukrainian language.<sup>13</sup> In this particular area the drawing of a political boundary based on purely ethnological or linguistic distinctions cannot be carried out any more than a rigid line of demarcation between the atmosphere and stratosphere. Under these circumstances the settling of the Polish-Russian boundaries was to be either purely conventional or based on considerations other than ethnological. When settling the boundaries between Poland and Russia, the Paris Conference, not being in a position to apply ethnological principles, and not wishing to return to the historical confines of 1771, simply neglected to make a decision, with the result that the Polish-Russian boundaries were not established. This indecision on the part of the Conference stirred up the aggressiveness of the Bolsheviks and was responsible for precipitating reborn Poland into a long and destructive war with Russia.<sup>14</sup>

West and north of the Vistula, however, the lines of demarcation between the Polish and the German population were distinct. Hence an ethnological basis could have been used here as nearly a 100 per cent foundation for fixing the political boundary. But the Peace Conference acted differently and left to Germany territories in which a Polish population was predominant. Poland thus lost borderlands inhabited by approximately 600,000 Poles, who remained a prey to Germanization.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, under the high-sounding name of self-determination of peoples a plebiscite was instituted in East Prussia<sup>16</sup> and in Silesia.<sup>17</sup> A special commission consisting of Allies was entrusted with preparing the plebiscite; in fact, however, everything was in the hands of local German

officials left there from pre-war time, who made all possible difficulties for the Polish delegates sent from Warsaw to take part in carrying out the procedure. In consequence, preparations for the Silesian plebiscite dragged on for three years, and the plebiscite itself produced unheard-of confusion, both in Poland and Germany, causing three armed insurrections in Silesia and definitely poisoning Polish-German relations.

The problem of boundaries between Poland and Germany was solved in a way which left about 700,000 Germans, dispersed in groups, on the Polish side. Poland, however, did not obtain a single community having a German majority. On the other hand, an entire province in which the Poles predominated was allotted to Germany. If we count Polish emigrants in Rheinland, Saxony and Berlin, the total Polish minority in Germany amounted to about 1,200,000.

In order to protect national minorities a minorities agreement was included in the Treaty of Versailles.<sup>18</sup> This particular agreement guaranteed to national minorities a special and highly complicated system of protection under the League of Nations. The history of the activities of the Minority Section of the League of Nations proves how ineffective this protection was and how, on the contrary, the whole system of procedure of the minority agreement served to stir up resentment and keep at seething-point the feelings of the minorities against the states in which they lived.

It may be added that Poland—ironically enough—was compelled to sign the minorities agreement, whereas Germany, well known for her pre-World War systematic persecution of Poles, was exempted from that obligation.

And now, by an effort of the imagination, let us assume that after the World War destiny dispersed

national groups in such a way as to leave a minority of one million Englishmen in Germany and just as many Germans in England. Let us imagine, further, that the Treaty of Versailles had given to the League of Nations the right to protect the German minority in England, but at the same time had refused such protection to the million Englishmen in Germany. Would you find such a state of affairs normal? Would you not consider that the fate of your brothers had been disregarded and your national dignity thus offended? How would you feel, indeed, had the Treaty of Versailles taken such an attitude towards your country and your countrymen?

That is precisely how the Poles felt.

\* \* \*

Now let us pass on to the economic conditions. The Paris Conference, having recognized Poland as an ally, did not find it appropriate to grant to Poland the war reparations accorded to other victor countries. As a result, while France and Belgium used these war reparations partly to cover the cost of rebuilding their countries, Poland—poor and emerging from a war which lasted not four but six years—had to rebuild the country at her own expense.<sup>19</sup>

During the first years of her existence Poland received no foreign gold loan indispensable to begin a sound financial life. Such a loan was obtained only after a period of nine years and under burdensome conditions. This tardy acquisition of an adequate foundation for the bank of issue<sup>20</sup> caused a delay of normal monetary circulation,<sup>21</sup> of solid banking transactions, and consequently held up the evolution of industry, commerce and armaments.

\* \* \*

Finally, I wish to mention the most important fact.

The plan of the Polish delegates to the Paris Conference, 1919, was to restore the status which had existed for centuries, namely to create out of Danzig and of East Prussia autonomic units under the sovereignty of Poland.<sup>22</sup> This plan was supported by French military circles, and accepted by the general Commission for Polish affairs at the Conference of Paris. However, contrary to the opinion of experts who believed such a solution indispensable for the security of the future Polish state, the Treaty of Versailles left East Prussia to Germany. If we consult the map, we will see what such a decision signified. It meant that in the interior of the northern area of Poland, reaching almost to her heart, Warsaw, there was left a German territory of over 37,000 square kilometres which was nothing else but a fortified outpost of the Koenigsberg<sup>23</sup> and Elbing<sup>24</sup> strongholds. Planes leaving bases in the southern part of East Prussia could reach Warsaw within fifteen to twenty minutes. In these circumstances every rational defence of West Poland against an attack undertaken from the Berlin or Breslau bases was problematic, inasmuch as the Polish military forces grouped parallel with the Vistula and facing west were exposed to a rear attack coming from East Prussia. However, this is not all. In view of the convention with Germany<sup>25</sup> resulting from the Treaty of Versailles—and which guaranteed the transportation of German troops and of war material from East Prussia and to East Prussia—the German army which in September, 1939, attacked the Polish troops from the rear, and whose action was decisive in the German victory, was in its main body previously transported from Central Germany through

Polish territory, with the co-operation of Polish railways and partly by Polish trains.

Such was the result emerging from the territorial and legal agreement provided for by the Treaty of Versailles.

We again appeal to the imagination of the reader. Let us suppose for a moment that in France the Departments of Pas-de-Calais, Somme and Oise, lying between the sea and Paris, were transformed by some miracle into a German province, inhabited by a population 75 per cent German, became strongly fortified and used as a German *place d'armes*. What would be the prospect, in such a case, of defending Paris and what the security of France?

Yet such was the fantastic kind of "security" guaranteed to reborn Poland by the Treaty of Versailles.

The Article of the Treaty of Versailles which left East Prussia under the sovereignty of Germany is responsible for that political and strategic nuisance, the "Polish corridor,"<sup>26</sup> which extended on the left bank of the Vistula river from the Polish town Torun, through Bydgoszcz to Gdynia and the Baltic Sea. This "corridor," being populated by a majority of Poles, who before the war of 1914 had elected only Polish deputies to the German Reichstag, would have been possible to defend were East Prussia dependent upon the Polish authorities as it was in the period of 1466-1657.

\* \* \*

In drawing our conclusion from the aforementioned facts it may be said that the Peace Conference of 1919, having in its power all ways and means to create a strong and safe Poland, instead of lending her a feeling of security, instead of satisfying her aspirations and

instead of helping her to build up a sound economic foundation, solved the problem in a way which put the new state, designed to become the support of the West in the East, in an extremely difficult situation owing to the fact that East Prussia was left in German hands. The reborn Polish state was weakened by an additional war with Russia (1919-1921), by the lack of capital for necessary investments, and by a feeling of resentment on account of the injustice experienced at the hands of the Allies, who so strongly advertised to their countrymen their sympathetic feelings for Poland. All this affected unfavourably the prestige of the Polish authorities at home, who were suspected by their countrymen of lacking influence at the Peace Conference. In the field of foreign politics it evoked a lack of confidence in the goodwill of the Allies and in their understanding of practical politics.

In consequence there was created in Poland a favourable ground for various unsound currents and experimentation in Polish foreign policy. The fact that there were intervals of pro-German policy pursued by both England and France could not remain without influence on Poland. Years passed, and hopes connected with the functioning of the League of Nations slowly vanished. German stabs at the Treaty of Versailles became deeper and deeper, their acts passing without punishment. A powerful propaganda glorified the methods of Fascism and Nazism, while the voice of the Western democracies sounded only faintly.

Can we be surprised, therefore, if under these conditions there appeared in Poland some groups who were tempted to direct Polish foreign policy into channels contrary to best Polish traditions and contrary to the opinion of the majority of the Polish public?

## II

### A NEW UNION

**I**F ERRORS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1919 committed at the time of the reorganizing of Europe are mentioned here, it is not for the purpose of reproach but rather to point out to the future peace-makers what steps should be avoided and what errors be repaired.

The Polish state which is to be reconstructed after the present war must embrace all territories belonging to Germany prior to 1914 which were populated by Polish elements. These territories are clearly defined in the archives of the Peace Conference. We emphasize that Poland should embrace all territories inhabited by Poles before 1914, because we are all well aware that in view of the methods at present applied by Hitler, namely the displacing of Poles and resettling these areas with Baltic and other Germans, even Warsaw may prove ethnologically to be a German city at the end of the war.

Further, if the Poland of the future is to live in security, one of the guarantees must be the incorporation of Danzig<sup>27</sup> into the Polish state. As far as the problem of East Prussia is concerned, must be fulfilled the Franco-Polish plan submitted to the Peace Conference in 1919, namely incorporating also East Prussia into the Polish state.

\* \* \*

Let us suppose for the moment that at the end of the war the attitude of Russia will develop in favour of returning to Poland all territories defined by the

Treaty of Riga in 1921. Would such a Polish state, cemented by the strips of land now belonging to Germany, by the incorporation of Danzig and by East Prussia, prove strong enough to oppose her two menacing neighbours? Will she become a Poland such as Piłsudski's genius and the leaders of the Polish insurrections, to name only Kościuszko and Pułaski,<sup>28</sup> intuitively strived to create?

I realize that my answer to this question will hurt many friends of Poland, and especially many of my compatriots. Yet I must answer in the negative. Such a Poland would not be strong enough and could not endure.

What boundaries would, therefore, be needed to make the new state endure? Should Poland be widened to the confines of 1771? Should the territories be added which belonged to her before 1667, when she embraced Smolensk and Kiev, and when she was the largest state in Europe? What boundaries should be conceded to Poland to establish her security and an honourable peace to Poland and to the whole of Europe?

To satisfy the end in view a solution must be found which will take into consideration not only the existence of Poland but also the conditions and interests of other Central European countries. A bloc should be created of Poles, Slovaks, Czechs and Western Ukrainians;<sup>29</sup> perhaps it will be possible to join Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to them; non-Slavic nations loving liberty and democracy, who have lived side by side with the Slavs and co-operated with them for centuries—such as Hungary, Rumania, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia ought to be invited to join the bloc. Only a Federation of States can offer a lasting solution of this problem.

On these territories which present an ethnological mosaic of nations, each striving to create its own autonomy, it will be impossible to found a single large national state; yet to leave in the hands of Germans and Russians the reign over non-Germans and non-Great Russians would be a crime against humanity and democracy. The only solution of this dilemma is the creation of a Central European Federation—a Commonwealth of Central European nations.

