

MEMO TO AMERICA:

The DP Story

THE FINAL REPORT OF
THE UNITED STATES
DISPLACED PERSONS
COMMISSION



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Letter of Transmittal

DISPLACED PERSONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C., August 15, 1952.

THE PRESIDENT.
THE CONGRESS.

SIRS: The Displaced Persons Commission herewith submits its Final Report in accordance with the requirements of section 8 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended.

This is the DP story—an account of a Mission Completed and of a Mission Ahead.

Respectfully submitted.

Chairman.

Member.

Member.

Preface

The Displaced Persons Commission was created by Public Law 774, Eightieth Congress, June 25, 1948. Formal operations were begun on August 27, 1948, and the first boatload of displaced persons was received on these shores on October 30 of that year. Legislation eliminating the discriminatory and unworkable features of the original law, was signed by President Truman on June 16, 1950. The last boatload of immigrants came into the United States on July 21, 1952. The Commission's job under the Act was to resettle in the United States eligible displaced persons from Western Germany and Austria, and from Italy, German expellees, Italian refugees from Venezia Giulia, political refugees from countries now behind the Iron Curtain, and displaced and war orphans. The Department of State was charged with other responsibilities under the Act. The Commission completed its regular program activities on June 30, 1952, and closed its books on August 31, 1952.

This, in the briefest outline, is the history of a unique and most significant experience in American foreign policy. For the first time in the history of the United States, this Government formally established an agency to undertake the resettlement of other nationals in this country. Existing barriers to immigration, rigidly maintained for decades, were temporarily set aside and a means provided for the integration into the American economy of a total of over 400,000 immigrants who will be resettled in all of the 48 States and in the Territories and possessions of the United States. From the sordidness and the spirit-crushing atmosphere of the displaced persons camps and refugee centers came men and women of diverse faiths and national backgrounds to find a new life and a new hope in the United States, and to enrich our economy and culture.

Here was a democracy in action. Here was something more than monetary and material support to nations to assist them in the physical and spiritual reconstruction so necessary to their reattainment of a place among other nations. Here was a declaration of the responsibility of nations of wealth, to open their own borders to new settlers in the interest of world peace. The problems involved in the admission of two-fifths of a million persons into the American economy were recognized, but more important was the realization also that shelter, sustenance, and a new purpose in life had to be found for

the homeless of other lands because of a fundamental phase of foreign policy in our own national interest.

And as so frequently happens, an effort founded on purely humane grounds resulted in gains for the United States that will continue for decades. American agricultural, industrial and cultural life was enriched by tens of thousands of trained workers whose apprenticeship and training alone represented an asset of billions of dollars. This otherwise unobtainable contribution of skills and knowledge came at a time when there was a desperate need for manpower. There also were men ready to bear arms in the defense of the United States. Their numbers were sufficient to man half a division, and their younger brothers and their sons made a reserve source of at least another full division.

What started out as a movement of displaced persons, refugees, expellees, orphans, and others from Europe, to the United States and other nations, also made a beginning at easing the tensions that resulted from overpopulation in Germany, Austria, Italy, Greece, and other countries. That the latter effort was merely a start was acknowledged in every quarter, but it was felt that practical measures, no matter how limited, had to be undertaken to meet this continuing problem.

The agency charged with responsibility for the program was one of the smaller establishments within the Federal administration. With a peak staff of 120 at headquarters in Washington, and with no more than 230 persons assigned to Europe at peak load, the Displaced Persons Commission was able to process, get transported and to visa some 370,000 persons by the target date, with total expenditures of only \$19,000,000 in the four years of its existence. The material gains, alone, far exceed that cost. In the year 1952, the persons admitted under the Act will pay in Federal income taxes alone, an estimated \$57,000,000.

This was a team job; it was all of America's job. This achievement would have been impossible without the immeasurable assistance by non-governmental agencies of a religious, social-service, and civic nature, by hundreds of thousands of interested Americans, and by State DP commissions and other governmental and international agencies. The time and energy expended by the personnel of these non-governmental organizations, and by unaffiliated Americans who voluntarily accepted the responsibility of helping give a new life to the victims of the tragic events of the last two decades in Europe, were many times that of the staff on the Federal payroll.

The American voluntary agencies participated in the very operations of the Commission, through the processes of sponsorship, and in transportation, reception and final resettlement. In the close association with these agencies, the Commission played its part in a new drama of a democratic government in action. Representatives

of an enlightened and interested citizenry sat on technical and advisory committees, gave counsel and guidance, and actually participated in the performance of routine activities as well as in the establishment of policy. The action taken by the Governors of 36 States in establishing State Commissions and Committees for the resettlement of displaced persons, orphans and other refugees was a unique development in American immigration. It laid the groundwork for the coordination of public and private facilities and services necessary to orderly, planned resettlement and local assimilation.

Also aiding in the general cooperative effort were international agencies, especially the International Refugee Organization, and many Federal agencies. Tremendously significant parts were played by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice through the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Security Agency through the Public Health Service, the Office of Education, and the Social Security Administration, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Labor, other Federal, State, and municipal organizations. Without the ready and able assistance of all these groups, the job could not have been done in the time and in the manner in which it was accomplished.

In this new enterprise, the constant support and interest of the President of the United States and of the Congress, without any regard to partisan considerations, was a basic factor in the successful accomplishment of the lofty purposes of the law.

Last of all, but by no means least, the people of the United States, in all of the States, on the farms, in little villages and big cities, all throughout the United States, showed their understanding of the need for this, their own citizens' foreign policy, and displayed a deep and continuing sympathy for the problems of the newcomers to their communities. After all is said and done, it is the people of the United States who made the program and who made it work.

To all these people and organizations, the Commission wishes publicly to express its deep gratitude. Without their devotion, hard work, support, and understanding, the program never would have succeeded.

In a review of the origin, development, and successful conclusion of the work of the Displaced Persons Commission, an insight may be obtained into the harmonious working of a complex governmental-citizen operation dedicated to two basic principles, one, that the dispossessed should be given the opportunity to gain the status of free men, and two, that immigration without discrimination is in the noblest tradition and in the highest self-interest of the United States.

The displaced persons program was the answer of Americans of the twentieth century to Thomas Jefferson's question of 1801, "shall we

refuse * * * hospitality * * * to the unhappy fugitives from distress? * * * Shall oppressed humanity find no asylum on this globe?" Here was action in the great American tradition, action in keeping with the ideal expressed by George Washington in his Thanksgiving Day Proclamation of 1795, when he urged the people of the United States to beseech God "to render this country more and more a safe and propitious asylum for the unfortunate of other countries." Here was a democracy in action, meeting its responsibilities to itself and to the free world.

This, then, is the final report of the Displaced Persons Commission, a successful experiment in American foreign policy and a new departure in American immigration. It is a review of a stewardship accepted in the faith that this experiment was a matter of high purpose and meaning. The objective was pursued fervently and the goal attained. But it is also recognized that this has been a limited, a temporary engagement; only a beginning has been made in easing the world-wide tensions caused by overpopulation and under-opportunity. Nor has the virtual solution of the problem of the so-called "displaced persons" coped with other major "refugee" problems. To the national and international programs directed toward the vitalization of the industrial and agricultural economy of the nations of the free world must be added a program for assistance in emigration and resettlement.

It is the firm hope of those who have participated in the work of the Displaced Persons Commission that the broader problem will be approached now and that once again the United States will assume world leadership in resolving a major issue that stands as a continuing obstacle to the securing of freedom and peace throughout the world.

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Why Did We Need a Displaced Persons Program?

The growth of the United States in population and physical and economic development has been phenomenal. In three centuries, a land sparsely inhabited by no more than a maximum of a million Indians dwelling in a primitive culture has been transformed into the most advanced technical and mechanical civilization in history—largely through its liberal immigration policies.

A brief review of the pattern of settlement of this country from the earliest days of free entrance to the controlled immigration of the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century, and of other national and international efforts at settlement, resettlement, repatriation, and assistance to the refugee and displaced person, is necessary to place this account of the displaced persons program in its proper historical perspective and to enable proper understanding of the future needs of the United States.

America—A Land of Immigrants

The total population at the first census in 1790 was 3,929,214, according to best estimates; 77 percent of our colonial stock were from Great Britain, 7.4 percent were from Germany, and 4.4 percent were from Ireland. In the period after the establishment of the United States of America, the pattern of immigration changed materially with immigration from Great Britain declining to a point below that of several other countries.

Of the 39,000,000 who are estimated to have immigrated to this country since the establishment of this Nation, almost 33,000,000 are estimated as having come from Europe, 4,500,000 from the Americas, 1,000,000 from Asia, and 350,000 from other areas.

Germany was the largest single national European immigration source in the period for which statistics are available—1820 to 1945—with a total of more than 6,000,000 immigrants. Italy contributed more than 4,700,000 people to the United States, and Ireland more than 4,500,000. Austria-Hungary sent 4,144,000 people to the United States and 4,200,000 emigrated from Great Britain. Over 3,000,000 came from Russia including large numbers of persons of non-Russian ethnic origin, and more than 1,200,000 from Sweden. From Norway

came more than 800,000 and 600,000 came from France. More than 3,000,000 came from Canada and Newfoundland; 800,000 came from Mexico; and 460,000 emigrated from the West Indies. More than a third of a million came from China and just slightly less than that from Japan.

Most found homes and ready opportunities and more than two-thirds of those who immigrated, or approximately 27,000,000, remained in the United States. Under a program of free immigration, significant movement to this country continued well into the early part of the twentieth century.

It was not until the end of World War I that restricted legislation was enacted by the United States and open immigration to the United States was curtailed. Until close to the end of the second decade of the twentieth century, local regulations covering entry fees and health examinations and Federal regulations relating to the employment contract between immigrant and sponsor-employer were usually the only types of regulations established to control the movement to these shores. And these regulations were introduced only after the country had been well established.

Immigration restrictions in more recent years caused a big drop in the number of immigrants entering the United States. From a total of 143,000, estimated as having entered the country in the decade 1821-30—the first decennial period for which there are statistics—immigration rose steadily decade by decade to reach a peak of more than 5,250,000 in the period 1881-90. Immigration declined to 3,688,000 in the following decade, but rose to almost 9,000,000 in the first decade of the twentieth century. The advent of World War I brought a decline of 35 percent in the next decade. The beginning of restrictive legislation brought another decline of approximately 28 percent in the decade 1921-30. The full impact of such legislation was felt in the 1930's when immigration fell to 528,000 for the decade. During the period 1941-50, immigration to this country rose to 1,035,039, notwithstanding the great drop in immigration during the war years.

The settlers of this country had all sorts of hopes and aspirations. There were the groups and individuals who sought a new land where they might find freedom of worship, and where they could speak, write, and live freely—privileges they were being denied in their native lands. It is frequently forgotten that some of our earliest settlers were combed from the streets and jails of their home countries and transported to these shores in an effort to rid the countries of origin of some of its—to them—undesirables. There were others who came merely for the novelty, the adventure, and the challenge of a new life and a new world. And there were the representatives of nations seeking to advance the holdings of the mother country and

to exploit the newly discovered land and the natives. There were others who sought added prestige in the elevation across the seas of the standards of their monarchs. Freemen, idealists, convicts of earlier government repressions, conscripts, soldiers, slaves, merchants, adventurers, refugees, immigrants all—they made America.

Early Immigration Legislation

During the colonial period there was no general legislation covering immigration. Similarly, for the first few decades after the United States was created, there was no legislation limiting immigration. Early legislation related primarily to standards for ocean transportation of immigrants.

Among the first generalized immigration laws was a provision designed to encourage immigration to the United States. In 1864, the office of the Commissioner of Immigration was established and legal sanction was given to the immigration of contract labor under agreements based on a maximum of 12 months labor for the immigrant's passage to the United States. Alien contract labor was prohibited on February 26, 1885.

The first general restrictive immigration law to exclude paupers and criminals was not enacted until August 3, 1882, when procedures for entrance of immigrants were formalized, a head tax of 50 cents per alien was introduced, and the exclusion of undesirables because of health and former penal service was made part of the law. In 1891 new legislation provided for the exclusion of additional categories on health standards, persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, and the solicitation of labor abroad was forbidden. On March 3, 1891, the office of the Superintendent of Immigration was created in the Treasury Department, and a staff was established in the Federal service to maintain surveillance over this activity and to provide inspection at the ports of entry.

In 1882 the first Chinese exclusion law was enacted, and was extended on numerous other occasions until repealed on December 17, 1943. In 1897 a bill was proposed providing for a literacy requirement made mandatory for all immigrants, with exemptions for categories of admissible immigrants; President Cleveland vetoed the measure and Presidents Taft and Wilson did likewise when similar measures were introduced in their administrations. In 1917 the measure was passed by Congress over the President's veto, and the basic Immigration Act of 1917 included doubling the head tax on immigrants, required a literacy test of aliens over 16 years of age, set up an Asiatic barred zone which denied entry as immigrants to peoples of southeastern Asia, and gave greater powers to immigration officials to exclude and deport aliens. As a war measure, an act of October 16, 1918, excluded alien anarchists and others believing in or advocating overthrow of the Government.

In 1920 Congress provided for the exclusion and deportation of alien enemies and anarchists. Later that year the House of Representatives passed the Johnson bill which called for a 2-year suspension of immigration except for the blood relatives of citizens. The Senate did not concur in total suspension but accepted a restriction for 15 months by the introduction of a quota system. The quota was to be applied on a national basis, the annual quota to be 3 percent of the number of foreign-born persons of such nationality resident in the United States according to the 1910 census, making a maximum total of approximately 357,000.

The House accepted the Senate measure but the President permitted the bill to die by a pocket veto. In the next session of Congress, however, a measure almost identical to the Senate bill of 1920 was passed and became law on May 19, 1921. This first quota legislation set the pattern of our present immigration restrictions. The act provided that "the number of aliens of any nationality, who may be admitted under the immigration laws to the United States in any fiscal year shall be limited to 3 per centum of the number of foreign-born persons of such nationality resident in the United States as determined by the United States census of 1910." Monthly limitations of 20 percent of the total were applied. Preferences were to be given on the bases of consanguinity and military service in the United States forces.

Subsequent action in 1924 brought a new basis for computing national quotas, based on the national origins of the population of the United States in 1890, instead of 1910. In addition, the quotas were reduced from 3 to 2 percent of the base population. The 1924 Act provided that after 1929 the quota of any nationality shall have the same ratio to the maximum quota of 150,000 as the number of that national origin living in the United States in 1920 has to the total population in the United States in that year.

The effect of the restrictive acts of 1917-29 was to reduce materially the numbers and kinds of immigrants to be admitted to the United States. Immigration, until the interruptions caused by World War I, had been running approximately 814,700 per annum. The 1921 legislation set the maximum at 357,000, the 1924 action drove the maximum under 200,000 and the 1929 national origins formula placed the maximum at approximately 154,000. All these acts continued exemptions of certain categories who were admitted outside of quota. The 1924 act discriminated against immigrants from southern and eastern Europe by giving to northern and western Europe a quota almost six times greater. The effect of the national origins formula was to restrict admission in proportion corresponding to the composition of the population of a chosen year and to prevent the creation of a more favorable balance to the immigrants who came to this country

in increased numbers after that date. The result of the national origins legislation was to reduce the actual immigration to a point far below the maximum quota authorized in the law, for the countries of northern and western Europe used less than one-fourth of their quota in the years between the establishment of the national origins formula and the end of World War II.

Aid to Refugees, 1933-48

Despite the restrictive and selective legislation of the postwar years, the United States Government made continuous efforts during this same period to assist the victims of national and international strife overseas.

It was not until very recently, however, that the divergent policies of assistance abroad and exclusion at home, were reconciled to bring about a measure of liberalization of restrictive immigration legislation. From the assistance tendered in 1945 to those who felt the fury of the first Hitlerian attacks within Germany and were forced to flee their homeland, to the sponsorship in 1951 of a new international organization to resettle people from the surplus population from western Europe, the Government of the United States balanced its xenophobic immigration laws with a policy of deep sympathy and active support for refugees and displaced persons.

It was an American representative, James G. McDonald, who served as the League of Nation's High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany from 1933 to 1935. And it was through the auspices of the United States Government that 31 nations gathered at Evian in France in 1938 in an effort to resolve the problem of finding shelter and sustenance for the political, racial, and religious victims of intolerance and persecution in Germany and Austria. The American representative and chairman of the conference, Myron C. Taylor, outlined the policy of the United States: "* * * our ultimate objective should be to establish an organization which would concern itself with all refugees * * *," but he recognized the need for immediate action to aid the victims of Nazi terror.

The Evian Conference adopted the course of action urged by the United States and established the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees (IGCR). This organization performed a noteworthy function in maintaining the legal and political protection of refugees and in developing plans for aiding refugees to resettle elsewhere in Europe and overseas. The United States was the major financial contributor to this organization and an American, George Rublee, was its first director.

The IGCR had just begun its work when the outbreak of war curtailed its operation. In 1943, it expanded its activities to cover all refugees in Europe and it continued its efforts in the postwar years

when there was an even more pressing need for an international facility to resettle refugees and displaced persons.

Within the United States during the war years, efforts at resettling refugees were continued. The War Refugee Board, established in January 1944, was engaged for 20 months in moving persons from Europe to places of safety beyond the reach of the enemy. This Board, consisting of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and War, was directed by the President to take "all measures within its power to rescue the victims of enemy oppression who are in imminent danger of death, and otherwise to afford such victims all possible relief and assistance consistent with the successful prosecution of the war."

The Board had representatives in a number of strategic stations abroad and, with the assistance of cooperating voluntary agencies and international organizations, developed programs for hiding and caring for refugees from the Nazis and for transporting them to safety. When movement out of the reach of the enemy was not possible, efforts were extended to provide for maintaining these persons.

It is estimated that thousands of persons were assisted in escaping from the enemy. Of this total more than 900 were brought to the United States and established at Oswego, N. Y., for the duration of the war.

During the war years, the military arms of the United States were directed to do all in their power to assist displaced persons in several theaters of operations. The contribution of the United States forces in feeding, clothing, and sheltering millions of war victims was tremendous and undoubtedly ran into an expenditure of many millions of dollars.

Coordination of this type of assistance for the relief and rehabilitation of distressed areas was effected by the midyears of the war. In 1943, the United States Government with other members of the Big Four, called for the establishment of an agency to aid nations and peoples who had suffered as a result of the war. In November 1943, 44 nations organized the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) with the avowed purpose of assisting liberated peoples to rebuild their countries and their lives by providing some of the necessary materials and the tools; to reunite families; to care for displaced persons and refugees; and to aid them to repatriate. The United States was the largest contributor, meeting about 70 percent of the cost of operation of the agency and expending an estimated total of \$2,700,000,000 in the slightly less than 5 years of its operation. Several Americans, such as Herbert H. Lehman and Fiorello H. LaGuardia, served as director-general of the organization.

Further evidence of the tendency away from the isolationism that produced the restrictive measures of 1917-29 was the United States

Government's sponsorship of the International Refugee Organization. This UN agency was created in 1947 to assist in the resettlement of approximately a million and a quarter refugees still remaining in camps and in the local economies of Germany, Austria, and Italy, and other countries, after the completion of UNRRA's repatriation activities.

The United States leadership in the IRO program included financial contribution as well as operational direction. Sixty percent of the funds of the organization, or a total of \$237,000,000 came from the United States. IRO was under the direction of several American directors-general, Arthur J. Altmeyer, Hallam Tuck, and J. Donald Kingsley, and many members of the staff also were Americans.

In addition to cooperation in international activities, direct efforts were made to deal with refugees by admission into the United States. In December 1945, President Truman issued a directive which gave preference to refugees within the United States immigration quota. Under this directive more than 42,000 displaced persons were permitted to enter the United States and a beginning was set for the admission of other displaced persons.

It was against this historical development of immigration into the United States and through the humanitarian impulse that brought with it a break in the current of restrictive legislation, that the Displaced Persons Commission came into being.

In 1948, the Displaced Persons Act specifically authorized the admission of 205,000 displaced persons over a period of 2 years. Certain discriminatory provisions against Jews and Catholics, as a result of certain preferences and priorities and datelines, made for such inequities in the operation of the program for the resettlement of these persons, that it was denounced by President Truman when he signed the bill, and by others who voiced justifiable protests against the discriminatory character of the measure. Nevertheless, the Displaced Persons Act was a distinct break from the previous pattern of restrictive immigration legislation. Although admission of displaced persons was to be within the established quotas, the device of "mortgaging" quotas into the future was clear Congressional recognition of the undesirable and unworkable rigidity of the quota restrictions in the face of a dominant national policy.

In its first semiannual report, as well as by other means, the Commission clearly showed not only that the 1948 act was discriminatory and unfair, but also that its restrictive provisions made effective and economical administration impossible.

The amendments in 1950, eliminating many of the discriminatory provisions of the original act, marked a further movement away from the restrictive legislation of the first quarter of the century. Congress also recognized the need for participating in the solution of

the overpopulation problem in Europe through provisions in the amended act of authority which enabled American sponsorship of the international conference which created the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe after the termination of the International Refugee Organization.

The 1950 amendments relating to admission of persons from Germany, Greece, and Italy, showed growing Congressional realization of the inseparability, from the practical point of view, of the problems of refugees and of overpopulation. In addition, a small start was made specifically in connection with refugees from communism.

Why Did We Need A DP Program?—A displaced persons program was needed to finish the “unfinished business” of World War II, the resettlement of refugees who could not return to their own countries because of religious or political persecution. It was also necessary to cope with the growing dislocation of people resulting from Communist aggression and overpopulation in Europe. In a very real sense, a displaced persons program was necessary to help preserve the peace.

How the Law Came About

With the end of World War II, and the growing realization of the seriousness of the refugee problem in Europe, the American people insisted upon American participation in an international effort to resettle the displaced persons in Germany, Austria, and Italy in other countries including the United States. This public opinion resulted in the eventual passage of legislation providing for the admission of displaced persons into the United States, but only after a bitter public and Congressional debate which even became an important issue in a presidential campaign.

Repeated attempts were made on a number of occasions, in the decade and a half since the Nazi persecution campaign created a new major refugee problem, to permit immigration of refugees and displaced persons.

In the Seventy-sixth Congress, from 1939 to 1941, with the tide of persecution rising and the numbers of refugees increasing, many members of Congress introduced bills to bring about some change, no matter how slight, in the restrictive immigration statutes that precluded admission of refugees and displaced persons because of the relatively few opportunities available under existing quotas. All of this was to no avail. In an effort to find some means of opening immigration opportunities, measures were introduced for the admission of refugees for the purpose of the colonization of Alaska.

Similar measures seeking to permit the entrance of refugees and displaced persons were presented in the Seventy-seventh and succeeding Congresses, but not a single measure was passed until the enactment of the Displaced Persons Act on June 25, 1948.

American Public Opinion

Life Magazine reflected the opinion of many when it declared editorially on September 23, 1946, “* * * the most shocking fact about the plight of these displaced persons is not that they are interned. It is the fact that the United States Government and people have the means to open the door for many of them but have not done so. * * * If we are to remain the leading nation of Our World,” declared the editor of Life, “we also have a deep moral obligation not to be too exclusive.” The Saturday Evening Post declared in an editorial on February 1, 1947, that “* * * if our efforts to protect

these people in their right of asylum in Europe are anything more than wind, we are bound to consider whether or not some of them could come to our shores without evasion of immigration-quota restriction. Careful screening would, of course, be necessary, but surely a nation whose population is mainly composed of immigrants and their descendants cannot logically maintain that the only 'good' immigrants are those who are already here."

Press opinion was generally sympathetic to plans for permitting entrance of displaced persons into the United States. The New York Times took the position on October 1, 1946, that "our fighting men displayed during the war a devotion to human liberty. Their relatives at home felt the same devotion. For Europe's displaced populations the war is not yet triumphant. We can speak more convincingly for freedom everywhere when we have done our fair share—even more than our fair share—to bring real freedom to those who have suffered most."

The New York Herald Tribune declared in an editorial of March 27, 1947, that "* * * the United States should be willing to do its share by opening its doors as well as by contributing funds. Our national immigration laws might have to be revised for that purpose. This newspaper feels that our country can afford to make some limited exceptions in order to help care for people whose plight has too long been on the consciences of the world." The Washington Post felt much the same. Reviewing the situation on September 9, 1946, its editor wrote "there are in Europe today some hundreds of thousands of harrassed, homeless people. We have committed ourselves as a matter of national policy to caring for them and to seeking a place for them to live. We have exhorted the British to admit a considerable number of them to Palestine. Yet we have done nothing on our own account to afford refuge to them here. The failure to practice what we preach ill becomes us and robs our exhortation of all its moral force. The denial of refuge to these people is itself a precedent dangerous to our cherished values."

On March 29, 1947, the Christian Science Monitor, published in Boston, Mass., declared "* * * the United States today is moving into the arena of world politics as a self-designated champion of the free peoples. A good part of the world looks with misgivings on this move, as a play for unbridled power. Protests of good intentions, however sincere, will carry little conviction if so clearly cut a moral challenge as the refugee problem is bypassed. Let Americans prove their concern for free peoples by giving a few of these hapless and hopeless refugees a chance to be free." This same sentiment was voiced by the San Francisco Chronicle, by the Los Angeles Daily News, and by scores of other papers in every section of the country.

But Commonweal, a prominent Catholic journal supporting DP immigration, warned on February 7, 1947, that there was an organized campaign against permitting the entrance of displaced persons into the United States and pointed to the fact that the President's mail was seven to one against admission. Newsweek of December 30, 1946, in summarizing opinion early in the year, doubted whether legislation permitting entrance could be passed; and the United States News declared in September 1946, "* * * in any case, the United States seems certain to remain closed to all but a minority of those who dream of entering it as a promised land." The Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Legion, and other groups with like views presented a solid front of opposition to plans for immigration, and their position was reflected editorially in the Chicago Tribune.

Support for the principle of immigration came from varied quarters. The American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service undertook a survey of the problem of displaced persons in 1946 and declared that "the primary responsibility for the care and welfare of displaced persons rests with government and military authority and that the work of voluntary agencies is supplementary to this primary responsibility * * *. In view of the seriousness of the situation of the displaced persons and the great interest of the United States in a sound solution of the problem, a thorough re-examination of the present immigration policy of the United States in respect to displaced persons should be taken immediately."

The Young Women's Christian Association, in its publication of February 1947, The Woman's Press, endorsed the Federal Council of Churches' estimate of the United States "fair share" of the displaced persons to be admitted, "which should not exceed half of the unreparables and which would not be less than half of the difference between those admissible under the quota law and those who actually entered."

President Truman's State of the Union Message, 1947

In his State of the Union Message on January 6, 1947, President Truman urged Congress to authorize the admission of displaced persons to the United States:

The United States can be proud of its part in caring for peoples reduced to want by the ravages of war, and in aiding nations to restore their national economies. We have shipped more supplies to the hungry peoples of the world since the end of the war than all other countries combined.

However, so far as admitting displaced persons is concerned, I do not feel that the United States has done its part. Only about 5,000 of them have entered this country since May 1946. The fact is that the executive agencies are now doing all that is reasonably possible under the limitation of existing law and established quotas. Congressional assistance in the form of new legislation is needed. I urge the Congress to turn its attention to this world problem in an effort to find ways whereby we can fulfill our responsibilities to these thousands of homeless and suffering refugees of all faiths.

Legislative Consideration, 1947

In the very first weeks of the Eightieth Congress, a veritable flood of bills was presented to permit the entrance of refugees or displaced persons. Representative Celler of New York, in four bills presented on January 3, 1947, called for easing of the restrictive immigration statutes to permit aliens in the United States on visitors' permits, who were unable to return to their countries of origin because of an existing state of war, to remain as immigrants for permanent residence. These measures also would have made available the immigration quota of a European nationality that was unused by September 30 of fiscal years 1947 and 1948, for persons who had become refugees or displaced since December 31, 1934. In the issuance of these visas, priority was to be given to those immigrants who had been refugees or displaced persons for the longest period.

The Celler measures never came out of committee nor did other bills during these first few weeks of the new Congress. Notwithstanding the support of the Administration, of members of Congress of both parties, of a considerable body of the public, and of a vigorous public campaign by a privately sponsored Citizens Committee on Displaced Persons, these measures did not even receive a public hearing.

One measure, introduced by Congressman Stratton from Illinois, did receive hearing in committee, but after 9 months of discussion in committee, it too died there. This bill was introduced on April 1, 1947, to authorize the United States to take its "fair share" of displaced persons. It would have authorized the admission of 100,000 persons a year for 4 years, and would have been administered by the Departments of State and Justice.

As used in the Stratton bill, the term "displaced person" had reference to a person in Germany, Austria, or Italy at the time of the proposed passage of the act who (1) was out of his country of former residence as a result of events subsequent to the outbreak of World War II; and (2) was unable or unwilling to return to the country of his nationality or former residence because of persecution or his fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinions.

The reaction of the press throughout the country was almost unanimously in favor of the measure. In an editorial in the Minneapolis Sunday Tribune on May 11, 1947, the writer called for American action in this matter for "if the United States refuses to take this action the problem of the occupation authorities in Germany and Austria will be increased and American pleas to other countries to take additional immigrants will be thrown back in our faces." The New York Herald Tribune of May 14, 1947, declared, in support of the measure, "The United States has been remiss * * * in failing to help provide the innocent with new homes. Our country has

been too grudging of its hospitality, too jealous of the protection afforded it by immigration laws, sound in themselves but framed at a time when an emergency like the present one could not be foreseen. Much has been said about the need for this country to take the lead in international affairs, but there is one instance where Americans can take the lead only by a gesture of good will and good faith."

An editorial column in the Washington Post commented on May 20, 1947: "The enactment of the Stratton bill is the very least we can do to help solve a problem whose existence is a blot on our vaunted civilization. Failure to take constructive action on the displaced persons problem will subject the United States to the charge that our professions of democracy and humanitarianism are the veriest mockery." The Baltimore Sun of April 3, 1947, emphasized in support of the bill, that "what we would be doing, under Representative Stratton's bill, would merely be to make a temporary adjustment to deal with a very special situation. This bill is not in any sense a scheme to flood the country with immigrants." On April 14, 1947, The Chicago Sun called for support of the bill as a means of transforming American sympathy "into action to relieve present misery and to provide for the future of more than half of the DP's."

Among those testifying before the Congress in support of the Stratton bill, was Gen. George C. Marshall, then serving as Secretary of State. In his statement he reviewed the problem of the displaced persons and the four proposed solutions; namely, forced repatriation; closure of the camps and releasing the displaced persons to fend for themselves in the German and Austrian economies; continued indefinite support of people in camps; and resettlement. Only the last of these, resettlement, was practical at this time, he said.

Recalling that some 7,000,000 displaced persons had been repatriated immediately after the war's end, General Marshall indicated that the majority of the remaining displaced persons were from areas which, subsequent to the armistice, had become Communist dominated. The general added his voice to those of many others by stating that forced repatriation would be against American tradition and American beliefs in the four freedoms.

General Marshall underscored the impracticality of closing the camps by noting that the animosity and resentment felt mutually between the Germans and the displaced persons might create a hazard to world peace if the two groups were forced upon each other at that time.

Continued support in camps, said General Marshall, aside from the burden upon the American taxpayer, would have a demoralizing effect on the refugees and was also contrary to American concepts of individual rights to earn a living.

General Marshall contended that the United States must come forward with a concrete plan for aid. "You cannot assert leadership and then not exercise it," he said. He further emphasized the resettlement schemes of some European and Latin American countries and suggested that here in the United States there were nationality groups who could probably assume the responsibility for helping refugees to resettle.

The late Secretary of War Robert W. Patterson also testified in support: "The resettlement program that bill 2910 forms the United States portion of, is the only sound solution for an extremely difficult and pressing problem, the problem of the displaced persons.

"My familiarity with this subject is due to the fact that for over 2 years, the War Department has had the responsibility for the care of the displaced persons in the United States zones of Germany and Austria. As Secretary of War, it has been a matter for my constant attention."

In addition to previous arguments advanced favoring resettling a "fair share" of displaced persons in the United States, Secretary Patterson introduced for consideration the role the United States Army played in discharging its responsibility for the care and maintenance of the displaced persons in camps in the American zones of Germany and Austria.

He emphasized the burden this additional activity placed on our occupation forces through the demands of maintaining law and order in the camps, providing food and adequate housing. Sixty percent of the displaced persons in Europe were being cared for by the American Government, he said. Quoting more facts and figures to bolster the arguments for a resettlement program, Secretary Patterson cited the sum of \$45,000,000 granted by Congress of appropriated funds to the War Department for the express purpose of displaced persons maintenance, for the fiscal year 1947. He further emphasized the tremendous drain on army funds quoting \$100,000,000 as the total costs for the year.

Attorney General Tom Clark, as head of the Department of Justice, the third government agency most concerned with the immigration of displaced persons, also supported the measure.

Church groups such as the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America and the National Catholic Welfare Conference and smaller affiliates, indicated not only their whole-hearted support, but also indicated a willingness to assist in the actual resettling of the immigrants in the United States.

The American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the United States Department of Labor went on record as stating that this number of workers would not change the picture of the labor force nor cause any undue competition for jobs. They disagreed with the veterans' organizations that unemployment

was just around the corner. The Federal Housing Administration testified that the admission of 400,000 displaced persons over a period of 4 years would not be serious as far as the housing situation was concerned.

For the most part, testimony in favor of the Stratton bill concerned itself with the displaced persons problem only; nearly all witnesses specifying they were not urging a general relaxation of the immigration laws, but only of certain emergency provisions to cope with the displaced persons problem.

Opposition to the bill, as voiced by the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and other organizations, was based on three controversial propositions:

First, that the United States had already done its fair share in providing care and maintenance for these refugees and no further assistance was required or should be given;

Second, the employment picture was not good, large-scale unemployment was just around the corner, there were many veterans now unemployed and some then in attendance at colleges and universities who would soon be seeking employment. There would not be enough jobs for everyone if the displaced persons were permitted entrance; and

Third, the housing situation was very bad with an inadequate number of low rental housing units available for veterans.

The opponents of the bill labeled displaced persons as degenerates, criminals, and subversives, who would never be assimilated into the United States but would breed their own particular brands of crime and subversion, making no worth-while contribution to the United States.

Figures of illegal entrants into the United States were cited, along with pleas for more stringent immigration laws, lower quotas, and the maintenance of the national origins system established by law in 1924.

For the most part the opposition could see no reason why the displaced persons either should not be turned loose in Germany or Austria, or compelled to return to their countries of former residence. If, however, resettlement were the only solution, settle them in Africa or some similar country offering wide spaces and opportunity for pioneering. In addition, the suggestion was made that Alaska be colonized with displaced persons.

Attention was called to the size of the camp populations and the indications that there were more displaced persons in the camps then than directly after the war. The reason, according to the opposition, was that these recent infiltrates were subversives whose only thought was to come to the United States to spread Communism or other unwanted doctrines.

Both the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars later softened their previously harsh criticisms of the bill and its intentions. At the VFW National Encampment in Cleveland in September 1947, a resolution was passed which stated that the organization opposed any change in existing immigration quotas and called for a national survey to determine community acceptance of immigrants. A previous report that the Veterans of Foreign Wars opposed any displaced persons program until the housing shortage and unemployment were taken care of was declared to be erroneous. The results of the community survey were to serve as a guide for future VFW course of action on displaced persons legislation.

And in Indianapolis in November 1947, the American Legion National Executive Committee recommended the admission of displaced persons in limited numbers. The committee adopted a resolution calling for a separation of the displaced person program from regular immigration, saying that it should be treated as "an emergency matter involving humanitarian considerations." The Legion recommended screening of all proposed immigrants, and after some original hesitation its national commander supported the program after his tour of Europe including displaced person installations.

The Congress adjourned without action on the Stratton bill which had been in committee for more than 7 months.

Meanwhile, proposed legislation for displaced persons had been submitted in the Senate.

On July 2, 1947, Senator Ferguson of Michigan, acting for himself and Senators Buck, Smith, Saltonstall, Bricker, Cooper, Hatch, McGrath, and Morse, introduced a bill authorizing for a limited time the admission of certain displaced persons into the United States for permanent residence.

Broadly defining those admissible, this bill authorized for a period of 4 years the admission as a nonquota immigrant of any displaced person applying for permanent residence to the United States, if he were qualified for admission under the immigration laws of the United States. Priority under this bill was given (1) to orphans under 21 years of age and (2) to the widow, children, parents and other relatives (within the fourth degree of consanguinity under common law) of citizens of the United States or of persons who served honorably in the Armed Forces of the United States during World War I and World War II.

Subject to these priorities, there were to be admitted under the program, persons possessed of special skills and aptitudes as would best meet the economic needs of the United States and contribute to its cultural, religious, economic, or industrial welfare and prosperity.

President Truman's Message of July 7, 1947

On July 7, 1947, the President sent a message to Congress re-emphasizing the need for legislation directed toward the entrance of displaced persons into the United States. He called to the attention of the Congress the urgent need for action in this matter and called attention to some fundamentals. There were in the western zones of Germany and Austria and in Italy, close to a million survivors who were unwilling by reason of political opinion and fear of persecution to return to the areas where they once lived. The new IRO was only a service organization and could not impose its will on member countries; for governments to aid the displaced persons, it was necessary for them individually to indicate their desire to accept them as immigrants. Only by such action would the victims of war and oppression be assisted in finding a new future for their children and in rebuilding their lives.

Certain countries in western Europe and Latin America had opened their doors to substantial numbers of these displaced persons. It became our plain duty, said the President, to join with other nations in solving this tragic problem. "We ourselves should admit a substantial number as immigrants. We have not been able to do this because our present statutory quotas applicable to the eastern European areas from which most of these people come are wholly inadequate for this purpose. Special legislation limited to this particular emergency will therefore be necessary if we are to share with other nations in this enterprise of offering an opportunity for new life to these people."

The President declared that this was not a proposal for a general revision of United States immigration policy. Prescribed standards for testing the fitness for admission of every immigrant, including displaced persons, were not to be waived or lowered.

These displaced persons were hardy and resourceful or they would not have survived. They had opposed totalitarian rule and "because of their burning faith in the principles of freedom and democracy" had suffered privation and hardships. They had opposed Communism and in addition had been our allies in World War II.

There would be no problem in assimilating the relatively small number of displaced persons to be admitted. Our Nation had been "founded by immigrants many of whom fled oppression and persecution." A source of the strength of the United States was the varied national origins, races, and religious beliefs of the American people. And many of the displaced persons already had "strong roots in this country—by kinship, religion, or national origin."

President Truman concluded by urging Congress to press forward with the consideration of the subject.

House Foreign Affairs Committee Survey, 1947

Among the groups taking advantage of the fall recess of Congress in 1947 to study the problem of the displaced persons on the ground in Europe was a subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The subcommittee was comprised of Representatives James G. Fulton, chairman, Jacob K. Javits and Joseph Pfeifer, members, with Frank L. Chelf of the Committee on the Judiciary, joining in the group on invitation and associated with them in their investigation and report. They were instructed by Representative Charles A. Eaton, chairman of the full committee, "to gain a grasp of the problem of displaced persons through direct observation rather than through secondary and documentary information."

In September and October 1947, this subcommittee studied the problem in the field in Europe. More than 150 displaced persons camps were visited in the United States, British, and French zones of Germany and in Austria and Italy. They investigated the headquarters establishments of the IRO and the military commands concerned with displaced persons, and held conversations with representatives of various voluntary agencies, consular officials, and European governments interested. Hearings reviewed in detail the planning and operations of the IRO and of the displaced persons activity in general.

The subcommittee submitted its conclusions and recommendations. The subcommittee accepted the view that repatriation was now close to completed; "repatriation provides no way out of the problem given that the nations responsible for taking care of the displaced persons stay on their present policy—the only one morally defensible—of avoiding coercion in repatriation." It was evident that large scale repatriation was ended and that the normal remaining efforts at repatriation would not reduce materially the care and maintenance load upon the IRO and its contributing members. It was necessary, therefore, concluded the subcommittee, for the governments to attack the problem through a vigorous program of resettlement. "The International Refugee Organization cannot do this alone. Only the efforts of the nations capable of receiving these displaced persons into their economies and into their national life can effect the cure."

A new international conference was felt by the subcommittee to be a basic need. This conference would direct its energies toward the establishment of an international agreement for the resettlement of displaced persons. The United States was called upon to give leadership to this international agreement for the resettlement of displaced persons and the international conference by opening its immigration to displaced persons with credits being set against "any quota allocated to or accepted by the United States in such an international conference."

The subcommittee insisted that "most of these people, given an adequate approach to the solution of their problems, will be an asset and not a liability to the western world."

In conclusion the subcommittee declared that the United States should take pride in the high moral position taken under its leadership that persons having "legitimate fear of political or religious persecution in their homelands will not be compelled to repatriate."

House Action, 1948

The failure to report the Stratton bill out of the Judiciary Committee brought action by other interested members of the committee. Representative Frank Fellows of Maine introduced a bill on April 7, 1948, which authorized for a limited period of time the admission of displaced persons into the United States for permanent residence. This bill defined displaced persons to be persons who on April 21, 1947—the deadline used by the occupation authorities in restricting UNRRA assistance—and on the effective date of the bill were resident in Italy, or in the United States, British, or French zones of Germany or Austria, and who during World War II bore arms against the enemies of the United States and were unable or unwilling to return to the country of which they were nationals because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion. The definition limited displaced persons to those who were registered by the IRO according to its constitution and who entered Italy or the United States, British, or French zones in Germany on or before April 21, 1947, as being within the purview of this bill. It expressly excluded Spanish Republican refugees and any persons who had been members of or participated in any movement which was or had been hostile to the United States or the form of government of the United States.

Provision was made in the bill for the issue of 200,000 visas without regard to quota limitations, provided that those seeking visas were qualified for admission under United States immigration laws. The 200,000 represented 24 percent of the 835,000 estimated remaining DP's. In an effort to avoid discrimination against any group, visas issued pursuant to the bill were to be made available to each element or group among the displaced persons as these groups were segregated or designated for the purpose of being cared for by IRO on January 1, 1948. Visas were to be issued in the proportion that the number of displaced persons in each group bore to the total number of displaced persons.

Upon issuance of an immigration visa to a displaced person, quota numbers were to be "mortgaged"—so-called—by using 50 percent of the immigration quota of the country of the alien's nationality for the current fiscal year or the next succeeding year or years for which

a quota number was available. It was further provided that orphan children be issued special nonquota visas.

Incorporating elements of the Stratton and other bills, the Fellows proposal provided that a total of 13,000 aliens who entered the United States prior to March 15, 1948, were to be admitted as permanent residents.

Preferences in visaing were to be based on the economic and scientific needs of the country. Priorities in the following order were established: (1) First priority was given aliens qualified as farm-laborers, physicians, dentists, nurses, household, construction, clothing or garment workers, and aliens possessing educational, scientific, or technical qualifications.

(2) Second priority was given to aliens who were blood relatives, blood relatives within the third degree of consanguinity of citizens or lawfully admitted alien residents of the United States.

(3) Third and last priority was given to all aliens classified as displaced persons.

Proper and suitable bond was required from either the relative or any recognized voluntary agency in the United States to cover the possibility of the immigrants becoming a public charge. Further provision was made for "executive officers of States and Territories to certify to the settlement opportunities for displaced persons."

The President was authorized to appoint an official to be designated as coordinator for the resettlement of displaced persons who was to serve at the will of the President. The coordinator's duties and responsibilities in administration, operations, preparation, and maintenance of rules and regulations, reporting to Congress, liaison with State and voluntary agencies and cooperation with the IRO, were defined. An advisory board on the resettlement of displaced persons, composed of Federal agencies, was also authorized. The coordinator was to consult with the advisory board in carrying out his functions under this bill. Supervision of instructions to diplomatic and consular officials of the United States in connection with this program was to be coordinated with the Foreign Service of the United States.