The creation of a large federation in which the Slavs would be predominant will give permanency to the balance of Europe.<sup>30</sup> It will further create a large territory which in the East will defend the ideas and the interests of the West. In this way the conception of the historical mission of Poles, Hungarians and Czechs will be revived in a new form and become stronger than ever. The suppression of Customs barriers within and a monetary union ought to form the economic base of the federation.\*

History has twice revealed the tendency to create such a federation. Once in the 15th century, when the Jagellon dynasty reigned over Poland, Hungary and Bohemia at the same time.<sup>31</sup> Secondly, in the existence of Austro-Hungary. Neither the Polish state under the Jagellon dynasty nor Austro-Hungary was an "artificial" state, as post-World War propaganda tried to convince public opinion; nor were they an outcome of the ambitions of monarchs eager to reign. In fact

\* In this place the reader may ask: "What boundaries should Poland, Czechoslovakia, Western Ukraine, etc., have inside the federation?" I do not give any precise answer as to all composing parts of this question, as the final fixing of the federative frontier will be defined by the events of the second half of the present war. The inner federative frontiers will depend on the ethnographic data as well as on future compromise between the interested nations. Here I limit my opinion to the general principle, illustrating only a few sectors of the problem by definite suggestions.

those monarchs were the instrument of tendencies issuing from economic and strategic conditions due to the ethnography and the psychology of peoples. On the Danube and north of the Danube some form of political co-operation of different states must take place in the future, otherwise the world will not be able to emerge from the difficulties besetting the organization of Central Europe.

We all recall the tendencies of Czechoslovak, Rumanian and Yugoslav politics when establishing the so-called "Little Entente."<sup>32</sup> It was not an alliance of weaker states for defence against shadows thrown by the increasing power of Germany and Russia, although no other than these two Powers were, are and will be a menace to the existence of small nations in Europe. But after 1919 some transient, circumstantial problems arose in the Danube basin which had veiled the vision of Czechs, Rumanians and Yugoslavians in a way that, instead of discerning the real danger, they perceived the imaginary one.

To the "Little Entente" such a phantom of danger, which hid the real state of affairs, were the claims of the Habsburgs to the throne of Austria. To Poland—the alleged Czechoslovak danger. Let me explain what I mean by an analogy from past events.

\* \* \*

Subversion of an enemy country does not only consist in destroying military objects, railways, telegraphic wires, etc., but also in its more subtle and dangerous modern form of suggesting, in peace-time, to the future foe ideas and doctrines which applied in practice weaken his strength. For instance, the recommendation of faulty types of arms or of formulas for

defective explosives may prove to be more dangerous than blowing up ammunition stores.

We now realize that the mass raids of German bombers prevented Poland from carrying out mobilization, a fact which was one of the causes of our disaster. However, it was not until after this practical experience that we understood the important significance of mass attacks of bombers. Unfortunately enough, the extent of the menace from the air was not foreseen in Poland. During the last years, since the beginning of Japanese activities in Manchuria and China, also during the civil war in Spain, the Polish Press minimized the effects of aerial bombardments. Was it mere coincidence? Indeed, it can be doubted. My own opinion is that the Polish Press was misled, as was also misled the vigilance of the public. Unfortunately, the Polish military authorities have failed to correct these misleading opinions and have endeavoured to conceal to the nation the fact that Polish aviation was not adequately prepared for war.

The value of German mechanized units employed in the occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia was also underestimated by the Polish Press. This was neither a matter of simple fortuity nor carelessness on the part of Polish journalists. As recently disclosed, it was the result of secret activities deliberately aiming to direct the opinion of the Press and of the nation into the wrong channels. The Polish Press, patriotic and incorruptible, had no funds at its disposal to pay for the services of aviation and automobile experts, and thus she accepted in good faith opinions which were suggested to her without suspecting their true purpose.

This kind of subversion, by means of false doctrine, may also be applied in purely political actions. Had a consolidation of the Danubian states been effected

in due time, this would certainly have prevented Germany from annexing, little by little, first Austria, next the Sudetes districts, and finally the rest of Bohemia-Moravia. However, between 1920 and 1938 a consolidation could not have been performed, except around the person of Otto Habsburg. And that is why no means were too costly for Berlin when it came to awakening the feeling of fright in Vienna, Prague and Budapest when faced with the possible return of the Habsburgs on the banks of the Danube.

Another false doctrine was applied in the mutual relations of Czechoslovakia and Poland—the doctrine of reciprocal suspicion and mistrust. It was a mistake on the part of the Czechs to seize in 1919 the Polish province of Teschen.<sup>33</sup> It was a mistake of the Council of Ambassadors to leave this territory in the possession of the Czechs. It was a mistake of Czechoslovakia to stop the transit transportation of arms and ammunition to Poland when in 1920 Poland was at war with Soviet Russia.<sup>34</sup> But it was also a mistake on the part of the Poles to maintain for twenty years an anti-Czech policy crowned by the occupation of the Teschen district in 1938, just at the moment when Czechoslovakia was attacked by Germany.

The false doctrines professed by the leaders of Bohemia and Poland were destined to become fatal to both states. It is said that sins are expiated in the next world: errors and mistakes, however, are punished in this world.

\* \* \*

Considering the Treaty of Versailles from the economic standpoint, the creation of many small states in Central Europe meant a decrease of the total

revenue of the territory which they occupied; while the costs of the administrative, military and diplomatic machinery forced their respective budgets to such a peak that, in spite of high taxes, in spite of Customs barricades, the deficit could only be covered by loans considered necessary to purchase armaments for the defence of autonomy. This state of things contributed to an almost continuous economic crisis, which repeated international conferences were powerless to heal.

Aristide Briand,<sup>35</sup> being conscious of the disastrous consequences, both political and economic, of such a situation in Central Europe, sought to prevent it by the creation of a federation of states on the banks of the Danube, a first link in the future United States of Europe. But at the time the nationalistic tension was so strong, the bureaucracies of the new states whose existence was menaced were so influential, German intrigue so watchful, that the project of Briand was frustrated.

\* \* \*

There was, however, during the period of 1919 and 1939 another hindrance in the way of realization of a federation of the Danubian states. The activity of Berlin was supported unconsciously by influential persons for whom the existence of Austria and Bohemia offered a possibility of satisfying their personal ambitions. Great political ambitions are a creative factor sometimes of highest positive importance, but they often risk becoming a cover for personal ambitions.

I am aware that the very same factor—petty personal ambitions—may become a hindrance to the creation of a federation of the states of post-war Central Europe.

### III

#### SOME REMINISCENCES

A FEW YEARS BEFORE the first World War, when the national tendencies of Austro-Hungarian people became more and more insistent, the old Emperor Francis Joseph<sup>36</sup> addressed his Prime Minister as follows: "What are our nationalists really striving for? What do they want? Will they be able to find anywhere else greater liberty and well-being than in the Austro-Hungarian union? I seriously doubt it."

Some statesmen began to understand how true were the words of the Austrian Emperor, when after 1930 they were comparing the methods applied in their respective countries with those applied in Austria before 1914. They came to the conclusion that in Poland, Slovakia, Yugoslavia and even in Vienna the freedom of the Press, of assembly and of speech in 1930-39 was more limited than in imperial pre-war Austria, and that the Austrian imperial and royal juries were more indulgent towards political criminals than were the courts in independent Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland.

Nevertheless, on the eve of the war of 1939 all the national minorities of Poland (with the exception of the *Hitlerjugend* and the secret Hitlerian organizations) acknowledged her as their mother country, whom they declared ready to defend.

\* \* \*

The declaration of the Austrian Emperor Charles I, published on October 16, 1918, instituted a federative

system in Austria-Hungary.<sup>37</sup> But in 1918 the peoples of Austria did not wish to hear of a federation, neither did they wish to belong to the Austrian Empire; at the moment they were preoccupied with the thought of joining their brothers of the same race who lived outside Austria, and thus form independent states.

The Poles who lived in Austria having considered, at the beginning of the war of 1914, the incorporation of the Russian part of Poland into Austro-Hungary (to transform the dual monarchy into a triple state, i.e. Austro-Hungarian-Polish state), in the second half of the war strove for the reunion of all the Polish territories invaded in 1772 and later by Germany, Russia and Austria.<sup>38</sup> The principle of disannexation, proclaimed by the Allies, found its full expression in the creation of united Poland. From that moment Europe ceased to live in the state of mortal sin in which, according to the expression of a French writer, it had lived since the partition of Poland.

Out of a part of dismembered Austria was carved Czechoslovakia.

Considering Czechoslovakia from the standpoint of nationalities, it was no other than a miniature of pre-war Austro-Hungary, with the sole difference that the Czechs and not the Germans constituted the element of fusion.<sup>39</sup>

The destruction of Austria was achieved before the Treaty of Versailles was signed. The Austrian revolution of 1918 took place in an atmosphere of storm and blood. The Czechs, bearing arms, occupied the Polish territory of Teschen, which a few months previously they had voluntarily ceded to Poland. In Hungary Bela Khun routed the adversaries of Bolshevism, who in turn did not fail to settle accounts with Khun's followers. In South-East Poland (East Galicia) the

Ruthenians, aided by the German General Staff, attacked the Poles and claimed independence for their province, while their leaders only endeavoured to maintain the influence of Vienna and Berlin over this territory. Owing to the partition of Austria-Hungary the desire of the Croats to be united with the Serbs was realized—this was the origin of Yugoslavia.<sup>40</sup>

In 1918 Emperor Charles I, persuaded that the Austro-Hungarian monarchy could subsist under the form of a federal state, failed to take into consideration an essential factor, namely that too high a nationalistic temperature is a decomposing factor. And also missed another fact, no less important, that the Germans could no longer play the cementing part in the fusion of Austrian peoples. The loyalty of the German-speaking Austrians towards the Habsburgs was giving way more and more to the desire of being united with the *Reichsdeutsche*.

The leaders of the states which succeeded Austria-Hungary did not expect that the power of Berlin could revive so quickly.<sup>41</sup> They, however, were aware that since the time of Frederick the Great, Berlin has constituted a menace for Vienna almost as great in peace-time as on the eve of the battles of Koeniggraetz and Sadowa. Neither Czechoslovakia nor the new Republic of Austria nor Yugoslavia and Rumania had foreseen that within a short time Berlin would become to them more dangerous than a great Austria with a Habsburg on the throne would have been. To govern should mean to foresee. That was a truth little known to post-war Central Europe. The events of 1938-39 were needed in order that the statesmen of these countries might become conscious of the major error which they had committed.

The experience acquired recently and paid for so

dearly may become the determining factor in the realization of a federation of the states which prior to 1938 were situated between Germany and Russia.

\* \* \*

A great Czech, Palacki, said once that had Austro-Hungary not existed it would have been necessary to create her. This is true inasmuch as it is typical of the real state of affairs in this part of Europe, where various groups of nations each speaking its own language and each striving for political autonomy lived in an area little larger than contemporary France.<sup>42</sup> Each of these nations could have lived, and in many cases has lived, separately under technical and political conditions such as those of the 12th century. But under recent conditions the so-called politically autonomous states could have maintained their existence and liberty solely by means of a co-operation for defence in case of danger. It was precisely the function of the late Austro-Hungarian monarchy to maintain the conglomeration of small nations to whom after 1867 she granted freedom of language as well as political liberty.<sup>43</sup>

But before 1867 the attitude of Austria to all her non-German subjects was a very different one. During long centuries the Habsburg monarchy has been an advance guard of Germanism among the Slavs; its policy of expansion, oppression and perfidy resulted in dissatisfaction and mistrust among Serbs, Czechs and Poles. This mistrust among Slavs towards Habsburgs exists to this day, and no liberalism of the last years of their rule could change this feeling. We have spoken above of this liberalism in order that justice may be given to the last Habsburgs. They are dead. Let them rest in peace!