The program under the President's Directive of December 22, 1945, was eliminated and provision was made for but one over-all program that was established under this bill.

The original Fellows bill never came out of committee, but on April 29, 1948, Congressman Fellows introduced another bill, H. R. 6396, which differed only in minor details from the original bill.

H. R. 6396 was reported out of committee on May 4. The committee reporting on the bill declared legislation on displaced persons to be an emergency problem that had to be divorced from the subject of immigration. It was felt that the United States action in taking as

much as 24 percent of the total DP load while contributing 60 percent would be an inducement for other countries to receive immigrants.

In the debate on the House floor, two amendments were added: The admission of 2,000 recent political refugees from Czechoslovakia, and the admission of 3,000 displaced orphan children, thus bringing the total to be admitted to 205,000.

The measure passed the House by a vote of 289 to 91 on June 11, 1948, and its provisions were substituted for S. 2242, which had been passed by the Senate on June 2, 1948, and was pending before the House. A conference report was submitted on June 16 and the bill was passed within the next week.

Senate Action, 1948

The initiatory step toward concrete action in the Senate was taken July 26, 1947, when the Senate passed S. Res. 137 submitted by Senator Chapman Revercomb for himself and Senator Pat McCarran, authorizing the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, "to make a full and complete investigation of our entire immigration system, including * * * (4) the situation with respect to displaced persons in Europe and all aspects of the displaced persons problem; * * *," and directing "that the committee shall report its findings and recommendations in a separate report with respect to displaced persons, on or before January 10, 1948." This date was later amended to March 1, 1948. The subcommittee was comprised of Senators Revercomb, chairman, Donnell, McCarran, McGrath, and Cooper. Senators Smith of the Foreign Relations Committee and Byrd of the Armed Services Committee were appointed by their respective committee chairman as advisers.

A tour of displaced persons camps and examination of the situation in Europe was carried on by Senators Revercomb, Donnell, and McGrath, accompanied by four staff members. Senator Cain accompanied the group and participated in the investigation.

The result of this survey was S. 2242, with an accompanying report, Displaced Persons in Europe, and the minority views of Senators McGrath and Cooper.

The subcommittee's bill was opposed by church organizations, nationality groups, and others interested in the refugee and displaced persons problem, who labeled it discriminatory and inadequate.

The elements in controversy in the bill were similar to those over which there had been debate in previous attempts at legislation on this matter. The basis of eligibility, the critical dateline, the total numbers to be covered by the bill, preferences and priorities in visaing, the requirement for assurances of employment, housing, and public charge provision, the administration of the program—all were factors over which there was comment and frequent acrimonious debate.

For the purposes of immigration to the United States, an eligible displaced person was considered, in S. 2242, as one who met the terms of the definition as spelled out in the IRO constitution. In order to be considered eligible, he must have entered the specified areas (American, British, or French zones of Germany and Austria; American, British, or French sectors of Berlin and Vienna, or Italy) between September 1, 1939, and December 22, 1945. Provision was also made for the admission of displaced orphans.

The 1945 date was a bone of contention and raised a claim that it was especially discriminatory in regard to Jewish as well as Catholic refugees who entered the areas of eligibility in considerable numbers subsequent to December 22, 1945.

The numerical limitation was set at 100,000—50,000 per year for the fiscal years 1949 and 1950.

S. 2242 provided that individual assurances of a job and housing, without displacing someone else from either, were to be provided. With respect to employment, the bill further stipulated that the applicant be a "person of a vocation, skill, or occupation needed in the locality in the United States in which such person proposes to reside," and further that the applicant and members of his family not become public charges.

Fifty percent of the visas issued were to be made exclusively available to displaced persons who had been previously engaged in agricultural pursuits and who would be so employed in the United States.

The bill also provided that any wilful misrepresentation on the part of the displaced person to gain admission would thereafter render him inadmissible to the United States.

Under the bill, a three-member commission was established "to formulate and issue regulations necessary under the bill, but the actual administration of the bill is to be by the regular immigration officials."

Some Senators were of the opinion either that the program should be headed by a coordinator acting on the advice of an advisory board, or that the proposed commission should be given more authority.

Less controversial features of the bill included provisions covering eligible displaced orphans and orphans adopted by United States citizens in specified areas in Europe; the stipulation that the burden of proof of eligibility should be on the applicant and that a written report attesting to his character, history, and eligibility be submitted. Certain requirements of the immigration laws were set aside: Those laws pertaining to contract labor and to the payment of immigrants' passage by a corporation, association, society, municipality, or foreign government were rendered inapplicable. However, in all other respects, those persons applying for admission under the proposed bill, were subject to the requirements of the immigration laws, including the provisions covering deportation and exclusion.

In analyzing the provisions of S. 2242, the Senate report stated:

The proposed bill embraces those European persons who were displaced during the war or shortly thereafter. September 1, 1939, was the date on which Hitler invaded Poland. The date, December 22, 1945, though some months after the termination of the war in Europe, was the date fixed for eligibility pursuant to a directive which caused certain preferences in the issuance of visas to be given to displaced persons.

The Directive, however, did not set any eligibility date of December 22, 1945. That date merely happened to be the date the Directive was signed by the President. The Department of State, under whose administration the implementation of the Directive was placed, realized that it was purely an arbitrary date without real significance and later changed it to April 21, 1947, the residence cut-off date set by the American occupation authorities.

Of those covered by the bill the Senate report said:

The group embraced by the proposed bill may be divided into three general classes: (1) Persons who were brought into Germany by the Nazis as forced laborers; (2) persons who fled to the west before the advancing Russian armies; and (3) persons, chiefly of Jewish origin, who fled from Germany and Austria during the Nazi regime and who have returned but have not been resettled.

The bill did not embrace recent refugees from Czechoslovakia seeking freedom from Communist tyranny, it did not embrace the recent Jewish refugees fleeing from the bloody persecutions and pogroms in eastern European countries, nor did it embrace the other recent refugees who, once repatriated found their life untenable, and returned to the haven of the occupying forces.

With respect to the housing and employment assurances, the report stated:

The proposed bill provides for certain vocational and housing prerequisites as a condition to eligibility. These prerequisites are prompted by the situation in the United States.

This position was founded on the premise that there was a national housing shortage and that assurances should be given that the DP would not become a public charge. On the housing matter, labor unions and the National Housing Administration agreed that the housing facilities in rural communities were adequate for as many as the 400,000 covered in the Stratton bill.

Of the 50-percent priority given to agriculturalists, the committee held, "The reason for this priority is not only to assist in filling the demand in the United States for agriculturalists, but also to assure a general distribution of those persons who were admitted."

According to the report a 50-percent preference was given to displaced persons "whose place of origin or country of nationality has been annexed by a foreign power" on the belief that since these people came from the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and

from areas east of the Curzon line in Poland, they would be unable to be repatriated, whereas there was conflicting evidence as to the repatriation possibilities of persons from other countries.

This preference was called discriminatory with respect to Jews and Catholics. Furthermore, since many of the refugees from the Baltic areas were farmers, they were given a double preference.

Another restrictive priority was granted in the issuance of visas to those displaced persons and displaced orphans who on January 1, 1948, were living in the camps. It was felt that by resettling first those people in camps, instead of giving an equal opportunity to those living outside, that the camps could be closed that much sooner and the government relieved of further expense and responsibility. However, it was also admitted there was a possibility that as soon as vacancies existed in the camps, they would be filled by persons living outside.

President Truman had twice requested Congress to enact legislation admitting 400,000 displaced persons, and there had been considerable comment by persons familiar with the problem and by editorialists that the United States should take its "fair share." Was the number 100,000 what the subcommittee considered our "fair share?" The subcommittee went back to the President's Directive and estimated that 50,000 would enter the United States by June 30, 1948, under provisions of that order. With the 100,000 to be permitted entry under S. 2242, a total of 150,000 would have been admitted into the country under DP legislation since 1945.

Opposition to the majority opinion on S. 2242 was registered by Senators McGrath and Cooper.

Senator Cooper had three main points of objection. He declared:

With respect to the number of displaced persons that should be admitted it is obvious that any number named for admission during the next 2 years will not solve the problem. * * * I have based my figure of 150,000 * * * upon the deficit of quota and nonquota immigrants during the war years, 1942, 1943, 1944, and 1945, taking into consideration the average number of quota and non-quota immigrants who annually entered the United States in the years 1930 to 1947, excluding the war years * * *.

As to the method of administration, it seems to me that in the bill submitted there is a conflict between the jurisdiction of the Displaced Persons Commission authorized by section 4 of the bill and the immigration authorities, and that in fact the Commission has little authority, other than to make rules. I believe that any commission or authority that is authorized to deal with the problem should be given power to:

- (1) Take preliminary action for resettlement in this country working with appropriate agencies, both governmental and private;
- (2) Send representatives to Europe for selection and screening of persons;
- (3) Certify such persons to immigration authorities for visas;
- (4) Provide for passage and transportation to their destination.

My third principal objection goes to the fact that there is no declaration in the bill which indicates the desire of the Congress that the displaced persons problem be quickly and finally settled * * *.

In regard to the 50 percent preference for "eligible displaced persons and eligible displaced orphans whose place of origin or nationality has been annexed by a foreign power * * *," Senator Cooper said, "I sympathize with this aim but believe that the choice should be made equitable between all groups."

Senator McGrath also had three main objections. He believed it unlikely that "even the maximum number provided for in the bill * * * would be able to enter * * * because of the vocational and housing prerequisites."

He attacked the 50 percent priority given to agriculturalists saying, "in view of the great demand for workers in other occupations, particularly in the garment and textile industries, in logging and fishing, and similar lines of work, it is my opinion that this priority is unjustified."

His main objection, however, was to the number to be admitted. "I would prefer that the bill provide for the admission of a maximum of 100,000 persons per year." He felt that this maximum "would at least afford an opportunity for some headway to be made toward the solution of the displaced persons problem."

As soon as the bill was out of committee, amendments began to appear. Of the 24 amendments introduced, only 7 were incorporated into the bill as it passed the Senate. Some of these were patterned after the House bill, others related to the various items of controversy such as date line, number to be admitted, assurances, preferences, and like problems.

Senator McGrath proposed an amendment in behalf of himself and Senator Hatch which was in the nature of a substitute bill and for the most part followed the bill reported by the House. However, the substitute bill never came up for a vote.

The Senate began consideration of S. 2242 on May 20. The debate was to continue intermittently for 2 weeks, finally culminating in an evening session on June 2.

The tight situation in housing in urban communities was used to justify the 50 percent preference for farmers.

The preference for persons from territories "annexed by a foreign power," came in for close verbal scrutiny. It was said to discriminate against both Jews and Catholics by virtue of the fact that those areas affected were predominantly Protestant, also that this provision made it appear that the United States had recognized Russian annexation of the Baltic countries and that part of Poland east of the Curzon line, which we had not done.

The other point in the bill termed "discriminatory" was the eligibility date, December 22, 1945. Opponents favoring the date of April 21, 1947 (which marked the closing of the displaced persons camps to any newcomers by order of General Clay), pointed out that the inclu-

sion of this date would enhance the feasibility of administration, as displaced persons residing in the camps on that date had been catalogued and registered. They argued, to no avail, that December 22, 1945, was an arbitrary date, it being the date of the signing of the President's Directive only, and was in no way related to a specific event, nor was it set by law.

Opponents to the April 21, 1947, date argued that that date did not affect displaced persons in camps in Italy and Austria, nor in the British or French zones.

The December date was also called discriminatory on the grounds that recent refugees would not be eligible, particularly Jews from eastern Europe where religious persecution still prevailed. But this was sought to be countered by the argument that the later date would admit Communists, and that the earlier date favored those people who had suffered the most, having been brought to Germany as forced labor.

In the final analysis the committee bill won out, except for some few amendments such as increasing the numbers to 200,000 and authorizing a German expellee program.

Opponents of the legislation repeatedly referred to the so-called pressure groups at work for this legislation, with particular emphasis on the Citizens Committee for Displaced Persons—both by allusion and by name—and on its force of registered lobbyists. Those opposed to favorable action seemed to resent this group.

The newspaper headlines told the story: Senate passes displaced persons bill at night session, 63 to 13, after 11½ hours of continuous debate.

Editorially the New York Times declared on June 3, 1948:

The DP bill just approved by the Senate is a sorry job. Throwing aside the high humanitarian principles of the original Stratton bill and all the powerful arguments advanced by the military government, Federal Government, civic, labor, and religious leaders in the past 18 months, the Senate took one step to rectify the injustices of the Wiley-Revercomb bill by increasing the number of DP admissions to 200,000 for the next 2 years. But that is as much as can be said for the measure which it then proceeded to approve.

Every liberalizing amendment which would have treated DP's equally as members of the human race * * * was voted down.

The Senate bill in its present form ought not be put on the statute books.

The House passed its own bill, H. R. 6396, on June 11.

Five days later the conferees met. They met in an all-day session, as it was getting near the day set for adjournment of Congress, with the result that the bill as reported still clung closely to the Senate bill. Although it was met by a storm of disapproval, the House passed the conference report on June 18, and the Senate on June 19 (the day set for adjournment), clearing the way for final action by the President.

The report was signed by 8 of the 12 conferees, and 2 of these signed it reluctantly.

Two sections of the Act were not Commission responsibilities. Under section 4 of the Act, not more than 15,000 otherwise eligible displaced persons who were temporarily resident in the United States and who entered prior to April 1, 1948, were made eligible for permanent residence status. Under section 12 of the Act provision was made for a 2-year program ending July 1, 1952, for German expellees. The activities under section 4 were assigned for administration to the Attorney General and those under section 12 to the Secretary of State.

The President's Statement

On June 25, 1948, President Truman signed the bill. In a statement concerning the bill, the President declared that the bill as passed by Congress consisted of a combination of the worst features of both the Senate and the House bills. He maintained that elements of the bill "form a pattern of discrimination and intolerance wholly inconsistent with the American sense of justice." The President referred especially to (1) the date line of December 22, 1945; (2) the provision for the mortgaging of future quotas; (3) the 40-percent preference to displaced persons from "*de facto* annexed" areas; (4) the requirement of assurances of employment and housing; and (5) the requirement of affirmative action by Congress in each case approved by the Attorney General to adjust the status of displaced persons already lawfully in the United States. The President stated in conclusion, "I have signed this bill in spite of its many defects, in order not to delay further the beginning of a resettlement program and in expectation that the necessary remedial action will follow when the Congress reconvenes."

The Commission's Recommendations for Amendments

The position taken by the President reflected the attitude of the supporters of liberal legislation on the admission of displaced persons. Immediately after the passage of the Act, and in the special session of Congress called by the President, several measures were introduced to amend it. These bills changed date lines, raised totals to be admitted, altered preferences, extended the life of the program, and included Czech refugees as eligibles under an enlarged mandate, but none came out of committee.

At this point, in August 1948, the Commission came into existence, and started its operations. In the face of predictions by many that the law could not be made to work and despite whatever views its members may have had on the policy aspects, the Commission's job was to take the law as it was passed and try its best to administer it.

The Commission realized that there were only 2 years in which to organize a program, create an administrative organization, develop rules, regulations, and procedures, and physically move 200,000 persons to this country. As time went on, however—and this will be described in detail in the next chapter—the fears of the President and others were confirmed by actual developments. The Commission found the Act increasingly difficult to administer and soon after operations were undertaken, made known its belief that amendment of the Act was necessary. In Commission meetings during the first few months of operation, in correspondence with Members of Congress, and with interested citizens, the many obstacles to the accomplishment of the objectives set by the Act were revealed again and again.

In its first semiannual report to the President and the Congress, the Commission strongly urged legislative amendment, and made 12 specific legislative recommendations. Acknowledging that the Act was an essentially altruistic and praiseworthy law, the Commission was compelled to point out that the Act failed in several very important respects to meet its purpose. Furthermore, it included certain features which would ultimately defeat the objectives of the program by creating administrative hurdles which would make the Act all but unworkable. These unworkable features of the Act seriously affected the Commission's capacity to proceed expeditiously with the selection and processing of displaced persons.

To alleviate these administrative difficulties, the Commission recommended the following amendments:

(1) Change the eligibility date for displaced persons to be present in Germany, Austria, and Italy from December 22, 1945, to April 21, 1947, in order to remove the discrimination against worthy refugees fleeing the Iron Curtain countries subsequent to 1945.

(2) Eliminate the so-called "Baltic Preference" or 40 percent limitation for *de facto* annexed areas, and in its place substitute a new provision to provide for selection of displaced persons without discrimination as to race, religion, or national origin.

(3) Eliminate the 30 percent agricultural preference, but retain agricultural pursuits within the general occupational preferences.

(4) Replace the provision for assurances of employment and housing by assurances of reasonable and suitable resettlement opportunities, and provide that the assurance against public charge be sufficient to satisfy present immigration requirements.

(5) Discontinue the "mortgaging" or charging of visas to future immigration quotas.

(6) Repeal the provision granting priority to displaced persons who were located in camps or centers on January 1, 1948.

In addition to recommending such administrative revisions, the Commission recommended that:

(1) The program be expanded to authorize the issuance of 400,000 visas over a 4-year period.

(2) A revolving fund be established for loans to voluntary agencies in order to meet expenses of reception and transportation of immigrants from ports of entry inland within the United States.

(3) Provision be made for recent political refugees.

(4) Visas not be granted to those persons who advocated or assisted in persecution of others for reasons of race, religion, or national origin.

(5) The date line relating to adjustment of status of displaced persons already in the United States be extended to cover those arriving by January 1, 1949, and that the Attorney General's action be final in such cases without need for Congressional action on each case.

(6) A technical transfer be made of the German expellee program.

House Action, 1949

As the months moved on it became increasingly apparent that the serious administrative restrictions in the Act would thwart accomplishment of its purpose, and the Commission and its members made this clear whenever they were called upon for their views.

When the Eighty-first Congress convened in January 1949, many bills were presented to amend the Act. Of the House measures, hearings were held on H. R. 1344, introduced by Representative Celler, of New York, on January 13, 1948. This bill, which embodied most of the changes incorporated in the other bills, called for a major overhauling of the 1948 Act along the lines recommended by the Commission. Among other things, the date line was altered to end the discrimination; provision was made for the admission of 2,000 Czech refugees; a new section was added to permit admission of 15,000 recent political refugees; nonquota status was provided for displaced persons and orphan children; total visas were set at 400,000 including 3,000 orphans; the discriminatory 30 percent agricultural preference was eliminated; the life of the Commission was extended to June 30, 1953; and provision was made for a system of loans to voluntary agencies for reception and transportation services.

Hearings were held on the Celler bill on March 2, 4, and 9, 1949. Representative Celler emphasized the discriminatory character of the 1948 Act, and stated that under the President's directive, 42,000 persons had been admitted from December 22, 1945, to June 30, 1948, while only 2,499 persons had been admitted from July 1, 1948, to December 31, 1948, under the Displaced Persons Act. Celler enumerated the discriminatory aspects of the Act, noted wherein his bill corrected these inequities, and then offered amendments (a) to make eligible 7,000 so-called "Shanghai" refugees, who were European refugees who fled eastward to Shanghai rather than westward to

Germany, Austria, or Italy; (b) permit entrance of 2,000 Czechoslovakians, who fled as a result of the Communist coup there; (c) permit 3,000 orphans to be admitted; (d) admit 15,000 refugees who fled to places other than Germany, Austria, or Italy; (e) admit 15,000 recent political refugees in the national interest, pursuant to State Department recommendations. The hearing went over much of the ground covered in earlier hearings.

Senator Wiley, in a statement read before the House committee, called for a revision of the 1948 Act, indicating the original measure had been a stop-gap effort and necessitated immediate revision. He called for (1) a new cut-off date of January 1, 1949, (2) extension of the program to 4 years, (3) elimination of "mortgaging" quotas, (4) substituting for job and housing assurance provision that the displaced person would not become a public charge, (5) raised numbers from 205,000 to upward of 400,000, (6) entrance of political refugees and orphan children, and other changes tending to eliminate the discriminatory character of the original bill.

The Commission's testimony followed its recommendations in requesting changes in date line, preferences, number, assurance, and other items that would facilitate the administration of the Act and carry out its high purpose.

H. R. 1344 was not reported out of committee, but a new bill, H. R. 4567, introduced by Congressman Celler on May 9, 1949, passed the House June 3, 1949. This bill provided for an increase in numbers from 205,000 to 339,000. The 339,000 included 18,000 Polish Army veterans in England, 500 recent political refugees from behind the Iron Curtain, 4,000 Shanghai refugees, and 5,000 orphans. The date line for eligibility was advanced from December 22, 1945, to January 1, 1949. The 40 percent preference for *de facto* annexed areas, the special 30 percent preference for agriculture, and the priority for in-camp displaced persons were eliminated. Selection of displaced persons was to be made without discrimination in favor of or against a race, religion, or national origin. The categories of orphan children were expanded to permit entrance of those barred under existing legislation. Refugees who had arrived in the United States prior to April 30, 1949, were to be extended opportunity for regularizing their status. A loan fund was authorized to assist sponsors to meet expenses of transportation and reception of displaced persons. The number of ethnic Germans or expellees authorized for admission was raised to 54,744 persons and additional security measures were provided.

In reporting the bill out, the House Committee on the Judiciary emphasized the procedural and administrative difficulties of operation under the 1948 law. Amendment of the discriminatory and administratively awkward provisions was called for, and note was taken of

the State Department's lack of progress on the German expellee program because of the original difficulty of determining who constituted a German ethnic under the provisions of the Act. A minority report declared "the so-called DP bill is a snare and a delusion and should be defeated." The minority claimed the existing immigration laws were "exceedingly liberal. They should be strengthened not weakened." Of the displaced persons arriving in 1948, it was maintained that only 5 percent went to the farms and the 95 percent "poured into our big and overcrowded cities." They denied existing legislation was discriminatory and believed that "many Communists have filtered into this country under the guise of refugees." They objected to the preference for displaced persons and the discrimination against expellees, castigated screening as bad, called for clarity at home, and concluded that "this legislation is born of fake and misleading propaganda, and should be defeated."

The debate in the House was along the lines of the debate on the measures presented in both houses since 1947. The protagonists in the House effort in 1947 once again called for liberalized legislation. The humanitarian, economic, political, psychological, and other arguments were once again detailed at length and with conviction founded on operational experience under the legislation. To the now firmly applied and well-accepted arguments were added new arguments that the amended legislation be enacted so that the displaced persons problem be liquidated at the earliest possible moment and the attention of the United States be turned to the solution of a far greater problem, that of the 10,000,000 German expellees.

Senate Action, 1949-50

Action in the Senate revolved largely about the views held by Senator McCarran, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and others who were opposed to the program. In September, Senator McCarran undertook a personal survey of the displaced persons program in Europe and his findings—generally adverse to the operations—tended to prolong debate and force review of the House measure over a period of many months. Enactment waited for more than 13 months after its introduction in the House.

After H. R. 4567, as amended, was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, various amendments were offered. The bill was reported out of the Senate committee without recommendation on October 12, 1949. In his absence, Senator McCarran indicated vigorous opposition to bringing the House measure on the floor of the Senate for action, and requested deferment until he could report on his investigations. After bitter debate, the bill was recommitted to the committee on October 15, 1949, with instructions from the Senate that a bill be reported to the Senate by January 25, 1950.

On January 25, 1950, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary reported out H. R. 4567 with amendments. The report called for a new definition of a displaced person totally unrelated to IRO status. The proposed new definition would include German expellees, Greek refugees, and Polish veterans, and exclude IRO status as a factor. The Senate report rejected inclusion of 15,000 recent political refugees, 4,000 Shanghai refugees, and the provision for out-of-zone refugees who fled to places other than Germany, Austria, or Italy. The Senate committee report set 320,000 as the maximum visas for displaced persons, as newly defined, retained the existing preferences and priorities, and strengthened the 30 percent preference for farmers. The committee held that statistics "flatly refute the charges which have frequently been made to the effect that the present law discriminates against persons of Jewish or Catholic faith." The committee agreed to the provision of H. R. 4567 regularizing status of displaced persons who had lawfully gained admission into the United States on a temporary basis. The committee expressed its concern "over the evidences of laxity in the administration of the present displaced persons law" and attempted by certain amendments to provide for strengthening the law. The committee felt that under the 1948 Act the Commission was to prescribe rules and regulations, but that the administration of the Act was to be by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the State Department. However, it felt that through presidential directive the Commission had been designated to administer the Act. A committee amendment provided for final determination of eligibility by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the State Department. Provision was made for a joint Congressional committee to study the German ethnic problem and the committee supported with only slight change, the security and loan provisions of H. R. 4567.

On February 14, a minority report of the committee was presented by Senators Kilgore, Graham, and Ferguson. Supplemental statements were offered by Senators Magnuson and Kefauver, and separate views were tendered by Senators O'Connor and Wiley, with the result that the so-called minority report was in effect accepted by a majority of the committee. The minority held the Senate amendments inadequate in that the "committee bill retains many of the restrictive, unfair and discriminatory provisions of the act and in fact adds others." The minority held that the committee bill's new definition of "displaced persons" reduced the number of IRO DPs who could enter the country and eliminated the Shanghai refugee provision. The minority recommended restoration of the 339,000 visa figure, adopted by the House, objected to the double inclusion of expellees both in the definition of displaced persons and in the special provision for them. The expellee problem admittedly warranted action, but it

was felt that it should not reduce the visas for DPs. The minority report proposed an extension of the expellee program and provision was also made for an international conference dealing with the expellee problem. House provisions on preferences and priorities were favored over the Senate committee's recommendations, and the assignment of final decision on eligibility to Immigration and Naturalization Service and the State Department was held to be an impediment to operations.

Senators Magnuson and Kefauver, in a supplemental statement, subscribed to the report, but reserved "unto themselves at the time of the committee vote the right to take any action thereafter that they might individually deem appropriate." Senators O'Connor and Wiley, in separate views, declared they had voted for the committee bill because it represented certain important improvements over the old bill, but held that further changes were desirable and undoubtedly would be presented for consideration in the Senate.

Reports of Congressional Committees

Several Congressional committees investigated the displaced persons program and their reports to the Congress were significant points of reference in the debate.

The Subcommittee on Relations with International Organizations of the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments in its report on United States relations with IRO, declared in 1949, after some 11 months of operation of the Displaced Persons Commission that:

It is quite manifest that unless the countries of the world, which are able to do so, assume their full responsibility with respect to displaced persons and refugees, the IRO may have to continue indefinitely. Accordingly, the subcommittee feels that it is in the interest of the United States to take steps to admit a higher number than are admissible under the act.

The Senate subcommittee felt that the restrictions in the Act made it very difficult to administer and recommended nine basic changes which closely followed the Commission's recommendations: (1) The number of visas authorized should be increased; (2) the eligibility date of December 22, 1945, should be changed; (3) the 40 percent limitation for *de facto* annexed areas should be eliminated and provision should be made for the selection of displaced persons without regard to race, religion, or national origin; (4) the 30 percent preference for agricultural workers should be eliminated and provisions should be made for including agricultural pursuits within the occupational preferences; (5) the charging of visas to future quotas should be discontinued; (6) the in-camp priority should be eliminated; (7) provisions should be made for recent political refugees whose admission into the United States is in the national interest; (8) provision

should be made that no visas are to be issued to anyone who has advocated or assisted in persecution of other people because of race, religion or national origin; and (9) provision should be made for the establishment of a revolving fund for loans to recognized voluntary agencies to meet the expenses of reception and transportation of immigrants from ports of entry to points of resettlement in the United States.

In its conclusion the subcommittee declared that the nations of the world must assume their full responsibility for the solution of the displaced persons or refugee problems created by World War II. "They must face these problems realistically and they must realize that contributing a sum of money however large to an international organization neither relieves them of their obligations nor constitutes a solution of the problem." And finally, "Until the nations of the world, including the United States, are ready and willing to meet these problems—in the only manner in which they can be met, by eliminating certain restrictions with respect to immigration this problem will never be solved."

House committee reports also were important focal points. In several reports, prepared during the twenty-odd months debate over amending Public Law 774, members of a special subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, appointed pursuant to H. Res. 238 of the Eighty-first Congress, reported on the status of displaced persons and expellees in Europe and the progress of resettlement in the United States. One of these reports, Displaced Persons in Europe and Their Resettlement in the United States, submitted on January 20, 1950, was the result of an investigation undertaken in Europe in September and October 1949 and a review of the activities of Federal, State, voluntary agencies, and other participation in the domestic program.

The subcommittee reviewed the DP situation and operations of IRO and the Commission in Western Germany, the western sectors of Berlin and Vienna, and the western zones of occupation in Austria and Italy. The committee, supported by staff experts, traversed the areas in question, and stressed personal contact, unscheduled visits, hearings with a free exchange of question and answer, and briefings by military and civilian personnel.

The subcommittee reported in detail on the operations of IRO, emphasizing both the minor repatriation and the major resettlement effort and the disposition of the hardcore of displaced persons. Similar analysis was made of the United States displaced persons program, which the committee felt was greatly superior to other national programs from a humanitarian point of view in "its insistence on the preservation of the integrity of the family." The 1948 Displaced Persons Act was declared to be "neither * * * conceived nor administered

as a means of providing workers for the United States economy." The assurance requirement, with its connotation of planned resettlement made the displaced persons operation considerably different from the pattern of normal immigration with its disregard of where the immigrant settles or what he does, provided he does not become a public charge.

The House subcommittee stressed the importance of the Commission as a coordinating agency among all the various agencies involved in the program and the sponsor. It was acknowledged that the assurance provision of the 1948 Act, although meritorious in itself, prevented the Commission from effecting occupational or other placement because of the primary sponsor responsibility for designating where the displaced person would settle and what he would be doing.

In appraising the Commission's activity, the subcommittee reported that "the studies and investigations undertaken in Europe have convinced this subcommittee that, on the whole, the administration of the 1948 act is being conducted in a diligent and satisfactory manner." It was agreed that the period taken in processing cases seemed excessive, but there seemed no possibility of shortening this time period if the provisions of the 1948 Act and of regular immigration statutes were to be followed. One aspect of the procedure applied in selecting eligible displaced persons did require immediate remedy. The subcommittee maintained that the IRO, the Commission, and the voluntary agencies, had not given sufficient review to the applicant's declaration that he possessed fitness and training for farming work.

The subcommittee also made thorough inquiry of the allegations that there was widespread fraud and falsification and forging of documents by prospective DPs. On the basis of an investigation carried on "at all levels of the European operation," the subcommittee concluded that it was "strongly inclined to believe that the majority of the allegations could be safely classified either as rumors or deliberate misrepresentations intended to serve a definite purpose." The subcommittee similarly put at rest the rumor that masses of displaced persons of criminal, subversive, or immoral background were infiltrating into the country by quoting Department of Justice reports that only one-twentieth of 1 percent of the first 120,000 displaced persons admitted were of questionable background.

The House committee said:

The number of screening agencies, screening sessions, interrogations, investigations, and checks that a displaced person must pass before reaching the United States is so extensive that the chance of a fraudulent statement or a forged document to "slip through" is practically nil.

A Nation-wide survey undertaken by the subcommittee went into all aspects of resettlement and the adjustment of DPs. Detailed reports were received by the subcommittee from the governors of States

throughout the Nation and the general consensus was that selection, placement, and assimilation of displaced persons were satisfactory. The reports from several agricultural States questioned the selection and placement of displaced persons claiming competence as farmers. The subcommittee found that geographic distribution was far from satisfactory.

In its conclusions and recommendations, the subcommittee, appraising the success in resettling the 120,000 displaced persons who had immigrated to this country, felt that the time had not arrived as yet to offer a broad and general judgment "on the extent to which the unprecedented resettlement program * * * has been successful." It was apparent, however, that (a) the economy of the United States had absorbed the new immigrants without noticeable difficulty; (b) no dangerous or disturbing elements had been injected into the body politic; (c) the nation as a whole had welcomed the displaced persons and had made good use of their capabilities while simultaneously offering them opportunities for rehabilitation.

The subcommittee made reference to the need for greater balance in geographical distribution in the resettlement process and for the close scrutiny in occupational selection and placement.

The subcommittee noted the harmonious cooperation overseas of the several Federal agencies engaged in the displaced person operation. They pointed to the only instance in which there was not complete harmony that in which certain junior consular officials "seem not to realize adequately what Congress had in mind in enacting this special legislation and appear to be reluctant to accept the necessity of the additional amount of expeditious work required under the terms of the temporary Act with its strict but justifiable time limitations." The subcommittee called upon the State Department to take "prompt and energetic action" to remedy the situation.

The subcommittee suggested that the United States program should include an increase in the numbers of persons to whom visas should be granted, a change in the existing cut-off date and elimination of fixed preference percentages.

The subcommittee in another report proposed a series of suggested remedies for easing the situation in Germany, in connection with German expellees. Included among these suggestions were (1) there should be emigration of German surplus population to underdeveloped countries; (2) in order to realize on the proposed plan for admission of German ethnics under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, the subcommittee recommended that "(a) the lifetime of the German ethnic origin provision be extended, (b) the contract labor clause be waived on behalf of applicants whose employment may be guaranteed by American sponsors, (c) provision be made for defraying the cost of transportation to the United States, and (d) the principal portion

of the 50 percent German and Austrian quotas for the fiscal year 1948-49 be made available again to German expellees and refugees."

In its conclusion the subcommittee declared the problem of the German refugees and expellees basically a problem of Germany, but held it to be in the interest of Europe and America to have immediate resolution of the refugee problem in Germany. It was maintained, however, the opportunity for emigration should be given a million expellees, the overwhelming majority of whom should be farmers.

The third Congressional investigation was that undertaken by Senator McCarran for the Senate Committee on Judiciary.

This investigation and subsequent hearings before the subcommittee on amendments to the Displaced Persons Act took place with intermissions from March 25, 1949, to March 16, 1950. The investigation was concerned with the details of the operations of the program, especially those of the overseas establishment. Representatives of numerous organizations, including opponents and proponents of amended legislation, testified on the measure.

Final Senate Action, 1950

Debate in the Senate was lengthy, vigorous and, at times, bitter. On April 5, 1950, the Senate passed H. R. 4567 by a vote of 58 to 15, after having adopted the Kilgore substitute for the committee bill by a vote 47 to 25. Before taking final action, the Senate adopted a series of amendments: (1) Giving consuls and immigrant inspectors coextensive authority with the Commission as to eligibility determination; (2) authorizing admission of 5,000 Italian refugees from Venezia Giulia, (3) authorizing admission of 4,000 so-called Shanghai refugees; (4) barring German expellees born in the Russian zones of Germany and Austria; (5) providing that quotas of German expellees shall be charged to country of origin, not to Germany; (6) requiring assurances to be submitted by United States citizens; (7) authorizing admission of 20,000 war orphans from some 18 countries or areas of western Europe.

The Senate rejected amendments (1) changing the cut-off date from January 1, 1949, to April 21, 1947; (2) admitting Arab displaced persons; (3) requiring supervision of displaced persons; (4) redefining the term, displaced persons; (5) establishing a joint Congressional committee on German expellees; (6) relating admission of additional displaced persons to specific housing and labor conditions; (7) permitting entrance of certain Spanish refugees; and (8) authorizing the Commission to make grants, instead of loans, for inland transportation.

The 1950 Amendments

The measure, as reported out of conference, contained most of the elements of the original H. R. 4567. A new good faith oath was

included, which required that the alien state, under oath, that he accept and agree in good faith to abide by the terms of employment provided in the assurance. It was emphasized in the conference report that "the requirement is aimed at fraud at the outset and is not intended as a means of general labor-management controls." It was indicated the Commission's statutory obligations in regard to resettlement were being increased and there was "imposed upon the Commission the obligation to provide the displaced persons overseas with information and guidance as to their responsibilities to American sponsors and the American community." H. R. 4567, as finally passed, contained the following basic changes in the 1948 Act:

(1) Eligibility date changed from December 22, 1945, to January 1, 1949.

(2) Visas for displaced persons increased from 205,000 to 341,000, all under quota but "mortgaged" to future years.

(3) Provided for admission of 341,000 displaced persons including 4,000 Shanghai refugees, 18,000 Polish war veterans in Great Britain, 10,000 Greek refugees, 500 recent political refugees, and 2,000 refugees from Venezia Giulia.

(4) Forty percent Baltic provision and 30 percent agricultural preferences were eliminated.

(5) Selection of eligible displaced persons and resettlement was to be made without discrimination in favor of or against a race, religion, or national origin.

(6) Sponsors of displaced persons were required to be American citizens.

(7) Provision was made for admission of 5,000 nonquota war orphans residing in 18 European countries or areas.

(8) Authorization was provided for the admission of 54,744 German expellees and the administration of this program was transferred from the Department of State to the Commission.

(9) A requirement was written into the Act providing for a "good faith" oath by which displaced persons and expellees accept and agree in good faith to abide by terms of employment offered them in this country by their American sponsors.

(10) Provision was made for loans by the Commission to accredited public or private agencies and through them to individual sponsors participating in the program.

(11) Additional security requirements were enacted, barring certain groups who voluntarily bore arms against the United States, advocated destruction of free competitive enterprise and the revolutionary overthrow of representative governments, who were members of organizations designated by the Attorney General as Communist organizations or who advocated or assisted in the persecution of any individual because of race, religion, or national origin.

(12) Every person 18 years of age or over was required to take an oath upon arrival at port of entry that he was not a member of a Communist or other subversive organizations.

(13) Provision was made for the United States participation in an international conference to help settle the problem of German expellees currently residing in Germany and Austria.

(14) Only United States planes and vessels were authorized for use in transporting to this country persons whose admission was provided for under the Act and whose transportation was paid for, in whole or part, by the United States.

(15) Consular officers and immigration inspectors were authorized to review eligibility certifications by Commission representatives concerning displaced persons.

(16) Priority to displaced persons in-camp was eliminated.

(17) The entry date line into the United States was extended from April 1, 1948, to April 30, 1949, for displaced persons temporarily in the United States who sought to adjust their immigration status.

(18) The Secretary of State was directed to secure the cooperation of other nations in solving the displaced persons problem.

Extension of Program

The amendment was enacted only 2 weeks prior to the termination of the program under the 1948 Act. The administrative and visa slow-down prior to that date, and the necessarily slow pick-up thereafter, made it apparent within a few months of operation under the amended Act that the new deadline of June 30, 1951, for the completion of visaing operations on the displaced persons program, was inadequate for the successful termination of the program. Accordingly, Congressman Walter sponsored a measure calling for further necessary amendments. The purposes of the bill were (1) extension for 6 months of the displaced persons program to December 31, 1951, with no increase in the number to be admitted and no extension of the Commission's term of office; (2) elimination of the fixed date for filing assurances for certain orphans; and (3) elimination of the requirement for the payment of visa fees and head taxes for such orphans.

On April 16, 1951, the House Judiciary Committee reported out H. R. 3576, and stated that another 6-month extension beyond June 30, 1951, would be necessary to complete the task of issuing the authorized number of visas. The committee reviewed the reasons for the delay in completing the program within the period originally established, quoted Chairman Gibson's statement at the hearings and emphasized the delays caused by the "careful and meticulous screening conducted by the Displaced Persons Commission, the Department

of State, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service." The thoroughness of the screening was reflected by the fact that of the 220,360 displaced persons admitted to the United States by January 31, 1951, not a single person had to be deported for reasons of security. This same record, in fact, prevailed to the very end of the program. The House committee also noted the need for this extension in order to complete the phases of the program directed by the Department of State. The House committee recommended the enactment of the three proposals requested by the Commission and submitted by Congressman Walter.

House debate on the measure began on May 7 and Representative Celler declared that a 6-month extension from July 1 to December 31, 1951, of the Commission's operations was necessary to complete the program. He reiterated the reasons for the delay in completing the effort and indicated the difficulties in interpreting the Internal Security Act, lack of ships, and disruption of operations in the displaced persons camps resulting from United States Army repossession of camps and installations. He stressed the growing demand for displaced persons workers in several categories, and singled out farmers, loggers, construction workers, hard-rock miners, foundry workers, and glove makers as being especially in demand.

Representatives Fellows and Keating commended the commissioners and the Displaced Persons Commission staff for a job well done.

The bill passed the House on May 9 by a vote of 312 to 63.

After hearings, the House measure was reported to the Senate, for the Senate Judiciary Committee, by Senator McCarran on June 21, 1951, and passed that day, following minor changes in the House bill.

The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in reporting out the bill, amended the original measure to provide: (1) Extension of the operative effect of the displaced persons program for 6 months; (2) requirement that no immigration visa shall be issued to displaced persons unless the Commission initiated the selection or processing of these persons before July 31, 1951; (3) elimination of the assurances filing dead line for orphans; and (4) the elimination of the visa fee and head tax for orphans.

The House concurred in the Senate amendment. The measure was signed by the President and became law on June 28, 1951.

* * * * *

This is the story of how the displaced persons law came about. Contradictory views, different objectives, conflicting appraisals, selfish and unselfish interests, varying concepts of the United States' best domestic and international interests, all of these were fought out in the light of public opinion. They coalesced in a preponderant national viewpoint, the displaced persons program. The years of public

and Congressional debate illustrated the basic principle of a democracy, that its laws must find root in the people and must express their aspirations, hopes, and desires. This was a democracy in action. The legislative history of the displaced persons program shows beyond question that the American people wanted a generous, a fair, and a workable displaced persons program.

How It Worked

The Commission

The President signed the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, on June 25, 1948, and nominated Ugo Carusi, Edward M. O'Connor, and Harry N. Rosenfield to the Displaced Persons Commission on August 2, 1948. Action on their appointments was not taken by Congress before its recess, and on August 13, 1948, the President gave the three commissioners recess appointments. Commissioners Carusi and O'Connor entered on duty immediately thereafter. Commissioner Rosenfield was in Europe as a member of the United States delegation to the seventh session of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations which was giving special attention to the work of the International Refugee Organization, and did not assume his duties until his return on August 27.

The three men named to the Commission brought to the new agency experience that related in considerable measure to the work of resettling refugees as displaced persons in the United States. Commissioner Carusi, originally from Vermont, was 46 years of age at the time of his appointment and designation as chairman of the Commission. He had been engaged for 23 years in Government service as a lawyer and administrator. He had served in various important posts in the Department of Justice, including those of assistant to the Attorney General, and as Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization for 2½ years. From August 1947, until his appointment to the Commission, he had been on a special assignment for the President, which involved a survey of the situation of displaced persons and refugees in Europe and the preparation of recommendations for a United States displaced persons program.

Commissioner O'Connor, originally of Buffalo, N. Y., was 39 years of age when named to the Commission and had been active in social welfare work. Immediately prior to his appointment as Commissioner, he had been executive assistant to the National Catholic Welfare Conference's War Relief Services. For his distinguished service overseas directing assistance efforts among displaced persons and refugees, and for civilian populations of the liberated countries, he had been decorated by several foreign governments. He had participated in the effort to bring about the passage of the DP bill. He had

been on the Survey Committee on Displaced Persons of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service and had taken a leading part in analyzing conditions among the displaced persons as early as 1945. He had assisted in the preparation of the Survey Committee's report in 1946, and following that had participated in precommission efforts at developing State and local programs for the obtaining of housing, employment, and other facilities for displaced persons who might be permitted entrance to the United States. He brought to the Commission a close previous relationship with the resettlement aspects of the program, and with the public and private agencies involved in that aspect of the Commission's program.