Now, without awaiting the end of the present war, the question arises of preparing the way for such a political combination as would continue the role played by Vienna during the last thirty years of the 19th century and until 1914. However, the process will have to be entirely new. In the first place the Austro-German element would no longer be the cement of the new federation. The human material of former Austria consisted of Slavic peoples cemented by a German bureaucracy under the crown of the Habsburgs. But that structure was transient, just as was the reign of the Jagellon dynasty in the 15th century. It crumbled, leaving the other material intact. At the present hour it is not the question of resuscitating the former Austria-Hungary, but of creating a new political body based upon Slavic peoples. The memory of the events of 1938-39, when the Poles, the Czechs and the Slovaks endeavoured individually to oppose Germany, will be a guiding factor for a union of these three peoples.

The Slavs, who will serve as the foundation of the federation, have received to a large extent their faith from Rome. Their inclination has been towards the ideas of the West, where Christian principles are united with a high conception of individual freedom. The Germanic people, on the contrary, considered love of one's fellow-creatures as a sign of weakness, and looked—and continue to look—upon the Slavs as an inferior race. The influence which they spread among the Slavs has had a lowering and not an uplifting effect on the latter. For centuries the aim of the Germans was to transform *Slaventum* into *Sklaventum*—that is, “Slavdom” into “Slavedom.”

## IV

### ONE OF THE MAIN TASKS

IT IS NOT LONG SINCE the diplomatic chancelleries and the Press of the world were full of German propaganda on the subject of the "Polish corridor." According to the German view, the "Polish corridor" was the source of calamity in that part of Europe, it made friendly Polish-German relations impossible, it represented the very essence of the mistakes of the Treaty of Versailles. The roots of the war to come were to be perceived therein.

Let us look at the map of Europe, such as it was in 1938 on the eve of the occupation of the Sudetes by Hitler. In eastern Germany we do not see one corridor but two. The first one is the famous "Polish corridor." The second—the German corridor, which runs in the shape of a wide belt towards south-east, from Berlin in the direction of the Polish and Czech part of Silesia. This particular German corridor divided two countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Considered from the strategic point, this corridor weakened the chances of Polish-Czechoslovak military collaboration, offensive and defensive. Fifty years ago in all the Silesian villages and towns, and even in the main city, Breslau, the Polish or Czech language was understood. This German corridor, passed over in silence by German propaganda, was the main politico-geographic cause of the events of 1938-39. It has served the Germans as a road for their invasion of Moravia and enabled them to outflank the Czechs and the Poles. Looked upon from this angle, the cardinal mistake made by the Treaty of Versailles was not so

much the "Polish corridor" but that strategic German corridor.

Should Bohemia within her natural boundaries (i.e. the plateau surrounded by mountains<sup>44</sup>) be incorporated into the future Central European Federation, her security can be guaranteed only by erasing from the map of the future new Europe this menacing German corridor. The part of Silesia which the Treaty of Versailles left to Germany ought to be divided between Poland and Bohemia. Such a solution, and such a solution only, can form a proper territorial basis for a good military co-operation between Prague and Warsaw and definitely close the "Moravian gate" to the Germans.<sup>45</sup> This way of establishing the German-Polish and German-Czech frontier will also liberate the un-Germanized inhabitants of this territory. The Treaty of Versailles, which has been so responsive to the situation of the German minorities in Poland, has entirely forgotten the existence of the Slav minority in Germany. This omission must be corrected.

In 1742 Prussia annexed the province of Silesia (to-day's "German corridor"), which at that date belonged to Austria. This annexation forms a turning-point in Europe's history, as by the acquisition of Silesia Prussia gained the balance of power over the other German states and prepared the way to the exclusion of Austria from the German Union. The annexation of Silesia gave to Prussia the controlling influence within Germany and begun the era of Germany as the Great Power. Now whoever seriously wants to abolish the menace of Prussia cannot do it otherwise than by taking Silesia away from Germany. If a cure is to be obtained, it is necessary not only to remove symptoms but to remove the vital cause of the disease.

## A REVOLUTION?

THERE IS A TENDENCY of Allied public opinion to believe that the blockade and the pressure exercised at the front will end in a revolution in Germany, which will overthrow Hitler and give a government whose word can be trusted. Let us try to penetrate the character of this future revolution by evoking memories of the events which took place in the German revolution of 1918.

The marines were first to revolt. The red flag replaced the Prussian colours on the men-of-war; in Altona and in Hamburg the revolutionists seized the city and the barracks. As by some miracle soldiers' socialistic councils were formed in all garrisons of Germany and in the occupied countries, Poland, Lithuania, in the Baltic districts and in Ukraine; soldiers and non-commissioned officers bearing the red emblem either seized command themselves or after having left the commanding officers in charge of important units controlled their actions by their own commissaries. Exaggerated reports were carried into foreign countries concerning the fights of the loyal army against the German *soldatesque*, about skirmishes between the revolutionary groups, each trying to seize the power which was left abandoned by the Kaiser who had escaped to Holland.

But what was the real face of the German revolution? This question remains to be answered.

In reality there was not one but two revolutions in Germany. The first one was organized by Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. It was the so-called "sparta-

cists" movement directed as well against the government as, according to the Bolshevik style, against the social capitalistic regime. The second revolution, parallel to the first one, was staged by Colonel Nicolai, chief of the Intelligence Service of the German General Staff, with the aid of the commissaries of the police, who at the command of higher officials prepared red armlets, red flags, threatening proclamations and posters, and distributed them among civilians and militaries chosen in advance to receive them. Within a short time Rosa Luxemburg and Liebknecht were assassinated by unknown persons, and the spartacists revolution thus terminated. The second revolution, the official one, triumphed, and under his mask, destined for the Allies, the face of Colonel Nicolai bore an evil smile . . .

Fifteen years have passed since this German revolution; the mask has become unnecessary, and everything it has concealed has been bequeathed to Hitler.

The world should have a good look at the new revolution, which undoubtedly will arise just at the moment when the Germans will judge it favourable to end the term of Hitler's dictatorship.

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It has happened in history that a state which had lost the war gained the peace. After the defeat of Napoleon, Talleyrand<sup>46</sup> gained for France the peace signed at Vienna in 1815. A similar fact was repeated at Versailles in 1919, when Germany, apparently having lost all her most important trumps—the fleet, her colonies, Alsace-Lorraine and a part of the territory taken from Poland one hundred and forty years previously—succeeded in saving other assets, which

enabled her to free herself from the "dictate" of Versailles and to begin once more, by annexing Austria, the conquest of new territories.

The evolution of German victory in the peace disclosed the real aim of the revolutionary demonstration of 1918. This aim consisted in mobilizing during the Peace Conference a group of naïve persons who would be convinced of the sincerity of the German revolution, in order to reinforce through their influence the pressure which was exercised by friends of Germany, acting openly or in secret. The object was to fight by this means every clause of the treaty capable of further limiting the activity of the conquered Junkers<sup>47</sup> and seeking to prevent the regeneration of their destructive influence.

Will Germany be successful in staging a second time such a domestic revolution, with all the benefits and consequences? This is a question which only the future can answer.

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I consider it quite probable that at the end of the present war the Germans will again make the same experiment with the revolution; this time, however, on more than a national scale, rather on a world scale. This time they will be aided by the world's best stage managers, the Russians.

No nation, great or small, can make war in the 20th century without a risk of defeat and of social troubles, which may appear even in case of victory. Even now Russia is sowing the seed of Bolshevism in Eastern Poland, even now her agents are acquiring in Germany an important freedom of movement. The neutral states, the Balkans, Switzerland,

North and South America report that not only Nazi but also Bolshevik propaganda are becoming more intense. It would be a great mistake not to take into consideration the possible post-war results of this propaganda. Stalin wishes to be present everywhere where misery, suffering and discontent will brutalize the human soul.

Remembering the experience of the last war, we may consider as highly probable that in the final period of the present hostilities insurrections, social unrest and civil wars will result on the continent of Europe. In 1917 and 1918 there were two consecutive revolutions in Russia—the second one bringing the Bolshevik upheaval—a number of insurrections in the Baltic provinces and in the Caucasus, also local wars between Finland and Russia, and later on between Poland and Russia. A few years after there was Mussolini's *coup d'état* resulting in a change of the political and social structure of Italy. Germany was for years shaken by internal disorders, which ended by the introduction of Nazidom. Considering that the shocks through which Europe is now passing are perhaps stronger than those of the first Great War, it is possible to foresee in broad lines what may be the general state of things towards the end of the present war. In Belgium, Denmark, France, Holland, Norway, Poland and Czechoslovakia the long-compressed animosity to Germans will result in a series of new St. Bartholomew's nights. Italians will be showing their temperament in settling their accounts with the Fascisti. In Russia—if Stalin would dare to make a general mobilization—there will be an anti-Bolshevik revolt. In France one can expect not only a chasing of German troops, but a popular outbreak against the followers of Monsieur Laval. In Germany there will come either another

“revolution” staged by the General Staff *à la* November 1918, or a real revolt against Nazis; the character of events depending on the chance whether at the propitious moment there would or would not appear on the people’s side a few men strong enough to be obeyed, as an average German never can do anything—even disobey—without being commanded.

It would be quite natural that the future European upheaval would react on the minds of the victorious English-speaking world. In such circumstances, facing Great Britain, and perhaps also facing the United States, there is not one but two main problems to solve: the first, to win the war; the second, to avoid revolution spreading on their own territories. Such will be the hidden rock of the future victory.

Social peace can be preserved if the masses shall be convinced that after the war the average man will have an easier life, that more justice will be given him. We must create more charity, learn how to exercise it, we must make greater sacrifice and faith must arise that the future organizers of peace will be able to avoid botching the new Europe as it was bungled by the Treaty of Versailles. This conviction will be an expression of faith that God’s Kingdom can be erected by human hands on earth.

## VI

### THE SOCIAL ASPECT

WHAT VALUE DID CENTRAL EUROPE represent before the war of 1939 from the economic, sociological and cultural point of view in comparison with the great Western states?

A few centuries ago Poland and Hungary not only believed themselves to be the defenders of Christianity against the onslaught of the Tartars from the East, but indeed were such defenders. This period was ended for the Poles in 1683 by the victory of Sobieski at the walls of Vienna.<sup>48</sup> From the moment when Peter the Great of Russia had opened the window to Europe,<sup>49</sup> the standard of the defender of Christianity was taken up<sup>50</sup> by the Russians, who carried it to the confines of Asia and guarded it until the moment when in 1917 the Bolshevik revolution swept away the Christian dynasty of the Tsars of "all Russia."

In spite of everything that the Poles, the Serbs, the Hungarians, the Czechs may believe concerning their contribution towards the secular treasure of international culture, it must be admitted that, though this contribution indeed existed, it is modest in comparison with the cultural legacies bequeathed by France, England, Spain, Italy.

As far as the production of raw materials and industrial wealth is concerned, Central European countries have given way to other countries and continue to do so. Being an agricultural area to the extent of two-thirds, Central Europe has since the 19th century established a sole record: namely, in supplying the world market with manual labour. The

great quantity of emigrants, however, with which Central Europe furnished the world had no professional value. Good farmers capable of doing auxiliary work in big industry, the emigrants succeeded only after long years of hard labour, maybe in their second generation, in developing into skilled workers. Many of those Central European emigrants did not know how to read and write; far from being pioneers of civilization, they were, with a few exceptions, stragglers. On the other hand, the major part of this poor class of emigrants was honest and uncorrupted human material, eager to learn, kind and modest of disposition, easy to be ruled and guided. In short, Central Europe was a reservoir of under-nourished people, who in pursuit of better bread fled the territories in which industry and political life were backward, seeking the countries where modern industrialism and political freedom prevailed.

The National-Socialistic system, which after 1932 was introduced by Hitler in Germany, has many features in common with Russian Bolshevism: big industry, banks and supervision of agriculture are in the hands of the government; the political power is concentrated in a dictator who is not responsible to anybody; in German schools and in German working camps posters announce that "the individual counts for nothing, the State is everything"; a citizen has no possibility of voicing his opinion or passing criticism on the ruling regime; all modern means serving to influence public opinion: the Press, the radio, cinemas are run by agents devoted to the government; moreover, there exists in Germany as well as in Russia the tendency to subordinate to the government's influence every scientific, literary and artistic activity; the propaganda of the official materialistic philosophy with

its purely materialistic conception of life has acquired a hostile attitude towards religion and the church; this hostility found expression in organized religious persecutions. In general, it may be said that the national-socialistic system, as well as Russian Bolshevism, constitute a renaissance of absolutism and idolatry inimical to primordial Christian conceptions and modern Western forms of political life.

The annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, the invasion of Poland, Norway, Belgium, viewed from a more general angle, are a triumph of paganism in that part of Europe where for a thousand years Christianity has reigned, where morals and political philosophy were based on Christian theses. At the present hour the conquerors of those areas do everything they can to exterminate religion, morals, Christian philosophy from the conscience of the subjugated people and to put in their stead the conception of a Nazi-Bolshevik life.

In these circumstances, to defeat Germany, to overthrow Hitler and the Nazi regime, and to create a Commonwealth of Central European nations will not only constitute a victory for democracy, but also the triumph of Christianity over modern idolatry, a triumph of the principles of tolerancy and political liberalism on a territory where for so many years before the war these principles were imperfectly applied, and where at the present time they are being exterminated by means of brutality. After the victory over Germany those devastated territories will require an enormous amount of labour for reconstruction, and the new political conditions will be favourable to the progress of civilization and to the development of a better standard of living for their inhabitants.

## VII

### THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY

**I**N EUROPEAN COUNTRIES there exists a right of damages against an architect for the collapse of a building during or after its construction. In case of the death of the particular architect, the responsibility devolves upon his successor. A similar responsibility exists in industrial societies and in banking corporations; their founders lose their good reputation or may be imprisoned if their business goes bankrupt. But do we find such responsibility in politics? Here the case is quite different. In the domain of social construction, in the domain of state construction, the constructors are responsible only "to history," which means that they have no responsibility whatsoever, though it concerns not a few or a few hundred victims as in the case of the collapse of a building or the bankruptcy of a limited company, but death, wounds, starvation, exile to millions of human beings.

Until now the politicians were not considered responsible for the bankruptcy of the state which they have created. Would it not be fitting for the future peace-makers to institute an effective responsibility for the constructors of states and for those who draw up new boundaries?

It would, however, be difficult to pass this responsibility into practice, as it is not so easy to prove the mistake or negligence of those responsible, or to create a tribunal which would take upon its shoulders the administration of sanctions. In the case where the architect could not be got hold of and his financial responsibility is insufficient, an institution would have to be created which would take in its hands the

interests of the tenants of this new building, and would save them from the consequences of a collapse of the building.

Even during the peace conference of 1919 the majority of its members were aware of the necessity for an organ which would assure the security of the system created. The concrete expression of this consciousness was the League of Nations,<sup>51</sup> which was nothing else than an insurance association receiving from the hands of the architects of Versailles full responsibility for the stability of their construction.

The International Insurance Association of Geneva, founded in 1919 and whose statute was a part of the Treaty of Versailles, had—as it has proved—a faulty construction. After a few decades of existence it went into discreet bankruptcy. In the face of such an experience would it not be advisable to consider from now on what form the guarantee of the solidity of the future European building should take?

The League of Nations lacked something to make it efficient—force. The efforts to organize collective security were but an attempt to find this lacking element of force. They failed, and since 1938 the British Empire has been in a state of profound insecurity through her hesitation to take in time risks in maintaining collective security.

When the present war is over Great Britain may perhaps enter into a closer union with the French Empire and/or with Belgium, Holland and Norway. Whatever form the British Empire may take, it is to be hoped that for the sake of her own security she will not leave the Central European Federation to look after itself. So the New League of Nations might be supplied with the element of force, which would solve the problem of guarantee.

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## NOTES



## NOTES

1. From a collection of Prince Metternich's letters, now in possession of the heirs of Baron Kuebeck, Vienna.

2. After the partitions of Poland by Russia, Prussia and Austria in 1772, 1793 and 1795, Napoleon, having defeated Prussia, constituted by the Treaty of Tilsit (July 7, 1807) out of territories annexed by Prussia the Duchy of Warsaw. The Duchy of Warsaw covered an area of 101,500 square kilometres, and its population amounted to 2,400,000. Napoleon provided for a *Sejm* (Diet) in the Duchy and dictated the constitution. The King of Saxony, Frederick August, a grandson of the Polish king, August III, was appointed ruler. The army of the Duchy of Warsaw consisted of 30,000 soldiers; this army fought victoriously against Austria, adding to the Duchy part of the territories which had been taken by Austria at the time of the partitions of Poland. The army fought also against Russia and for Napoleon in Spain. At the time of Napoleon's war with Russia the army of the Duchy was increased to 100,000 and again assisted Napoleon, covering his retreat from Moscow.

3. In 1813 the Russians occupied the Duchy of Warsaw. The Congress of Vienna (1815) put an end to the Duchy and created the "Polish Kingdom," called "Congress Poland." "Congress Poland" covered 127,320 square kilometres and, though a separate political entity and having its own constitutional charter, was united to Russia in the person of the Russian Tsar, who became at the same time King of Poland. The command of the army was given to the brother of Tsar Alexander I, the grand-duke Constantine, who did much to offend the Poles. In 1830 a rising, called "the November rising," broke out in Warsaw. After the suppression of this insurrection the constitution of "Congress Poland" was withdrawn.

4. Tadeusz Kościuszko, Polish soldier, patriot and statesman, was born in 1746. On entering the corps of cadets at Warsaw he attracted the notice of his superiors, and was sent to Germany, Italy and France at the expense of the State to complete his military education. At Brest, France, he studied fortifications and naval tactics. In 1776 he went to America and entered the

army of Washington as a volunteer, fought for the independence of the colonies and brilliantly distinguished himself, especially at Saratoga and Yorktown. Washington promoted Kościuszko to the rank of a colonel of artillery and made him his adjutant. In 1783 Kościuszko was rewarded for his services to the cause of American independence with the thanks of Congress and the rank of brigadier-general. Kościuszko returned to Poland in 1794. When in 1794 the insurrection broke out against the Russians, Kościuszko took command. On April 3rd he defeated a superior Russian force at Raclawice. However, at Maciejowice (October 10, 1794), when the support on which he relied failed to arrive, the Polish army of 7,000 was almost annihilated by 16,000 Russians. Kościuszko, seriously wounded, was made prisoner. He was conveyed to Russia, where he remained till the accession of Tsar Paul in 1796, who released him from prison. Kościuszko did not take part in Napoleon's campaigns. After the Congress of Vienna he settled in Solothurn (Switzerland), where he died in 1817. His remains were carried to Cracow.

5. After the breaking up of the insurrection of 1794, General Henryk Dąbrowski formed in 1797 in Italy, from officers and soldiers of the Kościuszko army, the Polish Legions. These Legions were intended to be the beginning of a new Polish army. Counting on the assistance and help of Napoleon to restore Poland, the Legions fought for the next ten years in the battles of the French Republic and for Napoleon all over Europe and even outside, from Egypt to the West Indies. The song of the Legions, "Poland is not yet lost as long as we are alive," was always considered as a national song, and after 1918 was officially recognized as the national anthem of the reborn Polish state.

6. The so-called "November rising" started in the night of November 29-30, 1830, a few months after the July revolution in Paris and the rising of Belgium against Holland. News that the Tsar of Russia intended to send the Polish army to Belgium in order to help suppress the movement for independence hastened the outbreak of the November rising. The signal for the rising was given by the instructors of the Cadet School in Warsaw. At first the rising was confined to Warsaw, but later on large masses of civilians began to join the insurrection, which spread all over the country and developed into a Polish-Russian war. Military historians, among them Russians, agree

that the November rising might have been fatal to the power of Russia, but owing to blunders made by the leaders the insurrection ended in October 1831 with the defeat of the Poles. Russia abolished the constitution of 1815 and the *Sejm* (Diet), and the Polish army ceased to be a separate unit. The Russians avowedly aimed at destroying the nationality and even the language of Poland. The use of the Russian language was little by little enforced in the civil administration, in the law courts, etc.

7. The insurrection of 1863 was not backed up by the regular army as was the insurrection of 1830-31. It lacked adequate equipment in arms. Though France, England and Austria made a diplomatic intervention in Petersburg on behalf of the Poles, no positive result was obtained. Russia, assisted by the Prussians, succeeded in suppressing the insurrection within a year and a half. Wholesale executions and confiscations followed. The Poles had approximately 20,000 casualties on the battlefield; about 1,000 were executed; about 15,000 deported to Siberia. Some of the Polish landed estates were distributed as reward among those Russians who took part in the suppression of the insurrection.

8. The Polish Legions which in 1914-18 fought at the side of Austria were formed from Polish youth organizations in Galicia, i.e. that part of Poland which Austria had taken at the end of the 18th century in the dismemberments of Poland. The spiritual leader of these organizations was Jozef Piłsudski, who wished to form a cadre for the future Polish army in the case of war involving Russia. Piłsudski's leading thought was to liberate Poland and to regain independence. On August 6, 1914, the cadre company left Cracow and crossed the Russian frontier. Kielce, a town in Russian Poland, was seized. At the same time, under the auspices of the Chief Polish National Committee (the Polish political body representing Polish interest in Austria), further volunteer regiments were being formed in Galicia. The regiments took the name of "Legions" in commemoration of the Polish legionaries of the time of Napoleon. In the latter part of 1915 the formations increased to seven infantry regiments, two lancers regiments and one artillery regiment. They fought as part of the Austrian army; but at the end of 1916, when the Austrian and the German emperors issued a proclamation on November 5, 1916, holding out a prospect of the restoration of

an independent Polish state, the Legions passed under the German command and were to form the beginning of a Polish army. In 1917, at the outbreak of the Russian revolution, the new Russian government repealed the treaties of the partitions of Poland. The Legions, on Piłsudski's order, refused to take oath to the German command, thus frustrating the German plan of recruiting in Poland. The Germans arrested Piłsudski and his chief of staff, Colonel Sosnkowski, and conveyed them to Magdeburg. A part of the Polish Legions was interned by the Germans, a part embodied in the Austrian army, and the remainder organized later on as the "Polish Auxiliary Corps" under Austrian command. When, after the signing of the Treaty of Brzesc between the Central Powers and Russia (February 9, 1918), some of the Polish territories were ceded to Russia, a part of the "Polish Auxiliary Corps," under the leadership of General Haller, fought its way through the Austrian front to Russia, from where after heavy losses it arrived in France. The Polish army in France was composed of the old legioners, of volunteers of Polish descent from the United States, and of the Poles taken as prisoners of war from the German and Austrian armies. It numbered *circa* 80,000 men.