Commissioner Rosenfield, 37 years of age, was serving as Assistant to the Federal Security Administration when named by the President to the Commission. As a lawyer, administrator, educator, and author, prominent for his services and writings in the fields of social welfare and education, he brought to the Commission experience in large-scale administrative operations, in the legislative process and in the development of Federal, State, local government, and private agency relations. In 1948 as a member of the United States delegation, he served as chairman of the United States delegation committee on human rights and played a leading role at the UN Economic and Social Council meeting on refugees in Geneva, where he vigorously maintained the United States position against the violent anti-resettlement stand and expressions of the delegates from the U. S. S. R. and the satellite countries. Rosenfield's extensive experience in governmental administration, education and social welfare, and legislative, legal, and related matters proved of benefit to the program in connection with the various aspects of the Commission's activities in the United States and in Europe.

The only change in Commission membership followed the resignation of Commissioner Carusi in 1950. President Truman named John W. Gibson, 40 years of age, to succeed Commissioner Carusi. Commissioner Gibson was sworn into office on December 27, 1950, and assumed his duties immediately.

A labor leader who achieved a position of leadership in the CIO, Commissioner Gibson formerly had served as Assistant Secretary of Labor for 5 years. In that period he had been Acting Secretary for substantial periods during the illness of Secretary of Labor Schwollenbach and the interim between the latter's death and the appointment of Maurice Tobin to the position. Prior to his service in the United States Department of Labor, he had been President of the Michigan CIO Council, assistant director of the CIO for Michigan, and secretary of the CIO Council from 1939-41. He had been chairman of the Michigan State Department of Labor and Industry, and also had served as a member of advisory committees for the War

Production Board, Office of Price Administration, War Manpower Commission, and Office of Civil Defense during the war years.

Commissioner Gibson brought to the Commission a substantial background in Government administration, an appreciation of the needs of a production-line operation, and an understanding of the program's relationship to the Nation's labor needs.

Formal operations of the Commission began on August 27, 1948. Funds totaling \$2,000,000 had been appropriated to provide resources for its initial operations. Space had been provided by the Department of State which also provided housekeeping services during these first days of the program. At the start of operations, there already loomed the deadline of June 30, 1950, then only 97 weeks away. Regulations had to be drawn for this novel effort and an organization had to be developed in Washington and overseas to determine eligibility and to facilitate the movement of displaced persons from their camps and elsewhere to the port of embarkation. Facilities had to be provided to receive them in the United States and to effect their resettlement in this country. Coordination had to be effected immediately with cooperating Federal agencies, with State bodies already appointed by their respective governors to participate in the displaced persons program, and with the voluntary agencies which had been active participants in the IRO program and had been leaders in the attempts to initiate a United States displaced persons program. And as an ever present and controlling factor was the realization that the \$2,000,000 appropriated was hardly sufficient to bring in half the total anticipated in the first year of operation of the organization. Even an additional \$2,000,000, requested several days before the Commission members were nominated by the President, could not cover the whole number.

Commissioner Carusi, who had spent weeks in November and December of the preceding year studying the problem of the displaced persons at first hand, had developed his plans for a United States displaced persons program months before the passage of the 1948 act. In a report of January 16, 1948, to the Secretary of State, Commissioner Carusi conceived of the establishment supervising the DP program as a small entity, simply the "administrator, with a small personal staff and an advisory council of the representatives of the cooperating Federal agencies, voluntary agencies, and State and local bodies." By utilizing existing facilities he believed personnel training time could be saved and the operation propelled at a rapid rate. He called for additional immigration inspectors and for immigration inspections in Europe for those "which ordinarily take place at the American ports of debarkation." He had been assured by American military authorities in Germany and Austria that rail transportation could be made available to more than 100,000 visa holders per annum to the port of embarkation.

Prior to the Commission's first meetings, there had been months of intensive consultations with consular and other officials on these matters. Carusi had sat in meetings at the Bureau of the Budget before the passage of the law, in connection with the fiscal, as well as the operational aspects of the program. He had expressed himself to Congressional groups and throughout had called for immediate action in the establishment of a very small independent agency with a staff of less than 25, coordinating the activities of existing units in the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and the Federal Security Agency. Housekeeping activities were to be undertaken by the Department of State and other support services were to be obtained from other Federal agencies on a reimbursable basis. Of course, the law actually passed required new plans on many aspects and the complete scrapping of the originally planned administrative structure.

Fundamentally, the Commission was charged under the Act with responsibility for carrying out the provisions and purposes of the Act and for formulating and issuing regulations for the admission into the United States of eligible displaced persons and displaced orphans and for coordinating all the operations to the end of accomplishing the purpose of the statute. By the President's Executive Order 10003, of October 4, 1948, the Commission was designated as the agency which under the law made a thorough investigation and prepared a written report on the character, history and eligibility of every person to be admitted under the Act. The "most general distribution and settlement of persons admitted under the act throughout the United States and their territories and possessions" was sought. The Commission was to report on February 1, 1949, and semiannually thereafter to the President and to the Congress "on the situation regarding eligible displaced orphans, eligible displaced persons and displaced persons." The reports were to contain "information respecting employment conditions and the housing situation in this country, the place and type of employment, and the residence of eligible displaced orphans and eligible displaced persons who have been admitted into the United States pursuant to the provisions of this Act." At the end of its term the Commission was to make a final report to the President and the Congress.

This was the specific charge of responsibility under the law and the President's Executive Order. The target number of visas to be issued was set by law at 205,000 and the final date June 30, 1950.

Staffing Pattern

These, then, were the Congressional targets and goals under the provisions of the act. In the critical period August 27-September 6, 1948, the Commission charted the course of the program. In Commission meetings that ran through the day, evening, and into

the early hours of the morning, and through week ends, they defined for themselves general areas of responsibility. Compelled by the force of circumstances confronting them, such as inadequate budget, novel questions of administration and law, pressure to move quickly and inability to recruit rapidly enough the necessary kind of people, the Commission in effect assigned to each of its members duties somewhat like that of a bureau chief. These functions were all exercised on behalf of the Commission.

Concern for the general administrative and budgetary activities of the agency was assigned as Chairman Carusi's primary responsibility; the preparation of regulations, and the Commission's legal and legislative activities were placed within Commissioner Rosenfield's primary area of responsibility; and Commissioner O'Connor undertook as his primary functions the reception and resettlement operation and sought the solution to the problem of integrating the activities of voluntary agencies and State committees with those of the Commission. These functional assignments of areas of interest were not rigid and exclusive, and the small staff of less than a dozen persons assisting them during this period handled elements of the program across functional lines. During this period the pattern was set that matters of both policy and basic operational character were handled by the commissioners sitting as a commission. A majority vote was the basis of commission decision. Under the law, no special authority was vested in any one commissioner. This situation required close working relationship and "give-and-take" in the development of Commission policy.

Determinations made during these first few days of the Commission's existence revolved about personnel, budgetary needs, general administrative set-up, and the regulations which would set the pattern for the future operation.

On July 31, 1948, the President transmitted a request for an additional \$2,000,000 for the fiscal year 1949 in order "to enable the Displaced Persons Commission to inaugurate operations on a scale which will permit an annual average of about 100,000 displaced persons to immigrate to the United States." It was maintained that the original appropriation of \$2,000,000 was insufficient and unless "additional funds are immediately available, there will be a material reduction in the number of displaced persons who can be brought into the United States during fiscal year 1949."

On August 7, 1948, by H. J. Res. 445, provision was made for the apportionment and expenditure during the first three quarters of fiscal year 1949, of the \$2,000,000 appropriated the Commission under the Second Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1948.

Original estimates of needs for personnel and other obligations, computed by the budget office of the Department of State in June of

1948, on the assumption that the House bill would become law, and then related to the Senate bill when it became apparent that the latter measure and not the former would become the basic pattern of the law, had conceived of a total staff of 12 in the office of the Coordinator of Resettlement at headquarters in Washington and with no personnel overseas. Under this organization, cooperating Federal agencies were to undertake all work overseas and to have some staff assigned to Washington headquarters of their respective agencies to participate in stateside operations relating to the displaced persons program.

During the interim period, after the act was signed into law, and before the Commissioners had been nominated by the President, a supplemental budget estimate for fiscal year 1949 was submitted to the House by the Department of State in connection with the displaced persons program. In this submission, the original estimate of 12 employees was revised. The new estimate was based on an organization operating both in the United States and overseas. The Commission's initial personnel needs were now estimated for it to be as follows: 20 positions for departmental staff and 85 positions overseas. Total obligations were estimated at \$625,000. Estimates for participating agencies were founded on the new apparent realization that not more than 50,000 visas could be issued by June 30, 1949, and on the assumption of operating responsibilities by the Commission.

Immediately after being named as chairman of the Commission, Carusi declared that the funds available were inadequate and the full Commission corroborated this position soon after it began formal operations.

As a result of Commission discussions during the period August 27-September 6, it was clearly recognized that the original plan for a small headquarters staff and for no field staff in Europe under the Commission's direction was neither feasible nor desirable if the purposes of the law were to be carried out fully. It was agreed that a larger headquarters staff would be necessary, that a larger European field force would be required to supervise activities and to participate in selection and case analysis, and that officers would be required at ports of entry. A revised estimate of needs was drafted and the estimate was submitted to the Bureau of the Budget.

Although it was already agreed that the original staffing pattern would have to be changed, staff assignments during these first days of operation of the Commission were in keeping with the original and completely inadequate pre-Commission plans. The events of the period immediately subsequent to the departure of the chairman for Europe on September 6, 1948, to deal with the overseas situation, bringing with them a tremendous public reaction in the United States

to the opening of the assurance program, and a realization of the needs overseas, soon drove home the fact that far more than the original number of persons requested for the headquarters operation would have to be employed in but a single operation—to handle the hundreds of thousands of pieces of mail with which the newly established agency was swamped. Almost immediately plans were developed for the enlargement of the headquarters establishment and the needs of the agency were reflected in budget estimates and requests for personnel ceilings submitted to the Bureau of the Budget during the course of the first few months of operation of the Commission.

Regulations

In the area of substantive operations, it was a matter of first importance that rules and regulations be drawn for the program. These regulations, covering the organization and controlling procedures for the program, were reviewed thoroughly and at length by the entire Commission. They were finally agreed upon and promulgated by the Commission on October 6, 1948, following review and clearance in Washington and overseas by the cooperating Federal agencies and consultation with the several voluntary agencies participating in the program. With their publication in the Federal Register on October 6, 1948, the pattern of operation for the movement of displaced persons was formally established and a basis laid for the processing of the first group of displaced persons who were being selected in Europe by the Chairman and a special team of Government officials.

The initial draft of the rules and regulations was submitted for comment to the Departments of State, Labor, Army, and Justice and to the Federal Security Agency. In addition, copies were sent to the voluntary agencies for their recommendations. Appropriate and suitable suggestions and recommendations were incorporated, after joint consultations, into the final draft of the regulations, which benefited from the experience and advice of the comments thus made.

When completed, the regulations permitted a liberal and effective operation within the many restrictive elements of the law. Adherence was paid to the letter and the spirit of the act. Every effort was made to facilitate action in the program in due appreciation of the need for the development of regulations that would enable the full realization of the Congressional purpose in enacting the DP Act.

Provisions of Regulations

(1) *Assurances.*—Under the law no one could be admitted into the United States without an assurance from a sponsor. The regulations required that assurance be submitted in writing. These assurances were to be by affidavit except where submitted by a public

agency or by a voluntary agency providing services in connection with migration, settlement, or welfare of aliens, and which was recognized by the Commission for this purpose. The assurances were to be forwarded to the Commission's headquarters office in triplicate, in such form as it might approve or require, and were to be accompanied by such documentary evidence as might be required. The assurances that the alien applicant would be suitably employed without displacing some other person from employment was to provide such information as might be required by the Commission in order to establish to its satisfaction that—

(1) Suitable activities for salary or gain are to be made available to the applicant by, through, or on behalf of the individual or agency furnishing the assurances, and (2) that no person will be removed from employment because of the activities to be performed by the applicant, or that if he would be so removed, such removal would take place in any event through the termination of the services of the incumbent because of his incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, or because of other inadequacy in meeting his employer's needs, or for like reasons.

The regulations also provided that assurances that an applicant was attending regular sessions at a school in the United States, undertaking studies appropriate to his age and prior scholastic attainment would be deemed to be adequate assurance that the applicant was suitably employed without displacing some other person from employment.

Assurances that the principal applicant and the members of his family who accompanied him or who proposed to live with him had safe and sanitary housing without displacing some other person from such housing were to include such information as might be required by the Commission in order to establish to its satisfaction—

(1) That there would be available to the applicants on their arrival, safe and sanitary housing, (2) that no person occupying such housing would be required to vacate it in order that it might be made available to the applicants or that if he were so required to vacate, such action would have been taken in any event for nonpayment of rent or because the occupant was an unsatisfactory person to continue to remain there.

It was provided, however, that action looking toward the removal of an occupant from such housing would be in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations.

However, where a public agency or a voluntary agency recognized by the Commission for this purpose submitted assurances of employment or housing they need not be assurances of a specifically identified job or housing accommodation.

Assurances that the principal applicant and the members of his family who accompanied him and who proposed to live with him would not become public charges were to provide such information as the Commission might require in order to establish to its satisfaction that the applicants would not require aid at public expense for essential food, clothing, or shelter, or for medical treatment for causes existing prior to entry into the United States under the act. An applicant admitted under the act would not be deemed to become a public charge under the act by reason of receiving public services (other than financial assistance) available to persons in the community in which he resided.

Assurances that an eligible displaced orphan would be cared for properly might be submitted by—

(1) Organizations recognized by the Commission for this purpose, in which event the assurance was to provide such information as might be required by the Commission in order to establish to its satisfaction that proper care would be provided the eligible displaced orphan through undertakings that the reception, placement and care of the child would be in conformity with the standards established by the Children's Bureau of the Federal Security Agency, and (2) individuals seeking entry into the United States of specified children related to them, in which event the assurances were to provide such information as might be required by the Commission to establish to its satisfaction that proper care would be provided the eligible displaced orphan.

Assurances were to include such undertakings as might be satisfactory to the Commission that adequate port reception arrangements had been made for the applicants.

Where the Commission was not satisfied with any assurance furnished pursuant to the Act and the regulations and desired further information, it might require the furnishing of such additional information and undertakings as would assure it of compliance with the act and the regulations. Such additional information might include, but was not to be limited to, matters relating to the nature of housing and rentals, the nature of schooling to be undertaken by the applicants and the payment of any fees and the nature of employment and the rate of salary.

The wife and unmarried dependent child, or children under 21 years of age, of an eligible displaced person who had been previously engaged in agricultural pursuits, and who were to be employed in the United States in agricultural pursuits, were deemed to have been previously engaged in agriculture pursuits and were to be accorded the same preference and priority as might be accorded to their husband or parent under the Act. The question of this derivative priority had later to be clarified by legislative amendment.

(2) *Preferences and priorities.*—The regulations provided in detail for preferences and priorities in the consideration of visa applications. No preferences in the issuance of visas to eligible displaced persons were to be granted except as provided in the Act. The regulations also stated that except for express provision there would be no priority in time of issuance of visas as between the preferences provided for in the act.

First priority in the consideration of visa applications within the preferences of the Act was to be given eligible displaced persons who established to the satisfaction of the Commission, that during World War II they bore arms against the enemies of the United States, either as members of regular armed forces or in organized movements directed against the enemies of the United States, and that they were unable or unwilling to return to the country of which they were nationals because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinions. Such inability or unwillingness was to be shown by such evidence as might be satisfactory to the Commission. If it were shown to the Commission's satisfaction that the eligible displaced person was unable legally to return to the country of which he was a national, the requirement that such eligible displaced person was unable to return to the country of which he was a national because of persecution or fear of persecution was to be presumed to have been established.

Second priority in the consideration of visa applications within the preferences specified in the Act was to be given to eligible displaced persons who on January 1, 1948, were located in a displaced persons camp or center. The law authorized the Commission, by regulation, to grant this second priority upon a showing of special circumstances where an eligible displaced person was not located in a displaced persons camp or center on January 1, 1948. The Commission's regulations prescribed the following special circumstances: (1) That the eligible displaced person left such camp or center prior to January 1, 1948, in compliance with compulsory labor service laws or orders applicable to him; (2) that the eligible displaced person left such camp or center prior to January 1, 1948, because of his health or, to accompany his spouse or child or children who left such camp or center because of their health; (3) that the eligible displaced person left such camp or center prior to January 1, 1948, in reliance upon promises or assurances made directly to him, or directly to his spouse or to any of his children and relied upon by him, by officials of the United States Government, military or civil, that he could return to the camp or center or that none of the rights or privileges which might thereafter accrue to him as an occupant of such camp or center in connection with migration to the United States for permanent residence would be prejudiced by departure from the camp or center.

If such individual had been firmly resettled in some other place, these circumstances would not be deemed to be special circumstances; (4) that absence from the camp or center on January 1, 1948, was temporary only and of such character as clearly to show intent to return after termination of such temporary period; (5) that the eligible displaced person was located outside of a displaced persons camp or center on January 1, 1948, by reason of employment by the Government of the United States, by the occupying authorities of the United States, Great Britain, or France, by the International Refugee Organization, or by a voluntary agency approved by the Commission; (6) that the eligible displaced person absent from camp or center on January 1, 1948, was the spouse or minor child of an eligible displaced person emigrating to the United States under the act, but only if the second priority would facilitate the simultaneous emigration of the family as a unit; and (7) any eligible displaced person who was not within one or more of the classes defined in the several provisions of this section, but in whose case circumstances of a similar character were found to exist by the Commission.

(3) *Proof*.—To establish a uniform rule of evidence and proof, the regulations set forth that certifications by the International Refugee Organization, local police records, Central Tracing Bureau records, military or other official records and documents, and other auxiliary official records were to be accepted as establishing, *prima facie*, the existence of the information stated therein, for the purpose of establishing eligibility under the provisions of the act. It was provided, however, that in the determination of eligibility under the act consideration was also to be given to other documentation, including personal records, to the statements and affidavits of applicants and of other persons in behalf of applicants, and to any other pertinent evidence.

An applicant's eligibility under the act was not to be affected by (1) absence from the geographical area, as listed in section 2 (c) of the act after December 22, 1945, or before January 1, 1948, or on or after January 2, 1948, or (2) absence from the geographical areas listed in section 2 (d) of the act after June 25, 1948 or (3) absence from the geographical areas listed in section 2 (e) of the act after having been present there on or before June 25, 1948, unless such absence in any case was for the purpose of a firm resettlement.

(4) *Selection*.—Selection of applicants for processing for admission into the United States was to be made by duly authorized Commission representatives on the basis of the assurances submitted by agencies or individuals. Commission representatives were to make a preliminary determination of the eligibility for admission into the United States under specific provisions of the act (apart from other applicable immigration laws) of applicants selected for processing in accordance with the regulations.

From the very outset, the Commission adopted a clear policy that its operations would not attempt to interpret or apply the normal immigration law, which under the act were to be left completely to the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

(5) *Investigation*.—Upon the completion of selection and the preliminary determination of eligibility, the Commission was to conduct a thorough investigation of the character, history, and eligibility of persons so selected. In order to facilitate the conduct of such investigation by the Commission, and to enable the Commission to determine (1) admissibility under the act and (2) whether the admission of persons so selected would be inimical to the welfare or security of the United States, the Commission arranged with the Department of the Army to provide the necessary investigative and administrative assistance, and to submit in writing to a duly authorized representative of the Commission a statement of the evidence found by it relative to (1) the character and history of the displaced person seeking admission and (2) whether he was or had been a member of, or participated in, any movement which "is or has been hostile to the United States or the form of Government of the United States." In areas where the Department of the Army was unable to assist the Commission in this activity, the Commission obtained such assistance as it deemed practicable from the Department of State in order to conduct properly and expeditiously the investigations provided for under the regulations and set up its own investigation procedures and staff.

(6) *Report*.—Upon the basis of the entire record, including the investigation and the written security statements, the Commission was to make and prepare a written report, as required by section 10 of the act and by the President's Executive Order 10003, regarding the character, history and eligibility under this act of each prospectively eligible displaced person selected. This report was to be deemed to establish, *prima facie*, the applicant's character, history, and eligibility under the act, and it was to be deemed, to establish, as conclusive, the existence of all factors relating to eligibility to enter the United States except the existence of those factors required in applicable immigration laws other than the act. These reports were to contain a certification of the preference and priority, if any, appropriate to the applicant under the provisions of the act and the regulations. The original of such a report, if favorable to the applicant's eligibility for admission into the United States, was to be transmitted to the appropriate consular officers for consideration in connection with an application for an immigration visa. On transmittal of such report, Commission representatives were to notify the applicant concerned, either directly, through the International Refugee Organization, or

through an agency which had submitted an applicable assurance, that he might apply to a consular officer for an immigration visa.

(7) *Visa.*—The Commission was to assist in every way practicable in the expeditious and efficient processing of applications for immigration visas, and to that end was to make appropriate arrangements with the Department of the Army, the Foreign Service, the Public Health Service, the International Refugee Organization, and other agencies concerned. Medical examinations by the Public Health Service were to be conducted concurrently, so far as practicable, with any other processing of applications for immigration visas. The original of the Commission report was to be attached to the immigration visa by the officer issuing such visa. This report was to remain with the visa and thereby be made available to the Immigration and Naturalization Service in order to facilitate the conduct of examinations under the applicable immigration laws.

Upon the issuance of an immigration visa, a Commission representative was immediately to notify the International Refugee Organization or other responsible authorities in order that adequate provision might be made for transporting the applicant to a port of embarkation and thereafter to the United States. At the earliest time practicable, the Commission was to arrange for notifying interested individuals or agencies of the granting of the visa and the expected dates of embarkation and of arrival in the United States, in order that appropriate arrangements for reception and transportation in the United States might be made in behalf of the applicants.

(8) *Immigration inspection.*—After an immigration visa had been issued to an applicant he was to be examined by an immigration inspector overseas prior to departure. An applicant who might not appear at that examination to be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land was to be referred for overseas examination by a board of special inquiry under procedures similar to those at ports of entry. Upon a preliminary determination, that an applicant was admissible into the United States, a notation of such determination was to be made in a manner sufficient to inform the Immigration and Naturalization Service at the port of entry.

(9) *Arrival in the United States.*—Upon the arrival in the United States, an applicant was to be given a medical examination by the Public Health Service and by an immigrant inspector in order that it might be determined whether the applicant was admissible to the United States for permanent residence. If the inspector was satisfied clearly and beyond a doubt that the applicant met all of the requirements for entry into the United States for permanent residence, the inspector was to admit the applicant into the United States in the same manner as other admissible immigrants. If the immigrant inspector was not so satisfied, the applicant was to be detained for exam-

ination by a board of special inquiry, and his case proceeded in the same manner as the cases of all immigrants seeking admission to the United States under the provisions of the immigration laws.

(10) *Other provisions.*—The most general distribution and settlement of persons admitted under the act was to be accomplished through consideration of the assurances required by the act and by the location of such persons throughout the United States and its Territories and possessions, in accordance with the availability of conditions which would promote the most effective resettlement.

Every eligible displaced person who was admitted to the United States except those with status derived from the head of a family, was to report in such form as might be approved or required by the Commission, on the first day of January and the first day of July of each year until he had made four reports to the Commission furnishing such information as might be required by the Commission.

A novel but very necessary provision of the regulations provided that where an application under the act was rejected by a consular officer, or where the applicant was found inadmissible by the immigration authorities, such officer or authorities were to submit a report in writing to the Commission containing a statement with the reason for such a rejection and of the evidence upon which it was based. Where an applicant for whom the necessary assurances had been provided was not preliminarily determined eligible, the Commission representative making such a determination was to prepare a report in writing with the reasons for such action.

Start of Operations

In the early days, in addition to the problems of internal administration, the general effort at manning and financing the total activity, and the preparation of regulations, the Commission undertook the development of the two basic operational programs of the organization: (1) The overseas selection and movement of DPs, and (2) the resettlement program in the United States.

(1) *Overseas.*—The establishment of an overseas organization, with country and area offices, became an accepted fact shortly after the Commission started operations. The exact structure of the European establishment and the pattern of operation were not at the start fully defined, in order to permit adjustments as they proved necessary. The Commission decided that the Chairman would go to Europe at the earliest possible date and would undertake (1) the organization of the European office and (2) the selection and movement of the group to depart for the United States on the first boat. This would not only indicate the Commission's desire to move rapidly, but also indicate first hand what problems were to be faced in the development of the program overseas.

A basic operational problem had to be settled in the United States before the overseas planning could proceed. The Commission insisted that the consular officers who were to issue the visas under the program be stationed in the IRO resettlement centers at which the displaced persons were located, and at which the Commission staff was to be located. This was contrary to the traditional State Department pattern, under which the prospective immigrants were required to come to one of the regularly established consulates. Such practice would not work in postwar Europe, in a mass migration program. After a number of conferences with the Commission, the State Department agreed to establish the necessary suboffices.

On September 6, 1948, the Chairman departed for Europe, accompanied by six representatives of the Army, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Department of Justice.

Arriving in Germany on the following day, the Chairman declared that under the Displaced Persons Act, displaced persons would be considered on the first-come-first-served basis. He said that he and the Commission staff of about 80 persons, most of whom had not yet arrived, would take up as the first of the displaced persons cases those who had been waiting for visas longest, under provisions of the President's directive.

In the course of discussions with the IRO, United States Army, Department of State consular offices, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the United States Public Health Service, the basis was laid for the beginning of operations in Europe, and for the support and working cooperation of officials of all organizations overseas participating in this effort.

As a fundamental element in the pattern of resettlement, the Commission had established the principle of keeping families together. In an interview on September 14, in Vienna, the Chairman declared, "It is basic to good resettlement to keep family units together if these new immigrants are to be permanently resettled." Of the program he declared, "We do not see this as a recruitment project or a labor enterprise, we are trying to solve the displaced persons problem."

In a cable to Washington, on September 15, 1948, the accomplishments of the first week of operation were indicated. Numerous conferences with the various interested parties overseas had established a complete and detailed processing procedure "consistent with the regulations and Commission planning," and applicable processing forms and liaison arrangements had been completed as well.

The Chairman said that the processing of cases for shipments had just begun and he was awaiting affidavits and assurances from Washington. In order to facilitate movement of persons he found difficulty with certain sections of the Executive Order 8766 of June 30, 1941, declaring that amendment should be provided for a

waiver of passport or document in lieu of passport for persons emigrating under the Displaced Persons Act because neither passport nor travel document was necessary under the DP law. The issuance of such documents for displaced persons was merely time consuming and would cause other difficulties, including the expense concerned.

Work was begun in the Frankfurt consulate and within the next few days was to continue in the Stuttgart and Munich areas. In the immediate future, consuls were to select cases from those on file, which had been processed to the point of visa issuance. The voluntary agencies then were to be notified of the cases and were to assure that housing and employment were available and that the applicant would not become a public charge. Lists of selected cases were to be given the voluntary agencies' field representatives, who were to decide whether or not the case was sponsored, and then notify the voluntary agency home office, which would dispatch the assurance to the Commission in Washington for approval or disapproval.

(2) *Resettlement activities*.—Not so clearly defined was the Commission position on the second of its two operational activities—the resettlement in the United States. There were two basic positions held within the Commission: (1) that there should not be a government-sponsored resettlement program but that the responsibility should rest solely on the voluntary agencies, and (2) that the government should have direct responsibility in the resettlement activity. With limited funds available a decision was made to place all possible emphasis on securing competent personnel to staff the European operation. It was further agreed that as the immigrants began to reach the United States in appreciable numbers a number of resettlement officers would be added to the Commission staff. In light of this decision the Commission undertook to develop and coordinate the resources of private and other public groups, including voluntary agencies, and religious, service, nationality, and other organizations, state committees and commissions, in the early phases of the resettlement program.

Voluntary Agencies

If follow-up on individual cases were to be made in the United States, at every step along the line of action from debarkation to settlement, the major effort would have to be undertaken by the voluntary agencies and other non-Federal Government organizations cooperating in the program. Plans were laid immediately for Commission port offices, but it was an accepted fact from the earliest meetings that the Commission port staff, limited to one senior officer and one clerk, could be little more than a point of liaison and supervision for Commission headquarters. Actual operations dockside necessarily became the task of the voluntary agencies, just as the survey of employment and housing opportunities and the gathering

of assurances had already become voluntary agencies and State committee functions.

For the scant two dozen Displaced Persons Commission employees operating at the Commission's Washington headquarters during these developmental days, there were literally thousands of persons, volunteer and salaried aides, who participated in the private and State organization phases of the combined operation. In the succeeding months, the Commission staff was necessarily increased at headquarters. Participation of the Federal Government in the resettlement process grew somewhat, but in no wise could its contribution in manpower and finances even approach the expenditures of the non-governmental agencies.

State Displaced Persons Commissions

In the first week of September 1948, the Commission communicated with the heads of several voluntary agencies and requested information from them on States where formal action had been taken on the establishment of State displaced persons committees or commissions.

In response to Congressional inquiries concerning the Commission's relations with the State committees the Commission declared, "The respective State commissions and committees on displaced persons can make an unlimited contribution to this program. We look forward to the fullest cooperation from these groups." In the first weeks in September it communicated with the official State displaced persons agencies, acknowledging their existence and indicated certain general aspects of the program to be pursued, and indicated the State groups could contribute in great measure to the successful operation of the program by (1) sending assurances to the Commission (2) surveying the State for available home and employment opportunities, (3) arranging for the reception of displaced persons in the State, (4) supplying the Commission with the names of members of the committee and with copies of forms and other issuances of the local body. The Commission also requested suggestions as to the best means whereby the American voluntary agencies could relate their activities to those of the State committees and inquired as to local opinion on the suggestion that assurances be audited. It was stated that plans were in the making for meetings with State committees at which the mutual problems of the Federal and State groups could be discussed.

The concentration on participation of non-governmental agencies, on need for close study in selection, and on certain procedural details is reflected in the inter-office communications of the commissioners in their first days of operations. In a significant communication of August 23, 1948, one of the Commissioners declared it imperative that some criteria be established for participation in the resettlement aspects of the program. He declared his principal concern at the

moment was to avoid two pitfalls. He sought first "to avoid participation by individual groups whose single purpose is monetary gain at the expense of either relative cases in the United States or good-hearted citizens who want a family or individual." Secondly, he believed it necessary to establish clear lines whereby reliable organizations at all levels and individuals could cooperate with the Commission.

From his past experience, he declared, "I have found that the best way to avoid participation by questionable groups or individuals is to establish certain minimum qualifications for participation in the program." He indicated that the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, an official body within the State Department, had established minimum standards which must be met before a voluntary agency could be registered with Government for work in the foreign field. With respect to the displaced persons problem, the advisory committee had also registered agencies for resettlement service in the United States. He recommended that minimum standards for participation in the new program be developed along the following lines: (1) That agencies registered by the advisory committee be accepted as fulfilling minimum standards; (2) that agencies not at the present registered with the advisory committee be required to meet the minimum standards as set forth by the advisory committee; this would apply to agencies purely domestic in character; (3) that the Commission retain as a part of its permanent records permanent registrations of the agencies which meet these minimum standards.

At this early stage, concern was voiced about ascertaining that persons coming to the United States under the Act would be qualified for the assured employment. He proposed steps to employ specialists in the field of employment placement, especially in agricultural placement, and hoped that such personnel would be hired for service in Europe. Representatives of certain industrial and business groups in the United States had already requested permission to send their representatives to Europe to select people to fit their special needs. This Commissioner felt that it would be impossible to accommodate all requests of this character and preferred Commission staff who would be capable of making such occupational determinations. He made special reference to the difficulty in connection with farmers. He declared that "employment placements are going to become a most important factor in determining success or failure of the program. If we have an unfavorable reaction on the selection of displaced persons to fit occupational skills needed in the United States a great deal of our time will be necessary in redirecting the replacement of these cases. It does not appear now that we will ever have a sufficient staff to engage in such an activity, which would impose an additional handicap." He therefore suggested that several persons recommended by

the United States Employment Service as having broad experience in the field of industrial and skilled trade placement be employed by the Commission. He further held that it would be wise to employ several people whom the United States Department of Agriculture recommended on the basis of their experience in agriculture including general farming, industrial farming, and dairy farming. The possibility of using employment interviewers from State employment agencies was explored at length by another commissioner. As a result, some of the first "selectors" hired and sent overseas were persons with these specialized skills.

Had these original plans for occupational selections been pursued more fully, and selectors hired who were trained in occupational interviewing skills more than in immigration technicalities, many subsequent resettlement difficulties might have been avoided. The early start in connection with employment and placement interviewers was not pursued as vigorously as it should have been. One of the reasons for this, as indicated in a House Judiciary Committee's report, was that the sponsors in large measure rendered this impossible either by specifically designating the displaced persons they were sponsoring or by delegating their nomination and choice to a specific voluntary agency in the vast majority of cases rather than to the Commission. Some use was made overseas of the IRO occupational classification which was set up by American employment specialists from the United States Employment Service. Later in the program, especially when the Commission itself made substantial selections in its preassurance program, there was a return to these earlier plans and employment interviewers and farm placement specialists were sent overseas for this purpose.

(3) *Growing pains.*—As was to be expected, especially in such a novel program, the growing pains involved false starts, misunderstandings among the various public and private cooperating agencies, and all the other difficulties inherent in starting up operations. This was further complicated by the fact that matters were moving so fast on both sides of the ocean that communications in this period were never quite able to keep up with developments. In the United States, for example, the voluntary agencies were demonstrating considerable concern over the Commission's operations overseas. Some of them feared that other agencies would "get the jump" on them. Others protested that the Commission's concern overseas seemed to be with filling the first two boats and not with setting up the long-range program which they were told would have to await the lessons of experience. They objected to the fact that no general procedure was set up before processing was begun overseas. They objected to the principle adopted by the Commission and enunciated by the Commissioner overseas that Commission selectors "will be the ones making

the selection, and that neither the International Refugee Organization nor the agencies will be able to make any preliminary selections." Doubts were expressed by the agencies about this exclusive basis of selection and also on Commission plans for free movement of selectors to camps. The voluntary agencies wanted their participation overseas in the displaced persons program formally recognized by the Commission, with which of course the Commission immediately complied. In particular the representatives of all the overseas voluntary agencies requested that the agencies have the right to present lists of persons to the selector, and also have the opportunity and right to follow through on certain phases of the processing of those cases. If necessary and desired, the agencies were willing to assist in the completion of documentation for cases in which they were interested. Many of these difficulties were premature and they disappeared as the overseas procedure matured.

Meanwhile the Commission in Washington was heavily engaged in building up a staff, developing programs for dealing with the flood of mail, setting up procedure for accepting or rejecting assurances, establishing interpretations of the law, organizing relationships with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other Government and private agencies and making preparations for the arrival of the first ship. A ship manifest or nominal roll system was set up in order that the Washington staff, the voluntary agencies Stateside and the State committees be informed of the identity and destination of the displaced persons being transported to the United States. Arrangements had been completed for the docking of ships carrying displaced persons, for the reception of the displaced persons as they disembarked, and for their rapid movement out of the port cities to their places of resettlement.

One of the problems in this period was the great difficulty of communicating fully with the European office. The problem remained throughout the entire operations, in one form or other. Progress was made in closing the gap and forging a complete integration of activities in Europe and in the United States, but—due in part to the circumstances and in part to personalities—full and automatic gearing of operations was never completely realized.

By the first week in October the initial screening process had been concluded and steps were taken to move displaced persons from camps to the ports of embarkation. Apparently only the absence of visa numbers was holding up the movement of immigrants who had been cleared by the Commission and by the United States consuls. An exchange of cables beginning on September 29 revealed that "issuance of visas by consulates here being delayed pending receipt quota number from State Department, Washington." The State Department was pressed for action in order to make certain that the sailing on

October 12 might not be jeopardized and it was discovered that the Visa Division, State Department, had sent more than 800 numbers on request and could not dispatch numbers without such formal request. On October 3, the IRO informed the press that the plan to move displaced persons to the United States had been indefinitely postponed because of the State Department's failure to furnish visa numbers to the displaced persons. As a result the ship reserved for shipment of displaced persons to the United States, the United States Army Transport *General Langfitt* scheduled to leave Brehemhaven on October 12, was to be filled with displaced persons bound for Canada.

The State Department again took vigorous exception to the comment that they were not furnishing visa numbers. The Department maintained "that any delay in the getting underway of the movement to the United States was because the machinery necessary to select the individual immigrants was late in being established."

Notwithstanding the original difficulty in obtaining quota numbers, the Commission on October 6, stated that delay in the movement of persons to the United States had been due to "growing pains," difficulty in getting the program started, and the shortage of personnel. It was held that all would soon be in working order. The acting Chairman expressed his confidence that job and homes could be found for the entire 205,000 under the act even though nowhere near that number had been spoken for by that date. Job and housing assurances for 18,000 families were declared to be on file in the Commission's offices in Europe on October 6 and at least an equal number were on file in Washington. This Commissioner stated, when interviewed, that the first 826 of the displaced persons would be leaving Bremerhaven on October 21 or 22 aboard the United States Army Transport *General Black*, and would arrive in New York on October 30 or 31. He declared that one of the reasons for delay was that the displaced persons in Europe were receiving close scrutiny in order to weed out any subversives. "I don't want any member of the Nazi party or the Communist party coming in under the program," he was quoted as saying.

On the same date another Commissioner indicated that the Commission was receiving excellent cooperation from the State Department and reemphasized the fact that the Commission, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and American consuls abroad had to pass on the eligibility or admissibility of every individual seeking admission to the United States and that this detailed processing was one of the most important reasons leading to the delay in the dispatch of displaced persons for the United States.

Within the United States, the various State committees and commissions and voluntary agencies were hard at work developing their

own programs for this particular activity. The voluntary agencies declared almost as one that the response to the requests for assurances of employment and housing was magnificent. In an interview at the offices of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service held in New York City, a spokesman for the various Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish voluntary agencies told of the splendid countrywide response to needs of the displaced persons. A correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor*, on October 13, 1948, quoted these spokesmen as declaring, "the American people have performed miracles in finding noncompetitive jobs and housing * * * especially in those areas of the Nation that have shortages."

One agency representative said "in fact, if the American people could have their way, judging in the concrete offers of jobs and housing, the number of displaced persons coming to this country would be much greater than that permitted by law." Another said: "The American people have responded generously"; still another said: "There are two bright spots in this situation that have helped to neutralize some of the disappointment that enlightened groups in this country experienced as a result of the restrictive legislation. The first is the very quick and active response of the American communities to the program; and the second, the enlightenment of the Commission itself and its interpretation of the law."

(4) *The first boat*.—Meanwhile, in Europe, events had moved forward to the point of departure of the displaced persons for the United States. On October 14, 1948, writing under a Butzbach, Germany, date line a reporter for the *New York Times* declared that the movement of the displaced persons had started with the transport to Bremerhaven of 1,070 men, women, and children from displaced persons installations in Butzbach and in Munich. The reporter declared:

* * * no ceremonies and no cheers, but only normal confusion marked the departure of a special train from the International Refugee Organization resettlement center at Butzbach about 25 miles north of Frankfurt a/Main.

On October 15, more than 1,100 displaced persons reached the camp at Bremerhaven preparatory to sailing to the United States. The *Hartford Courant's* reporter wrote:

One wonders at the stoical departure of the 1,070 displaced persons. No ceremonies, no cheers, no good-byes save for a few of the officials from the International Relief Organizations, attended that departure. They are people without a homeland, because they cannot or dare not return to the lands of their birth. This is stark tragedy, heightened by the fact that now they leave "unwept, unhonored, and unsung" for a land bright with promise. One can conclude only that while still within the long, dark shadow of their immediate past they are thinking more of the years long gone than of the future. But like others of the races and nationalities they represent, they will soon adapt themselves to our ways.

In the afternoon of October 21, 813 displaced persons sailed from Bremerhaven on the *General Black*, a United States Army transport

chartered by IRO. These were the first immigrants to receive visas under the Displaced Persons Act. These were the people selected by Chairman Carusi and a small staff of associates. Of those on ship there were 338 Poles, 168 Lithuanians, 53 Czechs, 32 Latvians, 17 Ukrainians, 6 Hungarians, and 83 who were listed as stateless. By religion, 491 of the total were Roman Catholics, 161 Jews, 143 Protestant and Orthodox, and 18 with no stated religion. The largest occupational group of all consisted of the 87 farmers and members of their families. A total of more than 60 other different skills were listed among the members of the 193 families on board. Also on board were 63 orphans. About one-quarter of the group was headed for New York City. Others of the dispossessed and homeless victims of World War II were to find their homes in cities and farms scattered across the Nation, including the west coast, the South and the Middle Atlantic States. The eldest on board ship was 74 and the youngest 6 months of age.

Plans were made in New York City for a reception for the displaced persons. Representatives of more than 175 religious and community organizations concerned with the problem of resettling the displaced persons met late in October in order to plan the reception for the newcomers.

At this meeting the Acting Chairman, addressing more than 600 representatives of these organizations, declared that the prospect of the arrival of the first ship of displaced persons was most heartening. The demonstration of interest by persons eager to sponsor displaced persons also was highly encouraging. "To us in the Commission, it is a thrilling exhibition of the heart of America showing itself at its best," he said. "And it is also an exhibition of the good hard sense of America in taking to itself the vitally needed skills, energy, and intelligence of a group of remarkably qualified individuals whose only fault was that they hated nazism and communism more than they loved their physical comforts, nay even more than they loved life itself."

The *General Black* arrived in New York Harbor on October 30, 1948.

As the transport went up New York Harbor the newcomers stood on deck and sought out the Statue of Liberty and the tall buildings of New York City.

The "somewhat shopworn-looking ship with a rusty grey hull and flecks of dirt on its white superstructure" received a harbor welcome which one observer declared was usually "reserved before the war for superliners and after the war for returning American soldiers." An Army tug sailed around the ship with a banner reading "Welcome to America." From the topmast of the *General Black* streamed a huge white Navy homeward-bound pennant.

The displaced persons lined the top deck of the ship solidly. Most were wearing their best clothing and everyone carried a tag giving his name and destination. Speeches of welcome were carried throughout the ship by loudspeakers from Federal, State, and local officials. The Attorney General of the United States, representing the President, said, "the President greets you as the Pilgrims of 1948 entering this historic gateway of freedom as did the Pilgrims of 1620."

Perhaps the most touching of all speeches made on this day was that of a 34-year-old displaced person, who had been selected by his shipmates to respond to the addresses of welcome. There were tears in his eyes and his voice quavered as he declared, "today we are liberated from every misery of existence in Europe and we thank you very much. We are born today the second time in our lives to a new life of freedom and a new life of democracy. We thank you very much. Thank you."

The first displaced person to walk off the vessel was a 16-year-old orphan. Most of the 318 passengers bound for the New York area found relatives on the pier ready to take care of them. The others, in the hands of the voluntary agencies, were started by train to their new homes in 25 States.

This was the first ship to come in. During the succeeding 3¾ years there were many other ships—a total of 308 ship arrivals and 284 airflights—that entered New York, Boston, and New Orleans carrying displaced persons, and German expellees, and Italian refugees, or orphans, who were to find a new life in the United States. For most, there was no such fanfare as greeted the group finding its way to the United States on the *General Black* in October 1948. But for all of them there was an unfolding of opportunity, a realization of something long hoped for, and now at long last realized.

By July 21, 1952, some 395,000 persons had been resettled in the United States. The program originally established under the 1948 Act had been concluded but for all those who had participated in the program, the arrival of the first boat was an exciting, memorable event. Here was the realization of the plans which had been made during the many years since the end of the war, had been fought through the Congress, and had won such support throughout the country. Soon, within a week, there was to be another ship and then a regular schedule and a movement of persons, along a production line pattern into the United States. But this first arrival had been made a reality in just 2 months since the three commissioners had sat down and developed their initial plans for the movement of persons to the United States. The techniques employed in this first effort, in the United States and overseas, the procedures developed, the pattern of movement, all were to be basic contributions to the general activity during the next 3¾ years. What was accomplished during these first weeks

in the United States and Europe under the tremendous pressure of demonstrating the possibility of selecting, investigating, and moving persons to the United States was to be demonstrated again and again during the course of the next months.