9. The Treaty of Versailles, concluded on June 28, 1919, placed in effect on January 10, 1920, did not provide for all the boundaries of Poland. Article 27, point 7, provided for the eastern boundary of Germany, thus establishing the western boundary of Poland, but left part of the southern boundary unsettled and subject to plebiscite, the territorial dispositions of which were provided for by Article 88 of the treaty. Article 28 of the treaty provided for the boundaries of East Prussia, thus establishing a northern sector of the Polish boundary; however, this applied only to part of the northern boundary, inasmuch as it was provided there should be a plebiscite. The territory of the plebiscite was provided for by Article 94. Article 87 prescribed the further boundaries of Poland; Article 100 the boundaries of the Free City of Danzig. The eastern boundaries of Poland were not settled by the treaty. The settling of the eastern boundaries of Poland (with the exception of those of Eastern Galicia) followed definitely on March 15, 1923, by a decision of the Conference of Ambassadors of the Allied Powers signatories of the Peace Treaties. As far as the boundaries with Russia were concerned the decision confirmed the rules laid down by the

Polish-Soviet Treaty of Peace, signed in Riga on March 18, 1921, after the victorious war of Poland against Russia. Russia conceded to Poland the district of Vilna with the town of Vilna and former East Galicia. After the final settling of the Polish boundaries their length was as follows: German frontier, 1,912 kilometres; Soviet Russia frontier, 1,412 kilometres; Czechoslovakian frontier, 984 kilometres; Lithuanian frontier, 507 kilometres; Rumanian frontier, 349 kilometres; Danzig frontier, 121 kilometres; Latvian frontier, 109 kilometres.

If Poland, following the example of France, had intended to fortify her frontier with Germany, the Polish "Maginot Line" would have been 1,912 kilometres long instead of 174 kilometres, representing the length of the Franco-German frontier.

The enclosed map shows the frontiers of Poland during the following periods: (1) The period of greatest territorial possession before the peace treaties of 1660 and 1667; (2) before the first partition in 1772; (3) the frontiers of Poland after the year 1919. Before the first partition Poland covered 733,500 square kilometres. The population was eleven and a half millions. The first partition (1772) deprived Poland of about one-third of her area; after the first partition Poland covered 520,000 square kilometres and had seven and a half million inhabitants. After the second partition (1793) an area of 212,000 square kilometres and three million inhabitants were left to Poland.

10. Modern Rumania was originally formed out of two duchies lying on the lower Danube: Walachia and Moldavia. After a few centuries under Turkish sovereignty these two duchies were united in 1858 into an independent state which was recognized by Turkey in 1861. Rumania has been a kingdom since 1881. In 1916 Rumania entered the World War on the side of the Allies. Meanwhile the Austrian and the German troops occupied Rumania, which was compelled to sign in May, 1918, a peace treaty with the Central Powers under very unfavourable conditions. After the defeat of the Central Powers, Rumania regained the occupied territories and received new ones, increasing her area of 138,000 square kilometres to 295,000 square kilometres. On the break-up of the Russian Empire, Bessarabia was incorporated into Rumania. Rumania has frontiers against Soviet Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and commands a part of the Black Sea shores. Her population in 1935 was over nineteen millions.

11. Bulgaria, first established as a kingdom in the 7th century, was suppressed and annexed to Turkey in the 14th century (1396-1878). The Treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878), signed between Russia and Turkey, liberated Bulgaria from Turkey. The latter ceded to Bulgaria most of her possessions on the Balkan peninsula: Macedonia and part of Thrace. The Treaty of San Stefano gave to Russia, for the time being, the right to administer Bulgaria. Russia provided the country with armaments and organized the civil and military administration. However, in the same year the Treaty of Berlin (July, 1878) reduced the principality of Bulgaria in favour of Rumania, Serbia and Turkey. The dependency on Turkey ended in 1908, when Tsar Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha proclaimed the independence of Bulgaria.

12. The White Russians are a Slav tribe and use a language containing elements similar to the Polish and Russian languages. After the rise of Lithuania in the 13th century, White Russia became subject to the Lithuanian princes. When the Lithuanian Prince Jagiello, by his marriage to the Polish Queen Jadwiga, became King of Poland (1386), White Russia, together with Lithuania, was united with Poland. With the exception of Smolensk, which was seized by the Russians in 1667, most of White Russia came under Russian rule in the first partition of Poland (1772); by the following partitions of Poland, Russia acquired all the rest of White Russia.

13. The Polish language, the Little Russian language (called in modern times "Ukrainian"), the Russian (Great Russian) and the White Ruthenian languages are the produce of evolution of old Slav language and show traces of influence of languages of those nations with whom they were in contact. Thus the Little Russian language is in a large degree influenced by the Polish language. It is characteristic that in 1816, at the time when the Austrian Government intended to reform the educational system in the schools of East Galicia, the commission entrusted to study the local language in order to eventually introduce it into the schools stated that the "Little Russian" language is only a variation of the Polish language. Until the beginning of the 20th century scholars regarded the Little Russian language (for which the term "Ruthene language" is also used) as a dialect. It was only in 1905 that the Academy of Sciences in St. Peters-

burg recognized the Little Russian language as a Slav language separate from the Russian language. (See S. Smolka, *Les Ruthenes et les problèmes religieux du monde russe*, Berne, 1917, p. 262.)

14. The Polish-Russian hostilities lasted from the end of 1918 to 1920. Towards the last they reached a stage of decisive action. Poland concluded with the Ukrainians, under Ataman Petlura, an agreement having as aim the creation of a Ukrainian state. On May 8, 1920, the Polish-Ukrainian troops entered Kiev, designated to become the capital of the Ukraine. Owing to a counter-offensive of the Bolsheviks the Polish-Ukrainian troops left Kiev on June 11th; on July 14th the Bolsheviks seized Vilno and handed it over to the Lithuanians. It was at the gates of Warsaw that the Russian troops were defeated and started to retreat on August 15th. The battle fought on the Niemen river (end of September) resulted in the complete defeat of the Russian forces. Armistice was concluded on October 18, 1920. The final treaty was signed in Riga on March 18, 1921, establishing the eastern frontiers of Poland. The eastern frontiers of Poland were recognized by the Conference of Ambassadors on March 15, 1923.

15. This refers to the Prussian province of Upper Silesia, established after 1921 from territories of the former Regency of Oppeln minus certain areas assigned to Poland by the Treaty of Versailles and by the plebiscite. According to German official statistics of 1910, this territory, later on allotted to Germany by the plebiscite, was inhabited in 1910 by 577,254 Poles and by only 406,842 Germans. Inasmuch as 182,288 German immigrants took part in the plebiscite, the number of Germans who voted for Germany in 1921 was much higher than was the total German population of 1910 in that particular area, although the number of voters was 30 per cent less than the population of 1910. Out of a total of 686,306 votes, 486,714 votes were cast for Germany and 198,378 for Poland. The discrepancy between the number of Poles living in the plebiscite area and the number of votes cast for Poland is explained by the vote of German emigrants as well as extreme terrorism of German organizations. In the area allotted to Germany there were 322 communities in which the majority had voted for Poland. In the whole plebiscite territory 699 communities (including 9 cities) cast their votes for

POLAND AND CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER THE WAR

Poland and 754 communities (including 32 cities) for Germany. In spite of this, Germany received 7,661·2 square kilometres, and Poland only 3,224·6 square kilometres. Thus, though nearly half of the communities voted for Poland, Poland received less than one-third of the territory. In the territory allotted to Poland there were 377 communities which voted for Poland and only 73 communities in which the majority voted for adherence to Germany. According to official German statistics of 1910, the area was inhabited by 68·5 per cent of Poles (576,523 Poles and 258,045 Germans). The following index showing data on the percentage of Polish population in 1910 and of votes cast for Poland in 1921 indicates the paradoxical picture resulting from the plebiscite :

<i>County</i>	<i>1910 Population Per cent</i>	<i>1921 Plebiscite Per cent</i>
Wielkie Strzelce .. ..	79·2	50·6
Kozle .. ..	75·1	25·1
Kluczborg .. ..	53·0	3·9
Lubliniec .. ..	79·3	46·9
Opole rural district .. ..	75·8	30·5
Raciborz town .. ..	30·0	9·0
Raciborz rural district .. ..	79·0	41·1
Olesno .. ..	80·7	31·8
Rybnik .. ..	77·8	65·1
Gliwice rural district .. ..	76·4	57·3
Prudnik .. ..	75·2	11·9

In spite of a favourable result of the plebiscite for Poland, the following counties or parts of counties were allotted to Germany :

<i>County</i>	<i>Percentage of votes for Poland</i>	<i>Percentage of Poles inhabiting the area in 1910</i>
Wielkie Strzelce .. ..	50·6	79·2
A part of the county of Bytom .. ..	61·8	65·7
A part of the county of Gliwice, rural district .. ..	56·3	76·0
A part of the county of Rybnik .. ..	51·9	80·3
A part of the county of Tarnow- skie Gory .. ..	76·1	79·4

Besides the aforementioned counties, other counties or parts of counties were allotted to Germany in which there was a Polish

NOTES

majority in 1910. However, in the plebiscite the majority of votes was cast for Germany:

County	Percentage of the Polish population in 1910	Percentage of Polish votes in the plebiscite of 1921
Kozle .. .. .	75·1	25·1
Olesno .. .. .	80·7	31·8
Opole rural district .. .. .	75·8	30·5
Prudnik .. .. .	75·2	11·9
A part of the county of Lubliniec	76·9	40·8
A part of the county of Raciborz, rural district .. .. .	72·7	32·5

The paradoxical result of the plebiscite, especially in reference to the number of votes which were cast for Poland, is shown by the following table which shows the percentage of votes cast for Poland in the plebiscite of 1921 in comparison with Polish votes in November, 1922, for the *Sejm* (Diet) elections:

County	1921 Per cent	1922 Per cent
Katowice .. .. .	49·7	65·6
Swietochlowice .. .. .	58·0	71·6
Krolewska Huta .. .. .	25·3	36·4
Tarnowskie Gory .. .. .	55·4	72·5
Lubliniec .. .. .	49·8	81·7
Rybnik .. .. .	67·4	83·8
Pszczyna .. .. .	74·2	86·1

(See K. Firich, *Polskosc Gornego Slaska*, 1921; St. Dziewulski, *Wyniki plebiscytu na Gornym Slasku*, wydanie 2, 1922; Lutman, *Straznica Zachodu*, vii, 1928, p. 235.)

16. Articles 94-97 of the Treaty of Versailles provided for a plebiscite in East Prussia. Article 94 prescribed the territory of the plebiscite; Articles 95-97 the procedure of the plebiscite. The plebiscite took place on July 18, 1920, at the time when the Polish troops engaged in a war with Soviet Russia were retreating. The plebiscite was unfavourable to Poland. Except for a narrow strip of land on the right bank of the Vistula river and one county (Dzialdowo), the whole territory was allotted to Germany.

17. Article 88 and the annex to Article 88 of the Treaty of Versailles provided for the plebiscite in Upper Silesia. It was

decided that Germans born on the plebiscite territory, though not inhabiting the area, could take part in the plebiscite; this decision was not provided for by the Treaty of Versailles. Germany sent over 182,000 such voters into the territory. German local authorities and clandestine German organizations oppressed the Polish population with the help of armed bands. The Polish population, refusing to yield to terror, took up arms. The plebiscite took place on March 30, 1921. At the rumour of an unjust allotment to Poland, a third armed rising of the Polish population occurred against the Germans on May 3, 1921. A commission of the Council of the League of Nations in October, 1921, awarded the major part of the coal basin and the mining and metallurgy district to Poland. The following counties were assigned to Poland: the county of Krolewska Huta, of Pszczyna, of Katowice (town and rural district); Germany was allotted Bytom (town), Gliwice (town), Glupczyce, Kluczborg, Kozle, Olesno (town), Opole (town), Opole (rural district), Prudnik, Raciborz (town) and Wielkie Strzelce. Bytom (rural district), Gliwice (rural district), Lubliniec, Raciborz (rural district), Rybnik, Tarnowskie Gory and Zabrze were divided between the two countries.

18. The Minorities Treaty was signed in Versailles in June, 1919, between the United States of North America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan on the one side and Poland on the other; the treaty entered into force at the same time as the Treaty of Versailles. The treaty describes the obligations of Poland as follows: "Article 2. Poland undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Poland without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion." The treaty prescribes Polish citizenship on the basis of place of residence, of birth, or by option. On the basis of Article 7, "All Polish nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion." Article 8 states once more distinctly that "Polish nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Polish nationals."

Similar obligations were taken by Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia in separate treaties. Powers defeated in the World War took similar obligations by signing their respective treaties: Austria by the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, Hun-

garia by the Treaty of Trianon, Bulgaria by the Treaty of Neuilly. But Germany was exempt from such obligations.

19. Damages caused by the war of 1914-18 on the territory of Poland were estimated to amount to fourteen billion gold francs. For particulars see *Histoire Economique et Sociale de la Guerre Mondiale (Serie Polonaise)* in "Publications de la Dotation Carnegie pour la Paix Internationale, etc." Paris, 1933.

20. The Polish bank of issue is the Bank of Poland. It was created on April 27, 1924, by private subscription and was not dependent on the government.

21. In 1918, at the time of Poland's restoration, there were five units of currency on her territory (the Austrian crown, the German mark, the Russian rouble, the Polish occupation mark and the Polish mark issued after November 11, 1918). A unification of currencies was carried out in 1920, and the Polish mark became the sole currency. However, during the five years of its existence the Polish mark was subject to increasing inflation. In 1924, when the circulating medium increased from 17,934 millions to the vertiginous amount of 570,698,000 millions, a currency reform was carried out at the time of the creation of the Bank of Poland by introducing a new currency unit, the zloty. The mark was taken out of circulation on the basis of 1,800,000 to 1 zloty. The zloty was declared equal to the Swiss gold franc. This reform was effected without the help of any foreign capital. In the autumn of 1927 another stabilization was carried out at the rate of 8.91 zlotys to 1 dollar. The new stabilization was carried out on the basis of a loan obtained from foreign banks, mostly American, amounting to 62 million dollars and to 2 million pounds. The Bank of Poland also secured a credit from fourteen issuing banks to the amount of 20 million dollars.

22. In 1226 the Teutonic Knights were invited by the Polish Duke Conrad of Masovia to settle in the district to-day roughly corresponding to modern East Prussia in order to protect his territories against the incursions of the heathen Prussians, a race closely akin to the Lithuanians. The Teutonic Knights conquered the territory of the Prussians, exterminated most of the native population, and invited German peasants and townspeople into the country as settlers. Thus the Order of the Teutonic Knights took

its place as the founder of one of the "marks" beyond the eastern frontier of Germany, forcibly extending the German colonization. The peace of Torun (1466) ended a thirteen-year war between Poland and the Order; East Prussia was made a fief of Poland. In 1525 the Grand Master of the Order, Albrecht von Hohenzollern, proclaimed himself hereditary Duke of Prussia. East Prussia remained a fief of Poland until 1657. In 1701 East Prussia became a kingdom; Frederick I, Elector of Brandenburg, crowned himself in Koenigsberg as King of Prussia. Present-day East Prussia covers an area of about 37,000 square kilometres and has almost two and a half million inhabitants. East Prussia forms an enclave within the territory of Poland between the lower Vistula and the lower Niemen river. The boundaries of East Prussia were provided for by Article 28 of the Treaty of Versailles. The so-formed East Prussia included the district of Warmia (Ermeland), Malborg (Marienburg) and Elblag (Elbing), which belonged to Poland until the end of the 18th century.

23. Krolewicz (Koenigsberg), an important harbour on the Baltic Sea, strongly fortified; it has about 280,000 inhabitants and is the capital of East Prussia. The air-line distance between Krolewicz and Warsaw is 270 kilometres.

24. Elblag (Elbing) belonged to Poland from 1466 to 1772, with the status of a free city. Elblag is an important business centre, and has about 70,000 inhabitants.

25. Article 89 of the Treaty of Versailles established the fundamental freedom of communication between Germany and East Prussia. This Article prescribes: "Poland undertakes to accord freedom of transit to persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails in transit between East Prussia and the rest of Germany over Polish territory, including territorial waters, and to treat them at least as favourably as the persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails respectively of Polish or of any other more favoured nationality, origin, importation, starting-point, or ownership as regards facilities, restrictions and all other matters. Goods in transit shall be exempt from all customs and other similar duties."

Furthermore, by Article 98 of the Treaty of Versailles Germany and Poland have undertaken to enter within one year into conventions "with the object of securing, on the one hand, to

Germany full and adequate railroad, telegraphic and telephonic facilities for communication between the rest of Germany and East Prussia over the intervening Polish territory, and on the other hand to Poland full and adequate railroad, telegraphic and telephonic facilities for communication between Poland and the Free City of Danzig over any German territory that may, on the right bank of the Vistula, intervene between Poland and the Free City of Danzig." Such a convention was signed on April 21, 1921, in Paris and entered into force on June 1, 1922. The convention went beyond the limits prescribed by Article 98 of the Treaty of Versailles. It was not confined to the railway, telegraphic and telephonic communications, but it included also the normalization of navigation, automobile and military traffic. (This is distinctly stated in the memorandum presented to the Parliament of the Reich by the German Foreign Office for ratification of the convention, *Denkschrift des Auswaertigen Amtes zum Gesetz ueber das Durchgangsabkommen*, Reichstagsdrucksache Nr. 2191 of 1921.) In particular, with reference to the military traffic, it was established that the Germans have the right to use one train each week carrying soldiers and soldiers on leave and one train carrying war equipment. The transit was carried out to the entire satisfaction of Germany and gave no cause for any complaint. This fact is acknowledged by the *Report of the Management of the German Railways in Koenigsberg* (Reichsbahndirektion Koenigsberg) published in the second part of 1923 in the pamphlet, *Ostpreussens Wirtschaft und Verkehr vor und nach dem Kriege*; it emphasizes and gives credit to the fact that Poland scrupulously carries out her agreement obligations, and that in view of the excellent functioning of transit traffic the question of directing traffic from Germany to East Prussia by waterways does not come in consideration.

26. "The corridor" is the German designation of the strip of land on the lower Vistula river which was allotted to Poland by the Treaty of Versailles, and which separated East Prussia and the Free City of Danzig from Germany. "The corridor" covers the area which after a period of changes was permanently joined to Poland in 1466 and remained under Polish rule until the end of the 18th century, when it was annexed by Prussia. Though the Polish language was suppressed in the schools after 1873, and in spite of strong German colonization, the Germans were not able to Germanize the country; on the contrary, as proved

by official Prussian statistics, the Polish element was increasing steadily. (See K. Smogorzewski, *La Pomeranie polonaise*, Paris, 1932.) The following figures giving the percentage of Poles in 1831, 1861, 1890 and 1910 in three counties illustrate this fact:

	1831 Per cent	1861 Per cent	1890 Per cent	1910 Per cent
Chelmno	38·8	49·7	52·2	54·0
Swiecie	34·8	46·7	52·5	52·9
Koscierzyna	43·1	52·1	54·2	57·8

It is a characteristic symptom that eight counties which formed the northern part of "the corridor," and which represented three electoral districts in 1871-1912 (Kartuzy-Puck-Wejherowo; Koscierzyna-Starogard-Tczew; Chojnice-Tuchola), have never elected a German as their deputy to the Reichstag. During this period twelve elections to the Reichstag took place. According to the German statistics of 1910, the territory of the "corridor" had 976,287 inhabitants. The German statistics took into consideration the "mother tongue" (not the nationality), whereby a perfidious distinction was made between the Polish language and the "Kashubian" and "Mazurian" languages. The difference between the Polish language and the "Kashubian" and "Mazurian" dialects is about the same as between Oxford English and English spoken in Devonshire or Lancashire. Yet the German statistics considered only those persons as Poles who gave as their mother language the Polish language, and not those who specified the "Kashubian" or the "Mazurian" languages, or who were bilingual. In order to obtain the actual number of Poles it is necessary to add to the number of Polish language inhabitants mentioned by the German statistics the Kashubs and the Mazurians and half of the bilingual inhabitants. The result thus obtained shows that in 1910 there were 56·7 per cent Poles, 41·6 per cent Germans and 1·6 per cent other nationalities on the territory of the "corridor." (See K. Kierski, *Pomorze Polskie*, Poznan, 1928.)

27. Danzig is mentioned at the turn of the 10th and 11th centuries as belonging to the dukes of Pomerania, who were dependants of Poland. In the 13th century a colony of merchants from Luebeck settled in Danzig. The Teutonic Order seized Danzig in 1308, massacring its inhabitants; but in 1454 Danzig

shook off its yoke and submitted to the Polish king, Kazimierz Jagiellonczyk. Under the Polish rule Danzig was organized as an autonomous republic, with the full right to conduct foreign policy and with its own currency. The union with Poland, which lasted until 1793 (second partition of Poland) was very prosperous to Danzig. In 1793 Danzig fell to Prussia and remained under Prussian rule until 1919—with the exception of 1807–14, during which period it was a Free City under the protection of France. Danzig and a part of the surrounding country was given by the Treaty of Versailles the status of a Free City. It covered an area of 1,892 square kilometres and had a population of 400,000. It was under the protection of the League of Nations, which was represented in Danzig by its own High Commissioner. The conduct of the Free City's foreign relations was entrusted to the Polish Government, and the city was included within the Polish customs area.