(5) *The long pull ahead.*—Within the objective established under the law, the Commission developed its program and established principles of operation founded upon the experience of these first few months. As a first order of business, the Commission went about trying to make an unworkable and discriminatory law work. However, its day-to-day experience reemphasized the fact that many of the basic elements of the 1948 law were administratively unsound and would militate against the most effective operation of the program. In the first semiannual report the Commission pointed to the need for a change in the displaced persons law. This dual attempt to do the impossible with an unworkable law, and at the same time to bring about a knowledge of the difficulties of operation and of the need for securing amending legislation was the Commission's task, not only for the first few months, but for its first 2 years of operations.

Of the highest priority in planning and policy consideration during this initial period was the development of significant procedures and effective operating techniques. The elements of the "pipeline" from receipt of assurances to the resettlement of the displaced person, were developed within the first 5 months of operation of the organization. The program was essentially one of selecting, investigating, determining eligibility, transporting, and resettling. That was the original plan of operation and that continued to be the general plan of operation through the years of the program to its completion in June of 1952. Basic changes in emphasis, founded in good measure on available resources in money and manpower, had much to do with giving weight and balance to any of the several elements in this process, but the basic pattern remained. New techniques were developed in operations in many of the fields of activity under this program, more effective occupational selection programs were devised, new interpretations were reached to facilitate operations as were novel adaptations of existing practices and procedures. At all times, every effort was made to expedite action, economize on expenditures, streamline the efficiency of the operations, and accomplish the congressional objectives.

On the policy level, a continuing problem to the very end was the maintenance of balance and integration of Commission operations with those of the several cooperating governmental and private agencies participating in the program. Policies, plans, and the very routine operation of the Commission had to be coordinated in Europe and in the United States with the policies, plans, and routine operations of the several Federal agencies, and had to be related rationally

to the activities of State commissions or committees, voluntary agencies, and the individuals who participated as members of the great diversity of policy, planning, and operating activities. This maintenance of liaison and coordination of activity brought great rewards in greater effectiveness, but also involved many difficulties. Notwithstanding the essential humanity, the zeal inspiring most of the participants in this program, and the common preoccupation with the best interests of the United States, there was considerable difficulty in synchronizing differences of opinion, emphasis, and practice. The basic objective of all parties in this cooperative effort was identical, but individual interests, requirements, and other forces tended to make impossible complete singleness of purpose and identity in all phases of the operation. But this would have been too much to have hoped for under any circumstances and perhaps even undesirable.

One thought that frequently occurred to some was that the entire governmental operation could have been more efficient and effective if it had a unitary administrative organization, with all Government staff in Europe and in the United States working under a single administrative direction. Operating as this program did with only a scattering of persons directly under the Commission's authority, it almost seems remarkable that the cooperative effort continued on such an effective level to the very end of the program and that the instances of open remonstrance and issue were relatively few. The Commission wishes here, as it has done elsewhere, to express its deep gratitude to all concerned for their cooperation and understanding.

(6) *Operational problems.*—The recruitment, training, and development of a staff competent, imaginative, and vigorous enough to direct this operation and see it through to fulfillment in the target time also was a continuing matter of the greatest concern. The hiring pattern established under terrific pressure in the first months of the organization included a purpose to find all the skills necessary in the program which included occupational analysis, welfare and other skill—a frustrating task in the light of the then pressures for immediate action. This was a new activity with many of the elements of the program of such a nature that relatively few persons had been in the position to obtain experience in the field. It was only after the passage of months and much experience and actual operation that an appreciation was gained of the nature of the displaced persons operation. It was only through such experience that Commission officials were able to obtain an estimate of the capacity of many of the staff to handle the responsibilities with which they were charged.

Once established, the basic pattern and structural organization, both in Washington and in Europe, was not changed significantly during the life of the organization. The original plan for a European coordinator assisted by separate country coordinators in Germany,

Austria, and Italy, with area officers under each of these three country directors, never was realized in Europe. The failure to do so resulted in less adequate field supervision than was necessary and desirable. This inadequacy of overseas field supervision was in large measure responsible for important overseas personnel changes midway in the program. The basic pattern of overseas administration, that of a coordinator for Europe, once established, did not change greatly, except for efforts by the Commission to establish devices for more effective field office coordination in Europe, and for a more uniform application of basic Commission policy and directives. The problem of Washington-Europe relations and the necessity for bridging the gap of time and space between headquarters and the field was a continuing problem, but one which was resolved in good measure through the use of trans-Atlantic telephone and cable, and through periodic visits of the Commissioners and the Washington executive staff to Europe, and of European staff to headquarters, for review of program and evaluation of procedures, practices, and activities for the future. As contrasted with security controls, administrative management control was never developed to a tight and thorough-going point. There was considerable autonomy in the early operation and administration of the European establishment, with the Washington headquarters setting policy and basic targets, and reviewing performance. There was a strong feeling within the Commission that no effective reporting scheme from Europe had been set up. Some of this situation was due to distances and to the fast-moving nature of the program; some of it to personalities. After some delay and discussion, this was at least partially remedied through Commission action of a policy character and through changes in top overseas personnel.

In policy and administration the Commission displayed a conscious boldness of enterprise that was founded on but one objective, to complete as much of the job set out by the Congress as it was possible to do, in the United States' best interest and security, by the termination of the program. The spirit evident in vigorous policy making and in aggressive operational enterprise was to be seen as well in the many developments of a novel character in the operating activity of the program. The program, at the policy level, undertook to produce a "new look" in immigration and to relate it to foreign policy and to population policy. On the working level, creativeness and enterprise produced such new operating techniques as the blanket assurance pattern, the audit by State commissions, preassurance processing in occupational groups, and many important new security protections. In addition, there was an adaptation of numerous practices, procedures, and instrumentalities such as visa issuance in displaced persons centers instead of at distant consulates, preexaminations overseas

by immigrant inspectors, compilation of unified security files, overseas orientation of prospective immigrants, the home study for orphans, the overseas review panel before visa consideration, the port committee as a cooperative reception device, the system of Government loans to individuals on recommendations of private organizations, the follow-up on resettlement, the report on reasons for visa denial, and many other adaptations on the working level that were evidence of the same purpose of complying with the Congressional mandate.

Amended Regulations

The most significant operational factor affecting the program at the mid-point of operations was the enactment of amended legislation on June 16, 1950. The elimination of priority and preference, the change of date line, the addition of new numbers of visas, the expansion of the program to cover new subjects, and the extension of the date line permitted a smoother, more economical, more humane, and less obstructed administration of the program.

The changes in the substance of the law provided by these amendments made possible the sensible administrative arrangements and operations which the 1948 Act prevented. Methods were adopted to meet the needs of an expanded program. At first continuing on a reduced level for various reasons, the program developed with added vigor and spirit once the legal impediments were removed, and with the addition of new personnel in some areas and at overseas headquarters, operations continued at a high level until the completion of the program.

Under the amended legislation, the program literally became three programs. To the continuing DP activity under the Commission's direction now were added: The administration of expanded programs for German expellees and war orphans. The three programs were operated coordinately, but naturally developed at different operational paces geared to their own peculiar and unique problems.

The Commission regulations were amended to cover the new elements in the amended act. Among those subjects covered in the amended regulations was the authorization to Commission analysts to prepare the written report called for in sections 10 and 12 of the Act, and empowering all Commission officers of a grade higher than assistant selector to administer the oath of good faith required by section 6.

Additional definitions were added, including those covering: "Eligible displaced orphan" and "orphan"; "De jure, an Italian citizen"; "German ethnic origin"; "principal applicant"; "sponsor"; "under the age of — years"; "— years of age or under"; and "World War II."

To conform with the language of the amended Act, the regulations likewise were changed to require that sponsors be citizens of the United States, and that in the case of voluntary agencies, the executive signing the assurances be a citizen. However, on the basis of the Congressional committee reports, assurances submitted by a non-citizen and validated prior to June 16, 1950, would not be canceled or withdrawn because the sponsor was not a citizen. With respect to assurances submitted by voluntary agencies, authority was granted for them to designate some area of housing and type of employment rather than specific housing accommodations and job opportunity.

Since the Act did not specify mode or payment of transportation for orphans (other than IRO eligibles) the regulations established the procedures to be followed by sponsors of these classes of orphans. The regulations covering assurances—submission, acceptance, or rejection by the Commission, investigation of representations contained in the assurances—were further amplified.

Acceptable reasons justifying "temporary absence" and expanded definitions of "firmly resettled" and "victim of persecution" were included. Procedures were established for the submission of assurances for orphans eligible under sections 2 (e) and 2 (f).

A new section dealing with subversives and undesirables was further amended to conform with the amendment of the Internal Security Act.

Other points of the amended Act were covered in the amended regulations.

With respect to resettlement, the regulations placed the responsibility upon the Commission of promoting effective resettlement in areas and locations where housing and employment were available; directed the Commission to seek advice with respect to acceptability of assurances and to establish and maintain working relationships with State, public and private agencies, in regard to orderly resettlements. The Commission further charged itself with the responsibility of providing orientation courses for the immigrants.

In addition to the amendments to the Commission's original regulations, a new part of the regulations was promulgated dealing entirely with section 14 of the amended Act, providing for loans for transportation funds through public or private agencies to persons providing assurances.

Internal Security Act

The passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950 over the President's veto had serious impact on operations and hampered immigration under the Displaced Persons Act. More than 100,000 refugees were estimated to be adversely effected by the Attorney General's interpretation of the Internal Security Act.

The cause of this bottleneck was found in the provisions for exclusion of "aliens who are members of or affiliated with * * * the Communist or other totalitarian party of any State of the United States, of any foreign state, or of any political or geographical subdivision of any foreign state; (v) any section, subsidiary, branch, affiliate, or subdivision of any such association or party; or (vi) the direct predecessors or successors of any such association or party, regardless of what name such group or organization may have used, may now bear, or may hereinafter adopt; * * *."

Two theories of interpretation developed in public discussion of the issue, the one a strict interpretation that membership in a prescribed organization was conclusive in itself on the inadmissibility of the alien. The other interpretation took into consideration the character of membership in the light of the political realities in the locality of the applicant's residence at the time such membership occurred. The Attorney General, who administered the Internal Security Act, adopted the former interpretation.

The effect of such law was, therefore, to establish a virtual block on all persons who had lived behind the Iron Curtain or in Hitler's Germany or Mussolini's Italy. This was due to the fact that membership in organizations—of a character proscribed by the Internal Security Act—was often involuntary or compulsory. The American voluntary agencies expressed to Congress their consternation at the virtual close-down imminent in the DP program. In response to a Senate inquiry, Commissioner O'Connor prepared a very extensive memorandum which had very considerable influence in showing the bad effect of the Internal Security Act, as it was being administered, upon the DP program.

Pending the amendment which clarified the intent of the Congress as to the exact limits of the exclusionary provisions, displaced persons and expellees who arrived in the United States were granted temporary admission to the United States through the machinery of the ninth proviso of the Immigration Act of 1917.

This situation was not rectified until March 28, 1951, when Public Law 14 clarified the terms "membership of" and "affiliated with," and directed that they be construed to mean only voluntary membership or affiliation with the outlawed organizations. The Commission amended its regulations accordingly on April 7, 1951. Thereafter, the Department of State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Commission agreed on joint instructions to be issued to their European field offices, explaining and interpreting the language of the Internal Security Act and its amendment as it applied to the DP program.

The "Pipeline"

The most critical element in the entire Commission operation was the establishment of a new system for processing displaced persons from the displaced persons camp to the point of resettlement in the United States. This system, which soon got the name "pipeline," was established during the first months of operation and was maintained with only slight changes as the method by which the displaced person was processed.

It was a production line. At first the theory was to feed cases into this pipeline at an even rate, in order that an even flow might develop. This proved totally unrealistic in the light of the uneven submission of assurances by sponsors and the completely different rate of processing time taken by cases of different complexity. By December of 1948 the Commission reversed this policy and put cases into the pipeline as rapidly and fully as they became available through assurances. Experience has shown that this decision was a wise one, and that the so-called "normal rules" of management and administration had to be adjusted to the needs and curious inherent nature of this problem. Here, as elsewhere in the program, management and administrative skills were viewed as tools for the objective not as ends in themselves.

Set up on functional lines, taking into account the requirements of the law and the regulations of the Commission and of other cooperating agencies, this "pipeline" was manned at its several points by representatives of the different organizations in this citizen-government cooperative effort. A review of the stations along the line, of the procedures maintained, and practices employed will give indication of the pattern of operation of the displaced persons program.

Because of statutory requirements, this "pipeline" in the selection and processing of eligible displaced persons required action by the Commission and various government agencies including the Department of State, the Department of the Army, the Public Health Service of the Federal Security Agency, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, and other intelligence agencies of the United States Government. The International Refugee Organization and various voluntary agencies and State committees also played important roles in the process but not in the determination of eligibility. To synchronize and integrate the actions of these various agencies, a complex series of cooperative relationships was established under Commission coordination and leadership.

In the British and French occupied areas of Germany and Austria, and in Italy special agreements were necessary in view of the separate sovereign nations or occupying powers there involved. Many of these relationships and procedures were totally new in immigration prac-

tice, and their establishment meant a period of slow development for the program.

The majority of the steps in the pipeline were completed in the area offices in Europe and, while at no one time within each area was the sequence the same, the pattern of these steps in the pipeline processing of displaced persons was generally as follows and was in general adhered to throughout the program:

(1) The processing was initiated when a sponsor submitted an assurance to the Washington office of the Commission.

(2) The assurance was validated or approved for the purpose of processing if it fulfilled all necessary legal requirements. It was assigned a validation number according to a Washington office coding system and was stamped with the date of validation. An original copy was kept on file in Washington and a copy was returned to the sponsor with the validation number indicated. If a State committee was in existence, a fourth copy was sent to the State committee for auditing of the assurance, and an original assurance marked "over-seas" was sent to the Frankfurt headquarters.

(3) In Frankfurt, the assurance control office assigned European case numbers for the persons covered by the assurance. Thus, each case had two identification numbers, a Washington validation number and an European case number. The reason for this duplication was that some assurances covered hundreds of individuals and lack of time and staff in Washington prevented assignment of the multiple numbers there. This dual numbering system created some confusion, but was due mostly to the extensive use of blanket assurances by voluntary agencies.

(4) The Frankfurt office then channeled assurances to the area office of the Commission nearest the location of the displaced person involved, where one was named. The area offices were staffed by Commission teams, consisting of a senior officer, case analysts, and selectors, and were located in resettlement centers maintained by the International Refugee Organization, to conduct and coordinate the processing of cases in their respective areas. Working at the centers in close cooperation with these teams, but responsible to their superiors in their respective agencies, were State Department consular officers, Public Health Service doctors, and Army investigation groups. At the start the immigrant inspectors were located centrally at the port of embarkation. Later they were decentralized to the area offices. The American voluntary agencies were also located at these area offices.

(5) For an agency-expedited assurance, the agency located the designated family. For a blanket voluntary agency assurance, the agency nominated a suitable displaced person family to match the assurance. Where a named assurance was provided by an individual or an organization having no European staff, the Commission's se-

lector, with the assistance of the International Refugee Organization, located the individual. In those cases where a nonagency assurance was for unnamed individuals, the selector or specially designated Commission occupational analysts found displaced persons suitable to the specifications indicated in the sponsor's assurance.

(6) Once a displaced person was located by the means adapted to the nature of the assurance, the person's name was submitted to the IRO for two purposes: (1) For a certification of IRO status as required by section 2 (b) of the act, and (2) for the preparation of such preliminary documentation as the IRO could provide concerning the person's background and experience.

(7) Then the case was returned to the Commission where the selector made a preliminary determination of eligibility under the law. When necessary, he would call in the displaced person for interview.

(8) Upon completion of the preliminary determination of eligibility, the Commission's selector sent the case forward for security clearance. This involved two separate procedures. The first involved European operations. In the United States occupied areas of Germany and Austria, this investigation was performed by the Army Counter Intelligence Corps which made some 21 checks, including a neighborhood check, in the nature of a security, history, and character investigation. This included a name check against the Berlin Document Center file and other critical intelligence sources to see if the displaced person had held Nazi party, or Communist party membership, or membership in other organizations inimical to the interests of the United States and a check against the file of the Provost Marshall General of the United States Army in Germany. In the British and French zones and in Italy, the Commission had its own investigating staff and was provided in addition with full and complete cooperation by the intelligence services of those governments. The second procedure involved operations in the United States, which was the preparation of a form and its transmittal to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency for appropriate check in Washington. This form gave the pertinent information relative to the displaced person and the sponsor. The system provided for overseas receipt of these Washington reports early enough to prevent the embarkation of persons indicated by such reports to be security risks.

(9) Upon completion of the security investigations, the case returned to the Commission for the statutory report upon the history, character, and eligibility of each person admitted under the act. This report was prepared by the case analyst. The report included a summary of the basic factors of eligibility, assignments of preferences and priorities, findings as to the availability of passports, birth certificates and other documents, good conduct certificate, "good faith" oath, and a final determination by the Commission of the displaced person's eligi-

bility under the Act. It was based on the entire file record including the International Refugee Organization's files, the selector's determinations, the assurance, the security investigation and report of the facts made by the Counter Intelligence Corps of the Department of the Army or of the Department of State where the Army could not operate, of the Commission's own investigations, the report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and of the Central Intelligence Agency, and such other investigations or documents as the analyst deemed necessary to prepare the file for submission. Where necessary he would call in the displaced person for interview. The senior officer of the area made such review and took such action as was necessary.

(10) The Commission's area office then passed the report, where favorable, to the consul for consideration for a visa. The entire file of reports and investigations accompanied this submission. The analyst's report was attached to the visa and became a part of the permanent record maintained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

The displaced person at this point of the procedure was "called forward" to the resettlement area so that he might be available for interview by the consul and for medical examination and X-rays by the Public Health Service. When the displaced person was called forward to the resettlement areas a "call forward notice" was sent out by the Washington office, based on "visa ready" lists received from Europe, notifying the sponsor that the displaced person had been called forward and would probably arrive in a reasonably short time.

(11) The medical examination, which was completely under the control of the Public Health Service, was the next step.

(12) A consular officer interviewed each applicant, and only duly authorized consular officials decided whether to issue or deny a visa.

(13) Next came the inspection by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, customarily made at the port of entry, but here made overseas, originally at the port of embarkation and later at the resettlement centers.

(14) Displaced persons who had been issued visas and had been cleared by immigrant inspectors moved to the United States by private arrangement, airflights of compassionate cases, or—in the preponderance of cases—on ships chartered by the International Refugee Organization.

In the rare cases of private arrangement the displaced person left Europe by air or ship, the sponsor or the displaced person paying for the passage.

An airflight of compassionate cases, usually involving 50 to 60 persons at a time, carried women who were from 5 to 8 months pregnant, children under 6 months of age, elderly persons, and other members of the family group of which these were a part. Persons were flown over also for special reasons, as, for instance, the approaching

expiration of a visa. In these instances transportation was paid for by the IRO.

Displaced persons leaving by IRO shipping went from the various areas, by train, to the staging area at Camp Grohn, near Bremen. Here the records were rechecked and documents sealed, not to be opened until the arrival at the port of debarkation. The displaced persons on these boats never were given their visas—except in privately arranged departures—until they were to present themselves to the immigrant inspector at the port of arrival.

(15) Upon arrival in New York, and before leaving the ship, the displaced person was again examined by the Public Health Service with particular attention to a reexamination of the X-rays. Following this health check, immigration authorities conducted another examination. Those displaced persons who were not detained for reasons of health or further security check, then proceeded to the dock where all baggage was passed through customs.

On the dock space was allotted to the various voluntary agencies. All cleared baggage was taken to these areas if the agencies were handling the displaced persons to whom the baggage belonged. Displaced persons arriving under the sponsorship of private individuals and smaller agencies, were taken care of by the Travelers Aid Society, as a result of arrangements made by the Commission. In some instances the sponsor arrived at the dock to meet the displaced person he was sponsoring.

(16) As the last step, the displaced persons were routed by train to the sponsor under the care, if necessary at stations and changes, of Travelers Aid or representatives of voluntary agencies.

This "pipeline," so called, was merely a control device established by the Commission as a means of effectuating a mass migration program which was superimposed upon a law and procedure couched in terms of individual immigration. New devices were constantly being found to streamline the process, such as the preassurance process. The "pipeline" stretched anywhere from 3 to more than 12 months, sometimes because of the nature of the case itself, always because of the complexity of the legal requirements and the thoroughness of the security investigation. Some such process was necessary for efficiency and economy. Both efficiency and economy would have been improved, within the stated Congressional objectives, if the Commission had been given unitary authority over all Government agencies involved in the process.

Periodic Progress of the Program

The DP program, by its very nature, could not flow evenly throughout all of its history. At the beginning, an organization had to be created and this took time. Throughout its course, the flow of assurances from sponsors was a matter beyond the Commission's control. The complexities of individual cases made them proceed at their own paces. The statutory restrictive provisions affected operations more heavily at some times than others. There were a whole variety of reasons for the flow of business being a varying factor—most of which related to the fact that the program dealt with human beings, and that human beings could not be "processed" like machines on an assembly line.

The following table shows the annual progress of the entire program:

Commission Programs

[For fiscal years 1949 through 1952]

Operations	Fiscal 1949 (July 1, 1948- June 30, 1949)	Fiscal 1950 (July 1, 1949- June 30, 1950)	Fiscal 1951 (July 1, 1950- June 30, 1951)	Fiscal 1952 (July 1, 1951- June 30, 1952)	Total all programs (July 1, 1948- June 30, 1952)
Assurances validated (families)	106, 522	79, 884	94, 159	39, 007	¹ 319, 532
Weekly rate of validations of assurances (families)-----	2, 049	1, 535	1, 811	750	1, 536
Visas issued (persons)-----	55, 632	132, 507	90, 386	² 95, 054	³ 373, 579
Admissions (persons)-----	40, 213	⁴ 132,800	87, 351	104, 869	⁵ 365, 233

¹ Includes validated assurances for orphans.

² Visa issuance for the DP group in the program terminated by law on Dec. 31, 1951.

³ Includes 10,090 visas issued to German expellees under the program administered by the Department of State prior to the June 16, 1950, amendment to the Displaced Persons Act.

⁴ Includes 9,750 German expellees admitted under visas issued prior to the June 16, 1950, amendments to the Displaced Persons Act.

⁵ Some persons visaed by June 30, 1952, had not yet been admitted by that date.

The above table shows the Commission's grand totals. However, the Commission administered several different programs—the IRO-DP program (including the Italian refugees from Venezia Giulia and recent political refugees), the German expellee program, and the orphan program. The following tables and comments show each of these programs in its own light.

The Displaced Persons Program

[For fiscal years 1949 through 1952]

Operations	Fiscal 1949 (July 1, 1948-June 30, 1949)	Fiscal 1950 (July 1, 1949-June 30, 1950)	Fiscal 1951 (July 1, 1950-June 30, 1951)	Fiscal 1952 (July 1, 1951-June 30, 1952)	Total (July 1, 1948-June 30, 1952)
<i>Visas issued (persons)</i> -----	55, 297	122, 217	88, 226	1 48, 913	1 314, 653
IRO displaced persons from Germany, Austria, and Italy-----	55, 297	122, 217	87, 822	1 47, 147	1312, 483
Recent political refugees-----				1 170	1 170
Italian refugees from Venezia Giulia-----			404	1 1, 596	1 2, 000
<i>Admissions (persons)</i> -----	39, 734	124, 164	84, 740	60, 309	308, 947
IRO displaced persons from Germany, Austria, and Italy-----	39, 734	124, 164	84, 567	58, 320	306, 785
Recent political refugees-----				162	162
Italian refugees from Venezia Giulia-----			173	1, 827	2, 000

¹ Visa issuance terminated under the law on Dec. 31, 1951.

This was a new program—new ideas, new procedures, new staff, new goals. It took months before the organization could be set up—once it was established, it began to send people to the United States in increasing numbers. The start of operations, both overseas and in the United States, is discussed elsewhere.

The response of the American people was such that at the beginning of the DP program, assurances from the voluntary agencies and from the public were far in excess of the Commission's capacity to handle them. The operation of the statutory preferences, priorities, restrictions, and limitations was such under the original Act, that in order to enable the Commission to meet the full authorization of 205,000 visas, there was need for assurances for a much larger number of people. Therefore, by June 30, 1949, assurances were in short supply. Commission validation of an assurance did not mean necessarily that a displaced person would be admitted to this country. There were a variety of reasons why this was so, such as ineligibility under certain provisions of the law and previous departure for other countries.

During the first year of the Commission's operation, about 8 out of 10 families were assured through voluntary agencies, and about this same proportion prevailed during the remainder of the program. The preponderance of assurances submitted by the voluntary agencies was for unnamed families, reflecting largely the use of blanket assurances. The flow of assurances varied in part with the needs of the American economy and was especially sensitive to the varying agricultural seasons in different parts of the country. The receipt of assurances

also reflected the activities of organized church and welfare groups, such as the designation of June, 1949, as "DP Month" in the Protestant churches throughout the country.

By the end of 1949, experience disclosed that what had previously been regarded as assurances for unnamed families had become in large measure a different type of named assurance. Sponsors were, in one way or another, naming the displaced person to the voluntary agency involved, although for purposes of economical and efficient administration the assurance came into the Commission offices as a seemingly unnamed assurance. Some 75 percent of all assurances were named ones in this sense. Sponsors obtained these names from agencies, nationality groups, or friends. In a large number of cases the sponsor did not actually know the named displaced person, but still having asked for him by name, the sponsor limited choice or discretion by the Commission.

This fact made for less flexibility overseas in the substitution of new names for originally named displaced persons who were found ineligible for one reason or another. Furthermore, since the sponsor had requested a specific person, the Commission could not question the suitability of the displaced person's employment skills for the employment provided in the assurance. In such cases (the vast majority of all), the sponsor in effect told the Commission that he alone would decide occupational suitability, as he had the legal right to do. Assurances for unnamed persons, in this sense, proportionally increased during the last half of 1949.

By June 1949 the Commission had an efficient overseas office in the United States zone of Germany, but progress was slower in other areas including the British and French zones, in Austria, and Italy. With adjustment of the various difficulties in these areas, "production" began to reach expected levels. However, these levels in all areas could be maintained only so long as the Commission was able to follow a policy which did not require strict periodic application of the percentages, preferences, priorities, and restrictions of the Act.

The 1948 Act required that no less than 40 percent of the visas be issued to persons whose place of origin had been *de facto* annexed by a foreign power, the so-called "Baltic preference." In these limited terms, it would apply only to persons from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, plus the Free City of Danzig. Such persons represented only 19 percent of the DP population as of June 30, 1949. On this interpretation of the Act, persons from these areas received 30 percent of all visas issued by June 30, 1949—far in excess of their proportion among the DP population, but still below the statutory 40 percent.

The Commission stated, in its First Semi-Annual Report, that this 40 percent provision was so uncertain of meaning that it was impossible to define satisfactorily. As a result, the Commission reported,

thousands of assurances were held back, in order to reach the statutory ratio. In order to avoid a complete breakdown, the Commission took two steps:

First, it adopted a policy of "first come, first served." All assurances were acted upon in order of their receipt. The theory behind this policy was that periodic compliance with these ratios was unnecessary as long as there was compliance by the end of the program.

Second, a clearer definition as to what areas were to be considered as *de facto* annexed, was secured from the Department of State. If the definition were to be limited to the Baltic Countries (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and the Free City of Danzig) then only 30 percent of the visas issued by June 30, 1949, the end of the first year of operation, were to persons from these areas. However, under the Department of State's definition of the "Baltic Preference," 53 percent of the visas issued up to that time were to persons from *de facto* annexed areas. By June 16, 1950, the date of the amended Act, the figure was 51 percent.

The 1948 Act required that at least 30 percent of the visas go to persons with an agricultural preference. The percent actually achieved by June 30, 1949, was 26 percent. The language of the agricultural preference was so restrictive that it did not encompass an additional 6 percent of families who had come to the United States to work on farms.

By November 1949 the Commission was faced with a difficult decision. Under the law, there were then only 6 to 7 months more to issue visas in compliance with the 30 percent agricultural preference. An analysis of the pipeline and of the number of farmers in it, indicated the need for immediate controls to cut back issuance of visas to nonpreference cases in order to attain the 30 percent agricultural preference requirement. What the President and the Commission had feared and warned against came to pass: discriminations against DPs because of the law's 30 percent agricultural restriction. In December, the Commission set aside its basic rule of "first come, first served" consideration in the cases presented regularly for visa issuance; it instituted instead a new rule that of the cases submitted to consuls 60 percent had to be agricultural preference cases.

From an average of 2,379 for the previous weeks, visa issuance for the week ending December 16, 1949, dropped to 1,518, to 997 during the next week, and to 804 for the last week of 1949. At the same time considerable numbers of persons ready for consular consideration were being held back because they were not agricultural preference cases. Continuation of the statutory 30 percent requirement seriously threatened a permanent slow-down in the program and a growing backlog of persons ready for consular consideration, who could not be considered because of the 30 percent requirement. The Act not only

operated to the detriment of the displaced persons, but seriously harmed American sponsors whose plans were based upon the arrival of displaced persons they had sponsored. Later the Commission had to shut down on all nonagricultural cases and send only agricultural preference cases to the consuls in order to comply with the 30 percent limitation. Apart from other considerations this caused grave congestion in camps and serious administrative difficulties.

As of June 16, 1950, the date of the 1950 amendments, by dint finally of shutting off all but agricultural preference cases, the agricultural preference percentage achieved was 30. This rate was accomplished only at serious detriment to program operations and by almost halving visa issuance as against the previous 6-month period. In a very real sense, this discriminatory provision almost wrecked the entire program and dealt it such a crippling blow that, along with other factors, it was almost a full year before operational productivity could be restored.

Although the 1948 Act was amended on June 16, 1950, there was a complex of reasons why the visa production during 1950 was relatively low when compared with the last half of 1949. During the period from January 1 through June 30, 1950, visa issuance was arbitrarily limited by the discriminatory provisions of the 1948 law—the requirement that 30 percent of visas issued go to agricultural workers and 40 percent to persons from *de facto* annexed areas—and by the required presence in Washington of top European staff members during Senate hearings. After the limitations on visa issuance were deleted by amendments effective June 16, 1950, the rate of visa production did not immediately increase rapidly for the following reasons:

(1) The Internal Security Act held up cases. Section 22 of the Internal Security Act, as interpreted prior to its amendment by Public Law 14, Eighty-second Congress, first session, prevented the completion of cases for which visas would have been issued. The effect was to delay the processing of these cases and to keep these people in resettlement centers, thus preventing use of centers for processing thousands of other cases.

(2) Displaced persons camps and resettlement centers were transferred to the United States Army. The world situation caused the Army to take over displaced persons installations. The result of the action was to disrupt processing. Displaced persons were dispersed throughout the local economies in Germany; communication with them became more difficult, and security investigation took longer to complete. A relocation of processing and resettlement centers became necessary and processing was delayed.

(3) The world situation affected the efficiency of overseas operation. International developments and the Korean conflict resulted

in resignations of personnel concerned about the safety of their families, who left because their original 2-year commitment was over and no longer desired duty abroad, or who returned to the United States for military service. Replacement and retraining of personnel were necessary. The unavoidable effect was lower over-all efficiency for the interim period involved.

(4) The 1950 amendments to the Act required the promulgation of new regulations and their implementation by new procedures—for example, the “good faith” oath made necessary the establishment of new procedures which required time to initiate and to perfect. Section 13, as amended, lengthened the security processing. Cases had to be reinvestigated, new reports written, and the process became longer and more time consuming.

(5) Facilities available to the Commission in the British zone of Germany were withdrawn. On September 1, 1950, the British Army withdrew facilities it had previously provided to the Commission as aids in security investigation. This withdrawal of facilities required the Commission to add substantially to its staff and to assume more intensive as well as extensive functions. The result was reduced visa issuance for a period of time.

(6) Shipping problems inhibited the smooth operation of processing. This was the result of uncertainty as to the availability of ships and the withdrawal of ships after the beginning of the Korean conflict.

To meet these difficulties, and in conformity with its policy of continuous self-analysis and efforts for improvement, the Commission took action before the end of 1950 to reduce and eliminate delays in the processing of cases.

First, the Commission made administrative changes to tighten up operations. These measures included the following:

(1) Staff changes in area offices and in the European headquarters at Frankfurt including change in the European coordinator in Frankfurt; (2) the establishment of a regular field service out of European headquarters to improve internal operations of the area offices and relationships between area offices and the Frankfurt offices; (3) establishment of regular reports on the status of cases in order to pin-point bottlenecks and to enable more effective deployment of personnel and efforts; (4) establishment of a system for more rapid nominations by voluntary agencies against assurances in Frankfurt and in the field, to reduce delays in processing of cases and speed up all points in the pipeline.

In the second place, the Commission developed new techniques of operation. These techniques included the following:

(1) Streamlining the procedure through simultaneous processing operations whenever consistent with legal and security requirements;

(2) acceleration of final action on rejected cases by assigning additional personnel to the European headquarters office and by decentralizing authority to the field offices; and (3) the establishment of a pre-assurance processing program to meet defense labor needs and to reduce the time required to get a displaced person or expellee to the United States after the assurance had been received.

The preassurance processing program grew out of a series of conferences and recommendations by voluntary agencies made at a regional conference in Milwaukee, Wis., in November 1950, at which time the program was immediately put into effect. The Commission revised the old procedure of waiting until the assurance had been received before beginning to process a person and directed its overseas staff to start processing, in advance of the actual receipt of the specific assurance, persons who met any one of some 11 occupational qualifications in fields of manpower shortages vital to the national defense. This development is described at greater length later. (See p. 191.)

Beginning in the last half of the fiscal year 1951, and continuing to the close of the DP program, “production” was greatly accelerated and operational patterns were again functioning at improved efficiency.

During this period, assurances were received in substantial numbers but a continuous flow of new assurances from the public and through voluntary agencies was still necessary in order that all programs administered by the Commission have a sufficient reservoir of assurances to meet statutory deadlines. Thousands of assurances were still on hand when the program closed.

A large proportion—about two-fifths—of the cases considered by the Commission were eliminated at some point or another of the selection and processing. The preponderant proportion was rejected or disqualified by the Commission itself. Among the causes of elimination were: Unacceptable assurances, ineligibility as a displaced person, security considerations, failure to meet the statutory requirements for arrival or presence in Germany, Austria, or Italy and bad moral character.

By the completion of the program, all visa quotas authorized to be issued to this group under the law were exhausted, and 11,643 DPs were left in the pipeline, with a likelihood on the basis of past experience that some 6,100 of them might have received visas had the law authorized more visa quotas.

Italian Refugees From Venezia Giulia

Under the 1950 amendments, the Congress authorized the issuance of 2,000 visas for Italian refugees from Venezia Giulia. The 2,000 authorized were but a fraction of more than 125,000 of their com-

patriots whom the Italian peace treaty had made refugees from their homeland—the Italian Province of Venezia Giulia.

Some special legal problems arose in connection with this program. The Venezia Giulia provision of the amended act required that difficult legal issues and the construction of an international treaty be resolved by the Commission, the Department of State, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service before visas could be issued. One issue to be resolved was the effect of the treaty provision mentioned in section 2 (g). Another was whether the intention of Congress by enacting 2 (g) was to cut off the eligibility of otherwise eligible refugees from Venezia Giulia under section 2 (c). The position of the Commission was that this was not its intention, but other departments had different views.

As a result of these difficulties, in part, and due to the necessity of making special arrangements with the Italian Government for certification of citizenship or noncitizenship status of applicants, as required by the law, this program got started slowly. However, all 2,000 visas authorized under the law were issued prior to the completion date fixed by the Act. In addition, some 1,600 people remained in the pipeline at the end of the program who could have been visaed if additional visa quotas had been provided by law.

Recent Political Refugees

Under the 1950 amendments, the Congress authorized the issuance of 500 visas to recent political refugees whose admission into the United States was in the national interest.

Although the Commission technically administered this program, the law required special recommendations from the Secretaries of State and Defense who were, therefore, responsible for initiating all

The German Expellee Program

[For fiscal years 1949 through 1952]

Operations	Fiscal 1949 (July 1, 1948-June 30, 1949)	Fiscal 1950 (July 1, 1949-June 30, 1950)	Fiscal 1951 (July 1, 1950-June 30, 1951)	Fiscal 1952 (July 1, 1951-June 30, 1952)	Total (July 1, 1948-June 30, 1952)
Visas issued (persons)-----		10, 090	1, 762	42, 892	54, 744
Admissions (persons)-----	165	8, 447	2, 040	42, 796	53, 448

¹ Issued under the 1948 DP Act under the program administered by Department of State.

In the 1950 amendments, the Congress designated the Commission as the agency to administer a new and expanded German expellee program, which up until that time had been under the administration

of the U. S. Department of State. A total of 54,744 visas were authorized, of which 10,090 had already been issued by the State Department. By the close of the Commission's activities, all 54,744 visas had been issued.

The Commission's basic pattern of operation, in general terms, applied to the expellee program; therefore the general comments under the DP program are often applicable here. However the Commission's expellee program involved difficult organizational problems which caused an initial slow development. The delay in processing German expellees could be attributed to several factors:

(1) There was a delay in the enactment of an authorization in the appropriation act to permit the Commission to use funds to reimburse the IRO for services rendered. Negotiations to utilize the facilities of the IRO for certain necessary services and for shipping expellees were completed by the Commission during July 1950 in time to begin immediate operations. However, the language of the appropriation act prohibited the Commission from consummating the completed negotiations. It was not until September 27, 1950, that Congress provided the necessary authorization.

(2) After arrangements were completed for IRO services and facilities, the Bonn Government and the United States High Commissioner for Germany insisted that Bonn Government facilities be used instead of those of the IRO. Although the Commission had already perfected complete arrangements and despite the obvious delay that would result, it acceded to the High Commissioner's request because of the interests which such request would serve. The Bonn Government, it was agreed, would provide housing and other physical care including immunization. The IRO processing centers would be used for the United States Public Health Service examination, the execution of the "good faith" oath, the issuance of immigration visas, and the preexamination by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Bonn Government further agreed to prepare documentation for German expellees and to provide transportation of expellees to centers and to the port of embarkation.

(3) The Bonn Government was slow in providing facilities and personnel for documentation. The Bonn Government agreed to provide the holding centers by October 15, 1950. In late November only one holding center in the vicinity of Bremen was made available, and this one proved to be of no use to the operation. By December 31, 1950, neither personnel nor facilities had been made available by the Bonn Government anywhere in Germany. On the other hand, the response of the Austrian Government was immediate; facilities were made available in Salzburg, and processing moved along rapidly. This accounts for the fact that by December 31, 1950, the only visas issued to expellees were issued in Austria.

(4) Groups and individuals interested in sponsoring expellees had been slow in submitting assurances and had failed to submit them in sufficient numbers. This was due, in part at least, to a failure on the part of these groups and individuals to understand that affidavits submitted under the original law had to be reactivated in the form of assurances under the amended Act. Steps to correct this misconception on the part of the public were taken by the Commission through the calling of several national conferences of interested groups.

To surmount these difficulties and achieve the Congressional purpose in this part of the Act, the Commission undertook several steps:

(1) It speeded up the immigration of expellees by establishing cooperative working relationships with the Austrian Government, the German Federal Government, and other agencies involved;

(2) It set up special administrative machinery within the overseas establishment to expedite the expellee program;

(3) It developed the pre-assurance program, which is described elsewhere (p. 191), and gave it special relevance for the expellee program;

(4) It established a special, streamlined system of team documentation for expellees which saved many weeks of time in documenting, security investigating and processing of expellees.

In addition, the various administrative and other steps taken by the Commission before the end of 1950, which have already been described, all were part of this same effort to expedite action on the expellee program.

The success of these efforts is clearly shown in the preceding table. While only 1,762 visas were issued from June 1950 to July 1, 1951, because of the above mentioned delaying factors, 42,892 were issued from July 1, 1951, through May 6, 1952. The total authorized number of expellee visas was exhausted 2 months before the end of the program, and some 50,000 people were left in the pipeline at that time. Had the law authorized more quota visas, some 32,000 more German expellees could have been visaed.

The orphan program

[For fiscal years 1949 through 1952]

Operations	Fiscal 1949 (July 1, 1948-June 30, 1949)	Fiscal 1950 (July 1, 1949-June 30, 1950)	Fiscal 1951 (July 1, 1950-June 30, 1951)	Fiscal 1952 (July 1, 1951-June 30, 1952)	Total (July 1, 1948-June 30, 1952)
<i>Assurances validated (families)</i> ---	635	80	2, 805	4, 407	7, 855
War orphans-----			635	4, 371	5, 006
IRO and Greek orphans-----	635	80	2, 170	36	2, 849
<i>Visas issued</i> -----	335	200	398	3, 249	4, 182
War orphans-----				1, 735	1, 735
IRO and Greek orphans-----	335	200	398	1, 514	2, 447
<i>Admissions (persons)</i> -----	314	189	571	1, 764	2, 838
War orphans-----			225	707	932
IRO and Greek orphans-----	314	189	346	1, 057	1, 906

The Commission administered two different orphan programs—the International Refugee Organization (and later Greek) orphans program, and the war orphan program. These programs involved different geographic areas of operation and different eligibility requirements.

Under the 1948 Act, there was only the authorization for 3,000 IRO orphans. Under this program, the Commission channeled all cases through the United States Committee for the Care of European Children, Inc. This committee operated under the terms of the Federal law and of Commission regulations and performed its services completely in line with well-recognized child placement practices as approved by the Children's Bureau of the Federal Security Administration and in accordance with the standards and requirements of the various State governments.

The 1950 amendments expanded the IRO orphan program to include Greek orphans who had been displaced from their homes as a direct result of Nazi military operations in Greece or by Communist guerrillas, and raised the number of authorized visas to 5,000.

These amendments also created a new war orphans program under which 5,000 nonquota visas were authorized for war orphans who

had lost one or both parents as the result of Nazi and Communist aggression.

After the 1950 amendments, the Commission decided to deal directly with all voluntary agencies and individuals in the war orphans program, instead of channeling all cases through one voluntary agency.

A special orphan section was set up within the Commission in November of 1950 and the Commission concentrated on developing relationships with the governments of the countries in which the orphans lived.

The impression had existed that there were innumerable orphans in Europe available for adoption by Americans. This turned out to be incorrect. Some governments approached by the Department of State, at the Commission's request, were found to be either uncertain or unsympathetic about the effort. They were hesitant to release orphans for adoption. This attitude which persisted for some time was largely responsible for impeding the operations of the orphan program.

Another factor which greatly inhibited the speedy operation of the orphan program, but one which was felt advisable as a matter of necessary protection for all concerned, was the Commission policy that all orphans, whether sponsored by individuals or agencies, should be placed for adoption in the United States only in accordance with the child welfare laws applicable to the State in which the child was to reside. A network of agreements and working arrangements resulted.

Following creation of the orphan section, special units for the program were established in Frankfurt, Germany; in Athens, Greece; and in Naples, Italy. A mobile team of child welfare specialists covered other countries provided for in the Act.

The orphan program ended June 30, 1952, with a total of 4,182 visas issued to the orphans, leaving 5,818 unused visas. Of this number of 5,818 unused visas, some 2,500 were reverted to the DP program under the law, and used for persons who would not otherwise have been visaed, thus leaving some 3,318 unused orphan visas.

There are three primary reasons for the fact that all visas were not used up in the orphan program: (1) the legislative limitations on IRO orphan eligibility which reduced the number of such orphans who could qualify; (2) the unavailability of sufficient numbers of war orphans in Europe for adoption; and (3) insufficient funds and staff to cope with the complicated problems.

How It Got Done

The achievement of the Congressional objectives for the several programs was realized only through constant prodding by the Commission at every point in the pipeline. For the most part the pipeline was a European operation, under policies, procedures and supervision of the Washington office which set the target. The follow-up at Frankfurt and area level was a continuing operation. The Commission staff both in Washington and in Europe, early departed from the normal 5-day, 40-hour workweek of the Government establishment and during many critical periods worked unlimited hours. Special production drives to catch up with growing backlogs were instituted on more than a dozen occasions during the period of the original Act. Following the passage of amended legislation, streamlining devices were introduced. Near the close of the displaced persons program, in the winter of 1951, forced clean-up drives were the rule in all phases of the operation, in order to give every possible displaced person an opportunity to establish his eligibility.

The results of these efforts were the attainment of Congressional mandate in the displaced persons and expellee programs. The inability to attain the maximum available visas in the orphan program was the result of an insufficiency of available orphans, which was due to the attitudes on the part of cooperating foreign governments. In 1946-47 some governments had sought to find resettlement opportunities for their orphan children. By 1951-52, with the acceleration of economic recovery and the prospect of war in Europe less immediate, these governments would not permit the departure of their orphaned youths. In the light of these facts, the actual visaing of 4,182 orphans by June 30, 1952, though far from the maximum of 10,000, was a considerable achievement. The early reluctance of some foreign governments to allow adoption of orphans made it impossible to visa additional orphan children within the limited time set by law.

Operations

The Commission established most staff and operating divisions at an early date and with the exception of one staff division made no major changes in this structure. Staff functions in the legal and legislative areas were performed by the Legal Division; editorial and public information work, first carried on by the Commissioners them-

selves, was charged as a prime responsibility to the Information and Editorial Division, which was not established until 1951; and staff work on statistical analysis and general research was undertaken by the Research and Statistics Division. All three divisions reported directly to the Commission.

The two operating areas were (1) selection, security investigation, eligibility determinations and movement from Europe, and (2) resettlement in the United States. The former operation was under the direction of the coordinator for Europe, who reported directly to the Commission; the latter operation was under the direction of the director of the Resettlement Division.

General administrative and other related services were under the direction of the executive director, who was responsible to the Commission.

The Commissioners served as both policy and operating directors of the Commission and for facility of operations, the administrative and related activities were assigned as a primary responsibility to the chairman of the Commission, first to Commissioner Carusi and later to his successor, Commissioner Gibson. The legal, legislative, and research functions were the primary responsibility of Commissioner Rosenfield, and the resettlement operation was the primary responsibility of Commissioner O'Connor. All exercised their so-called primary responsibilities only in terms of joint Commission responsibility.

The term of reference of each of the several staff, line, and service divisions was generally defined upon establishment. However, the program was too new, too unique, too dynamic for any final and definitive detail of responsibility. Because of the nature of the operation, a fully formalized and final definition of the text-book kind was never desirable or possible, in some areas, and new functions and activities frequently were added as necessary to the work program of a division. The welfare of the United States and compliance with the Congressional mandate were always given priority to stereotyped administrative patterns that looked good only on paper.

Similar preference for dynamic rather than formal patterns was to be found in the issuance of instructions and the designation of work targets. There was regular but not necessarily formal reporting by operating heads to the Commission on work performance.

Coordination of the functions of the several divisions was developed through periodic Commission meetings, which were regularly attended by the general counsel, the executive director, the directors of the Resettlement and Information and Editorial Divisions, and such other staff members as were necessary for the business at hand.

There were only occasional Commission-wide staff meetings, and these generally for special purposes. However, the frequency and in-

formality of Commission meetings, with the regular attendance of all top officials, mitigated in very large measure for the absence of broader staff meetings.

The Staff Divisions

Legal Division

Important among the several divisions offering staff service to the Commission was the Legal Division. Prior to the formal establishment of the division on February 11, 1949, regulation, opinion, and other legal activities were performed by Commissioner Rosenfield, assisted for a very short period of time by a lawyer on detail to the Commission from another governmental agency. Following the creation of the division, direction of divisional operations was under the general counsel.

From the outset, the Commission established a basic policy in connection with its legal operation. Commission operations must always be in complete conformity with the law. In addition, Commission operations were to carry out the spirit of the law. The Commission would therefore adopt interpretations which would also further the spirit of the law and the intention of the Congress, the President, and the people to "get the job done" by means consistent with law. Where the law would not permit such accomplishment, the Commission would look for its solution to another form of law, statutory amendments by the Congress.

Law, in this program, was to be like all other staff services, an instrument to help rather than to hinder. Its motivation was to be found in the statement of that leader of the American bar, Elihu Root, that the lawyer's function was to advise his client how, consistent with the law, the client could do something. In this instance, the "client" was the American people—as represented by the Displaced Persons Commission—and the "something" was the successful and full accomplishment of the Congressional mandate.

The first and immediate task devolving upon the Commission was the promulgation of regulations required under the 1948 Act since without them no operations by the Commission or others could be final. They were published in the Federal Register on October 5, 1948. In these regulations the Commission had the advice and the general concurrence of the other cooperating governmental agencies, the Departments of State, Justice, Army, and the Federal Security Agency. These regulations served as the official guide not only for the operation of the Commission in the United States but also in its field operations in Europe. Owing to the absence of a Commission legal staff at the time, the responsibility of preparing these regulations fell upon Commissioner Rosenfield.

Immediately following passage of the Act a great deal of interest was shown both by the public and by the members of Congress who were deluged with inquiries from their constituents. Owing to the novel and intricate provisions of the law and the many new procedures devised, it was soon apparent that a great proportion of the inquiries which were received involved interpretations of the statute. Planning prior to the Act's passage had not anticipated there would be any need for any more than a nominal legal division. However actual experience soon proved that a strong legal staff would be essential to the proper handling of the manifold legal problems which were arising because of the unique and uncharted nature of the questions that arose. It was also evident that the other offices of the Commission were not equipped to handle inquiries and other matters which involved legal aspects of the statute. Accordingly, it was found necessary to establish a legal division.

The first major assignment for which the Legal Division was called upon, in conjunction with the Research Division, was to prepare the form of assurance as required under the statute and which was to be executed by the sponsor of a displaced person. The assurance was a novel departure in the field of immigration and, unlike the regular affidavit of support, incorporated within its provisions assurances of employment and housing, and against the displaced person becoming a public charge. It was necessary to develop two types of assurance forms—one for named individuals and the other for unnamed and anonymous persons. In addition to assurances which were to be executed by individual sponsors it was also found necessary to develop a form of assurance for use by the voluntary agencies accredited by the Commission which were participating in the program. In view of the accreditation given the voluntary agencies by the Commission greater responsibility was thrust upon them in permitting the use of so-called blanket assurances. In such blanket assurances by accredited voluntary agencies the employment, housing, and public charge features were not subjected to the same scrutiny that individual assurances were given, owing to the reliability and high standing of the voluntary agencies, attested to by their accreditation for this purpose. With the issuance of the assurance forms for execution by individual sponsors the usual questions inherent in the execution of any affidavit were soon raised and the legal office had to set acceptable standards, with respect to the actual execution of the oath by individuals and corporate officers.

The increasing number of inquiries and questions which were constantly being transmitted to the Commission resulted in calls upon the Legal Division by Commission officials and others for guidance in determining the legal requirements involved. So heavy was the mail that the Legal Division found it necessary to develop and draft

standard forms of replies which fitted the pattern of the bulk of the inquiries which were being received. In addition there were directed to the Legal Division from all the other Commission offices, all communications involving interpretations of the statute and the general immigration laws. In addition to written inquiries the Division found itself carrying the brunt of telephonic inquiries and personal interviews with interested sponsors and individuals who had questions concerning the meaning of the law and its eligibility requirements.

With the pressure of legal activities growing, the Commission realized that it was essential to the various functions of the organization that there be created the position of general counsel and a strengthened legal office which could maintain necessary liaison and other governmental agencies and serve to resolve the serious problems which were arising from day-to-day and week-to-week. The office of the General Counsel was created on February 11, 1949.

The general counsel was charged with responsibilities in several areas of the Commission's operations. He was legal adviser to the Commission, and to its major staff aides on regulations, opinions, interpretations, and other aspects of the law. He was also chief security advisor and loyalty officer to the Commission and its representative on all interagency committees engaged in this important area of the agency's program. In addition, he was the staff officer responsible for the drafting of legislation, development of testimony, analysis of pending bills and existing laws. He was the liaison officer with Federal, State, and other public and private agencies on legal and legislative matters.

He directed the activities of the Legal Division, and supervised the Validation Division, which was concerned with the review, clearance, and validation of assurances submitted to the Commission.

He attended meetings of the Commission and made recommendations on broad aspects of the Commission's business. In the performance of his functions, the general counsel acted within the structure of the Commission's assignment of primary responsibility in this general area.

Legal Advisor to Commission

The most significant of the several functions performed by the general counsel was his service as legal advisor to the Commission. In this capacity he made legal analyses and prepared recommendations and opinions on multiple phases of the Commission's activities. The most significant of the problems faced by the Legal Division in this role included the following:

(a) The requirement for actual presence in the prescribed area on January 1, 1948, under the 1948 Act, as being one of the mandatory criteria in order for an applicant to establish eligibility. This issue

was the subject of continuous controversy and resulted in amendments proposed by the Commission and enacted by the Congress, in the 1950 amendments, which advanced the eligibility dates of December 22, 1945, to January 1, 1949, and liberalized the presence requirement by permitting exceptions to be made where an applicant had temporarily absented himself owing to special circumstances.

(b) Although the Commission in its regulations had defined "child" to include a "stepchild" and a "legally adopted child," both the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service refused to accept this definition. Owing to an inability to resolve this important issue among the governmental agencies concerned, the matter was referred by the Commission to the President, with a request for an opinion from the Attorney General. However, before the Attorney General rendered his decision the Commission's view was enacted into law by the 1950 amendments, which defined a child to include adopted children and stepchildren.

(c) Early in the program the Commission was called upon to rule upon the language "who shall accompany" as used in section 2 (c) of the act, the issue being as to whether a principal applicant could depart for the United States ahead of his family, and whether a principal applicant's family could derive eligibility from him where they were not processed together as a family unit. The Commission adopted the Legal Division's interpretation that a principal applicant's family need not depart simultaneously with him provided the family had been processed together as a unit, thus permitting the spouse and dependent minor children to derive eligibility from the principal applicant. Where, however, the principal applicant was processed separately and departed for the United States it was held that his family could not thereafter derive eligibility from him but must qualify in their own right in the absence of having been processed together as a family unit.

As a result of extensive hearings by the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and House and vigorous debate in both Houses of Congress, the 1948 Act was amended in many important respects with the enactment into law of Public Law 555, Eighty-first Congress, which was signed by the President on June 16, 1950. In large measure the amendments followed those recommended by the Commission at various times. These very important changes resulted in the need for an immediate revision of the Commission's regulations. In anticipation of these amendments, with Commission direction, the Legal Division drafted revised regulations. This revision was completed on June 16, 1950, the same date on which the President signed the bill and Public Law 555 became law. The regulations were developed after joint meetings and agreements with all the other principal participating governmental agencies.

In addition to removing many of the discriminatory features of the 1948 law, the 1950 amendments made many major changes in the basic law. As a result of these amendments the Legal Division was called upon frequently for interpretations of various provisions of the amended Act. Some of these interpretations involved the following questions:

(a) The meaning of the terms "abandonment" or "separation" as used in the definition of the term "orphan." The Commission adopted the Legal Division's opinion that "abandonment" included an abandonment in law as well as in fact and that where a child had been adopted by a third party a liberal construction of the statute was justified. In such instance a legal adoption was considered to constitute a termination of the legal relationship between the child and its natural parents and to fall within the statutory meaning of the term "abandonment." Likewise, the Commission decided that a separation as used in the orphan definition covered cases of voluntary as well as involuntary separation of a child from his parents, thus covering a case where a child had fled from behind the Iron Curtain, leaving his parents behind.

(b) With the transfer to the Commission of the administration of the German expellee program, it was necessary to obtain a definition of the term "areas" which were under the control and domination of the Iron Curtain countries listed in the statute. The Research Division, with the assistance of the Legal Division, developed a satisfactory definition of the areas in question, aided by research performed by the office of the geographer of the Department of State. This definition was concurred in by all the participating governmental agencies.

(c) The expression "firmly resettled" first appeared in the definition of "persecutee" under the 1948 law and its meaning evoked considerable controversy. With the 1950 amendments, the expression "firmly resettled" was carried over and was held to constitute a ground for disqualification of an IRO displaced person or a persecutee. The determination of firm resettlement called for a policy decision by the Commission with respect to displaced persons who had gone to Belgium in 1947 on a coal mining resettlement scheme and to others who had gone to Great Britain as domestic employees in 1946 on what was popularly known as a "Balt-Cygnets" plan. The issue was whether such applicants although they had returned to Italy or the western prescribed areas of Germany or Austria by the January 1, 1949, cut-off date, had been firmly resettled within the meaning of that term as used in the statute. After extensive research the general counsel rendered his opinion that "returnees" from the Belgium coal mining scheme were not to be considered as having been firmly resettled if they had not applied for Belgian naturalization and if they had returned to the

prescribed areas by January 1, 1949. He reached a similar opinion in the case of returnees from the "Balt-Cygnat" scheme. The Commission adopted these views thereby permitting several thousand people to establish eligibility.

A question of a similar nature was subsequently presented to the Legal Division for opinion regarding displaced persons or victims of Nazi persecution who went to the mandated territory of Palestine or to Israel to assist in the creation of the State of Israel or who entered there for temporary refuge. The question arose with respect to the very few such persons who subsequently returned to Italy or the western areas of Germany or Austria by January 1, 1949, and who were seeking admission to the United States under the displaced persons program. The Commission adopted the opinion of the Legal Division that where such applicants were not legally admitted for permanent residence and did not apply for and obtain citizenship in mandated Palestine or Israel they had not been "firmly resettled" within the meaning of the statute provided they had returned to the prescribed areas by January 1, 1949.

(d) With the inauguration of a loan fund as provided by the 1950 amendments it became necessary for the Commission to issue regulations governing the administration of this fund. They were prepared by the Legal Division. The loan regulations, which by statute were required to be approved by the President, were filed with the Federal Register on December 22, 1950.

(e) Section 10 of the Act provided that an applicant who made a material misrepresentation for gaining admission to the United States as an eligible displaced person would thereafter be barred from admission to the United States. This is one of the severest penalties provided in any immigration law. A very difficult problem arose as a result of the 1950 amendments. This revolved about applicants whose rejections had been predicated on a finding of a misrepresentation under the 1948 Act who—but for such finding—would be eligible under the provisions of the more liberal 1950 amendment. It was necessary to decide what effect the past material misrepresentation would have upon a rejected applicant who reapplied under the amended legislation. The Commission adopted the view that such past misrepresentation would be a bar under the Act if it were willful and if it were made to a person charged with the administration or the enforcement of the Displaced Persons Act, for the purpose of gaining admission as an eligible displaced person under the original Act.

The matter was also dealt with in a ruling of the Board of Immigration Appeals of the Department of Justice, in the Matter of Altman, A-7991300-1, a decision affirmed by the Attorney General, that a misrepresentation (not bearing on security) to the Counter Intelligence Corps of the Department of the Army or the International Refugee

Organization was not a misrepresentation to a person or official charged with the administration or the enforcement of the Displaced Persons Act.

(f) The 1950 amendments authorized the issuance of 500 visas to recent political refugees whose admission was to be approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Legal Division was called upon to develop necessary procedures in conjunction with the Departments of State and Defense to accomplish this objective. The special approval of the Secretaries of State and Defense represented a departure from other types of cases being processed under the Act and required a careful correlation among all of the governmental agencies concerned. Special procedures were developed for the processing of such applicants who, unlike the displaced persons, were scattered all over the world. Although this was primarily an operational problem, these cases were of an intricate and sensitive nature, involving only applicants whose admission to the United States would be in the national interest. In view of these unusual criteria and the other factors involved, the Legal Division was found to be best qualified to supervise and coordinate the processing of these cases in the United States prior to the time the materials were sent overseas for action in the normal process.

(g) Several civil suits were brought against the Commission, generally to require the Commission to provide relief in the cases of some applicants who could not otherwise meet the eligibility requirements of the statute. All of these cases, which were handled by the Legal Division in cooperation with the Department of Justice, were successfully defended.

One of the most important legal suits against the Commission was brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, by the Social Services Employees Union, Local 19, and District 65, Distributive Processing and Office Workers of America. The Commission had notified three of its accredited agencies participating in the program that "it would be in the interest of national security for the Commission to discontinue the accreditation of any voluntary agency where such voluntary agency or its associated organizations continues to have contractual relationship with District 65 of the Distributive Processing Office Workers of America." As a result, the accredited agencies involved severed their relationship with the union which then sought an injunction against the Commissioners, and the several voluntary agencies, asking the court to require the Commissioners to rescind the notification to the agencies that their accreditation would be discontinued unless they terminated their contracts with the plaintiff unions, and for other relief. An extensive reply, in the form of an affidavit, was prepared by Commissioner Rosenfield.

This suit was closed favorably to the Commission when the plaintiff union requested dismissal of its complaint on April 15, 1952.

In view of the wide-spread interest in the Commission's legal pronouncements, it was decided that some decisions of this nature should be promulgated for public dissemination in the form of policy letters. Recurring problems of this nature were those involving public charge; standards for blanket assurances which were submitted by recognized voluntary agencies; meaning of World War II as used in the Act; confidentiality of information in the Commission's files pertaining to admitted aliens; the Commission's policy regarding membership in subversive organizations; standards for sponsors of unaccompanied children; presence in Trieste constituting presence in Italy for the purposes of the Displaced Persons Act; and other similar general problems.

The Legal Division also maintained the closest relationship with all other offices of the Commission which leaned heavily upon it for guidance in application of legal standards to the many problems which arose. This was especially true of the Resettlement Division in its activities in connection with persons admitted into the United States. The Commission was constantly receiving inquiries as to the rights of such aliens admitted under the Displaced Persons Act, their legal status, their right to join labor unions, their entitlement to social security, to vote, the effect upon their status of grant of public assistance, right to State institutional medical care, admission of children to school, necessity for compliance with the Alien Registration Act, and responsibility for filing four semiannual reports as required under the Displaced Persons Act, among other things.

Other operating offices referred many problems to the Legal Division. One example is the status office which found itself unable to furnish information as to final decisions rendered in cases where the applicant had been rejected under the security provisions of section 13 of the Act and where the information upon which the rejection was based was classified. It was necessary to refer all such inquiries to the Legal Division for appropriate explanation and reply.

The budget office likewise called upon the Legal Division for assistance in the interpretation of statutory language contained in the appropriation bills affecting the Commission and for assistance in the preparation of the Commission's budget submissions. One of the most serious fiscal questions involved the authority of the Commission to reimburse private carriers for detention expenses incurred by aliens who were detained at Ellis Island in New York for various reasons such as medical, failure to obtain security clearance, likely to become public charge. Because of the precedent nature of the question, the Commission requested a ruling from the Comptroller General.

The Comptroller General, in decisions numbered B-95534 and B-95583 dated September 27, 1950, ruled that the Commission's funds could not be used for reimbursement of expenses incurred by private carriers for detention expenses. A similar ruling was promulgated by the Comptroller General in a decision numbered B-106321, dated November 15, 1951, when it was likewise held that Commission funds could not be used to reimburse an international organization, the International Refugee Organization, for settlement of an account of private carriers for detention expenses incurred in behalf of detainees who had been transported by private carriers under arrangements made by the International Refugee Organization.

The only exception to the foregoing decisions was made by the Comptroller General in decision numbered B-95529 dated July 13, 1950, as a result of a submission prepared by the Legal Division. There the Comptroller General ruled that a company which is the exclusive operator of the baggage room at Ellis Island, N. Y., where baggage of all detainees is handled, could properly be reimbursed by the Commission for such baggage expenses incurred by it in behalf of displaced persons on the ground that such a service might properly be regarded as a service "necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948."

Before the establishment of the Legal Division, one of the Commissioners was responsible for the operation of the validation office whose function was the processing, adjudication and control of assurances submitted by individual sponsors, voluntary agencies and State commissions. This office had to work closely with the Legal Division since much of the work of the validation office was of a quasi-legal nature, involving questions of whether assurances submitted complied with the law. As operations progressed the Commission transferred the validation office directly under the supervision of the general counsel.

In compliance with the President's loyalty program, the Commission created a loyalty board. The general counsel served as the chairman of the board.

Security Advisor to Commission

Another important phase of the displaced persons operation in which the Legal Division played a prominent role was that concerned with security. As a result of the President's Executive Order 10003 designating the Commission as the agency responsible for the investigations and written reports required regarding each applicant seeking admission into the United States under the act, the Commission inaugurated one of the strictest and most rigid security procedures ever devised in the history of immigration in the United States. In addition to the actual field investigation made of each applicant in Europe, all available governmental intelligence services within the United

States were welded into this security program. Employment of the services of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence divisions of the Department of Defense, was initiated through agreements reached by the Legal Division with these respective agencies. As a result of such agreements these agencies furnished the Commission with any pertinent information in their files concerning applicants seeking admission to the United States as well as the sponsors. This service was one of great magnitude for it covered *each* applicant who sought admission. The Legal Division also handled all the material received as a result of these various security investigations in the United States, and was responsible for their transmittal to the Commission's European headquarters for use in the investigations being conducted there.

The classified nature of such materials required the strictest safeguards of security of all times.

As an indication of the measures devised by the Commission to ensure against undesirable and subversive aliens, every applicant under the Act was checked by:

- (a) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- (b) The Counter-Intelligence Corps of the United States Army, which included 21 separate investigative steps before submitting its report to the Commission.
- (c) The Central Intelligence Agency.
- (d) The Provost-Marshal General of the United States Army in Germany.
- (e) The fingerprint record center in Heidelberg, Germany.
- (f) The Berlin Document Center.
- (g) A special investigation in connection with displaced persons whose country of origin had been overrun by Communists.
- (h) A special additional check by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice through stationing of its immigration inspectors overseas in the DP Resettlement Centers as well as at ports of entry.
- (i) A check by consular officers especially assigned for this program.
- (j) In addition, by special liaison investigations with British Intelligence in the British zone of Germany, France's Surêté Général in the French zone of Germany, and Italy's Questura.

In the fulfillment of its responsibility under section 13 of the Act, which provided that no person should receive a visa who had been a member of or participated in any movement hostile to the United States or its form of government, the Commission adopted a policy which required mandatory rejection of any applicant who had been a member of or participated in any "hostile" movement. In pursuance of this policy the Commission undertook to compile a list of totali-

tarian organizations and movements which were hostile to the United States or its democratic form of government. These organizations included Communist, Nazi, Fascist, and other groups, and extended throughout all the countries of Europe in which the displaced persons, German expellees and Italian refugees had their origin.

The list originated in the overseas office, as a result of recommendations from the Commission's legal and security officers, after extensive study. The Legal Division gathered all information available on questionable organizations, and from governmental and nongovernmental sources, and where the circumstances indicated made appropriate recommendations to the Commission for revision of the list.

The list was used by the European offices of the Commission engaged in the security investigations of applicants under the Act. It served as the basic guide not only for the Commission, but also for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department of State, the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army and the Criminal Investigation Division of the United States Army. At the Commission's initiative an interdepartmental security committee was created, composed of representatives of the Commission and the Departments of State and Justice. The Commission was constantly studying this list in the light of changing and more current information. As the first and only complete list of foreign hostile organizations compiled by the Government, it served as a ready reference in immigration administration and enforcement for consular officers and immigration inspectors, and has been a significant contribution to the well-being and security of the United States in all aspects of immigration, not merely the displaced persons program.

One of the organizations which was the subject of considerable controversy with respect to the effect of membership in it was the Baltic Waffen SS, otherwise known as the Baltic Legion. Membership in the Baltic Legion was for several years considered by both the Commission and the Visa Division to be a bar *per se* under the security provisions of section 13 of the Act. After extensive research and review, and on the basis of a change of view by the Visa Division, and strong evidence showing that membership in the organization was due to conscription and force by the Hitler regime, the Commission revised its policy on September 1, 1950, by holding the Baltic Legion not to be a movement hostile to the Government of the United States under section 13 of the Act. This view was not a unanimous decision within the Commission; an extensively documented statement of the minority views was filed by Commissioner Rosenfield.

With the enactment of Public Law 14, Eighty-second Congress, on March 28, 1951, clarifying the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Commission found it necessary to reappraise its procedures and list in the light of this clarification. While Public Law 14 did not directly

amend the Displaced Persons Act, nevertheless, it was deemed desirable to obtain harmony among the Commission, Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service in employing the same standards with respect to security. Accordingly, tripartite conferences were held among the three agencies mentioned and the Legal Division represented the Commission in these discussions. As a result of the conference a joint instruction was drafted and upon its adoption by the three participating agencies, it was given immediate application overseas. The joint instruction implemented Public Law 14, which in effect provided that membership or affiliation in proscribed organizations where under 16 years of age, by operation of law, or for the purposes of obtaining employment, food rations, or other essentials of living, would not constitute a bar under the Internal Security Act, with the further exception that as to the Displaced Persons Act, membership in the Communist Party, regardless of its nature, would in every case be an automatic bar. In harmony with the clarification of the Internal Security Act the Commission amended its regulations pertaining to section 13, on April 7, 1951.

The Commission established the most rigorous system of security and intelligence investigations in the history of American immigration. A general estimate of the successfulness of this activity was made by the Vice President of the United States, the Honorable Alben W. Barkley:

* * * there has never been, in my judgment, in the whole history of the United States, a more careful piece of machinery of inspection and investigation than is now in effect in regard to the administration of these displaced persons in the United States. Our Army, through its Counter Intelligence Service, all of our consuls abroad who have to pass upon visas, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the Immigration Service, everywhere—here and elsewhere—and many others which I might mention, are a part of this screening process. I do not know how there would be any better system of investigation by which it could be determined that those who are permitted to come are entitled to come * * *.

Legislative and Legal Liaison

With the continuing effort in Congress for amendment of the Displaced Persons Act by reason of various of its discriminatory features and the administrative unworkability of others, the Commission found itself called upon to furnish members of the Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate as well as individual members of the Congress with technical legal and drafting services in connection with proposed amendments and changes as well as analyses of the provisions of the 1948 law.

The displaced persons program was a joint administrative venture of the Commission, the Departments of State, Justice, Defense, and the Public Health Service of the Federal Security Agency; therefore, the attainment of uniformity of interpretations among all the partici-

pating agencies was essential. The Legal Division was responsible for the close liaison and for the regular conferences with all Federal agencies concerned, which were necessary to achieve this purpose.

Part of the "growing pains" in the program was the development of the Commission's role *vis-a-vis* the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The novelty of the program, the necessity for establishing new procedures never before used, the pressure from Congress and the American people for immediate arrival of displaced persons, and the large number of governmental, private and international agencies involved in the program, all pointed to the need for the Commission's coordinating role.

In connection with the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Commission initiated in the spring of 1951 a series of tripartite consultations covering the whole area of program operations. The meetings included, on some occasions, the top European staff of each of the three participating agencies. These tripartite consultations resulted in closer working relationships in matters of security, and in questions of administration and interpretation. In order to continue this close liaison, the Commission always invited the Visa Division and the Immigration and Naturalization Service to participate in all of its meetings with the Advisory and Technical Committees and in all National and Regional Conferences.

As the program developed, furthermore, the magnitude of the operations was such that the other cooperating agencies began to look more and more to the Commission for initiative and leadership. All concerned recognized the fact that the utmost cooperation was necessary to the program's success and an understanding was reached whereby agreement would be sought among all the agencies concerned on every major issue.

Several other factors placed the Commission in a central coordinating and leadership role. The Bureau of the Budget established a pattern for a unified budget whereby the Commission's budget submission and its justification to the Congress encompassed all agencies and funds for all aspects of the program, even for those for which the Commission itself had no administrative responsibility. Another governing factor was the continuous insistence of the Congress, through its committees and by individual members, in looking to the Commission for all aspects of the program, irrespective of actual administrative jurisdiction. A similar attitude prevailed among the voluntary agencies, the various State commissions appointed by the respective governors, and the public at large.

In this coordinating role, the Legal Division played an important staff function.

The 36 State Commissions and committees and the cooperating voluntary agencies were in constant touch with the Commission for

guidance on the many questions involving statutory interpretations, and application of other related laws, administrative rules and regulations. The Legal Division provided the service to the extent permitted by a limited staff. A continually recurring question was the responsibility of the displaced person to his sponsor and the legal responsibility of the sponsor by reason of his assurance. The Legal Division prepared material describing these responsibilities. At the Commission's request, the Immigration and Naturalization Service prepared and widely circulated an authoritative statement on the subject of "public charge" and its effect upon the displaced person and his sponsor.

To the Legal Division were referred also the numerous legal problems raised by the technical and advisory committees of the voluntary agencies which met regularly with the Commission.

Quite early in the program a problem was presented in respect to applicants who were found eligible under the Act in Europe but who upon arrival at the port of entry were, for various reasons, excluded by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Such exclusions generally resulted from inability to meet the health requirements of the Public Health Service, likelihood of becoming a public charge, or in some very few instances for security reasons. When such persons had been permanently excluded it was necessary to find a means of having them returned to Europe. This raised special problems since Germany was an occupied country. Although these cases were rare the Legal Division was called upon to work out a procedure for the return of such excluded aliens. This required the close cooperation and assistance of the various governmental agencies including the Departments of State, Justice, Defense, the Allied Permit Office, and the International Refugee Organization. As a result of numerous meetings, the Legal Division drafted a procedure for returning excluded applicants which was agreed to and used by all interested agencies.

Another function which the Legal Division performed from time to time was the preparation of drafts of reports on pending private and public immigration bills as called for by the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, or on other proposed legislation affecting the Commission. When prepared, such reports were submitted to the Commission and if adopted were then transmitted to the appropriate Congressional committee.

Overseas Operations and Review Panel

As the program got under way it became clear that the closest coordination between the Washington headquarters and its field operations in Europe was required in obtaining legal application to the field operation in conformity with the Commission's policies and the general counsel's activities in pursuance of these policies. The Euro-

pean coordinator also needed counsel on legal matters who could also supervise the legal administration in the field offices. Accordingly, at the request of the European coordinator, a legal officer was re-assigned to the Frankfurt office to serve as review officer and chief of the Frankfurt legal office, and later as European assistant general counsel, under the general supervision of the general counsel.

The major function of the Legal Division's overseas staff related to the review panel.

A precedent in the field of immigration law was established when the Commission set up a three-member panel at its European headquarters to review cases of displaced persons who were rejected under the Act, and to establish precedents in key situations.

For the first time in the history of United States immigration, an administrative appeals board of a Federal agency screened and reviewed cases of rejected aliens before such cases were considered by the United States Consular Service and Immigration and Naturalization Service.

The review panel was created by the Commission on August 30, 1949, in order: (1) to insure "expeditious, uniform, and impartial reexamination" of all cases considered by the various widespread area offices of the Commission, and (2) to establish a body of precedent to guide the area offices. The permanent member of the panel was the chief of the Commission's Legal Division overseas. He was assisted by two other attorneys, also from the Legal Division. Alternate members were the chief and the assistant chief of the Security Division.

The review panel went through three different stages of development. For the first year, from August 30, 1949, to August 1950, the major attempt was a complete internal review throughout all areas of the overseas operation. This meant that every case rejected or disqualified in the area offices was reexamined by the review panel. One of the aims of this panel was to enable the European coordinator to coordinate the growing and diversifying precedents and patterns of determining eligibility and ineligibility.

During this first period, on March 28, 1950, the Commission directed that area offices were to submit to the review panel all difficult questions involving security information which could not be settled on an area basis. This policy, which continued until the end in August 1951, of the panel's second stage of development, involved the review panel in all of the Commission's security problems. Some of the new techniques of the security investigations initiated by the Commission came from the proposals of the panel during this period.

After a year's operation on the basis of an automatic review of all cases, on August 3, 1950, the panel was directed to consider only those cases where an appeal had been filed by the applicant, and it became strictly an appellate review body.

During this second period, the decision handed down by the area senior officer was considered final unless a written appeal was filed by the applicant with the appropriate area office within 30 days. Exceptions to this time limit were made by either the area senior officer or the review panel in particular cases where the ends of justice would better be served thereby. Where the facts had not been sufficiently developed, the review panel returned the file to the area officer for additional evidence, or referred the case to the Counter Intelligence Corps or the Commission's investigative units outside the United States zone of Germany or Austria.

This appellate character of the review panel continued for another year, at which time the impending close down on December 31, 1951, of visa issuance to displaced persons under the law forced another change in the way of decentralized appeals. As of August 13, 1951, no further appeals were entertained by the review panel on displaced persons cases, and the senior officer in each area made final determination on all such appeals. Appeals continued to be received on expellee cases until the imminent expiration of that program required a like decentralization to the area offices.

Throughout its existence, the review panel not only passed upon cases submitted but also cases on appeal. Its members also fairly regularly visited area offices to assist in dealing with difficult or troublesome legal problems. It was in daily telephone communication with area offices on legal interpretations and rulings. It rendered several hundred advisory opinions which resolved not only the particular cases in issue but whole blocks of similar cases.

The review panel was the centralized vehicle for coordination of Commission legal determinations and of Legal Division opinion and action. It was through the panel that decisions made on the area office level could be reviewed for uniformity and for consistency with law and established policy. It was here that cases were held by Commission direction as law, regulations, and policy changed. It was inherent in an unprecedented program of this nature that a certain number of contingencies, as well as changes in legislative policy in respect of security standards necessitated by the shifting concepts of what constituted a hostile movement or organization, would impede the uninterrupted flow of cases, and would from time to time make it necessary to hold certain categories of cases in suspense pending policy decisions or clarification from the Commission or from other agencies of government authorized by law to make such decision.

The Commission's experience underscores the beneficial effect of the review panel's operations, especially during its first two stages, in maintaining close liaison with the area offices and in establishing a uniform policy in interpreting the Act and regulations. This practice created a comparative consistency and uniformity of application of

Commission policy which resulted in a more efficient and uniform treatment of cases, diminished the work load in the area offices, and saved many applicants undue anxiety and grief. Thus its major function was in helping to develop a uniformity of application in Commission policy.

Its second major accomplishment was in strengthening the administration of the Commission's policy to prevent subversives and undesirables from entering the United States.

And its third effect was much wider in its application than the Displaced Persons Act. It was an exemplification of American justice and of objectivity in the administration of law.

Research and Statistics Division

The staff function of research and statistical reporting formally began with the appointment on October 6, 1948, of a chief statistician. For both policy determination and operational control, it was imperative that current statistics be maintained and their significance be appraised periodically.

The functions of this office, as originally developed, were as follows: (1) To secure factual data needed by the Commission for policy determination and for the administration of the program; (2) to analyze information on immigrant displaced persons admitted under the Act, in order to determine whether the Commission was meeting the quantitative requirement of the law as to numbers, preferences, etc.; (3) to provide information to guide and control the selection of displaced persons by the European staff, within the quantitative requirements of the law; (4) to plan for and analyze the semiannual reports of displaced persons; (5) to measure the flow of assurances; (6) to help in the preparation of the semiannual reports of the Commission to the President and Congress; (7) to conduct the overall statistical and research activities of the Commission.

Owing to the temporary character of the Commission, the philosophy underlying the operation of the Research and Statistics Division was one of (1) using whatever basic information was available in established agencies, (2) using whatever statistical equipment and facilities other agencies could provide, and (3) serving as a planning and coordinating office in securing information.

As demands from Congress, the public, and other agencies grew heavier, it became evident that the limitations inherent in the original restricted philosophy of operations of this office proved to be a handicap. It became increasingly necessary to take on new functions outside the original designation, and to broaden its scope into a general research operation. The division was chronically understaffed.

The provision of current factual information was systematized through the establishment of a statistical unit in Europe and the

integration in Washington of the figures prepared by that office with material gathered from other sources. As an instrument for keeping participants in the program informed of current production, a loose-leaf periodical, *The Displaced Persons Commission Fact Book*, was instituted in January 1949. This periodical was furnished monthly to a mailing list including staff of the Commission and cooperating Federal, international, State, and voluntary agencies and to others interested in the program. It provided encyclopedic information concerning all statistical aspects of the program, and was invaluable in providing ready information to Congress, the cooperating public and private agencies, and the public.

In addition to this invaluable Fact Book, the Research and Statistics Division also prepared for publication monthly a series entitled "Information on Immigrants Admitted Under the Displaced Persons Act" and a weekly series, "Arrivals Under Displaced Persons Act." These series were primarily for operational use and were distributed to Commission staff and to cooperating agencies in the displaced persons program.

Another operational series, *Progress of European Operations*, was prepared periodically by one of the Commissioners on the basis of statistics gathered by the Research and Statistics Division. This series was an analysis of both the DP and expellee pipelines and indicated the position of cases along the several stations on the pipeline. This series was the successor to an informal series by the same Commissioner, *Outlook for Future*, that undertook to give similar information but in somewhat less detail. Both these series were intended to provide qualitative judgments on overseas and State-side operations.

Series of statistics maintained, but not released in published form included: (1) Displaced persons in the American labor force, (2) loss and survival rates of cases in the DP and expellee pipelines, (3) production rates of processing cases at various stages, (4) visa production by areas of processing.

In addition, complete series of data published by the European statistical office and national or international governmental agencies were maintained. These included publications of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the Federal Reserve Board, the Department of Labor, the Federal Security Agency, the Bureau of the Census, and others.

The activities of the division were not restricted to current operational statistics. Special surveys and studies were undertaken on economic and demographic matters with which the Commission was concerned. One of the most important of these was a sample survey of 644 German ethnic families immigrating under the provisions of the amended legislation of 1950. This survey sought to obtain information on the identity, composition, age, sex, marital status, housing,

income, education, training, sponsored, and current occupation, application for citizenship, sponsor-immigrant relations, and other information of vital importance to an analysis of the group settling in this country under the provision of the Act. The results of this survey are contained in this report at a later point (see page 259 et seq.).

Other studies and surveys undertaken by the Research and Statistics Division included: (1) A survey of educational and recreation agencies to elicit information concerning the adjustment of children of displaced person immigrants entering the United States. The results of this survey were published in the Commission's second semiannual report. (2) Reports of immigrant displaced persons. Each 6 months, data from the reports of immigrant displaced persons were analyzed and presented to the Commission. These reports presented data on shifts in residence, shifts in occupations, labor force status, employment of youth and other characteristics. The results of these reports are published in this report in the chapter on who they were and where they went. (3) The semiannual report to the President and the Congress. These reports are required by section 8 of the Act, and include information and data on all aspects of the displaced persons program: Refugee groups, social and economic conditions in those areas where refugees are located, new policies of agencies and governments and their effect on the program, processing and the progress of the program, resettlements in the United States, displaced persons in the American labor force, their effect on the labor market and on housing, and new developments in legislation.

The Division designed all forms used by the Commission—assurance forms, semiannual reporting forms, loan forms, reports of sponsors of orphans, and transportation forms.

The Research and Statistics Division also assisted the Commission in its broad policy planning through special research projects in the several phases of international migration.

A working paper was prepared for a section meeting, under Commissioner Rosenfield's chairmanship, on the problem of refugees and overpopulation, at the third national conference of the United States National Commission for UNESCO held at Hunter College in New York City, January 27-31, 1952. This paper included: (1) The problem of overpopulation; (2) the role of the United Nations and the specialized agencies; (3) United States programs, which discussed the role of the Economic Cooperation Administration, the Point IV program, the Export-Import Bank, the displaced persons program, and the United States immigration laws; (4) the future of migration, which discussed the limitations of existing international agencies and the need for a new agency which possesses appropriate facilities enumerated in the publication.

Other studies included research projects on the displaced persons program. Under the direction of the chief of the Research and Statistics Division, a research report series was established. This series included a study of major aspects of the program. Research report No. 1 included a study of the New Americans Under the Displaced Persons Act. Tabulations were made of the reports of immigrant displaced persons reporting on January 1, 1951. These reports were analyzed to indicate shifts in residence, labor force status, and shifts in occupation. Other characteristics—age, family status, family size, educational attainment, and religious distribution—were tabulated from the total group admitted by October 31, 1951. Migration trends among American natives and displaced persons were discussed. Statistical techniques were utilized to indicate the relationship between economic opportunity and migration of displaced persons.

In addition to these research efforts, the Research and Statistical Division worked closely with the Commission's budget office in the development of data for the support of budget submission; with the Information and Editorial Division on the preparation of necessary material; and with the chief historian in the preparation of the final report. The latter association was continuous and both establishments worked as one office on all phases of the preparation of the report.

Chief Historian

Another significant staff service was that concerned with the preparation of the final report of the Commission's activities. Such a report was mandatory under the provisions of section 8 of the Displaced Persons Act.

The Commission very early decided that the report should be more than a perfunctory statement of the accomplishments of the organization, but rather an actual analysis and a look to the future. The chief historian reported for duty in November 1951. The present report is based on his study.

Information and Editorial Division

The press, magazines, radio, television, and other media of public information in the United States expressed continuous interest in the program. In addition to its significance as a departure in American foreign policy and immigration laws, the program had direct and local domestic involvements. The press, radio, and television, and other instrumentalities of public information performed an immensely valuable service of making for general understanding which greatly aided in the adjustment of the new Americans to their new responsibilities and communities.

From the very first meetings of the Commission in late August 1948, thought was given to the assignment of an information officer who might answer inquiries of the public and the press which were coming in in such heavy proportions, but no permanent assignment was made to the post until 1951. In the first two and a half years, the Commissioners themselves handled the various problems of public and Congressional inquiries, the press and radio, and the relationship with various State, local, and private sources of inquiries.

Early in 1951, a director of the Information and Editorial Division was appointed with responsibility for the normal information and editorial functions and for several activities not normally found in such establishments.

This division entered immediately on plans for a full-scale program in information and editorial work, especially in connection with the need for assurances to make the German expellee preassurance program tie into the defense labor needs.

The division was also charged with several functions unrelated to the usual public information activity. One of these was the development of the program for the orientation of displaced persons, which program was transferred to this division from the Resettlement Division, in American traditions and customs; secondly, was its participation in projects dealing with internal public relations; and thirdly, the division undertook certain activities with the Voice of America, the UNESCO National Commission in the United States, the foreign language and religious press, and other groups having an interest and requesting services in connection with the program of the Commission.

The division cooperated closely with State commissions which were developing public understanding of the program. Such State and local programs were of importance in aiding effective resettlement, in advising sponsors, displaced persons and expellees of their responsibilities and in making it possible for labor shortages to be met through the displaced persons program.

In its relations with the 36 State commissions, the division met the general demand for assistance which would aid the State commissions in bringing public understanding within their own States. As a result of a formal request at a resettlement conference, the division provided State and local commissions with periodically available materials which were applicable to every region. These materials involved operational relationships and program developments, especially newsworthy developments such as visa production, closing date, assurance situation reports, arrival figures, and like matters of interest to the local groups.

In its relationship with the working press the division sought to contribute to the public understanding on the program. The purpose,

however, was not the story, but the integration of the displaced person and expellee into American life, through informative programs assisting in the better understanding of the problems of the displaced persons, their reception and their contribution to American life. Special attention was given to the foreign language press, because of the service they could render to aid the displaced persons in their adjustment to American life.

In 1951, an overseas office of the Information and Editorial Division was set up for two major purposes: First, to serve as a direct general link between the Commission and the displaced persons and expellees in order that they might best understand their opportunities and responsibilities, and second, to provide the people of Europe with some understanding of the high purposes and motives of the people of the United States in enacting and carrying through the displaced persons law. The Commission regrets the lateness of its start on this operation because it feels that public understanding in Europe of the purposes and accomplishments of this program is of utmost importance to the welfare of the United States.