28. The Polish king, Stanislaw August (reigned from 1764 to 1795), was strongly under the influence of Russia. A group of Polish patriots, endeavouring to liberate their country from Russian influence, formed in 1768 at Bar a patriotic confederation known as the Confederation of Bar. Kazimierz Pułaski, born in 1747, took a prominent part in the activity of the Confederation. Some of the confederates, among them Pułaski, decided to seize the king. However, the plan failed, and Pułaski was driven into exile. He went to America, where he joined the army of Washington. He fought for the independence of the colonies and organized the American cavalry. Mortally wounded at Savannah during an assault against the British fortifications, he died on October 11, 1779, on the ship which was used to evacuate wounded soldiers. His body was buried at sea.

29. The term "Ukraine" was applied for the first time in the 16th century. It designated territories of the Polish state of that time which lay on both sides of the Dnieper river. From the 9th to the 12th century the Duchy of Kiev occupied this area and was the centre of the eastern Slavs. At the beginning of the 13th century the Tartars invaded the Duchy of Kiev, but in the 14th century the Lithuanians freed the duchy, which later on in 1569, together with Lithuania, went over to Poland. By the Treaty of Andruszev (1667) Poland ceded to Russia the eastern part of the Ukraine, i.e. the territory on the left bank of the

Dnieper river, including Kiev. The remainder of the Ukraine (Podolia and Volhynia) was annexed by Russia in 1772. Galicia, however, in the eastern part of which the Ukrainian element (Little Russian, or Ruthenian) was predominant, was annexed in 1772 by Austria.

In the 19th century the term "Ukraine" started to be used in describing all territories inhabited by Little Russians (Ruthenes), and gradually the name of "Ukrainians" was applied to designate the inhabitants. Ukraine included three fundamental groups of East Slavs: (1) the Polesians (inhabitants of Polesia); (2) the Ukrainians proper (the Ukrainians of the Dnieper and of the eastern part of Podolia and Volhynia); (3) the Podolo-Halicz group (in Polish Galicia). (See L. Wasilewski, *Kresy Wschodnie*, Warszawa, 1917.)

30. The solidarity of the Poles, the Czechs, the Slovaks and the Ukrainians, which is referred to here, has nothing in common with the so-called "Panslavism." "Panslavism" is a doctrine according to which all peoples of Slav origin are of the same race as the Russians and form one family in which Russia is the oldest member. During the 19th century and until the World War the doctrine of "Panslavism" was a political instrument of Russia, facilitating the penetration of Russian influence in the Balkans, in the direction of Constantinople and the Adriatic Sea. In the name of this doctrine Russian writers have summoned "all Slav streams" to converge into "a common, great Russian sea," and they condemned the tendency of the Poles to shake off the Russian yoke as being a "treason to Slav interests."

The doctrine of "Panslavism" is based on the conception that Russia is a Slav country and that the Russians are Slavs. However, this is not the case. In the first part of the 13th century the territory of present-day European Russia, which was inhabited by tribes of Finnish and Slav origin, was conquered by an army of horsemen whose chief commander and emperor resided in Peking. Among historians the nomenclature of "Tartar" was adopted as the name for those invaders. In fact, however, modern research has disclosed that they were Chinese and certain Asiatic tribes subject to Chinese rule who had been conquered by the Mongols. In the middle of the 13th century the eastern boundary of Poland formed the western boundary of Chinese rule. (See, among others, the report of Joannes de Plano Carpini, who was sent by Pope Innocent IV to China in 1245 to Kuyuk Khan,

a grandson of Ghengis Khan. This report was published in the book, *Contemporaries of Marco Polo*, by M. Komroff, London, 1929. See also *La Pologne et ses frontières*, by the Marquis de Noailles, Paris, 1863; new abbreviated edition under the title, *Les frontières de la Pologne*, Paris, 1915.) The Grand Duchy of Moscow and the neighbouring duchies were for two and a half centuries (1240-1490) under the domination of the successors of Ghengis Khan, residing in Peking, and became independent only at the break-up of the monarchy of Ghengis Khan. The result of the centuries-long occupation of the Muscovite territories was that Central Russia, so-called "ethnological Russia" (coinciding with the area of the former Grand Duchy of Moscow), has a population of a mixed Finnish-Slav-Tartar type. Russian ethnographers speak of this fact distinctly.

There existed before the World War a school of Russian scholars (among them Prince Uchtomskii was the most prominent) who emphasized the fact that as far as race is concerned the next-of-kin of the Russians are neither the Poles nor the Czechs, but the Chinese. Russian diplomacy and propaganda, Tsarist as well as of the present Soviet regime, in dealing in Asia continually stresses the blood ties which unite the Russians with the Chinese. Seen in this light the whole Russian doctrine of "Panslavism" was and remains nothing but a propaganda slogan which has no foundation in fact or history.

As far as Russia after the war of 1914-18 is concerned, the Bolshevik statistics, in agreement with statistics of former Tsarist Russia, show that the Great Russians form a minority within the Russian state which rules the majority consisting of a mosaic of peoples of Slav origin (Ukrainians and White Ruthenians) and of non-Slav origin (Tartars, Georgians, Kirghiz, Armenians, etc.). Even in European Russia, according to statistics of 1932, the Great Russians do not represent as much as a half of the entire population. (See *Geographie universelle* publiée sous la direction de P. Vidal de la Blache et L. Gallois, vol. v, *Etats de la Baltique, Russie*, par Camena d'Almeida, 1932, p. 100.)

31. Wladyslaw Jagiellonczyk became King of Bohemia in 1471; in 1490 he became also King of Hungary. He was succeeded by his son Louis, who perished in 1526 in the battle of Mohacz, when the Magyar kingdom went down before the Turk. The Bohemians then elected as their king Ferdinand of Habsburg, the husband of Louis' sister. The union of the crowns of Austria,

Hungary and Bohemia, which was to last for nearly four centuries, brought about the creation of the great Habsburg dominion.

32. The Little Entente was a political agreement between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania, created after the World War chiefly by the initiative of Beneš, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister at that time, and for the purpose of defending their common interests against the revendications of Hungary and preventing the return of the Habsburgs to the throne of Austria-Hungary. The political agreement was later on extended to include economic agreement.

33. From the 10th century Silesia was a part of the Polish state. In the 12th century Silesia broke up into small duchies, whereby Teschen Silesia (with the capital at Teschen) remained a sovereign duchy under the rule of the dukes of Teschen of the Piast house. At the end of the 13th century the Duchy of Teschen Silesia transferred its allegiance from Poland to Bohemia, and in 1625, when the dukes of the Piast dynasty died out, the duchy was incorporated into Bohemia. Under the reign of the Austrian Habsburgs, Teschen Silesia formed a separate administrative unit and retained its Polish character. According to Austrian statistics of 1910, 47·6 per cent of the population of Teschen Silesia was Polish, 38·5 per cent Czech, and 11·7 per cent German. After the World War, Teschen Silesia was taken by force by Czechoslovakia, in spite of the Polish-Czech provisional agreement of September, 1918, recognizing Teschen Silesia and the town of Teschen as Polish territory. The plebiscite, which was to solve finally the conflict about Teschen, did not take place because Poland was at war with Russia and resigned from the plebiscite, agreeing to have the matter settled by the Council of Ambassadors (agreement of Spa, July 10, 1920). On July 28, 1920, by the decision of the Council of Ambassadors, Teschen Silesia was divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia (Poland obtained 1,002 square kilometres, Czechoslovakia 1,280 square kilometres). The town of Teschen was divided between the two countries.

34. Weakened by war occupation, having a small and inadequately equipped army, no armament factories, no ammunition and no war equipment, Poland was at the time of the war with Soviet Russia in 1920 in a difficult position. In view of the malevolent attitude of Germany, the only direct route from the

Western Powers to Poland was via Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia, however, decided not to let any transit shipment of arms pass through her territory to Poland (compare *The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World*, by Viscount D'Abernon, London, 1931).

35. Aristide Briand, French statesman (1862–1932), held office in almost every French Cabinet from 1906 to 1931 as minister of foreign affairs, of justice or of public instruction.

36. Francis Joseph I, born in 1830 of the house of Habsburg, reigned as Austrian Emperor and King of Hungary from 1848 to 1916. The year of his accession to the throne was a year of bloody revolutions in Hungary, in Austrian Poland and in Bohemia. After meeting with varying success in several wars, Austria was defeated by Prussia in the battles of Sadowa and Koeniggratz in 1866. As a consequence Austria not only suffered territorial losses (Venice was ceded to Italy), but lost hegemony in the German Federation in favour of Prussia. (The German Federation—*Deutscher Bund*—was created by the Congress of Vienna (1815); it consisted of thirty states under the leadership of Austria, which were formerly included in the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.”) In 1867 Austria was changed from an absolutist state into a modern constitutional state, based on principles of equal rights for all citizens, parliamentary rule and an autonomy for individual provinces. Galicia (i.e. the part of Poland under Austrian reign), Bohemia and other so-called Crown lands were assigned provincial diets. The year 1867 brought also the compromise with Hungary, based on autonomy, independence and equality of rights of both parts of the monarchy; Austria and Hungary were not only united under the person of the ruler, but also by so-called “common interest” such as the army, foreign affairs, and later on by the political and financial administration of Bosnia and Hercegovina. After the constitutional reform Austria-Hungary lived in peace for almost half a century. The World War of 1914 broke out at the end of Francis Joseph’s reign. Its outcome was fatal to Austria-Hungary. After the death of Emperor Francis Joseph the Archduke Charles, a grandson of the brother of the late emperor, ascended the throne under the name of Charles the First.

37. This manifesto announced a reconstruction of Austria into a federated state, in which “each national state was to form on

its territory its own constitutional organism." This reconstruction was to be carried out with the co-operation of all interested nations and in agreement with their desires. However, this manifesto concerned only Austria and not Hungary; it also specified that the reconstruction of Austria does not foresee a union of the Polish territories under Austrian rule with an independent Poland. The new status was to be a guarantee of the autonomy of each nation, a defence of common interests in cases where such common interests were of vital necessity. The existing Austrian institutions were to remain in force until the constitutional reform was carried out. The manifesto, however, was belated inasmuch as a few days prior to its proclamation the Government of the United States declared in a note to the Austrian Government that the autonomy of Czechoslovakia and of the southern Slavs was insufficient and could not be the foundation of peace.

The Austrian emperor, Charles I, foreseeing a catastrophe, endeavoured in vain to influence allied Germany to conclude an early peace. His secret attempts for a separate peace for Austria failed. The defeat of the Central Powers in 1918 induced the emperor to resign and to leave the country. During his sojourn in Switzerland he made an unsuccessful attempt (1921) to return to the Hungarian throne. This failure resulted in his internment on the Madeira Islands, where he died in 1922.