The division also developed material for the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe. Briefing sessions of various types, scripts, and booklets for overseas distribution and other such activities resulted from these efforts.

The most important of the noninformational and editorial functions undertaken by the division was that relating to orientation. This program, initiated and set up under the Resettlement Division, was transferred to the responsibility of the Information and Editorial Division in July of 1951.

The Information and Editorial Division sought to develop a knowledge by displaced persons of our country's customs, traditions, and the great pattern of industrial and agricultural life in the United States. Given this much needed background, the displaced person could better appreciate the nature of life in the United States and could adapt himself with great ease. An example of this type of project was the Oscar Schmidt story. Schmidt, a typical American farmer, had emigrated to America in the early twenties from Germany, and had built a good and profitable farm. Having overcome the language obstacle and barriers of misunderstanding, having been through the entire process of adjustment, Schmidt was an ideal vehicle for informing the displaced persons and especially the expellees of life in America. Photographs and a narrative in German were sent to Europe where the Commission's orientation officers used the material in illustrative lectures on life on farms in the United States.

Supplementing this effort in the orientation field, the division sent letters to every chamber of commerce in the United States, to fraternal

and State societies, to patriotic organizations such as the DAR, and to other groups which produced materials about the United States, which might be of use in the orientation program. Thousands of pamphlets, booklets, maps, guides and other aids resulted from this request and these were sent to Europe to be used in the orientation program.

The division also served as the Commission's ear in obtaining information from every quarter of the country on the progress of the program. This information was brought home to operating officials in the several areas of the program. Items found by the division, indicating either satisfactory or unsatisfactory reaction in the country, were reviewed by operating officials in their current work in efforts to serve better the American people.

Administrative and Management Services

The Commission's administrative and management services, covering the personnel, fiscal, procurement, property, methods and procedures, communications, transportation, records and related functions of the organization were under the supervision of its executive director.

The executive director's responsibility was essentially in the area of administrative service to the Commission and to the operational and staff units of the Commission in Washington and Europe. The forces which determined the allocation among the Commissioners of primary responsibility have already been discussed. Chairman Carusi and later Gibson, had primary responsibility in the area of administration and management. This pattern, started early in August 1948, was fixed by November 1, 1948, so that the Commissioners operated both individually as line directors of the operational activity, as well as jointly in policy formulation. At this early date, the executive director became the coordinative authority over the administrative services. He was not given responsibility in the operational areas, since the major responsibility in this area was exercised by the chairman of the Commission as his primary responsibility within the Commission. As a Commission officer the executive director was answerable to the entire Commission, although naturally his major operational relations were with the chairman.

Since the executive director was not responsible for the substantive and policy aspects of the Commission's work he was not the channel for their communication between the Commission and the staff, except in terms of the particular responsibilities entrusted to him. After the 1950 amendments with the inauguration of the loan program, the executive director was given responsibility for its operation and control.

When the Commission was organized, there was a deputy director, a special assistant, and professional, clerical, and secretarial assist-

ance. The deputy had primary responsibility for budget and management and had a staff of two budget and fiscal assistants. The special assistant was responsible for the several housekeeping functions, for the preparation of administrative regulations, operational procedures, and the nominal roll. A personnel officer and staff of professional and clerical aids handled the various aspects of personnel service. Within a short period of time, the incumbents of these three top posts left the agency. Later the two top posts were closed out.

In his relations with the administrative staff of the European establishment, the executive director normally followed the formal pattern of communicating through the chairman to the European coordinator. On occasion he communicated directly to the European coordinator, or to an administrative subordinate responsible for an area of work within the executive director's general sphere of interest. The executive director had no authority over overseas personnel, which authority was given the European coordinator. The overseas administrative personnel reported to the coordinator who was vested with considerable power because of the nature of the operation.

Earlier reference has been made to the conflict within the Commission concerning the looseness of the supervision over the European office and its operations, and of the final insistence by some of the Commissioners upon a tighter control. This exemplified itself first in periodic reports on the substantive aspects of the program, but reports to either the Chairman or the executive director on administrative matters never attained any such periodic regularity or completeness. Reports to the executive director from his own subordinates were more definitely regularized, especially in those fiscal and personnel areas where reports had to be submitted periodically to the Bureau of the Budget, Department of Treasury, the Civil Service Commission, and other control agencies of the Federal establishment.

Management control and improvement activities within the Commission understandably were given a secondary role. By statute this was to be a short-term emergency operation. There seemed little wisdom and, in the light of the pressures, no time or money, in planning detailed management programs for an agency which, in the beginning of activities, in late August 1948, had less than 100 weeks in which to operate. Internal administrative issuances were established in two basic series, the Administrative Memoranda and Office Information Memoranda. The former series dealt with internal administrative rules and regulations and was nonperiodic and not all inclusive, with issuances meeting special needs. The second series was of a routine nature and covered the usual oddments related to administrative custom and practice at the headquarters establishment. At the outset the deputy to the executive director conducted some

management surveys and exercised general management controls within the Washington headquarters office, thereby improving an operation which had grown up under such heavy pressures as to prevent immediate rationalization.

Two major activities in the office of the executive director were those related to the Commission's fiscal and personnel functions. Both functions were handled by line units, supervised by officers directly subordinate and reporting to the executive director. Both establishments were relatively small, neither having more than five persons assigned, with only the top person at a grade above the junior level.

The fiscal function originally was handled by the deputy executive director. Following the elimination of that post, the function, covering all fiscal activities from budget estimating to audit and review, was under the direction of the budget and management officer. The special assistant to the executive director originally directed the personnel function, giving way in February 1949 to a personnel officer.

Budgets and Appropriations

First Year of Operations

When the Displaced Persons Act was passed by the Congress in June 1948, and before a Commission had been appointed, Chairman Carusi and a staff of borrowed budget and fiscal experts from the Department of State appeared one evening at 9 p. m. before the Senate Appropriations Committee and presented a budget estimate in the amount of \$2,783,500 for the fiscal year 1949. This budget, prepared by the Department of State Budget Office, was submitted simply as a rough estimate of the Commission's needs without the benefit of any experience factors. There had never been anything in our immigration history comparable to this new program, and the Senate demonstrated its appreciation of this fact by approving a figure of \$2,000,000 and authorized its expenditure in nine months, with the definite understanding that as the needs became more apparent the Commission would come back to the Congress with a request for additional funds based on more definitive experience.

The House approved a similar amount and the Commission was appropriated the \$2,000,000 for the fiscal year 1949, by the Second Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1948.

One interesting development in connection with budget submissions was the direction to the Commission from the Bureau of the Budget to include not only its own estimates, but also those of all the cooperating agencies in the budget submissions to the Congress. The purpose was obvious: to enable everyone to see in one place what the whole program cost. This was not always received with favor by the House committee, but it remained the practice until the end. This practice meant that the Commission not only had to submit the whole budget

but frequently had also to justify it—with the assistance of the affected agencies—before the Congress. It also meant that the Commission had to allocate funds to the other departments. In practice, when appropriation cuts meant reduced allocations, the Commission itself generally bore a disproportionately large share of such reductions.

Immediately thereafter began the task of determining more accurately the costs of operating this program. The Commission had not yet been formally constituted and it had to depend for budgeting assistance on the Department of State. Throughout its existence, and especially at the outset, the Commission had the great advantage also of direct technical and general assistance from the Bureau of the Budget in these matters. A supplemental estimate was prepared by the State Department in the amount of \$2,000,000, which was submitted to the Congress on August 2, 1948. Subsequently, it became apparent that certain economies could be realized by charging many costs and services rendered the program to the occupation budget in Germany. On this basis a new supplemental request was prepared and submitted in the amount of \$1,500,000. The House, after hearing testimony on this request, reduced the figure to \$1,200,000 with which the Senate concurred.

With a total appropriation therefore, of \$3,200,000, the Commission was able to complete its operations for the fiscal year 1949, with a balance of \$788,250, for return to the Treasury. Although funds were desperately short in this early period, this full sum was not used because continuing uncertainty as to its ultimate availability was not dispelled until too late to enable adequate planning for necessary staff and facilities.

Funds available and obligations by each of the participating agencies for the fiscal year 1949, the first year of operations, were as follows:

Agency	Allotment	Obligations
Displaced Persons Commission.....	\$1, 290, 000	\$990, 593
Department of the Army.....	550, 000	528, 332
Public Health Service.....	310, 000	158, 815
Department of State.....	835, 000	536, 467
Immigration and Naturalization Service.....	215, 000	197, 543
Total, fiscal year 1949.....	3, 200, 000	2, 411, 750

Second Year of Operations

The work of preparing a budget estimate for the fiscal year 1950 was started in October 1948 and continued through the first half of November of the year, still before any developed operational experience. The budget estimate finally submitted to the Bureau of the

Budget was in the amount of \$6,508,000, which was reduced by the Bureau to \$5,200,000 for presentation to the Congress. The House committee, in April 1949, reduced the amount requested by \$990,000. The Senate concurred with the House figure of \$4,210,000, for the fiscal year 1950.

Funds available and obligations by each of the participating agencies for the fiscal year 1950 were as follows:

Agency	Allotment	Obligations
Displaced Persons Commission.....	\$1, 886, 500	\$1, 644, 317
Department of the Army.....	738, 700	281, 979
Public Health Service.....	348, 800	173, 873
Department of State.....	707, 000	703, 225
Immigration and Naturalization Service.....	529, 000	491, 933
Total, fiscal year 1950.....	4, 210, 000	3, 295, 327

Third Year of Operations

Early in calendar year 1950 a budget estimate was prepared for fiscal year 1951. Under the existing legislation, the program was to have been completed and the agency liquidated by June 30, 1950, so that the budget estimate as submitted was both an operational and a liquidating budget. It was submitted to the Bureau of the Budget in the amount of \$2,656,000; the Bureau reduced the figure to \$1,200,000. The House committee recommended a further reduction of \$744,900. To accomplish this reduction, in part, the House suggested that the funds requested for Commission resettlement operations be reduced by \$100,000.

Concurrent with House action on the appropriation request, other legislation (H. R. 4567) was pending in the Congress to amend and extend the statute which would have expired on June 30, 1950. On June 16, 1950, the President signed the 1950 amendments into law. On May 30, 1950, after the House and Senate conferees had completed their deliberations and had reached agreement on a compromise measure on the original submission, a revised budget estimate was submitted to the Bureau of the Budget in the amount of \$12,300,000, including funds for the ocean transportation of expellees, a totally new item under the amended Act. The Bureau of the Budget cut this to \$10,000,000, and a revised estimate was prepared in that amount and submitted to the Senate. On June 21, the President presented an amendment to his budget of \$8,800,000, the difference between the original submission and the revised figure of \$10,000,000.

The Senate committee recommended \$8,544,900. After a joint conference the Commission was given \$8,000,000, for fiscal year 1951.

Funds available and obligations by each of the participating agencies for the fiscal year 1951 were as follows:

Agency	Allotment	Obligations
Displaced Persons Commission.....	\$5,680,000	\$3,631,847
Department of the Army.....	350,000	270,209
Public Health Service.....	350,000	186,467
Department of State.....	950,000	891,121
Immigration and Naturalization Service.....	570,000	545,649
Savings required by Congress.....	200,000	
Total, fiscal year 1951.....	8,000,000	5,525,293

The unobligated balance of funds for fiscal year 1951, was accounted for mainly by the failure to achieve substantial shipment of persons under the expellee program, although budgeting had been based on an extensive and accelerating shipping schedule.

Fourth Year of Operations

When the likely passage of the extending legislation became apparent, the Commission immediately undertook the work of preparing estimates of funds required for fiscal year 1952. By June 14, 1950, even before funds had been made available for 1951, the estimate for 1952 had been completed and fixed at a figure of \$7,479,000. This estimate was submitted to the Bureau of the Budget on October 16, 1950. When it became evident, however, that the Commission would not be able to achieve the goals set for the German expellee program for fiscal year 1951, and that consequently while substantial unobligated funds would be returned for 1951, but by the same token additional funds would be necessary for 1952, the Commission revised its estimate requesting additional funds for 1952 for this purpose. This revised budget estimate was submitted to the Bureau of the Budget on November 21, 1950, in the amount of \$9,074,000.

In December 1950 the Bureau of the Budget reduced the request to \$8,260,000, at which figure it went to the Congress. The House committee recommended an appropriation of \$6,195,000. The Senate committee recommended an appropriation of \$7,500,000, and imposed within that amount, limitations on certain items as follows:

For ocean transportation of German expellees under sec. 12 (35,000 at \$125).....	\$4,375,000
Loans, for inland transportation in the U. S.....	1,100,000
Liquidation expenses, IRO DP program.....	700,000
General operating expenses.....	1,325,000
Total recommended by Senate committee.....	7,500,000

The conference report of July 24, 1951, issued by the House, fixed the appropriation for fiscal year 1952 at \$7,000,000, with the limitations on section 12 transportation and loan funds as recommended by the Senate. This left for general operating expenses, and the liquidation of the IRO displaced persons program, a total of \$1,525,000.

Before this appropriation was enacted, Congress further amended the DP Act by Public Law 60, approved June 28, 1951, extending the IRO displaced persons program for another 6 months, to December 31, 1951. It also extended (a) the date line for initiating the processing of assurance for IRO displaced persons from June 30, 1951, to July 31, 1951, and (b) the date line for processing orphans under section 2 (e) through June 30, 1952. This amendment necessitated a revision of estimates which had been submitted on a liquidation basis, by a supplemental budget estimate of \$3,248,000. The Bureau of the Budget reduced this to \$2,431,000 but the House committee disallowed the entire request.

The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended that, in lieu of a supplemental appropriation at that time, the restrictive limitation on existing appropriations be reduced as follows:

Loan fund limitation.....	\$1,100,000
Reduction.....	600,000
New loan fund limitation.....	500,000
Transportation funds, sec. 12.....	4,375,000
Reduction.....	1,375,000
New transportation limitation.....	3,000,000

The Commission informed the Congress that reductions of limitations as indicated above would enable continuance of both displaced persons and expellee programs temporarily but would still require a supplemental request in the early spring of 1952 for the funds necessary to complete the transportation of the German expellees, and to liquidate the Commission.

On November 1, 1951, the Appropriations Act was passed and provided for the reduction of the limitations as follows:

Loan fund limitation.....	\$1,100,000
Reduction.....	500,000
New loan fund limitation.....	600,000
Transportation funds, sec. 12.....	4,375,000
Reduction.....	975,000
New transportation limitation.....	\$3,400,000

The Commission's final budget submission was for \$1,573,000 to complete the shipping of German expellees, and for funds for July

and August of fiscal year 1953 for the liquidation of the Commission.

A new budgetary problem developed, however, with the termination of the International Refugee Organization and the establishment of the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME). The transportation agreement negotiated with PICMME revealed higher per capita costs than had prevailed within the agreement with IRO. This was due to increases in wages to maritime personnel, and a higher per diem ship cost issued by the United States Navy, which operated the chartered vessels. The average per capita cost as submitted in the regular budget request for 1952 was \$125, whereas the agreement negotiated with PICMME provided for an average cost of \$151 per person.

On direction from the Bureau of the Budget, the Commission eliminated the 1953 budget request and submitted instead a supplemental budget estimate for the fiscal year 1952, covering both funds needed for transporting the remainder of the German expellees, as well as the funds necessary for liquidating the Commission during July and August of fiscal year 1953, in the amount of \$3,309,000. The Bureau of the Budget rounded this off to \$3,300,000, and presented it to Congress. The House committee recommended an appropriation of \$3,074,500, the reduction to be applied as follows: the funds requested for the transportation of German expellees reduced by \$100,000, the remaining cut of \$125,500, to come from operating expenses. The Senate committee report of April 10 recommended the amount as approved by the House. The sum recommended was maintained in conference and appropriated.

Funds available and obligations by each of the participating agencies for the fiscal year 1952 were as follows:

Agency	Allotment	Obligations
Displaced Persons Commission.....	\$8, 698, 900	\$7, 712, 962
Department of the Army.....	220, 000	198, 000
Public Health Service.....	157, 600	153, 000
Department of State.....	487, 000	474, 367
Immigration and Naturalization Service.....	511, 000	508, 233
Total, fiscal year 1952.....	10, 074, 500	9, 046, 562

With more than \$105,000 remaining in the loan fund under section 14, plus an accrual of more than \$922,938 in unexpected savings in the cost of transporting expellees under section 12, the Commission, upon its termination on August 31, 1952, expects to return to the Treasury of the United States more than \$1,027,938 of unobligated funds.

Fiscal Control

During the first 3 years of the Commission's operation the Department of State maintained the detailed financial accounting records of funds appropriated to the Commission on a reimbursable basis.

The supporting fiscal operations were transacted by memorandum accounts maintained by the Commission's administrative office in Washington and by the finance office of the European headquarters in Frankfurt.

The Commission, however, maintained control of the obligation of its funds within the apportionment schedule approved annually by the Bureau of the Budget. To accomplish this a system similar to that used by the Department of State was employed. With regard to monies appropriated for the use of the four cooperating Federal agencies, the only control or supervision exercised by the Commission was through its letters to the Bureau of the Budget requesting allocation transfers to the agencies. Under this system the Department of the Treasury obtained approval of the Bureau of the Budget to make the allocation transfers from the funds appropriated to the Commission.

The Bureau of the Budget exercised further control over the Commission and cooperating agencies by requiring a monthly report of obligations and expenditures, after a study of which the Bureau could approve or deny the request for apportionment or allocation of funds. The Bureau also requested, from time to time, further specialized reports as deemed necessary by the Bureau, the President, or the Congress.

For fiscal year 1952, under the requirements of section 1211 of the General Appropriation Act, 1951, the Commission assumed complete control of obligation, expenditure, and accounting records, while the Department of State continued to process the vouchers, purchase orders, payroll, etc., and render to the Commission a monthly record of expenditure. Pursuant to that act, the Commission, in 1951, issued instructions for the administrative control of funds.

Personnel

The need for the establishment of a personnel unit for personnel recruitment, placement, and classification was recognized as soon as the Commission was constituted. The personnel function, with other administration activities, was placed under the executive director. The executive director reported to the chairman, whose primary area of responsibility included the Commission's administrative functions.

Owing to the frequent absence from Washington of the chairman, the variously designated acting chairmen had to assume some of this primary responsibility for periods of time. This resulted in practice in recruitment and placement of top Commission staff becoming more

of a Commission than an individual responsibility. In part this was the result also of Senate committee hearings which questioned the legal propriety of assigning appointment of personnel to any one single Commission member instead of acting by Commission vote. Thus personnel recruitment of top Commission officers was an area in which the executive director had only very limited authority.

Because of continuous financial problems in part, selection of some of the personnel in Europe was originally undertaken in the same manner. Another reason was the realization of the importance of a balanced staff to serve the program's unique fields. Later, selection in Europe became fully the responsibility of the European coordinator. Until that time every appointment cleared through the Commission, even when it was recommended by the coordinator overseas.

At the start of operations, a centralized personnel establishment was begun with the appointment of a junior personnel technician responsible to the executive director. On March 20, 1949, a personnel officer was appointed as chief of personnel operations.

The Commission's personnel policy and procedure was not formalized and published except on such subjects as performance rating, fair employment practice, and position classification, when agency adherence was indicated to a specific law or order. Oral interviews and review of records of experience constituted the usual basis for selection in terms of the program's experience and needs. The Commission in selecting a staff suitable to this wholly new kind of operation had to be careful to appoint people who could carry out the Commission's concept of its administration of Congressional policy. The Act did not require civil service status of Commission employees.

Early in the program employees hired for the European operations were so desperately needed overseas that they had to be sent overseas immediately. Consequently they were equipped only with oral definitions of program activities given in general terms. Specific job assignments and geographic locations were left to the discretion of the European coordinator to be made upon arrival of employees in Frankfurt. It was recognized, however, that employee effectiveness and agency activities could be improved with a more definite orientation system prior to the employees' departure for Europe.

At the start and for many months thereafter the Commissioners themselves as well as other top officers would conduct orientation lectures to groups of new employees. Beginning in May 1949, a system was established whereby each new employee was equipped with an "operational kit" which included material on the law, regulations, policies, and other necessary official and personal information. Whenever possible, overseas personnel awaiting departure were assigned to various units and sections in the Washington office. This arrangement proved fruitful and gave the employee an opportunity to

acquaint himself with activities and details concerning the Commission's over-all operation. Such arrangements ranged from one week to two months, depending on the time element involved for processing passports, immunization shots, and other requirements.

Placement and orientation for employees assigned to the Washington office was handled on the job in a routine manner. Prior to passage of the Classification Act of 1949 (Public Law 429, 81st Cong.), and to some extent thereafter, until passage of a rider on the Independent Offices Appropriation Act, position classification was under the discretionary authority of the Commission. The personnel officer and the executive director usually made recommendations concerning these matters to the Commission as matters arose.

The European coordinator transmitted his personnel recommendations to Washington for approval. Personnel actions were considered for overseas personnel in the same manner as those in the Washington office.

Until the passage of the Classification Act of 1949, all positions established by the Commission were in the unclassified service as stipulated by section 8 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. Under the Classification Act of 1949, it became mandatory to allocate the Commission's positions in accordance with regulations promulgated by the Civil Service Commission. In adherence to these requirements, position descriptions and organizational charts were prepared for submission to the Civil Service Commission.

The classification project for overseas personnel presented a more difficult problem than the positions in the United States, but the Commission obtained the service (on a reimbursable basis) of a classification expert employed by the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany. When the assignment was completed all Commission positions were officially brought under the Classification Act of 1949.

The reduction-in-force program for the liquidation of the Commission was started in July 1951. All reductions were made in accordance with civil-service regulations. On April 18, 1952, an official liquidation order was issued. This served to simplify reductions of those employees who were last to leave the rolls.

The peak employment in the Commission at Washington headquarters was 129 in June 1951 and peak in Europe was 230 American personnel in March 1951.

Administrative Services

The executive director was responsible for miscellaneous administrative services. Frequently these services were initiated by Commission staff, but the actual performance of the service was undertaken by members of the staff of the Department of State. This arrangement developed from the initial assistance rendered by the Depart-

ment of State upon the Commission's establishment and continued in some areas of service throughout the Commission's life. The Department of State travel unit assisted the Commission until June 30, 1951, in the preparation of travel orders and clearance of travel vouchers. From July 1, 1951, to the conclusion of operations, the Commission prepared and cleared its own travel documents. Telegraphic and cable communications, procurement, supply, and printing services were also obtained through the Department of State's facilities. All arrangements were based on periodic billing and reimbursement for the services rendered.

The most significant of the other administrative services operating directly under the executive director was that involving the records, communications, and archival activity of the Commission. It was evident at the beginning of the program that quantitatively the bulk of the records would accumulate in Europe, but that a most significant holding would also exist at the executive and policy level in Washington. Hundreds of thousands of assurances would be pouring into Washington with similar kinds of correspondence loads. In addition, the European office would be submitting hundreds of thousands of individual forms for security investigation with FBI and CIA on every case, as well as reports and cables on the status of every single case at various points in the processing pipeline.

Furthermore, even at the very outset, the nature of the resettlement functions, with the close and continuous relationship with State commissions and voluntary agencies all over the United States and the urgent interest of members of the Congress in the problems raised by people in their districts and states, required a filing system capable of almost immediate response on the status of individual cases. For a relatively small organization, the files turned out to be a job of mammoth proportions requiring all sorts of flexibilities not normally demanded of a file system.

Plans for a central filing system were in the process of formulation by early October 1948, but so heavy was the inflow of mail, especially of assurances, that it was impossible with the resources available to effect the establishment of a definite system of centralized record-keeping. The processing of cases having first priority, assurances were placed under a code control and the 18 hours a day, 7-day energies of the very small records staff were devoted almost exclusively to moving these cases forward to the validation unit and then to the European establishment. By November 1, 1948, the chief of Records and Communications Division had submitted recommendations for a central files system. Administration Memoranda Nos. 6 and 7 of April 1949, codified the already established mail procedure and records system. Provision was made for a central files that covered everything except "records relating to

administration matters, such as fiscal, personnel and administration services, and such records as the Commissioners may find necessary to maintain in their respective offices."

The pressure under which the Commission operated soon made the exceptions the rule. Unit files were established in the various divisions and basic material soon found itself with these files, rather than into the central file. Added to the absence of written records in situations where the need for urgent action resulted in oral discussions, this dispersion of the records of the organization made for considerable difficulty in the course of most phases of operations, difficulties which were bridged because of the devotion and calibre of the people directing the files. A limited staff, a high turnover, and a high volume of work forced the staff to continued peak production for months at a time.

Loans

The 1950 amendments, section 14, authorized the Commission to make loans to finance the reception resettlement of displaced persons, German expellees, Italian refugees, and displaced orphans. The Congress provided that the loans were to mature not later than June 30, 1953, which was a date beyond the expiration of the Commission's statutory life. For the fiscal year July 1, 1950, to June 30, 1951, the Congress appropriated \$1,200,000 to the Commission for such loans. For the fiscal year of 1952 the figure was \$600,000.

The Commission was authorized to grant loans to public and private agencies and through such agencies to individuals. The purpose of these loans was to finance reception and transportation. The Commission defined "reception and transportation" to mean "providing meals, lodging, baggage transfers, customs duties, travel, and other necessary incidentals to the movement of the immigrant."

Loans were made only to persons or agencies that had provided assurances. These were public and private agencies, and individuals. The public and private agencies were those voluntary agencies and state commissions and committees recognized by the Commission. "Individuals" were construed to include a partnership or corporation other than the public or private agencies and an American citizen or family of citizens.

No loans were granted under the law except under regulations promulgated by the Commission and approved by the President. Such loans regulations were approved by the President on December 22, 1950. Under the basic policy set forth in the Commission's regulations, a loan was approved by the Commission, after recommendations by the executive director, when: (1) The provisions of law and regulations were met by the borrower, and it was clear that the loan would be used only for the purposes provided by law; (2) the finan-

cial condition of the borrower was such as to provide the Government with the reasonable assurance of being repaid; and (3) the credit status of the borrower was such as to indicate a previous history of good performance in meeting financial obligations. The amount of the loan had to be related to the number of aliens to be benefited by a loan, the amount available to the Commission for loans, and the capacity of the borrower to repay from present and anticipated income and current assets. A loan was approved if the schedule of repayments met the minimum criteria established by regulations, and provided for as rapid a repayment as was commensurate with the financial status of the borrower. In the case of a borrower who was a private or public agency, the schedule of repayments had to be properly related to the potential use of the loan as a revolving fund.

By August 31, 1952, the total amount requested for loans was \$4,922,500. The Commission had approved loans amounting to \$1,554,970, thereby obligating all but \$245,030 appropriated for loans. Repayment by August 7, 1952, totaled \$262,500. The rest matured under the statute, not later than June 30, 1953.

It is estimated that these loans helped in the resettlement of 96,956 immigrants who have come to the United States under the displaced persons and expellee programs. See table 1, in Appendix 2, for requests for loans and Commission action.

Liquidation

The responsibility for the physical liquidation of the Commission as an independent agency of Government was delegated to the executive director in order that expeditious handling of the multitudinous small details would not burden the Commission in its final days. After consultation with the several interested Federal agencies, agreements were negotiated with the Department of State and the Bureau of the Budget which resulted in the issuance in August 1952, of Executive Order No. 10382, which provided for the liquidation of the affairs of the Displaced Persons Commission. It authorized the Secretary of State to take possession of the records and property of the Commission and provided for the continued certification by the Department of State of vouchers for which Commission funds were obligated before the termination date but not actually expended until thereafter.

As operations drew to a close an archivist was appointed who undertook the retirement to the National Archives of the completed case records of the agency. By liquidation date, these records arranged by office and series, with nonrecord material eliminated, were forwarded to the National Archives complete with series lists, disposal lists and schedules.

By agreement with the Department of State, the many thousands of case files, concerning persons who entered the Commission pipeline at one time during the program but, for one reason or another, never migrated to this country, were turned over to the Consular Service and maintained in a central repository in Frankfurt, to be readily available for reference by that Service.

The Operating Units

The substantive operations of the Commission were concerned with the approval of resettlement opportunities through the assurance process, and the selection, security investigation, eligibility determination, movement and resettlement of displaced persons, German expellees, Italian refugees and orphans. The selection operation and a large part of the security investigations were performed in Europe, as was the first portion of the movement activity which resulted in the transfer of the visaed persons to a port of embarkation. The ocean transport service was controlled from Europe; debarkation, United States inland transport, and resettlement and some of the security process were operations under the jurisdiction of the Washington office.

In all of these several operations, the Commission related its activities to those of other public and private organizations participating in the program. In many of these operations the Commission performed only a coordinating function in relating the participation of the several cooperating agencies engaged in the general effort.

The European Establishment

The Commission's major operation was performed in Europe. That was where the displaced persons, German expellees, Italian refugees, recent political refugees and orphans were located, and the foremost objective in the displaced persons program was to locate and identify them and to determine their eligibility.

Earlier reference has been made to the starting of operations.

Upon the Chairman's recommendation the Commission on October 8, 1948, named a coordinator for Germany and acting coordinator for Europe. Plans were developed for a European establishment with offices in the following areas: Ludwigsburg, Schweinfurt, Augsburg, Amberg, Butzbach, Munich, Salzburg (Austria), Bremen (port of embarkation), Hamburg (British zone), Rastatt (French zone), and Naples (Italy). In addition, suboffices were later established in Austria, the British zone, and Italy. When the expellee program was started, an additional office was opened at Hanau, in the United States zone of Germany. For the orphan's program, offices were later established in Athens and Trieste.

The European operation's organizational structure and its principal personnel, and its relationship to the Washington headquarters, proved to be a continuing source of difference within the Commission until late in December 1950. It is mentioned in this report only because at some stages these difficulties actually impeded efficient and rapid administration and overseas processing.

The fundamental issue was one of organization and management; unfortunately, it was also complicated by personalities on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. The issues were: (1) An effective and business-like system of policy, operational, and reporting controls between Washington and the European headquarters; (2) a series of management, policy and operational controls between the European headquarters and the widely scattered and newly staffed area offices; (3) an officially recognized program of regular consultation with the American voluntary agencies and United States governmental agencies involved in the program.

After considerable discussion, and an effort to conciliate differences, the Commission (by majority vote) decided to institute at least a minimum supervisory control. The European coordinator was directed to submit weekly reports of a specific designated character. To supplement these reports, it was necessary to resort to frequent cabled and trans-Atlantic telephonic communication and to periodic overseas inspection trips by the Commissioners themselves as a substitute for ordinary devices of administrative management and policy control.

To meet the second organizational weakness, a relatively complete absence of regular field supervision by the European coordinator, the Commission by majority vote established the office of associate coordinator for field operations.

The third organization problem was handled by a direct Commission instruction to the European coordinator to establish an advisory committee of cooperating agencies and to hold regular and periodic meetings with it.

The European coordinator never accepted these necessary organizational changes and sought outside influence to have these decisions set aside. Under these circumstances, his resignation was accepted by the Commission on August 4, 1950. Chairman Carusi resigned shortly thereafter. Commissioner Gibson, who succeeded Commissioner Carusi, and the new coordinator found it both desirable and necessary to carry out these kinds of relationships with Washington on the one hand and the European area office on the other. With these changes operations moved along smoothly under direct and continuous Commission direction and control.

Internal Relations

The beginnings of the European operations of the United States Displaced Persons Commission were heralded in the Berlin Telegraph on August 16, 1948, with the qualification that "Congress had provided for immigration outside the normal quotas but had done nothing to provide the money necessary for this generous enterprise." At a meeting in Frankfurt, Germany, on September 9, 1948, the Chairman was able to announce that the Commission had at any rate one address in Europe, namely a room at the visa section of the consulate where a clerk would be in attendance "to receive mail until the Commission offices were set up."

The team of experts accompanying the Chairman to Europe faced a twofold task, on the one hand to start sending displaced persons off to the United States as quickly as possible, and on the other to set up an organization capable of managing the continuing operation authorized by the act. In order to manage the first task they had to make sure of the elements of success for the second task. The law had laid down a number of conditions which every immigrant had to meet in order to enjoy the privileges extended by the Act. The Commission alone could not make sure that these conditions were met. An international agency, the International Refugee Organization, and American and foreign government agencies as well as private American agencies had to take part if the American displaced persons program were to help solve the problem in Germany, Austria, and Italy.

The Commission's representatives decided to limit their first efforts to the United States zone of Germany and to Austria. They found themselves involved in a succession of meetings with other agencies while trying to reopen the processing of displaced persons whose movement had been stopped when the program under the Truman Directive was replaced by the 1948 Act. The problem proved so complex that the Commission did not establish a headquarters and place a man in control of the European field for 2 months.

The original plan had been to establish an office with a coordinator for Europe and separate offices with chiefs or coordinators for Germany, for Austria, and for Italy either alone or together with Austria. A first contingent of Commission personnel had in fact been sent to Munich pending the appointment of a European coordinator while the intention was to station the director for Germany in Frankfurt. At the stage of development in October 1948, the Chairman felt that the Commission was not in a position to set up the whole operation immediately, if for no other reason, at least because the budget was so limited. The Munich office was then moved to Frankfurt where the coordinator for Germany some weeks later was temporarily named as acting coordinator for Europe. Meanwhile, the office in Austria had been acting on the assumption that it was respon-

sible to the Commission in Washington direct and not via the Frankfurt office. This was finally clarified by Christmas 1948.

The seeming lack of speed in the establishment of the Commission's field operation was not due to money stringency alone. With a small group of associates the Chairman, on his initial trip to Europe, went to the consulates where cases dating back to the Truman Directive were awaiting action. He made agreements with the local representatives of the sponsoring agencies on the form of the assurances required by the Displaced Persons Act. With his associates, he personally processed cases to such avail that it proved possible to have visaed more than a thousand displaced persons and to start sailings in October although, properly speaking, the Commission's organization in the field was as yet far from being in an operating condition.

In all of these first cases before the consulates for action, most of the documentary prerequisites demanded by the Act to prove eligibility had already been furnished by the International Refugee Organization, the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army, the sponsoring agencies, and the immigrants themselves. The Commission representatives now checked the documentation, tested the eligibility of the applicants according to the Act, and if it were warranted, wrote the statutory report which was forwarded to the appropriate consulate. This operation constituted an initial application of the law and regulations, allowed for no central bookkeeping and checking on cases against assurance control at European headquarters and in Washington. All that had to come later.

During the first few months of the program, European headquarters and the offices that were established in the field were concerned with every element of the creation of an operating organization. The Chairman in November 1948 informed the overseas headquarters "in looking over our budgetary situation, I find that we are overspending and it is quite likely that we will have to cease recruitment of all kinds at once."

In the early months of its existence, the Commission had to proceed on an experimental basis in developing operations both overseas and stateside. The Commission's new functions of both operation and coordination were not easy, with old-line government agencies and private voluntary agencies proud of their long-time records and their experience under the Truman Directive, uncertain of the motives and the practices of this new and untried agency. The Chairman had declared as early as September 9, 1948, "the Commission is a coordinating body" and had expressed his desire that "meetings between consular officers, agency representatives and the military should continue."

In the early months, circumstances made it natural for the field direction of the displaced persons program to concentrate on an area

of manageable character with a reasonable guarantee of a relatively large yield. Apart from the early informal processing in the early fall of 1948, European headquarters at first limited its interest and its activities almost exclusively to the United States zone of Germany.

Considerable time was to elapse before the Commission's European headquarters had under its management operations of any size and regularity in the British and French zones of Germany and Austria, in the western sectors of Berlin and Vienna, and in Italy. It took time to recruit the necessary staff. As of August 31, 1949, Frankfurt headquarters had in support of the coordinator, an executive assistant and an administrative officer, and department heads as follows: Operations, assurance control, security investigation, legal, selection, statistics, personnel and administrative services, supply and transportation, budget and fiscal, status reports. In January 1949 a deputy coordinator was appointed, but returned to the United States in July 1949. An associate coordinator was appointed early in 1950. In March 1951, the finance, personnel, and supplies function with associated services were consolidated under a director of administration. The legal, security, assurance control, statistics and productions control, and orientation divisions, in turn, were placed in a department of operations.

The housekeeping activities of the overseas operations were facilitated greatly as a result of a telegram of November 2, 1948, from Lieutenant General Heubner, instructing post commanders and chiefs of service to give logistical support to the Commission to provide transportation, including motor transportation against reimbursement, and to perform the loyalty and integrity investigation of all persons selected for the United States. The telegram also authorized the employment of "indigenous" or local German persons.

The significance of this assistance for Commission operations in the United States zone of Germany can be measured against the situation in Austria where no occupation authority existed and where in consequence no such help could be obtained except for assistance in transportation and housing of Commission personnel. The consequent lag in the development of the Commission operation in Austria made it impossible for the Counter Intelligence Corps in Austria to utilize the funds provided through the Department of the Army for its services to the Commission. These dormant funds tided the Commission over in Austria during the first 3 months of 1949 on a hand-to-mouth basis, but the development of an adequate program there was deferred.

European headquarters was repeatedly faced with advice such as the following from the Commission Chairman in Washington, April 23, 1949: "Obligate no funds except as absolutely necessary until you receive word from this office that supplemental appropriation bill

was passed. Temporarily hold all orders for equipment and supplies.”

The relative simplicity of finance and accounting in the early and limited field operation may have deferred the development of the Frankfurt headquarters organization to handle fiscal matters, which became necessary with the extension of active operations and the need for corresponding disbursement and accounting outside of the United States zone of Germany. Fiscal regulations differed from one zone and one German administrative area to another. Costs that were borne by the occupation budget in Germany had to be paid out of the Commission's fund in Austria and Italy and, eventually, Greece.

Outside the United States zone of Germany, the Commission eventually succeeded in establishing relatively simple channels of disbursement by suballotments to the embassies, legations, or consulates that were acting as disbursing authorities for the Commission's area offices.

Assurance Control

At all times determination of eligibility on cases was the first consideration. By the middle of December 1948 Frankfurt had actually started action in the field for between 13,000 to 14,000 people, with current requests for action going out to the field offices at a rate of some 3,000 persons a week. The key to this process was the assurance; it was necessary to establish a system of registry, coordinated between Washington and the field, which would permit bookkeeping and control of assurances.

Preselection Unit

The number of assurances for which the Commission was itself to make the nomination to match the assurance was not significant in the first months of the program, amounting to no more than several hundred assurances during the first year of field operations. By early 1949 the delegation of responsibility for actual nominations in such cases to the field offices had been considered but it was decided in the early summer to have the preselection unit at Frankfurt do the selection. Administrative responsibility for this task was placed in the preselection unit of the assurance control department at headquarters. Selections were made initially on the basis of personal and employment records submitted by the International Refugee Organization. This was abandoned later in the year in favor of selection by the unit's members visiting the field.

The combination of assurance control and direct processing in the field by representatives of the preselection unit, eventually gave way to selection in the field by the local offices. This latter process was always in intimate and direct contact with the preselection unit in the assurance control department of Frankfurt. The appropriate division of labor between headquarters and the field offices was the subject of a special meeting at Frankfurt in April 1951 when this scope of

direct Commission matching of assurances with persons was beginning to assume sizable proportions under the preassurance program. The outcome was that the preselection unit at headquarters retained ultimate authority and control in regard to bookkeeping, instruction, and the final approval of selections.

Administration

Physical facilities were nonexistent when the Commission started to operate in the field. In the United States zone of Germany, headquarters delegated responsibility of getting the necessary equipment and supplies to the various area offices. European headquarters therefore did not, at the beginning of the program, provide for the administration of equipment and supplies beyond its own local needs. As it became clear that field needs and contingencies could not be met entirely in this manner, even in the United States zone of Germany, the coordinator at first established a petty cash fund for each field office out of his own private resources. In Austria the situation was more difficult because the Army was not in the same position there as in Germany and the Commission staff were not even getting their pay checks.

As the Commission started to develop its activities beyond the borders of the United States zone of Germany, the need for orderly handling of equipment and supplies, including the automobiles which were purchased for the field operations, became urgent. A supply and transportation section was eventually established. This section was made responsible for general housekeeping functions for Frankfurt headquarters and for what finally amounted to 12 area offices. The problem of contingencies was never satisfactorily settled in the European administration. Effective control of equipment in the whole field was not secured. This could at times have serious consequences of a purely managerial character for the processing of immigrants. Without the necessary forms, without necessary automobiles or gasoline, without the necessary filing cabinets and equipment for arranging case materials, operations anywhere might at any time come to a standstill. This could and did happen in early and in late periods of Commission history but was not peculiar to the displaced persons activity in the complex of overseas or field operations anywhere.

Security

One of the major preoccupations of the European operation, both at its headquarters and in the area offices, was full, effective and thorough security investigation of each person considered under the act. Since security operations in the United States zone of Germany were completely handled by the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army, the administrative concern of the Commission's European headquarters with security matters was devoted initially to

the provision of proper guidance to area offices for the handling of security in terms of the law, the regulations, and its own instructions, through a review of all rejections on security grounds, and a general supervision of all other cases. Cases were also security checked by the Consular Service of the Department of State and by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice before the immigrant's departure. All of this was a matter for policy instruction and supervision for which the Washington headquarters provided the assistance of a legal officer, specially equipped in security matters. In addition, a security section with trained and experienced intelligence agents was established in Frankfurt.

Parallel with the application of the law and regulations on security clearance by Commission staff in the field and at Frankfurt ran the overseas effort to secure agreement with the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army on the terms and arrangements of its investigation of all cases submitted by the Commission. Early conferences with the Division of Intelligence of the Army's European Command (EUCOM) and with the CIC, led to a meeting on September 10, 1948, to draft a procedure on integrity and loyalty investigation. Administratively this placed the burden and the whole range of the investigation with the CIC. The CIC was to be responsible for the handling of the provost marshal fingerprint check and for all the many other vital checks, investigations, inquiries, and security clearance.

The CIC was also made responsible not only for the Berlin Document Center check but also for the follow-up, in case the results of the Berlin Document Center check should prove adverse to the applicant. The Commission's basic policy was that the content, scope and character of the security investigation would best be determined by the intelligence agencies of the United States Government.

As the CIC in Germany and in Austria drafted and adopted procedures for displaced persons investigations, the administrative relationships of the Commission's European headquarters with the CIC did not lessen. On the contrary the need for uniform standards in the relation between the Commission's area offices and the regional offices of the CIC, both in terms of clearance and of operational practice, increased the workload for headquarters in Frankfurt. The corresponding problems in the relations between CIC in Austria and the Commission's area office were in practice handled and resolved without headquarters intervention, but headquarters reserved its right to address itself directly to the Austrian headquarters of the CIC. It consequently had to keep itself fully informed of this element in the Austrian situation.

The basic problems increased far beyond any original contemplation when the Commission came to face the need to establish its own

investigative services in the British and French zones of Germany and in Italy. The first task of the security officer was to investigate the security clearance problems in those three areas. The operational pattern was based upon his recommendations. These investigation services came directly under the security officer in the line of command and he had a day-to-day concern with them. This concern expanded in the course of time to include direct Commission relations with the Berlin Document Center, with the provost marshal's office, and with other primary sources of intelligence data. The security officer also became directly concerned with the review of cases and with inquiries referred to headquarters review panel. The security section was also charged with internal security at headquarters and in the Commission field offices. As the DP program drew to a close, the security section was merged with the legal section.

Legal

The legal establishment at European headquarters grew from a small staff appointed to meet the needs of the European Coordinator for a review of legal and case problems submitted to him. It was decided early that all cases rejected in the field for any reason whatsoever must be referred to Frankfurt for review.

The number of cases referred to headquarters for (1) legal guidance and (2) as rejections, increased in such number that eventually the Legal Division had to be strengthened beyond anything foreseen during the first year of the operations.

The activities of the overseas legal office and the review panel are described more fully elsewhere (p. 104, et seq.).

Transportation Planning

Before the end of 1948, the coordinator appointed an executive assistant whose main task was to keep track of visa progress in the field in order to be able to plan movement to ports of embarkation, and to advise with IRO on shipping schedules.

Statistics

At an early stage the statistics section of European headquarters developed a series of regular statistical analyses which permitted a forecast of the number of applicants to be processed and the number that would be ineligible for one reason or another. Later, in 1950, organizational changes in Frankfurt headquarters linked the statistics section with the transportation planning section in providing a comprehensive basis for the current operational planning of the coordinator, and in making available to Washington all required program and operational statistics.

Orphans

Under the 1948 Act the Commission channeled all orphan cases through the United States Committee for the Care of European Children. Therefore, it was not necessary to set up administrative arrangements in Frankfurt. However, the 1950 amendments presented the Commission with administrative and geographical problems of such magnitude that an independent children's branch was set up in European headquarters, with specialized personnel and special field representatives. (See p. 206, et seq.)

Area Arrangements

It was an early assumption that the bulk (80 percent was mentioned in one communication) of the total number of immigrants under the 1948 Act would come from the United States zone of Germany. Because of this factor and because of the logistic support more readily available there, the largest and most homogeneous network of area offices was created and undertook operations in the United States zone of Germany during the fall of 1948. The British and French zones of Germany opened one office each in the course of the spring of 1949. The area covered by the British office made it necessary to use sub-offices for investigation purposes, and documentation teams on a roving basis were added for the expellee program in 1951 and 1952. In Austria, a single Commission office was established immediately in 1948 in Salzburg. The size of the program and its peculiar nature made it necessary in April 1949 to establish suboffices throughout the western zones of Austria as well as in Vienna and in Salzburg. Operations did not start in Italy until the summer of 1949, and agreement on Naples as a main center was not reached until a later date. Later, to handle the Venezia Giulia cases under the 1950 amendments, temporary suboffices were set up in Naples, Rome, and Trieste. For the DPs and expellees in Berlin and for war orphans (except in Greece and Italy), the case loads were handled by visiting teams rather than by resident officers.

The Commission's area offices were set up under extraordinary difficulties. First, there was the pressure to act immediately, because all visa issuance to refugees had been halted by the enactment of the DP Act. Second, the Commission lacked funds. Third, the Commission was a new organization and unknown in many parts of Europe. Then, there was a whole complex of reasons arising out of the occupation status in Germany, quadripartite arrangements in Austria, and separate national sovereignty in Italy. In addition it was necessary to adjust to the pattern established by each of the Army post commanders in the United States zone of Germany. Under the circumstances, uniformity among the area offices would have been impossible to achieve within any foreseeable period of time. In order to get into

operation, it was necessary to permit substantial organizational and operational variations, subject of course to the basic policies and principles established by the Commission. Here, as in other instances, the Commission had to adjust itself administratively to circumstances beyond its control.

Reference is made elsewhere to the problem of field supervision. At the start, uniformity in daily operations was centered about the daily progress report on cases, from assurances received to applicants departed, which was telephoned into Frankfurt as early as possible every day from November 1948 onward. These daily reports served to reveal differences in local operations in the field in particular in the British and French zones of Germany, in Austria, and in Italy.

In Austria, the variation was a minor one, relating to the difference between Austria and Germany in the camp location of displaced persons. In the British and French zones of Germany, and in Italy, the reference of a case for investigation was not a separate step in the process line as in the United States zone and in Austria where the CIC received a fully documented case and completed its investigation before the case was submitted to Commission analyst for the statutory report. This was natural in view of the independent status and separate operation of CIC. In the British and in the French zones, the investigation was in the hands of the Commission itself and could therefore be started as soon as the case reached the Commission.

Relations with outside authorities varied among area offices outside the United States zone of Germany. In the French zone, the camps and resettlement centers were managed by the French occupation authorities even though the latter were subject to IRO supervision and direction since the displaced persons remained under the care of IRO. Therefore, the area office had more dealings with the French occupation authorities than the area officers in the United States zone had with the American occupation authorities. In Italy, the main difference rests in the fact that Italy was a sovereign nation, with the consequent necessity for the Commission office to act, on the one hand, through American diplomatic officers, and, on the other, in cooperation with the Italian authorities in the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Interior.

The story of the creation and structure of the Commission's area offices shows that every step was conditioned by different or new circumstances growing out of the complexity of postwar Europe. Since the Commission had to choose between performance and text book organizational charts, and chose the former, and because the problems faced by operations stretching from the North Sea to the Mediterranean were so different, one cannot review and analyze the work of the area offices according to any one standard.

Field Supervision

The DP program was in itself so new in so many respects and so different from ordinary immigration that even personnel with experience in social work and immigration needed policy and operational instruction in the elements of this new operation. In its staff recruitment, the Commission sought to develop a balance in terms of the wide variety of skills and judgments that might prove necessary. Some training was provided by Washington headquarters before the departure of personnel from the United States. Distance from the fields made this training general rather than operational in nature. The pressure of work both in the Washington and in the Frankfurt offices reduced the time available for staff training to a minimum. To compensate for the rush at the start which made complete training impossible and for the lack of constant personal field supervision, there were headquarters meetings with the officers in charge of the area offices, often accompanied by one or more members of their staff. A further remedy and a guarantee for standardized procedures were provided in the instruction bulletins and instruction memoranda that began to come from European headquarters. No. 1 was dated October 30, 1948. Together with No. 3 of November 27, 1948, it provided the necessary guidance on the handling of individual cases for visa issuance according to the law and the regulations. Bulletin No. 8, on the Treatment of Irregular [ineligible] Cases, of March 1949, was also a basic codification. These various bulletins remained basic to the end so far as displaced persons cases were concerned and applied also basically to expellees.

The principle of headquarters training of new personnel had in the meantime become fully accepted. Throughout the history of the Commission operation in Europe staff training at and by headquarters nevertheless remained subordinate to the immediate operational pressures to which headquarters was as much subject as the area offices. In many areas attempts were made to develop standard operating procedures based on the law, the regulations, and on guidance from Frankfurt, but adjusted to the special features of the area. These were checked by Frankfurt headquarters.

As the operation grew, Frankfurt started to give detailed guidance and directions in administrative and fiscal matters, and eventually issued regular administrative memoranda to the field, the first dating from September 27, 1950.

A controversial question in the early days of the program was whether all applicants should be personally interviewed by the Commission staff. Every applicant was actually personally interviewed four times by American governmental officials, apart from any Commission interview. Everyone was interviewed in the Commission's security investigation, either by the Counter Intelligence Corps or the

other intelligence service which acted for the Commission under the President's Executive Order, or by the Commission's own intelligence and security officers. Everyone was also interviewed by the United States Consul, the United States Public Health Service examiner, and by the United States immigration inspector. In the early days of the program, with severely limited budget and staff, since these four American officials were already interviewing each applicant, it was neither possible nor necessary for a fifth personal interview to be made by a Commission officer as a matter of course in every case.

However, even at the very outset, and increasingly so with the development of the program, applicants were called in by the Commission for personal interview, for this fifth personal interview, whenever in the judgment of the area office such interview was necessary. Practices necessarily varied among the area offices, but the basic Commission policy was the same for all.

Generally speaking, the supervisory relationship between the European headquarters office in Frankfurt and the area offices in the field—at least until late 1950—was one of the weakest points in the administration of the program. Some of the reasons for this have been discussed elsewhere. Others were the early financial stringency facing the Commission and the great pressures and operational difficulties under which operations were started.

The Commission's experience leads to the conclusion that affirmative, well directed, and purposeful field supervision is of paramount importance in such a program.

Public Information

Frankfurt headquarters was chary of public pronouncements except for operational announcements. Displaced persons had to be informed individually and in general of the workings of the program. This strictly informational publicity to DPs was undertaken in large degree by the IRO. As the program took shape, public relations with the displaced persons eligible under the DP Act was formalized in the development of a pipeline by means of which he was located, called forward, selected, and passed on through the process line.

When the German expellee program was shifted to the Commission the fact that they were not under the aegis of any single organization made the problem of Commission public information a much more difficult and costly one, at least within the German Federal Republic. New channels had to be created before it proved possible, during the spring of 1951, to consider the call forward of prospective expellee immigrants as an established and reasonably organized element of Commission operation in Germany. Public relations policy and operation, was the subject of a meeting of field officers at European headquarters in March 1951, with the Chairman. A public information officer was then added to the European headquarters staff.

Frankfurt headquarters was assisted in broadening the perspective of the field operation by policy letters issued by the Commission from Washington and disseminated through Frankfurt to the field during 1949, and by the News Letters issued in Washington between December 1949 and May 1951.

Orientation

The reason for delayed initiation of an orientation program will be discussed more fully elsewhere (p. 200). European headquarters did not enter actively into this field until the Commission decided in September 1949 to designate a special officer for field orientation.

The requirement of a good faith affidavit of displaced persons and German expellees by the 1950 amendment made a personal meeting necessary to administer the oath. This new development in procedure helped to expand the concept of orientation.

The 1950 amendments placed direct responsibilities in this respect upon the Commission. An orientation section was created at Frankfurt in the fall of 1950. In the field of orientation the European headquarters exercised a coordinating, rather than executive or managerial function. "Steering committees," composed of the cooperating agencies, were established. Within the ranks of the Commission itself the orientation section at Frankfurt did, however, for most of the time, exercise direct authority in relation to the orientation arrangements in individual area offices.

"Production"

From the beginning to the end, there was public pressure on the Commission. There were continuous inquiries from Congress. The American voluntary agencies and the American people demonstrated an intense interest in the week-to-week progress of the program. This interest was reflected in deluges of letters, telegrams, telephone calls and personal visits. Every one was entitled to an answer—the American sponsor, whether he was to get his DP; the DP, what his status was. Accordingly, "production" meant the number of determinations of eligibility (which ended in visas) or ineligibility (which ended in letters of regret).

American Government authorities, including first and foremost the occupation authorities in Germany and the allied authorities in Austria, were insistent in their desire to press for physical departure of eligible applicants to alleviate the difficulties in those countries.

In its relations with cooperating organizations, such as the Consular Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the IRO, Commission staff in Europe was confronted with conflicts of traditions, attitudes, standards of performance, objectives, techniques and practices that made for difficulty in attaining a perfect synchronization of activities. The problem became even more complicated as relations

developed with foreign governments having their own objectives and standards.

Relations with cooperating agencies

The multiple-character of the DP operation in Europe was written into the DP law and was recognized from the start. It was not a unitary organization operated by the Commission. Instead, it was a joint operation in which various agencies of the United States Government, various foreign governments, an international organization and a great number of American voluntary agencies all played their respective parts. In addition to its own operating responsibility, the Commission's role was to coordinate, expedite, streamline, and give general guidance to the whole cooperative effort.

The United States Army

In the United States zone of Germany the first step in Commission coordination was aimed at full support from the United States Army. Representatives of the Civil Affairs Division took a prominent part in the early discussions. The displaced persons were a burden on the occupying forces and repatriation had come to a stop. The resettlement programs of various nations were welcome means of solution and the United States program more welcome than others because of its size.

The implications for the Army were manifold. It backstopped the Commission operation, in a direct manner for the processing facilities of the Commission offices, and in an indirect manner so far as the care and movement of the DPs by the International Refugee Organization depended on Army support. All this was put in practical terms by instructions from the Civil Affairs Division of the European Command, or EUCOM, during September 1948. This was finalized in Annex A to EUCOM circular No. 2 on June 30, 1950.

Until May 1, 1950, EUCOM, Civil Affairs Division, was the authority responsible for scheduling resettlement movements, and even after this responsibility had been transferred to the High Commissioners and the Land Commissioners in Germany, the Army post commanders had a continuing responsibility for the necessary trains.

Office space, lighting and heating, communications, transportation, billets, service both in the offices of the Commission and in the billets of the Commission personnel, as well as staging centers for displaced persons under consideration by the Commission, depended on Army arrangements and services.

The necessity for Army action to support the Commission went beyond the instructions received from the Department at home. In view of the inadequacy of Commission finances in 1948, the operation could not have got going at all in Germany without happy relations between the Commission and the Army. Its operations would have

come to a complete standstill in Austria before the close of 1948 and remained at a standstill until the acceptance of a supplementary budget by the Congress, had it not been for Army support. For this the Commission has always been grateful.

As the political situation in Europe and the world became critical and the needs of Allied forces in Germany grew, the Army was subject to conflicting demands, as for example, the very availability of the DP camps and resettlement centers in which the displaced persons were processed, and which the Army began to need for other purposes. Either directly, or through the United States High Commissioner for Germany after that office was established, the Commission had to make sure that the needs of the displaced persons program did not suffer from the lack of camps and resettlement centers. The last difficulty of this kind occurred in March 1952, as to the retention of the staging center at Camp Grohn outside Bremerhaven from which the emigrants left for the United States.

By the time the Commission was prepared to start operations in the British and French zones of Germany, operational experience had been gained, and the Commission's operational pattern was known. Relations with the British and the French occupation authorities varied in the same way as the relations varied from one area office to another in the United States zone of Germany or between the latter and Austria. But the mechanics of support and above all the arrangements for collaboration with the British and French Intelligence services in the investigation of applicants worked out smoothly. A satisfactory groundwork was provided and continued until the occupying authorities in the British and French zones withdrew their supplementary assistance in 1950 and threw the Commission back solely on its own investigative resources.

The Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC)

In the United States zone of Germany, and all western zones of Austria, the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army was the operating intelligence agency.

This meant a heavy workload as well as a responsibility for the CIC going far beyond normal operations of that agency. To many hundreds of thousands of displaced persons and expellees the investigation by CIC meant a more detailed and lengthy personal contact than any other step in their preparation for immigration into the United States.

The Department of the Army authorized this activity in September 1948. It was renewed and general support was given by a specific request for investigation from the Commission.

The loyalty and integrity investigations which had been called for in the instruction from the Department of the Army were centered in

the CIC but were not necessarily performed in every detail by the CIC as a group. The CIC gathered important elements of the information required through intermediate security or intelligence organizations such as the Provost Marshal's Office and the Berlin Document Center. It also used the military government courts and their successor organizations, the HICOG courts, for its search of records on applicants. The CIC used the local police authorities in Austria and in Germany as well as in France and other countries. In all, some 21 different sources were used in these intelligence and security investigations.

The CIC report was regarded by the Commission as conclusive upon all questions of security. It became a part of each case file and was forwarded to the Consular Service and to the inspectors of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for their independent scrutiny in reaching their own decisions. In this regard the Commission program was unique, since in other immigration programs the security investigation report does not automatically follow the case. This practice grew out of the Commission's rigid policy to do everything possible to protect the security of the United States.

The Commission also sought CIC advice in matters of internal security. It had been agreed from the beginning that the Commission would clear personnel for the purpose and would report accordingly to the CIC. In one area classified material was at one time left with the CIC and the Commission officers had to visit the CIC officer in order to complete their reports on cases involving classified material. In the closing phase of the program each of the Commission area offices had specially designated security officers, a development which stemmed from the recommendations of one of the Commissioners upon returning from his overseas inspection trip late in 1949.

The Commission used not only the Counter Intelligence Corps in developing its investigation, but in fact, all of the intelligence agencies of the United States Government overseas and in the United States. In the field and in practice this also involved CIC activities because items of information from other intelligence agencies were referred to the CIC for verification, amplification, and as clues to further investigation, and for report and judgment. Here again the Commission acted as the coordinating agency.

Every single prospective immigrant under the act was security cleared with the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence agencies in the United States. The area offices sent to Washington headquarters for this purpose, a basic data sheet on each applicant, including the sponsor and no one embarked until this state-side investigation was completed. If there were derogatory information, the applicant would be held while the CIC looked into the matter on the basis of a request from the Commission. In fact, this very rigid security system predated and was precursor of systems later

adopted for more general application, and prevented the need for a stoppage of all immigration, as did happen temporarily with nondisplaced person immigration.

Berlin Document Center (BDC)

One of the most important of the security agencies operating independently, but servicing the Commission investigation through the CIC, was the Berlin Document Center. This was not really an investigative office but the repository of documents on membership, association, and adherence to the Nazi cause. Included in the holdings of this archival establishment, which the Allied Forces had obtained at the end of the war, were records running the gamut from the central Nazi party itself to local bodies. In view of the ban in section 13 of the Act on members of hostile movements, the availability of the Berlin Document Center with its 20 million names on record in one spot meant an incalculable saving in time and money for the whole DP program, and an unimpeachable source of security data.

It was agreed as early as September 10, 1948, that examination of records of the Berlin Document Center was an indispensable condition for final clearance of an immigrant under the Act. On the basis of consular experience with the Berlin Document Center check before the DP Act, it was jointly agreed by all Government agencies involved to allow cases to go through the process line up to the point of departure prior to requiring a reply from the Berlin Document Center. If derogatory information was received from the Berlin Document Center the procedure was to stop the applicant through appropriate channels, and refer the case to the Commission for final decision.

A troublesome situation developed in connection with this arrangement on BDC reports. Owing to a misunderstanding, which the early and undocumented character of the Frankfurt-Washington supervision failed to bring to light, the European headquarters—when faced with a very slow return of these BDC reports—misinterpreted the Commission ruling to mean that persons could embark for the United States regardless of completion of the BDC check. This was based on the assumption that derogatory returns would be referred to appropriate governmental authorities in the United States for action.

This unauthorized practice was discovered by Commissioner Rosenfield during an overseas inspection in 1949 and immediately stopped. On November 15, 1949, Commissioner Rosenfield issued the following instructions to the European coordinator:

1. I must repeat what I said to you orally, that I am completely startled by the failure to tie in the BDC reports prior to departure of DP's. This is contrary to Commission policy.

2. According to our discussion Monday, the following procedure will be followed:

- (a) As to all cases not yet embarked, and after a short period to put the new system into effect, no DP will sail until the BDC document check is properly completed and so noted in the file.

- (b) As to cases already embarked, we will obtain verification that a BDC report has been received on each case. If positive (i. e., derogatory) reports are disclosed on cases already embarked, the reports are to be forwarded to Washington immediately.

Later, during the often heated legislative discussions leading up to the enactment of the 1950 amendments, opponents of a liberalized law made much ado about this earlier so-called calculated risk with security. In fact, the number of persons who embarked without the BDC check who should have been held was almost literally negligible. Candor also dictates the observation that most of those who would have been held by a prior BDC check were of the same category of cases which Congress itself released for entry into the United States, regardless of the kinds of findings in the BDC, by Public Law 14 of 1951. It is clear therefore that there was no security risk to the United States as a result of this temporary aberration from established Commission policy.

BDC checks covered every single applicant, originally if born before 1926 and later if born before 1930. This initial procedure in the United States zone of Germany was cumbersome and time-consuming. Two steps were taken in the course of time to speed up this check without in any way affecting its thoroughness. One of them was through initiating the request for a BDC check at an earlier point, the same time that IRO was asked to document an applicant. The other transferred the handling of the request from the CIC to the Commission.

The direct contact between Commission headquarters and the Berlin Document Center that followed from these changes in procedure made the Berlin Document Center useful to the DP program in a broader sense. In addition to specific eligibility determinations, the Commission began to use the Berlin Document Center in increasing measure to develop its own policy interpretations. The strengthened enforcements of section 13 that resulted during the late phases of the program, were largely based upon authoritative advice from the BDC. The BDC serviced the program independently of CIC investigations before direct relations were instituted with Commission field offices in the United States zone of Germany in the spring of 1950. As soon as the Commission started operations in the British and French zones of Germany and in Italy, BDC checks for these areas were reported directly to the Commission office. In Italy, the origin and residential history of an applicant decided whether a BDC check was necessary.

Provost Marshal

Another basic intelligence operation was the service to the program channeled through the CIC from the Identification Section, Provost

Marshal Division of the Army's European Command. Location of the applicant nominated on an assurance was at all times basic. Identification by the Provost Marshal Division was an essential element in this process.

The Provost Marshal's regulations were the pattern for the IRO fingerprint cards which were included in the documentation submitted to the Commission. The same procedure applied to the German police authorities in their fingerprinting in connection with German expellee documentation.

As the German expellee fingerprints were channeled through the various regional CIC offices to the Provost Marshal Division one batch of documentations after the other was returned by CIC because the fingerprints had not been made by the German authorities in accordance with the uniform standards prescribed by the Provost Marshal Division. Finally, for better control of the files, the Commission decided late in 1951 to take the same step with regard to Provost Marshal checks that it had taken more than a year earlier in regard to the Berlin Document Center and to channel requests for fingerprint checks directly.

The fingerprint check prevented subterfuge. Any individual who might, for instance, have been processed and rejected in the United States zone of Germany and would then try to pass under a different name elsewhere in the field, from the British zone of Germany and down to Italy, would be detected by means of the fingerprint check.

CIC Reports

The Commission relied completely upon the security and intelligence findings and opinions of the CIC. Although a fact-finding agency, the CIC was requested to and did express in writing its finding and an opinion, in each case, whether "it appeared" or "did not appear" that each applicant "is or has been a member of or participated in a movement which is or has been hostile to the United States or the form of government of the United States." After the 1950 amendments of section 13, the CIC's findings and conclusions also covered a series of requirements of that section in its amended form.

From the start of operations in the field, it became clear that the CIC was in fact making a decision, as to security, with which the President's executive order had charged the Commission. This was deliberate with the Commission, and at no time was the CIC relieved of this basic function in connection with strict security findings and conclusions.

The CIC's investigation covered not only security and intelligence matters, but all questions of eligibility insofar as they related to investigative disclosures. Thus, it covered among other items, date lines, character, criminal record and other items affecting the applicant's

"character, history, and eligibility," as required to be covered in the "investigation and written report" provided for in section 10 of the Act. In these nonsecurity areas, the CIC's findings, although accorded great and almost always conclusive weight, were reviewed by the Commission. In security matters, the CIC's findings and opinions were deemed conclusive because security was its fundamental area. But in nonsecurity areas, the CIC was not necessarily familiar with the legal requirements of the act, the regulations, the interpretations of the Commission and other agencies, and other relevant matters. However, in such nonsecurity matters, even where the Commission reviewed such CIC findings, the complete original CIC report was included in the file sent along to the consul and to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Where the Commission representative's findings were in conflict with the nonsecurity findings of CIC, he presented his full reasons. For a long time, it was the practice in such instances to return the case to the CIC for further consideration.

The workload for CIC continued to grow right up to the end of the program because of the Commission's reliance upon CIC as the basic investigative agency.

The Department of State—The Consular Service

The consuls were an integral part of the DP operation as the Government officials entrusted by law with the issuance of visas. In addition, they served, in part, as a channel of communication and also as the agency substituting for the Army in areas where the latter was not operating. This was of real importance in Austria and Italy and for the orphan program in particular in a number of other countries.

From the first the Consular Service was involved in basic overseas and Washington negotiations. A coordinating consul general took part in the first conference in Frankfurt on September 9, 1948, where he emphasized the desire of the Department of State that each consular office concentrate on the DP program and advised that they would not hesitate to use all available personnel if the circumstances required. The coordinating consular officer established his headquarters in Frankfurt but his authority cut across normal lines of command from Washington. It embraced all DP visa-issuing offices in Germany and Austria and the American Consulate General at Naples in Italy. After some initial hesitations in the Department of State, and after strong representations by the Commission, the visa-issuing vice consuls established their offices in the resettlement centers where the Commission itself was operating. The Commission insisted upon the consuls serving on DP cases full time since they were paid out of the appropriations made to the Commission. The allocation of funds for this purpose was made by the Commission to the State Department in Washington.

Under the 1948 Act, there was a clear-cut division of responsibility between the Commission and the Consular Service in handling DP cases. The Commission decided on the qualifications of the applicant under the DP Act and the consuls under the normal immigration laws specifically. As the program developed so did interlineations in this division of labor. When consuls had some questions under the strictly DP law aspects of a case, they would resubmit the file to the Commission. And its coordinating function itself gave the Commission broader operational dealings with the consuls because smooth operations in as complicated a system as the pipe line were best served by the presentation to the consul of not only the Commission report with supporting documents in terms of the DP Act, but also by the inclusion of all documents and testimonial material which the consuls would need for their purposes under the normal immigration laws.

The amended Act in 1950 gave authority to the consuls and immigration inspectors to review the eligibility determinations of the Commission and IRO's decision on IRO status. Commission officers found themselves meeting hurdles day in and day out throughout the entire program in order to provide that the documentation, supplemented by reports of investigation and incidental documents, and to assure the proper availability of other evidence that would ultimately satisfy the needs of the consuls so that they could decide upon visa eligibility without the necessity of delays for required papers and other documents.

The assistance of the Consular Service was enlisted when the Commission started to plan the expellee program. As in the DP program in 1948, consideration of affidavits and applications under the normal immigration law had been stopped when the Commission took over administration of the expellee program in 1950. These applications with affidavits were on file in the consular offices. A transfer to Commission operation on the required statutory assurance basis, with its by then customary tie-in with the voluntary agencies, was more difficult than in the DP program. The Commission obtained the names of the original sponsors from the consuls and wrote to the sponsors to enable them to adjust to the new legal requirements for sponsorships of immigrants through assurances.

Early in the program, at a meeting called by the coordinator in Frankfurt in February 1949, it was felt necessary to emphasize to all collaborating agencies in all areas, and especially the Consular Service, the serious consequences of a possible continued lack of vigorous cooperation. This problem was also noted by a special subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee after an intensive on-the-spot survey of the overseas operation:

The subcommittee was glad to note the high degree of cooperation and mutual understanding existing among the various United States agencies involved in the

overseas operation of the displaced persons program. There is one instance, however, where there is room for improvement. The subcommittee has observed at certain consular offices a lack of understanding of congressional intent as evidence by the passage of Public Law 774, Eightieth Congress.

Certain junior consular offices, most of them in the rank of vice consuls and consuls, seem not to realize adequately what the Congress had in mind in enacting this special emergency legislation and appear reluctant to accept the necessity of the additional amount of expeditious work required under the terms of the temporary act with its strict but justifiable time limitations. Unnecessary frictions ensuing from this attitude of a small number of young career officers could be easily remedied by prompt and energetic action taken by the Department of State.

The congressional committee's objectives were followed out by the Consular Service.

The Federal Security Agency—The Public Health Service

The United States Public Health Service examined applicants before a consul could decide whether to issue a visa. The United States Public Health Service was in this respect advising the consuls, not the Commission, but in practice the Commission found itself involved as if it had direct responsibility for the Public Health Service. It was asked to secure arrangements for the Public Health Service in the same way as for the consuls, with an additional commitment arising out of IRO medical aid to the Public Health Service. The Commission arranged space and equipment and directed the arrangements for the transmission of medical reports and their control on which the efficient progress of the whole operation depended. It would on occasion find itself involved as the channel for complaints from the applicants and from local representatives of sponsoring voluntary agencies to the Public Health Service.

The Department of Justice—The Immigration and Naturalization Service

Normally, the immigration inspector first sees the immigrant on the shores of the United States, and has only the visa papers before him. In the DP program, in order to expedite the operation, the immigration inspector was stationed overseas. The Commission insisted that the whole security and investigative file, and not merely the visa, be made available to the inspectors.

At the beginning, and for more than a year, the Immigration and Naturalization Service had its European office centrally located at Camp Grohn, the port of embarkation near Bremerhaven. A Commission office was established there as well, and the function of coordination with the Immigration and Naturalization Service was performed by the local Commission office.

A backlog started to grow of cases and of persons who had arrived in Camp Grohn with their visas issued by the consuls in the expecta-

tion of an early passage to the United States. This backlog continued to grow to such an extent that late in 1949, the Commission found it necessary to detach an experienced Commission senior officer to Camp Grohn to help clear up obstacles which had developed.

One of the serious effects of the Camp Grohn growing backlog was the overloading of camp capacity and interruption of the whole program back through all steps in the complicated pipeline. The House Judiciary Subcommittee, as a result of its overseas inspections, recommended a decentralization of the immigration inspection to the Commission's area offices. At the very least this would reserve transportation and embarkation facilities for unquestionably admissible persons. As a result, immigration inspectors were detailed to the individual resettlement centers in Germany, Austria, and Italy. Boards of special inquiry were organized on a roving basis and toward the end, in April 1951, an acting deputy commissioner of immigration was stationed overseas in Munich to review appeals to the Commissioner from the boards of special inquiry.

The overseas operation of immigration inspection had trying effects upon all. The human effects were particularly severe during the period before inspection decentralization when the immigrant and his family had arrived in Bremerhaven, all packed and all local relations severed, ready to embark for the United States. A finding of inadmissibility thus worked a severe hardship at this stage. Decentralization did not remedy this situation entirely because the Service still found it necessary to stop immigrants at the port of embarkation even when they had been cleared by their own inspectors in the area offices. Bearing in mind that other Government selection missions operated out of the same resettlement centers and port of embarkation, these situations did not redound to the best interests of the United States overseas. For the efficiency of the operation, for its impact on the displaced persons and German expellees, and for United States public relations in Europe generally, such incidents caused the whole humanitarian operation to lose in quality compared with the Canadian and Australian immigration operations which operated under a unitary administration.

With decentralization, it became possible for the Commission at least to mitigate the impact of the Service's policies and practices on the DPs and expellees and on United States public relations overseas. If the Service held a case, the Commission was in a better position in the areas to secure detailed information on the reasons and to supply or have supplied the necessary information for a final judgment by the Immigration Service.

The policy framework of the Immigration Service's operation seemed to be more rigid than with the other cooperating agencies, and reference back to Washington for consideration went into more

detail with consequently more delays. It was also unfortunate that the European headquarters of the Service were in Munich whereas Commission and consular headquarters were in Frankfurt. Adjustments were sought in various ways in the field as well as by policy coordination in Washington.

Honesty requires us to record a Commission belief that the overseas staff of the Immigration and Naturalization Service failed to carry out the same spirit of cooperation and the same sympathetic understanding of the basic purposes and aim of the Act as that Service exhibited in Washington. The Attorney General, Commissioners Watson B. Miller, and Argyle Mackey, and their chief aides, were always cooperative and desirous of accomplishing the stated Congressional purposes behind the Act. However, this spirit seemed to have been diluted overseas by a general lack of sympathy with the very purpose of the program. This observation, of course, cannot be applied to all the members of that Service's overseas staff; perhaps it is fair to say that like the Commission, the Service's overseas operations were complicated by personality factors.

The Commission passes no judgment upon the charges by one very reputable American voluntary agency that the overseas staff of the Immigration and Naturalization Service was discriminatory in its practices.

The High Commissioner for Germany

In the summer of 1950, responsibility for displaced person and refugee affairs was transferred from the Army to the High Commissioner for Germany, who set up a Displaced Populations Division. This transition was not complete in all respects. In some matters problems were handled between the Commission and the High Commissioner's office, although the latter might in fact be acting on behalf of the Army. The transition caused complications which it took some time to resolve.

The practical consequences for the Commission of this shift of responsibility were confused by the process of transfer of ultimate responsibility for displaced persons to the German authorities and by the need for direct negotiations with the latter on the German expellee program. With the High Commissioner's office in transition to an embassy, under impending contractual arrangements, the Displaced Populations Division of the High Commissioner's office itself was fading out of the picture.

Foreign Governments

The migration of displaced persons had the general accord not only of the cooperating United States agencies but also of foreign governmental authorities in Germany, Austria, and Italy, and of the

British and French occupation authorities in Germany, because they all had the same interest.

The attitude of foreign governments toward the orphan program was surveyed largely through correspondence by the United States embassies and legations, but visits to the government bureaus of the interested nations eventually became part of the business of the children's branch at Frankfurt headquarters.

The development of the expellee program necessitated direct Commission negotiations with the Austrian and the German Governments. The negotiations in Austria were conducted by the Commission's area office and led to the assignment of Austrian officials to assist the Commission in the various areas of Austria. In Germany, decentralized action by the Commission corresponded to the Federal character of German refugee administration. Within a general framework laid down by Frankfurt headquarters the expellee program was charted in local negotiations, first between the Munich office of the Commission and the Bavarian authorities, and then between the Commission office in the British zone and various German Laender administrations. The general framework was based on exploratory talks between Frankfurt and the German Federal Emigration Office. The interest of all parties in obtaining uniform practices and interpretations in the end led to centralization in negotiations and decisions.

In the process, the Commission discovered that the operational relationship or difficulties did not arise solely out of national, legal, or constitutional differences. One of the difficulties was the failure of the German voluntary agencies—through which their American counterparts worked in part—to adjust to the needs of the United States program. The German voluntary agencies were subsidized for program purposes by the German Federal Republic. Furthermore, the staging centers for the expellees were constructed or made available by the German authorities with an eye to their use after the termination of the DP Act program.

A basic initial factor was that the German authorities and public were at odds among themselves about the emigration program itself. A similar situation prevailed in Austria. Domestic political considerations in Germany and Austria created difficulties for the officials of those countries. In fact, a Government office might be cooperating with the Commission in all practical aspects of the operation while one of its officials was publicly advising against emigration. The limited size of the movement authorized in the Act was an important factor at this stage in the expellee program. However, emigration was becoming recognized as an indispensable factor in the solution of the growing refugee problem of Germany and Austria.

Aiding in the realization of a sympathetic reaction in Europe was the Commission's primary emphasis on the family, rather than on

labor recruitment. This emphasis on the family helped to achieve results, especially in the German expellee program, because latent opposition on the part of some Germans and Austrians was disarmed by the recognition that the program did not aim at economic exploitation of domestic labor reserves.

Emigration of displaced persons was in itself accepted as helpful even though the Austrian authorities remained disappointed at the small number, relatively speaking, which the assurance system of the United States operation made it possible to take. In Germany, the volume was much more substantial on the displaced persons side but direct contact with the authorities infrequent. In the expellee program which demanded more of the German authorities and which produced less emigration in total numbers, the give and take of cooperation in the field between United States and local German officials created the spirit of a single team, even though the policy background and policy aims of the cooperating parties might differ. The operation, however, was considered to be of such a delicate nature because of domestic political involvements that the German authorities discouraged publicity on the program.

It is a fact that there was division of feeling and views within Germany as to the wisdom and desirability of any program of emigration. Nevertheless, after very considerable delay, in the end such divided counsels did not prevent effective operational cooperation.

Italy was unique in the program until the 1950 amendments, in that it was the only sovereign foreign government with which the Commission dealt. This fact raised special problems in connection with the DP, the Venezia Giulia and the orphan programs.

Special efforts were made to obtain maximum assistance from the Italian government to supplement the Commission's security and character investigations. This involved dealings with the Questura (local offices of the Italian Ministry of Interior) throughout Italy for criminal court records and with the Italian Ministry of Interior in Rome for security information. The Commission's Italian Office also maintained close security liaison with the American Embassy in Rome.

In connection with the Venezia Giulia program, special administrative and legal problems arose. It was necessary to set up Commission sub-offices in Milan, Rome and Trieste. It was also necessary to obtain from the Italian government special certifications relating to the citizenship or noncitizenship status of applicants under the Venezia Giulia provision, because of the specific requirements of the Act in connection with the Italian peace treaty. This factor involved extensive and complex relationship with the Italian government.

The orphan program in Italy raised special problems because of the Italian government's interest in the nature of the guardianship of the children it released for adoption.

In addition, the Commission made special arrangements in connection with Trieste, owing to the sensitive international situations in that area. In all respects of the Commission's operations, the Italian government was completely and fully cooperative.

The International Refugee Organization (IRO)

The IRO had been created by the United Nations to take care of large numbers of persons displaced by World War II. One element in that care was assistance in resettlement.

Coordination of Commission activities with the services of the IRO was not based on any single specific agreement covering the whole field but developed out of a series of conferences on all levels of both organizations. This coordination was not easy to effectuate. The IRO had developed a pattern for governmental selection missions which was not suitable to the requirements of the United States Displaced Persons Act. Conversely, requirements for proof of eligibility under that act found no counterpart in IRO's previous practices in behalf of other governmental programs. The Commission's overseas administrative direction covering Germany, Austria, and Italy out of one overseas headquarters office, differed from IRO's administration through separate missions in each zone of Germany, and in Austria, and Italy, and caused many complications.

However, a common objective and good will motivated efforts to bridge these gaps and a continuous and workable arrangement was devised to get the job done. IRO had to adjust its existing operations to the Commission's needs. The Commission, in building its structure and program, was often able consistently with the law and the best interest of the United States to adjust its development to the capacities, experience, and structure of the IRO. It was a mutual and joint process of development, in which the Commission's first objective always was the fulfillment of the intent of the law and the protection of the best interests of the United States.

IRO, as well as local United States Army post commanders, pressed for the use of the resettlement centers by the Commission, a view that made obvious sense and was accepted by all concerned. This arrangement proved to be the best from every point of view including access to the displaced persons, for exchanges between Commission offices and IRO, medical services of IRO and the United States Public Health Service, consuls, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the voluntary agencies.

In order to get the United States program going IRO provided not only space in its resettlement centers, but transportation facilities of all kinds, office equipment and supplies, even interpreters, in addition to the services in processing displaced persons for resettlement which was its real task. Facilities were requested not only by the Commis-

sion teams but by the participating agencies, or for them by the Commission, such as the Consular Service, the United States Public Health Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

The question of what supporting documents were needed for preliminary documentation and what their content had to be, was a recurrent problem to the IRO. Documentation was handled differently from area to area with no uniform practice imposing itself in relation to any of the participating agencies. However, although forms, procedures, and in some instances, content differed, in all areas the basic documentary needs were demanded and obtained by the Commission's area offices before eligibility determinations were made.

Problems of staff training as well as of recruitment, equipment, and supplies arose when the IRO was asked to complete the fingerprint forms which were to serve in the investigation and final clearance of applicants. In Austria an extensive questionnaire was also made part of the investigation. This questionnaire was made part of the documentation which was channeled and directed solely by the Commission.

The documentation activity involved IRO relations with the police authorities in Austria and Italy, and camp authorities in Germany. The mechanics of providing good conduct certificates from police authorities required new negotiations again and again on all levels. The preferences and priorities of the Act called for evidence regarding certain occupational skills and qualifications of an applicant. When the 1950 amendment reduced these demands by changing the preferences and priorities, the preassurance processing program developed late in 1950, with its dependence upon occupational classifications, enlarged the initial demand on IRO in the field of occupational skills. IRO was never fully able to meet these demands and the Commission sent to Europe a substantial staff of occupational specialists and farm placement experts.

The United States Public Health Service was responsible for determining the medical qualification of applicants for immigration into the United States. IRO was, however, responsible for health services to the displaced persons and had to make certain of their physical readiness to travel, as transportation to the United States was under IRO care. At the request of the Public Health Service, the IRO rendered important professional services in connection with the necessary medical examinations.

There was much misunderstanding as to the IRO's role in the process of eligibility determination. This misunderstanding did not exist overseas where the process took place but rather in some uninformed quarters in the United States. The IRO never, at any time, made determinations of eligibility under the Displaced Persons Act. Such determinations were always and only made by duly appointed officials

of the United States Government. What the IRO did do was to certify whether prospective immigrants were or were not "displaced persons" or "refugees" within the meaning of the constitution of the IRO, and whether such persons were or were not "the concern of the IRO." This status was the sum total of any certification of the IRO, and its part in the process was specifically required by the Congress in section 2 (b) of the Act. Such certification was only one item in determinations of eligibility, and was only one factor for consideration in the definitive determinations made by officials of the Government of the United States.

Until the 1950 amendments, there was growing controversy whether such certifications by IRO were to be taken as conclusive, since they related to matters which were peculiarly and completely within the official responsibility of IRO. The 1950 amendments clarified the situation by authorizing the Commission, the consuls, and the immigrant inspectors to reach their independent judgments as to the substantive validity of these IRO certifications.

One concern about the IRO certifications was whether there was uniformity in IRO's status decisions. An IRO officer was brought into Commission headquarters for consultation on IRO status decisions. On the other hand, the Commission did not permit itself to get involved in the appeal procedure within the IRO which governed the status of displaced persons under the IRO constitution.

Relations between the Commission and the IRO were affected also by an inclination in the early days of the program on the part of some IRO officials to make at least negative decisions on the application of the DP Act in the sense that it would not document displaced persons for the United States program because an IRO official ruled that they would not be acceptable under the Displaced Persons Act. However, this inclination was quickly stopped after vigorous Commission action consistent with the established policy that all determinations of eligibility under the DP Act would be made by United States Government officials, who, in every case were citizens of the United States. Some opponents of the DP program especially in the 1950 legislative debates, either ignored or were ignorant of this basic Commission policy and procedure. In order to assure as full objectivity as possible the Commission hired no displaced persons and in connection with IRO's own operations, the Commission insisted on an agreement with IRO that displaced persons who were rejected by the Commission under sections 10 or 13 of the act would be removed from any position with IRO, if they held any position which had anything to do with the United States program.

Another IRO service to the Commission was calling the applicants forward and providing their transportation, when visaed, to the port of embarkation and to the United States. For more than a year the

problems involved were handled exclusively between Frankfurt headquarters and IRO. Until January 1950 the Commission field offices, at least in Germany, had no direct concern with applicants after they had been visaed except for the packaging and sealing of documents for delivery to the port of embarkation. After the early spring of 1950, with the decentralization to the area offices of inspection by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the departure of visaed displaced persons from their areas of residence became a matter for local handling between the Commission area office and the IRO.

The Commission never set up a general counseling service for displaced persons or for German expellee applicants. The American voluntary agencies performed this necessary service. The necessity of such service was also recognized in relation to displaced persons by the International Refugee Organization, in particular for displaced persons with individual nonagency assurances. Such counseling was most necessary and desirable. In relation to the German expellees the International Refugee Organization was asked to give advice to the extent that such applicants appeared before IRO officials.

In connection with expellees, the Commission's plan, as elsewhere noted, was for the IRO to provide the same services for expellees as for displaced persons, except that in this instance, since the German expellees as a group were outside the mandate of the IRO, the costs of IRO aid would have to be reimbursed. But this plan was abandoned and the German Federal Government took over most of IRO's operational responsibilities. Nevertheless, the IRO placed its experience at the disposal of the agencies participating in the German expellee program.

All these elements in the joint cooperation and in relations between the Commission and the IRO were directed to one end: All persons were to be given a fair opportunity to show their eligibility for resettlement in the United States. Each organization realized it was an emergency and a temporary one, and that human lives and European stability in general depended upon the effectiveness of performance.

Consultation on the operational progress became the main focus of cooperation between the Commission and the IRO. Both headquarters were in constant communication on pipeline movements, with the Commission in Washington coming in with representations to IRO, Geneva, when handicaps developed which prevented necessary action. Complaints and countercomplaints, with and without explanations, were the order of the day from the beginning to the end. In fairness, it must be noted, this was only the natural pattern among agencies equally desirous of accomplishing a common humanitarian goal.

One of the problems was the Commission's need to keep the sponsors in the United States informed of the progress of their assurances, whether or not the displaced person was eligible. In fact, it seemed almost especially true where the DP was not to go to the United States. On the other hand, the obvious impulse was to concentrate on cases which seemed likely to end in visas and departures for the United States. Both organizations also were interested in clearing their books of so-called inactive cases. But neither organization succeeded fully in resolving the operational and statistical problems of coordination on this score. There was always a substantial time lag and consequent discrepancy in the records when viewed in the light of total numbers of assurances sent out to the field.

At one time the need for specific grounds for negative replies to the sponsor led the Commission to press IRO for a declaration of reasons when IRO denied IRO status to a displaced person named on Commission assurances. IRO refused, principally because of the confidential nature of the regulations governing action by the status officers of IRO, although it made the regulations available to the Commission.