38. Resolution taken at the meeting of the "Kolo Polskie" on May 28, 1917. The "Kolo Polskie" was the name for the group of Polish deputies to the Austrian Parliament in Vienna.

39. Three possibilities of solving the problem of Czechoslovakia were considered in the memorandum of the British Foreign Office prepared in the autumn of 1916: (1) the creation of an independent Czechoslovakian state; (2) union of Czechoslovakia and Austria; (3) union of Czechoslovakia with Poland. (See *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, by D. Lloyd George, vol. i, London, 1938.)

It was decided at the Peace Conference to create an independent Czechoslovakian state consisting of Bohemia, Slovakia and sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, carved out of Austria and Hungary and covering a combined area of over 140,000 square kilometres. Czechoslovakia had frontiers against Germany (1,530 kilometres), against Poland (920 kilometres), against Rumania (180 kilo-

metres), against Hungary (570 kilometres) and Austria (310 kilometres). As far as the mixture of population is concerned, Czechoslovakia presented the same problem as the former Austrian monarchy. With the exception of Italians and the southern Slavs, Czechoslovakia is populated by all those nationalities which dwelt in former Austria: Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, Poles, Hungarians, Ruthenians and Rumanians. Out of a total of 13,374,364 inhabitants in 1921, there were 42·2 per cent Czechs (5,660,937), 23·3 per cent Slovaks (3,100,000), 23·4 per cent Germans (3,123,568), 5·6 per cent Hungarians, 3·5 per cent Ruthenians. In 1935 the population of Czechoslovakia amounted to over 15 millions.

Until 1939 Slovakia was a part of Czechoslovakia. It covers the mountainous territory of the Western Carpathians east of the Morava river (a confluent of the Danube). In the beginning of the 10th century this country was occupied by the Magyars; later on it was alternatively under Czech and under Polish rule. In the 11th century it came under the Hungarian rule. After the World War Slovakia was incorporated by decision of the Treaty of Trianon (1920) into Czechoslovakia as an autonomous unit, with the capital at Bratislava. It has frontiers against Poland, Rumania, sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, Hungary, Moravia. The area is about 49,000 square kilometres, and the population in 1931 amounted to 3,330,885. The Slovakian language belongs to the group of Western Slav languages. According to the Czechoslovakian constitution, the Slovakian language was the official language of Slovakia and had equal rights with the Czech language. In the southern part of Slovakia the Hungarian element predominates. In 1921 this element amounted to 21·5 per cent of the entire population.

Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia was, until October, 1939, the easternmost autonomous administrative unit of the Czechoslovakian State. The pre-World-War boundaries of Hungary and Galicia form the northern and the north-eastern boundary of this area, which covers over 12,000 square kilometres and has a population of over 600,000. During several centuries this territory was under Hungarian rule. The peace treaty concluded at Trianon in 1920 with Hungary, to which sub-Carpathian Ruthenia owes its official name, separated sub-Carpathian Ruthenia from Hungary and incorporated it in the newly formed Czechoslovakian State as a separate autonomous unit. After the

annexation of the Sudeten district of Czechoslovakia by Germany, sub-Carpathian Ruthenia was occupied by Hungary. According to statistics of 1921, the population of sub-Carpathian Ruthenia included 61·8 per cent Ruthenians (Greek-Catholic religion) and 17·2 per cent Hungarians. The rest was composed of Jews and Czechs. The language of the Ukrainian population in sub-Carpathian Ruthenia has a local colouring.

40. Yugoslavia was created after the World War from the union of parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire with Serbia and, at a slightly later date, with Montenegro. It united the Slavs of Southern Europe. Until 1929 the name of the country was "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes." Yugoslavia has an area of 248,665 square kilometres. Its population is increasing steadily: in 1921 the population was about 12 millions; in 1935 it amounted to almost 15 millions. Yugoslavia has frontiers against Italy in the west, against Austria and Hungary in the north, against Rumania and Bulgaria in the east, and against Greece and Albania in the south. The length of its coast on the Adriatic Sea is 1,571 kilometres.

41. "Successor States" is a term applied to states which were formed out of the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy after the World War, on the basis of the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye with regard to Austria (September 10, 1919) and the Treaty of Trianon with regard to Hungary (June 4, 1920). The "Successor States" took over some of the obligations of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy; hence the derivation of the term indicating their succession in legal and administrative matters.

42. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy, including Bosnia and the Hercegovine, had an area of 675,887 square kilometres. The French Republic covers an area of 550,986 square kilometres.

43. In 1860-61 Galicia and other Austrian provinces were assigned Diets; the constitutional decree of 1867 granted to individual nations of the Austrian territory inviolable rights to preserve and cultivate their national aspirations and language, equality of rights towards all languages used in the Crown lands in schools, offices and in public life. In 1867 the Polish language, which up till then was prohibited and banned from the schools, was introduced into the schools of Galicia, and an autonomous

school council was created; in 1869 the Polish language was introduced in law courts and in the civil administration of the country. In 1872 this autonomy was extended to the school legislation, and the Polish language was introduced in the two universities of Galicia, Lwow and Cracow. The Cracow Academy of Sciences was created in 1872, and the High Polytechnical School in Lwow in 1874. Contrary to Russia and Germany, where the policy aimed to oppress the Polish nationality and to suppress every symptom of Polish national spirit, the Poles in Galicia had after 1867 favourable conditions to develop their national culture.

44. The plateau has a form of a quadrangle and is surrounded by the Sudetes, the Metalliferous and the Shumava Mountains, the Bohemian Forest (Böhmerwald), the Bohemian and Moravian Hills.

45. Silesia passed from the hands of Poland to Bohemia in 1335. Then Silesia passed to Austria, when the Habsburgs in 1620 became rulers of Bohemia. Prussia wrested Silesia from Austria in three wars (so-called "Silesian Wars"): (a) the war 1740-42, ended by the Treaty of Breslau on June 11, 1742; (b) the war 1744-45, ended by the Treaty of Dresden on December 25, 1745; (c) Seven Years' War, 1756-63, ended by the Treaty of Hubertsburg on February 15, 1763.

Professor L. Eisenmann, of Paris University, expressed the following opinion as to the results of annexation of Silesia by Prussia: "The conquest of Silesia by Prussia ended the so-called 'war of hegemony in Germany.' Thanks to the annexation of Silesia, Prussia got . . . the upper hand in Germany and on the other side a stronger material base of her power. . . . This fact radically changed the balance of forces between Prussia and Austria and condemned Austria—in a later moment—to be excluded from Germany. One could say, using a formula brutal in its simplicity, that Sadowa was an unavoidable consequence of the peace of Breslau." (Professor L. Eisenmann, Conference faite le 19 Mars, 1931. Voir: *La Silesie Polonaise*, Paris, 1932.)

46. Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord (1754-1838), French diplomat and statesman. In ecclesiastic orders he rose to the position of Bishop of Autun, but after a few years resigned. In 1797 he became French Minister of Foreign Affairs. He served Napoleon, later on became follower of the Bourbons, and in 1815

he represented France under Louis XVIII at the Congress of Vienna.

47. The term *Junkers* is a German word designating the younger members of a noble family. In Germany's political life this term is applied to owners of large landed estates situated in north-east Germany, east of the River Elbe. The *Junkers* belong to the conservative party, and had during the reign of the last Kaiser strong political influence, preserved up till this day in spite of changes of the regime.

48. John Sobieski, born in 1629, was King of Poland from 1674 to 1696. His military services in the wars against the Cossacks, Swedes, Turks and Tartars were outstanding. During his reign Poland concluded alliances with France (1674), with Sweden (1677) and with the Austrian emperor, Leopold I (1683). It was this political alliance which caused Poland to take part in the war of Austria against the Turks. Under the leadership of Sobieski the allied forces relieved Vienna on September 12, 1683, from the siege of the Turks. The rescue of Vienna by Sobieski prevented Islam from advancing more towards the West. It was a unique service rendered to Christianity and won Sobieski and Poland offers of friendship from all the Great Powers.

49. Peter I, the Great, born in 1672 and called to ascend the throne of Russia in 1682, started his reign only in 1689. He founded St. Petersburg (1703). After his victory over the Swedes, Russia received Ingermanland, Esthonia, Livonia and also parts of Karelia. The victory over Persia gave to Russia the western shores of the Caspian Sea. Under the reign of Peter the Great Russia became a European Power. His internal reforms brought about great changes in the social composition of the Russian nation. He created the Russian army and navy on a European scale. He also carried out reforms in the educational life of Russia and in Russian finance. The Academy of Sciences and the Naval Academy were founded, commerce and industry were developed, and roads improved. Peter's reforms did not leave untouched the sphere of religion. As the clergy was mostly opposed to his reforms, Peter abolished the Patriarchate and put in its place the "Holy Synod," thus obtaining for the Tsar of Russia leadership in religious matters. The negative side of his reign was the cruelty with which he treated his adversaries. He died in 1725.

50. After the transfer of the capital of the Roman Empire from Rome to Constantinople (about A.D. 330) the differences between the Church in the West and in the East, both in policy and doctrine, started to become more and more visible. The organization of the Eastern state ("byzantine"), which vested the highest authority in the person of the emperor concerning matters of state and the social life of the citizens, did not fail to influence the organization, the discipline and even the doctrine of the Church. The recognition of the authority of Rome in church and religious matters evoked in the East opposition on the part of the emperor and the highest Church dignitaries—the patriarchs. Furthermore, the inclination towards mysticism, theological disputes, ascetism and superstition were favourable to the development of different sects which stirred up antagonism against the Holy See. The strong stand taken in the second part of the 9th century by the Patriarch of Constantinople, Focius, against the Pope's mixing into affairs of the Eastern Church, caused a visible break; the final separation of the Eastern Church from Rome (the schism) followed in 1054, when Pope Leon IX excommunicated the Patriarch of Constantinople. The distinctive characteristic of the byzantine culture thus found expression in the separatism of the churches. The Eastern Church (Orthodox), supported by the Eastern patriarchs under the leadership of the Patriarch of Constantinople, embraced the Balkan states and Ruthenia, which at the end of the 10th century accepted Christianity in the byzantine form. As time passed the Eastern Church broke up into various national churches (called Autocephalous). Some of these churches—for instance, the Russian Church—became entirely dependent upon the secular authority. The differences between the Eastern and the Western Churches lay not only in dogmatism, but also in hierarchy, organization and church discipline. However, the fundamental divergence is the non-recognition of the authority of the Pope by the Eastern Church. The individual national churches are exclusively subject to church dignitaries (patriarchs, metropolitans or archbishops) supplemented by the synod, a judiciary body consisting of bishops. The head of the Russian Church from the times of Peter the Great was the Holy Synod, whose decisions required the confirmation of the attorney-general, who in turn was under the Tsar.

51. The Covenant of the League of Nations was incorporated

POLAND AND CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER THE WAR  
in the Treaty of Versailles. The aims and duties of the League  
are formulated in the preamble, which reads as follows:

“The High Contracting Parties,

In order to promote international co-operation and to  
achieve international peace and security

by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,

by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations  
between nations,

by the firm establishment of the understandings of inter-  
national law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments,  
and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect  
for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples  
with one another,

Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.”

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