On the other hand, the Commission placed IRO at a disadvantage when it could not advise IRO of reasons for rejections because of confidential information of its own. IRO was thus hampered in processing resettlements for such persons to other countries which quite naturally wanted to know the reason for the rejection. Modifications were sought and found in the handling of investigations of applicants by and for the Commission in such a manner as to keep IRO as fully informed as possible on the status of displaced persons, consistent with the highest standards of security protection for the United States.

The Commission feels that it cannot leave this discussion of IRO without some public recognition of the outstanding job the IRO did in its four and a half years of existence. During this time it registered and assisted 1,619,008 people, of which number 1,038,750 were resettled in 48 countries and in about the same number of other areas. In addition to its magnificent and pioneering role in planned international migration and resettlement, IRO conducted widespread programs of health, care and maintenance, and of legal protection and reparations.

The United States was the largest financial contributor to the IRO, and the Displaced Persons Commission resettled more IRO displaced persons than any other individual country. These roles in the IRO story are things of which the United States can well be proud. As an international instrument, the IRO proved that international cooperation can work effectively.

The Voluntary Agencies

Perhaps the strongest pressure for action and for remedies for inaction or faulty action throughout the whole DP program came from the same source in the operation in the field as at home—from the American public which sponsored immigrants under the act either individually, through their private representatives such as the American voluntary agencies either in the United States or on the spot in Europe, and through official representatives such as the Congress or State DP commissions.

The American voluntary agencies performed a function broader than the DP program. They had started before the program came into existence, and did not necessarily plan to stop operations after the DP act terminated. Nevertheless, the scope of the DP program forced the voluntary agencies to concentrate their major efforts on the DP operation.

Since they predated the Commission, the official status of the agencies in Europe was integrated with that of the IRO as the only means of obtaining status in an occupied area or in sovereign nations.

By direction of the Commission, the overseas headquarters insisted on the establishment of direct relationships with the American voluntary agencies, without the intermediations of any other body. To further this end, the voluntary agencies in Europe established bodies of consultation among themselves so that they could deal with the Commission overseas, not only individually, but through a representative spokesman.

One of the major contributions of the voluntary agencies overseas was in the assurance area. Where an assurance by an agency was of a blanket character or covered unnamed persons, the whole pipeline awaited agency nomination of a specific person or family in order to start the processing. For most unnamed assurances, the voluntary agencies were the chosen agents of the American sponsors for the nominations of the particular displaced persons and were accordingly indispensable in making the assurances operative. The extent to which the agencies delegated this authority upon a decentralized basis to their field representatives varied. Some had authority to nominate locally; others could only nominate in consultation with their European headquarters; and still others had to secure confirmation from the United States. The various arrangements depended either upon the constituency, the operating pattern of the agency, or the specific nature of the arrangements between the agency and the sponsor. There were as many different types of arrangements as there were agencies, and in some instances, there were many different arrangements within a single agency.

The variety of such arrangements had the strength of permitting experimentation and made for sensitivity to the demands of the Amer-

ican public. However, it also caused great complications in the Commission's administrative operations. The mere fact that the voluntary agencies in the United States had submitted an assurance, and that the Washington headquarters had validated it as acceptable and sent it overseas, did not necessarily mean that it would immediately or for that matter, ever, go into the pipeline for active processing. The delays and uncertainties attendant upon all the above-indicated varieties in making such blanket or unnamed assurances operative by matching up the validated resettlement opportunity with an actual DP, remained in the program until the very end. It was never really possible for anyone to tell exactly how many of the validated assurances would show up in the pipeline. For operational purposes, and to assure that everyone and every agency was being fairly and equitably treated, the Commission from time to time made analyses of these dormant validated assurances. Frequently this resulted in affirmative action on these assurances. On at least two occasions, it resulted in the reduction of the seeming backlog through elimination and cancellation of "dead" cases.

According to their strength in the field and their needs, the voluntary agencies stationed representatives in the various Commission area offices. They were usually located in the same resettlement centers or made periodic trips to them. They kept books on the progress of their cases in the process line. They were animated by a spirit of competition, both as between representatives of the same agency and as between agencies, for they were in the field to watch out for the interest of their respective agencies and stateside sponsors.

This job would in some areas mean more actual physical work than in others. In Austria, the voluntary agencies did a large part of the actual preliminary preparation for documentation which, in Germany, the IRO was supposed to perform. If the voluntary agencies had not done this work in Austria, the start of the United States program would have been hamstrung to the point of complete inability to move because of the limited number of personnel which IRO detailed to service the United States program during the first 6 months of its existence.

In area offices and at headquarters, the voluntary agencies inquired into the progress of their cases at every point in the pipeline. In the development of many of the policies and procedures adopted by all parties in this complex program, the Commission is indebted to the voluntary agencies for constructive and helpful suggestions. They supplemented the counseling activities of IRO in a manner related directly to their interests in the applicant, to his interests, and to the DP program, in a way which could not be matched elsewhere in the operation. Their presence, aid, cooperation, and day-to-day operations were absolutely essential in the program. The sum

total of their devoted, selfless, and patriotic services to the purposes of the program and their contribution to the welfare of the United States cannot be overestimated.

Selection for resettlement in the United States—the pipeline

At an earlier point a brief outline was given of the steps from assurance to arrival at the sponsor's home, the so-called pipeline. At this point, special reference will be made to the operational aspects of this pipeline in the overseas operations.

The Assurance

Since the assurance governed the whole operation of the Commission and the number of assurances approached the one-third million mark, adequate control from a bookkeeping and operating point of view was of utmost importance.

Control as between Washington and European headquarters centered on the Washington validation number; however, one assurance might involve many families or cases. Therefore, in Europe cases in this sense were given numbers in a different and larger sequence, and the European case number, so-called, became the key to action throughout the European field. The E. C. number related to a particular person rather than to the assurance sponsorship.

Synchronization was not limited to the case number. European headquarters had to make certain that action was taken according to the sponsor's specifications. If facts in the field showed that selected persons did not match the sponsor specifications on essential points, the sponsor would have to be consulted and the books adjusted according to advice from the sponsor.

European headquarters had to record and communicate with the utmost care to field offices the name, age, family composition, and nationality as given on the assurance or certificate associated with it. The family composition had a basic legal importance as well, because it indicated the responsibility which the sponsor was prepared to assume in regard to housing, and public charge.

The wording of the Act brought the Commission up against conceptions of family composition for eligibility purposes which created serious difficulties throughout the program and in particular in relation to the farmers in whose behalf the 1948 law provided special preferences. Under the Act the members of the family derived eligibility from the principal applicant. As defined, "family" included only the spouse and minor children. Other members of the family, such as children older than 21 and grandparents or other close relatives, had to be handled independently for purposes of eligibility, and had to have independent assurances. The Commission sought to define "child" to include adopted children and stepchildren, but was unable to obtain concurrence in this view from the Department

of State or the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The 1950 amendments wrote the Commission's definition into the law.

A basic principle of the program was the maintenance of the family unit. The Commission did everything in its power to keep various members or component parts of a family together and control was exercised with a view to arranging joint travel as well. But the principle was negated, in part at least, by the discriminatory provisions and preferences in the 1948 Act, which became critical during the winter of 1949 and 1950. A member of the family in the broader and real sense might be cut off from the rest of the family by the necessary application of the agricultural preference quota. In such instances, the Commission never permitted family separation except upon the family's own insistence.

A basic Commission policy forbade acceptance and validation of assurances which required the Commission in its own direct selection of displaced persons or expellees to follow religious preference. In such cases, the prospective sponsor was provided with a list of accredited voluntary agencies through which assurances could be filed on a religious preference basis. However the discriminatory provisions of the 1948 law required the Commission to permit nationality preferences. In such instances, frequently the nationality indicated on the assurance was an unreliable means of identification because it might be wrong in itself and very often did not conform to recognized standards of nationality or of citizenship or the conception of the applicant named on the assurance. Whatever the nationality recorded in the assurance, the consular visa section applied American law to the quota designation.

As already indicated when European headquarters received assurances from Washington, it was not a complete master of their dispatch to the area offices for immediate action. Large batches of assurances, being blanket or unnamed assurances, did not carry any names and were subject to the nomination of specifications by the voluntary agencies concerned. Frankfurt therefore was not in a position to distribute these anonymous assurances to the Commission field offices without first securing the nomination of individual families to these assurances. The voluntary agencies and their representatives in Europe were responsible for these nominations. These assurances did not become effective until the voluntary agencies in question made the official nomination.

European headquarters scrutinized the assurance. Analysis was made of the job designation because it affected the status eligibility of the applicant under the preference quotas. The job designation also was important because consuls and the immigrant inspectors made a practice of matching the physical and occupational qualifications of the applicant with the job designation on the certificate in order

to assess the validity of the assurance against the applicant becoming a public charge. The job designation was of obvious importance in the search for an applicant to be named on a nonagency anonymous assurance, but in this respect the Commission was acting only on behalf of the individual sponsor.

In order for the European headquarters to perform its double job of assurance control in relation to Washington and the sponsor and in relation to the facts of each case in the field, and in order for Washington headquarters to have control of eligibility determination in connection with assurances, it was essential for the Commission to insist on Frankfurt as the only channel of communication with the United States. It had to discourage sponsors from sending copies of their assurances direct to nominees. It insisted on inquiries to the field offices going to European headquarters for reply, and refused to recognize modifications not recorded and sanctioned by the Frankfurt office.

The first indication from an area office of positive action on assurances, apart from routine acknowledgements of receipt, were in the so-called E-5 forms which were sent to Washington for security clearances by FBI and CIA, and which indicated that the applicant had been found preliminarily eligible. Frankfurt control of assurances in the field depended on this and other notifications relating to progress at all the stages in the process line up to departure.

If notified currently and accurately, Frankfurt was in a position to accomplish its function in keeping Washington and the sponsor informed for reception and general inquiry purposes. In this respect the organization of the field operation never fully corresponded to the needs of Washington and the sponsors. The basic reasons for the lag in the development of the field coordination have already been mentioned. Concentration of action, in the positive sense of eligibility decisions moving displaced persons and German expellees to the United States, took precedence over arrangements for recording and notifying Frankfurt of the fate of ineligible cases. Over-all control by European headquarters was made more difficult thereby, and in the closing stages of the program a heritage of negative cases had to be reconciled on the books at headquarters, as well as in the field, for corresponding notification stateside. The displaced person or expellee, as well as the local European representative of his sponsoring agency, were notified of the status of the case.

The voluntary agencies in particular made an effective operation of tracing individual cases through assurance control at headquarters and in the field. Their own bookkeeping on cases helped to test Commission records. In the field the relative efficiency of the two might vary. Tests showed that one or the other might be lagging. In terms of individual cases, assurance control was the means and clearing house of voluntary agency cooperation with the Commission.

Pre-Processing of Assurances

From the beginning the Commission had accepted assurances from individual citizens or industrial or agricultural sponsors according to occupational specifications but without naming an individual and without relationship to a voluntary agency. Assurance control was tied in with actual selection of persons to match these assurances. It had been a small-scale operation but it provided the basis in the winter of 1950-51 for an expanded program of direct Commission selection to match unnamed assurances in large occupational classifications, through the preassurance program. The European headquarters of the Commission had already conducted one experiment with area office selection undertaken from headquarters. It was decided to authorize area offices of the Commission to go into the field and make selections within a specified range of occupational skills and according to certain age and family specifications, before assurances were made available.

Elsewhere, general observations have been made concerning the Commission's experience in this special program (p. 191, et seq.).

Documentation

Documentation meant a number of things. The first task of the documenting agency was to locate the individual or family named on each assurance. If he was not so named there was an intermediate task of finding an individual or family that would match the specifications on the assurance. This was not an IRO responsibility. In the great preponderance of these so-called anonymous assurances an American voluntary agency would act on behalf of the sponsor in the United States by nominating to the Commission a person to meet the sponsor's specifications. In the winter of 1950-51 when the Commission itself reinstated a large-scale selection job on behalf of non-agency sponsors this operation was commenced on the understanding that the occupational classification records of the International Refugee Organization and its field units would give effective help in presenting potential applicants. This did not prove feasible, and the Commission sent overseas a large number of occupational analysts and farm placement specialists.

One of the difficulties experienced in the early days of the program grew out of the matching of persons to assurances by the voluntary agencies. Lacking staffs of trained employment specialists, their nominations against unnamed or blanket assurances could not always make the necessary occupational matchings that would have assured less resettlement difficulties after arrival in the United States. The Commission sought to meet this situation, for nonagency cases, by its specially staffed preselection unit in the early days, and by its occupational analysts and farm placement specialists under the later

preprocessing program. The voluntary agencies were able to use for their assurances some of the persons occupationally screened by the Commission.

The location of the applicant after he had been named on the certificate of assurance was a fairly simple matter in the earlier stages of the operation. An average of two-thirds or more of the displaced persons lived in camps under IRO supervision. Location of an applicant was therefore largely a paper job which could be handled with speed and reliability.

The picture changed as the Commission extended its activities beyond the United States zone of Germany. In Austria, in the French and British zones of Germany and in Italy, location was more difficult because a greater proportion of the displaced persons lived outside the IRO camps and were therefore more mobile.

As resettlement to all parts of the world became increasingly successful during the years of the operation and the total number of displaced persons diminished, an ever increasing proportion were "free living," the term used for displaced persons residing outside camps. The camp situation itself was in constant flux. Camps were closed because of the reduction in number of the displaced persons population and because some camps were required for other uses. When the IRO prepared to go out of business and the German and Austrian authorities started to assume responsibility for the displaced persons population, new camp arrangements entered into the picture and complicated still further the problem of locating a displaced person for documentation purposes.

The main objective of documentation was to identify the applicant, and to enable complete security and eligibility determination. The means of identification of displaced persons was the form used to register the applicant with IRO, either in general in the care and maintenance form (CM/1 Form), or specifically for the United States program.

If the applicant could not be found, documentation consisted of a report to that effect. This was not specific enough to meet the Commission's need for adequate information to the sponsor. If possible it was necessary to find out whether the applicant had left for the United States under another assurance, or to some other country, or had died, or simply disappeared leaving no trace.

Documentation was therefore inactive or active. The Commission required documentation agencies to give individual notification in inactive cases as well as in active cases. IRO was reluctant to add what eventually became a considerable load of paper work for its staff. In the expellee program the situation was even more difficult because important links in that documentation arrangement were unfamiliar with the treatment of nonvisaed cases and did not know how to register and report inactive cases.

The documentation agencies did not assume responsibility for the content of active documentations. The forms which they submitted were signed by the applicant himself or were based upon documents signed by him. The IRO did however have an independent obligation to certify whether the applicant was within the mandate of the organization and whether he was the concern of the IRO. While individuals or agencies affected might appeal from IRO determination of IRO status, a negative IRO certification was accepted by the Commission as conclusive on that point.

Identification, and in the case of displaced persons, certification of IRO status, did not exhaust the needs for documentation at the opening stage of the process. For the sake of economy and efficiency, this was the time to collect details in information as well as supporting documents to meet processing demands at every stage of the entire pipeline. This documentation must make it possible readily to decide whether an applicant was preliminarily eligible under the Act from the point of view of the time of his entry into specified areas and of his residence in certain areas. The requirement for IRO status was replaced in the expellee program by a requirement regarding the individual's birthplace. In IRO documentation the CM/1 Form was reasonably presumed to give reliable information on dates of entry because it had not been prepared exclusively or especially for the United States program and in most cases had been prepared long before the DP Act was passed.

Documentation represented the first attempt of the Commission field operation to establish at least indirect contact with the applicant and his family in person.

The need to secure the personal appearance of an applicant on all the occasions which the process required was one of the most harassing problems of the program throughout its existence. Repeated nonappearance of an applicant when called for documentation did not close the case, because he would appear later with a valid excuse, or be presented again on a reactivated or new assurance.

Personal appearance before IRO at the documentation stage carried one other consequence. The IRO would take this opportunity to conduct a special medical examination. The question was raised as late as the fall of 1950 whether the examination of the Public Health Service could not be tied in with the original medical examination performed by IRO when documenting cases, and thus screen out those cases which would obviously not secure visas. The matter was dropped when an examination of statistical records at Commission headquarters showed that the advantages were outweighed by the inevitable complications.

Personal appearance before the documenting agency presented a further advantage in view of the Commission's concern to protect

family unity. It was the first and also the best opportunity to find out family relationships. The IRO made a practice of noting family links between a case in the process of documentation and other cases in the pipeline, and so prepared the ground for practical consideration of these links throughout the operations. In the expellee program cooperation between the voluntary agencies and the Commission's selection teams brought to light the serious impact of this problem on the successful selection of farmers. As a result, a project was developed to secure supplementary assurances for other family members in order to allow families as a whole to move forward under the program.

Documentation in Expellee Program

Documentation for the German expellee program followed a different pattern from that in the DP program. As indicated earlier, at the request of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, in the fall of 1950, the practical responsibility for initiating the documentation of German expellees was transferred from the International Refugee Organization to German governmental authorities.

The aim of the High Commissioner's office coincided with the desire of the German governmental authorities. Both wanted to use the occasion to establish more or less permanent arrangements for handling emigrants. The High Commissioner's office wanted to make emigration one of the fields where German sovereignty could begin to assert itself. However, for Commission efficiency, this new arrangement almost proved disastrous. When entrusted with the expellee operation by the amended act in June 1950, the Commission had nearly 2 years of practical experience behind it, and an operating pattern which would pick up the new program and produce results quickly. The new approach and the extensive negotiations forced upon it by high policy retarded the effective development of the expellee program for nearly a year.

The Commission faced great difficulties in working out the necessary procedures with the German authorities. There were two stages of activity before the Commission was able to assure an effective documentation program. The original arrangements with the Bonn government called for the documentation for German expellee cases to be performed by the German Beratungsstellen, or advisory centers. These included the St. Raphaels-Verein (the German counterpart of the American Catholic agency), the Evangelisches Hilfswerk (the German counterpart of the American Protestant voluntary agencies), and the Bundesstelle fuer das Auswanderungswesen (the German governmental emigration bureau).

For years these private German agencies had looked after the welfare of their correlative, and after World War II they had regis-

tered German expellees. Their scope of activity, however, was not directly concerned with the problems of emigration. Consequently it was necessary for them to increase their existing staffs in the forty odd offices in Germany, to train such staff, and to obtain from the German Federal Government the funds necessary to carry on the program.

The combination of these factors proved more time-consuming than they had originally planned, with the result that the documentation of expellee cases in Germany fell far behind and suffered from undue and serious delays which threatened to bog down the whole program.

The Commission was much concerned with this situation. The Chairman went to Europe to set up an operative and effective documentation system. On July 28, 1951, he met with the German and American voluntary agencies and the Bonn government. Out of this meeting came the plan for Commission documentation teams, the device which broke the backlog of the undocumented cases and enabled the Commission to get the German expellee program going in full operation.

This documentation team approach was built upon the Commission's experience in connection with preassurance documentation. In that project, the area offices in the United States and British zones of Germany had made arrangements with the respective German Laender governments to assist the Commission. This assistance consisted of:

- (1) A sufficient clerical staff to fill out the expellees questionnaires.
- (2) A representative of the Laender Ministry of Interior to coordinate the work of the clerical staff.
- (3) Clerical staff to type and mail invitations to the applicants to report for documentation.
- (4) Free transportation for applicants and their dependents to and from the place where the documentation was located.
- (5) Office space and logistic support.
- (6) Representatives of the German police to fingerprint applicants.
- (7) Photographers to make passport pictures.
- (8) Official German Government representatives to take statements in lieu of oath in cases where applicant was unable to procure necessary birth, marriage, divorce or death certificates, or to certify to translations or true copies of such existing documents.

These teams were organized without cost to the Commission. They were augmented by:

- (9) Representatives of the Commission, in most cases occupational analysts and farm specialists.

This was the previous pattern. Since these documentation teams had operated efficiently and well under the preassurance program, it

was agreed at the July 28 meeting that they would be recreated to assist the Beratungsstellen with the documentation of cases still in their possession where documentation had not been completed, and to cover all future documentation. In addition, it was decided to add to the documentation teams:

- (10) Commission security investigators and CIC agents, and a Commission analyst.

At this documentation stage, the security investigators and CIC agents could immediately interview the applicant and his family, and thus reduce by several weeks the time usually required for investigative purposes. The case analysts could right then and there decide whether a case should be passed on to the investigative units; or could reject the case at this point because of obvious security reasons indicated in the questionnaire.

Another meeting followed on July 30 to work out operational procedures. At this meeting, the following additional unit was added to the documentation team:

- (11) A representative of the American voluntary agencies, to advise and counsel the applicants.

The plan was immediately put into effect. Under this arrangement, all assurances were distributed to the Beratungsstellen, which sent the first notification letter to the applicants to inform them of the documentation requirements, and requesting the applicants to reply when they had the necessary documents ready. On the basis of weekly progress reports from the Beratungsstellen the Commission's area office drafted advance schedules of documentation team visits. The Beratungsstellen then prepared lists of their cases, which were made available by the Commission to all agencies concerned.

The Laender Ministry of Interior, in close cooperation with the Commission, then was responsible for arranging to call the applicants, assure their transportation, and provide the facilities above indicated for the team operation.

To enable all of these various cooperating units to work effectively took close liaison between the Commission's area office, the Laender Ministry of Interior, the CIC and the voluntary agencies. The team leader of each documentation team was a German government official, designated by the Laender Ministry of Interior. However, the whole operation was under the direction and supervision of the Commission's area offices.

This was the pattern in the United States and French zones of Germany. In the British zone of Germany there were some variations from this basic pattern, in order to fit the situation prevailing there.

It is clear to the Commission that without some such coordinated documentation team, the German expellee program never could have

been completed within the statutory period. Once it began to operate, it was able to move rapidly and to document large numbers of people satisfactorily and effectively.

The documentation difficulties which prevailed in Germany were absent in Austria. There the Austrian government made facilities available quickly and the program progressed rapidly.

Security Investigation

Under the law and the President's Executive Order 10003, no person could be considered for a visa unless the Commission had conducted an investigation and prepared a written report on the applicant's personal history, character, and eligibility.

In connection with the investigation, in the United States zone of Germany and in Austria the Commission had the experienced help of the CIC as an investigation agency. The Counter Intelligence Corps was usually the first American agency that interviewed every applicant with which it was concerned. In some cases, Commission personnel might already have interviewed the prospective immigrant. The range of documentary checks and personal interrogation which the CIC developed to meet the needs of the Commission report on each case tended to cover all the points which the DP Act and the immigration laws of the United States might raise.

The CIC's function was never limited simply to a factual report on the applicant and his family. It included findings and an opinion on whether he was a security risk. CIC's investigation also ranged across all aspects of eligibility.

Identification of an applicant for investigation purposes naturally involved his residence, since the CIC personally investigated every applicant it reported on. Residence was important in the program not only because the applicant had to be found but because the residential history of an applicant afforded important clues to his security standing and because certain residence facts were an eligibility requirement. Accordingly, the CIC not only had to find the applicant, it also had to check on his past record of residence.

The registration form which the IRO developed for the United States program in the United States zone of Germany did not give the residential history of the applicant because it listed his places of work rather than of residence. Of course, this additional information was valuable for security and character investigative purposes. In most cases this was satisfactory for the investigation but on occasion created problems in relation to the residential requirements of the Act since the dates of residence in areas specified in the Act did not necessarily coincide with the dates of work locations on the registration form. The matter was resolved by reference to the CM/1 Form.

Despite its thoroughgoing investigations, the CIC never assumed

judgmental responsibility for the character qualifications of applicants under the Act and considered its investigation of, and report on, the residence history of the applicant and his truthfulness in that regard as an incidental service to the program. However, the Commission had such investigations continuously available. These investigations had the effect of limiting the range of possible fraud by pin-pointing a number of localities where residence records were proved to be generally unreliable. On this score, a considerable difference of opinion arose between the Commission on the one hand and the consuls and immigration service on the other. It was the Commission's view that each case had to be decided upon its own merits, and that merely because a particular individual claimed residence in an area in which there had been a pattern of unreliable evidence of residence did not mean that any particular individual was to be guilty of fraud, presumably on the theory of "guilt by association." The other Government agencies were more prone, however, to rule a person out merely because of this association, without any reference to the facts of the specific case. The facts bore out the Commission's view, because in many cases there was reliable proof of actual residence even in such areas. And the law bore out the Commission also, in several opinions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, approved by the Attorney General of the United States. The Zyngel case, A-8015559, November 2, 1951, is particularly in point.

Obviously the CIC could not report everything about an applicant and his family and had to find and report only the facts of relevance to the application of the law and the regulations. As these changed throughout the history of the operation and interpretations changed, the CIC adjusted the range and the elements of its investigation and reporting functions. The operational effects of this interdependence between investigation and application of the law was an added burden on CIC when current work had to be rearranged or cases had to be returned for new investigations in the light of such changes. The greatest impact of this kind came with the 1950 amendments, and the requirement upon the CIC for renewed interrogation, renewed checks, and the completion of new reports in the light of the amended security provisions of section 13. Since there was a time limit on the validity of a number of specific inquiries which were part of the whole report of the CIC, the delaying impact of changes, and in particular of the 1950 amendment, went far beyond the direct impact of the changes themselves.

The simple relationship between the Commission and the CIC as principal and agent, in a fact-finding and opinion rendering assignment, developed into a close and continuous cooperative relationship. In the British and French zones of Germany and in Italy where the Commission did not have the CIC as an independent fact-finding

and opinion rendering agency, the Commission itself was both the fact-finding agency and the agency making decisions on the facts under the law. In these areas, the Commission's own staff of trained and experienced investigators conducted the investigations and made the necessary personal interviews and ground checks. In the conduct of these investigations, the Commission had the support and aid of the national intelligence services of the British, French, and Italian Governments. Other operational problems arose in these areas out of the practical necessity for the Commission to use these British and French intelligence services in Western Germany and the American Embassy and Italian police records in Italy. The operation in these areas in consequence resembled more closely that of the Canadian and Australian immigration missions with their streamlined control and direction.

Commission Report on Personal History, Character and Eligibility

Before cases were sent to investigation, the Commission selectors examined the documentation and made preliminary determination of eligibility, in the sense that applicants who were obviously ineligible because of dateline or other requirements of the Act were rejected. No extensive study was involved in Commission selection at this stage. Because of the different circumstances in connection with documentation, selection by the Commission proved necessary throughout the operation of the expellee program. It became more inclusive and streamlined in the United States zone of Germany when, on the model of practices in the British and French zones, documentation teams included CIC agents. Under this scheme it proved possible to eliminate applicants at the documentation point not only for dateline reasons but for security reasons which emerged clearly from replies to the questionnaires and interrogation, such as membership in organizations proscribed by security requirements.

The essential operating function of the Commission overseas under the act was concentrated at a later point in the pipeline, in the Commission report which was prepared by case analysts. This report embodied the determination of the Commission that applicant and family were eligible under the Act, apart from the requirements of the general immigration laws as to which the Commission never passed judgment. The determination was expressed in a report submitted to the Consular Service in connection with visa consideration. This report had conclusive effect so far as the terms of the Displaced Persons Act itself were concerned, apart from the regular immigration law. The 1950 amendments gave concurrent authority in this regard to the consuls and the inspectors of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The report was in particular calculated to demonstrate the completion of both documentation and investiga-

tion and to establish a conclusion as to eligibility. In experience, this conclusion was accepted in the vast preponderance of cases.

The preparation of the report was the capstone of efforts of the Commission's area offices. It required them to focus attention and action on basic eligibility elements of the case, such as exact identification of the assurance with Washington validation and European case numbers, the name or names of applicant and family, family relationships, age or ages, the name of sponsor and his address, and, under the 1950 amendment, the accomplishment of the good faith affidavit which became an exclusive Commission function and responsibility. Other elements in the Commission report were the background history of applicant and his family as required by the act and the regulations.

The applicant's destination was also included in the report, on the basis of the certificate of assurance. In most agency blanket assurance cases, destination frequently was only a forwarding center, and the real and ultimate destination appeared in reports to the Washington headquarters.

The report also included a finding on the applicant's character. A difference in concept and language between the Displaced Persons Act and the normal immigration law, on the subject of the applicant's character, caused considerable misunderstanding on this score. Under the normal immigration law the commission or admission of a crime involving moral turpitude was a bar to admission. However, under the Displaced Persons Act, the test was "character," and not a crime involving moral turpitude, and the Commission by basic policy refrained consistently from attempting to interpret or apply the normal immigration law. This meant, therefore, that a person might technically be guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude under the normal immigration law and yet, under the specific provisions of the DP Act, have a good character. An actual case in point will illustrate the difference. An applicant for admission to the United States had stolen a loaf of bread to feed his hungry family, during the very difficult and trying circumstances of the immediate postwar period. For this he had been tried and convicted. The Commission found such a person, under those circumstances and in the light of his conduct subsequent to that incident, to be of good "character" and passed the case on to the consuls. This it did because, on principle, it could administer only the Displaced Persons Act and not the immigration law, which was for the consuls and the immigrant inspectors to interpret and administer. In this case, the applicant had to be denied a visa by the consul because of a crime involving moral turpitude.

This clear division of responsibility between the Commission on the one hand, and the consuls and immigrant inspectors on the other, obviously meant that the Commission would be passing to the con-

suls, cases which would not be admissible under the normal immigration laws. But during the legislative hearings in 1950, this fact was distorted out of all significance and made to appear as if the Commission were deliberately trying "to slip" bad cases through. Nothing was further from the truth. Instead, the Commission was simply carrying out the law as enacted by the Congress.

A Commission report unfavorable to the applicant on grounds of character would be a rejection under section 10 of the Act. By and large the negative determination was a matter which in practice was based on individual decisions in each case. There were no legal precedents in this field, as there were as to "moral turpitude," and much depended upon full understanding of the facts surrounding the particular circumstance in question. Naturally this was a developmental factor and as time passed the judgments began to fall into some form of precedent pattern. Review within the Commission was for a long time a means of general training and instruction rather than a case review, in the literal sense, which came with the overseas assignment of a member of the Legal Division.

The report also included a judgment on security considerations. The broad terms of the ban on totalitarian organizations in the original section 13 created new human problems. On the one hand, there were people who were hardened members of Communist, Nazi, Fascist and other totalitarian and un- and anti-American organizations and who clearly would be a threat to American security. On the other hand, totalitarian developments in Europe had brought the range of totalitarian organizations to such a flowering that children and political innocents were forced into organizations which they now learned were proscribed under section 13 both of the 1948 Act and even more so of the amended 1950 Act. The situation was even further complicated by the Internal Security Act of September 1950, which, while not a part of the Displaced Persons Act, still was part of the body of immigration laws to be applied by the consuls and the Immigration and Naturalization Service inspectors, and actually threatened an almost complete close-down of the displaced persons program, if the Commission, in its coordinating rather than directly operating function, had not taken into account possible stoppage under the Internal Security Act. In March 1951, Public Law 14, dealt with the prospective immigrants who would otherwise be piling up by the thousands in already overcrowded resettlement centers, but did not help matters immediately.

These extraordinary problems were not new. The independent authority and differing practices of the Consular Service and Immigration and Naturalization Service had already required measures for the special care of a proportion of the prospective immigrants whom the Commission had called forward into the resettlement centers

for consular action. But the Internal Security Act increased the size of the problem beyond anything experienced before. There were times during the ensuing year when complete stoppage of the program as a whole did not seem far off.

Prior to the enactment of Public Law 14 to alleviate this situation, the difference in the operational interpretation of section 13 (of the Displaced Persons Act) and section 22 (of the Internal Security Act) respectively arose almost wholly out of varying policy determinations in Washington.

In the spirit of team work, the Commission invited joint consultations with the Visa Division and the Immigration Service on these matters, to the end of resolving all possible differences of opinion and interpretation. Although each agency reserved the right of its final decision, these consultations resulted in complete agreement among the three headquarters offices. These agreements were formalized in joint instructions issued in April 1951, to the respective overseas staffs of the Commission, the consuls and the Immigration Service. The instructions created a new function for the Commission, in connection with the report, because relief from the ban in section 13 could be obtained in the light of the joint instructions through affidavits and supporting documents which were to be provided to the Commission. All three agencies expected that these joint instructions would now release the blocks to processing cases. But, apparently the overseas staffs of some of the agencies that issued the joint instructions found it impossible or were unwilling to carry out these instructions. As a result, the joint instructions were not being enforced overseas. Further joint conferences were held to achieve a new reconciliation on procedure by the three agencies; this was not actually completed until representatives of all three government agencies met in Europe in November 1951, to reconcile their differences in the light of practices in the field.

Where the documentation and the investigation led to the determination of a security rejection by reasons of section 13, the classified material caused administrative problems. The very natural desire of the applicant and the representatives of the voluntary agencies concerned in such cases to discover the reasons led to a profound change in Commission arrangements. Interviews became the order of the day. Voluntary agencies of recognized standing intervened in the actual current handling of cases and soon lawyers appeared on the scene.

The problem was inability to disclose classified information. The Counter Intelligence Corps instructed its local officers to beware of too high classifications and to consider Commission representations in that respect with sympathy. The Counter Intelligence Corps also agreed to the principle that Commission officers should feel entitled to

analyze classified information in a file with a view to reasonably informed discussion with representatives in good standing of recognized voluntary agencies.

This situation was in large measure alleviated through the Commission's release of the names of organizations removed from the list of inimical organizations as the result of joint reconsiderations leading to revision of the original list.

The Commission report under section 10, was, in a very real sense, a new and extremely important development in American immigration law. Even when parts of it could not be publicly discussed because of security restrictions, it became a guaranty to the alien, to the American voluntary agencies, and to the American sponsor, that consideration of the applicant's case would be on an objective, non-discriminatory, and strictly legal basis, since once a matter of record it would be subject to the review of other Government agencies. In this regard, therefore, coupled with the requirement in the Commission's regulations for a report of the reasons for rejections by consuls and immigrant inspectors, the report was a basic development along the lines of fair play and juridical decisions required by the basic principles of Anglo-Saxon law and tradition.

Review

The Displaced Persons Act did not create a right to immigrate, not even indirectly for the sponsor whose assurance under the law made the immigration possible. Rejection, however, had a dreadful finality about it, all the more because rejections under section 10 of the act for wilful misrepresentation under certain circumstances barred immigration to the United States forever. Applicants and the sponsoring agencies had an additional concern in case a rejection had its basis in section 10 or section 13 because it was widely believed that other Government selection or resettlement missions would refuse an applicant who had been rejected under these sections of the Act. In fact, there were occasional consultations between resettlement missions, in particular between the Commission and the Canadian and Australian Immigration Missions, and rejections by one would lead to careful scrutiny by the other, although the rejection of one would not necessarily be duplicated by the other.

IRO's denial of IRO status, which thereby barred the applicant from appearance before the Commission, might be reversed on appeal to IRO Geneva. If the applicant secured a new assurance he might appear again without prejudice before the Commission. But the rejections made by two of the United States Government agencies under the Act were in a formal sense final and there was no formal appeal. This was equally true of rejections by the Commission and by the Consular Service, whether on medical or on other grounds,

whereas rejections by the Immigration and Naturalization Service were in a separate category. They were not just straightforward rejections but in effect reversed a consular decision to issue a visa. A system of careful review and appeal was available in connection with the Immigration and Naturalization Service rejection.

Rejection by the Commission prevented consular consideration of the case. The Commission recognized from the start that in a new law, without precedents, with a new staff and in far-flung area offices, there were possibilities for error in interpreting the law, in understanding evidence under the law, in relating the evidence to the law and in applying the law. Therefore, the Commission set up a review operation within the Commission itself. In point of historical development, the overseas operation first had a legal adviser, then a legal division, and then a review panel. This development has been described more fully elsewhere. (See p. 104.) The review panel was not a matter of statutory right, but it was part of the pattern sought to be established by the Commission to give everyone, even people not in the United States, a sense of American justice, a feeling that the right thing had been done—even if they were rejected—and the assurance to itself that justice had been done, that the statutory requirement for nondiscrimination and an equal right to all was effectuated. Among other purposes served by the review process, it afforded an opportunity to bring into the pipeline the specialized knowledges, skills, and intelligence of many people in connection with the current and past European scene, in terms of which the eligibility determinations had to be made. It was, among other things, a two-way educational process for all governmental agencies on the one side and for appellants and their representatives on the other. In addition to all else, it served an important function in giving to Europeans a demonstration of American justice and fair play at work.

Medical Examination

The Public Health Service inspection was as decisive as any other stage, since whatever else may have been the applicant's eligibility, his health might bar him from a visa.

The examination was called for when the Commission passed along an applicant for visa consideration. Arrangements were usually made for the examination to cover everybody included in the family so that confusion in the process line would not be caused by medical reports on the various individuals in one case going forward at different times. When the medical reports on one case were assembled in a visa section of the Consular Service, together with the Commission report and case file, this step in the process line was completed.

In practice the medical examination was involved with preceding and later stages in the pipeline. After the 1950 amendments appli-

cants were called for medical examination when the Commission asked for their appearance for the good faith affidavit, even before the Commission report was submitted to the consul.

Medical reports causing denial of visas affected other members of the family who were visaed. As a rule the family elected to stay with the rejected persons but there were cases in which arrangements could be made at the family's request so that the fate of all members of a family was not decided negatively.

In some cases there was no rejection but a medical deferral. If necessary, treatments were then arranged by the IRO, by the voluntary agencies and in the expellee program, according to laws and regulations on social welfare, by the German Public Health Services.

These deferrals created administrative problems. One such item was actual physical control of the case file, to assure prompt reconsideration when the period of deferral had expired. The lack of Commission control of the file was most pronounced in areas where the local consular office insisted on an exclusive relationship between the Public Health Service and itself. This was serious in its effects on progress in the program, in the first place because there was no way to reactivate the case since the Public Health Service did not as a rule give official advice on such deferrals. In the second place the effect was serious whenever changes in the law and the regulations or new interpretations made it necessary to study case files in their entirety, and to amend or to supplement them. In most area offices it was possible to secure current and fairly adequate information on these twilight cases so that the Commission was able to keep track of them.

On several occasions, the voluntary agencies jointly requested reconsideration of blocks of cases which had been medically rejected for tuberculosis. The Public Health Service was uniformly cooperative in this respect. On one occasion, it dispatched to Europe a special review board of three medical specialists, who made a review of all the cases. On another occasion, a group of some 400 disputed cases were resubmitted to another review panel in the United States, and some cases were determined to be acceptable although previously rejected.

The Consul

The displaced person, the German expellee, the Italian refugee, and others who were being considered for immigration under the Displaced Persons Act ran the gantlet of a large number of American officials. That all-important piece of paper, the visa, however, was within the sole jurisdiction of the United States consul who would examine his case, interview him, and finally administer the oath to him.

The appearance of an applicant before the consul did not in itself mean that Commission responsibility was over. It was consular prac-

tice on a wide scale at the outset to handle cases under the Act in much the same manner as the consuls were accustomed to handle ordinary visa cases. They asked the applicant himself to furnish additional evidence or better documentation if they considered it to be required. The practical operational difficulties of such requests in a mass resettlement program required a more coordinated way of handling such matters. As a result, the consuls turned to the Commission in such instances even though the case had already been officially submitted by the Commission.

For a time it was a delicate matter which agency would decide whether applicants met the preference requirements in the Displaced Persons Act. In principle the Commission was left to make this decision, as on other eligibility qualifications falling under the Act exclusively, and the consuls called it to the Commission's attention if they thought the Commission officer handling a case had been mistaken or if they gained contrary information in their own dealings with the case. The concurrent power over eligibility determinations given to the consuls in the 1950 amended Act in practice did not change the cooperative relationships in this area.

A consular decision granting or denying a visa was an independent decision over which the Commission had no control and did not try to exercise control. The regulations required a report on the reasons for rejections. The report proved easier to obtain than sufficient details. The requirement of such reports was in conformity with the Commission policy that determinations should be made on an objective and legal basis, and not for irrelevant, strictly personal or discriminatory reasons. A justification for the refusal had to be made to the sponsor in the United States, and to members of Congress who inquired in large numbers of cases as to specific reasons concerning the cases.

The Immigrant Inspection

The regular immigration law required the immigration inspector to interpret the very same law as had guided the consul in issuing the visa. A visa, therefore, was not a guarantee of, but merely a reviewable opportunity to seek admission into the United States.

On the basis of its 4 years of experience the Commission does not believe that there is any necessity for stationing the immigrant inspector in Europe, contrary to the normal practice in immigration.

Orientation

Orientation of the prospective immigrant was first concentrated in the port of embarkation, with most of it undertaken in Camp Grohn. When the Commission established orientation as a regular part of its program, the task was decentralized and participation by the immigrant was promoted by all means available including arrangements

to demand proof from him that he had attended courses in English and in conditions in the United States. The period during which the function could be performed with energy was determined by the short-term character of the program and particularly after June 1951 by the limited funds.

One of the handicaps to an effective orientation program was the fact that it was never given independent full status in the pipeline. Rather, it was to be available in the interim between and during other pipeline processes, but never was to be permitted to hold or delay a person merely for purposes of orientation. This was not an accident, but by direct Commission decision. Perhaps some way should have been found to do both orientation and the other pipeline steps without mutual interference.

As the final stage in the process line orientation did, at any rate, mark the transition of the immigrant from a background of despair to hopes of a new life.

Departure

Transportation for displaced persons to the United States under the Act was paid for by the IRO. If the DP's paid their own way, they were still subject to control measures under the Act and the regulations, especially the preexamination by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. In the first year and a half of the operation this meant travel to Bremerhaven, the service's then sole office, except when in some compassionate cases Immigration and Naturalization Service inspectors come to the departure point for an airflight or when they came to Italy for special inspections.

Transportation to the port of embarkation was provided by the IRO in agreement with the Army wherever Army railroad facilities were available. Later the Austrian and German authorities provided such service. After February 1952, PICMME undertook this service, with the Commission coordinating arrangements in general.

The Commission's role in transportation was looked upon as a relatively simple thing in the beginning. There would only be a Commission liaison officer at the port. Eventually the departure point turned out to embody all the complexities of the pipeline. Advance planning never fully succeeded in avoiding some "hold" at the port. The fate of the traveler depended on too many participating agencies with responsibilities in too many quarters to make for a clear run after the regular points of inspection had been passed. Consequently, the Commission had to set up an office at Bremerhaven which channeled the bulk of the departures and after December 1949, all departures by ship.

The complexities of departure requirements affected the area offices of the Commission from the start. Transportation from the areas was the business of IRO and so was the readiness of the travelers

and their luggage. Later on the Commission area offices found themselves concerned on this score as well, both in relation to airflights and in relation to the expellee program, but they never had direct responsibility. They were, however, always and primarily involved in the evidence that the travelers were properly cleared under the Act.

For a long time the extent of the evidence needed was a problem between the Commission area offices and the various public and private agency offices at the port of embarkation—medical documentation to clear the traveler and to guarantee his identity; the visa file as prepared by consul; and, finally, the so-called related file containing the information necessary for last-minute clearance under the Act and the immigration laws or for last-minute review in the light of changing policies and policy interpretations. The medical documentation never became complete because the United States Public Health Service had conflicting instructions and in some areas insisted on keeping part of the documentation for reference. The visa file was variously compiled in different offices throughout the history of the program, and routine clearance and correction by the Bremen consul was never obtained.

Embarkation and departure affected several agencies and called into action the Commission's coordinating role. The Commission carried direct responsibility in providing adequate documentation on the departure eligibility of the applicants. Examples will show some of the problems: The Commission might discover, for instance, that one area office was not making sure of the presence of Berlin Document Center checks in case files until the visaed applicant was about to leave and would accordingly at this last moment have him taken off the nominal roll for departure to port, as well as bodily off the train to await a Berlin Document Center check which was discovered to be missing. In 1951 an alert from the Washington Commission headquarters that failure to include all medical records, even though approved overseas, was causing serious consequences, led to similar results.

Apart from the normal problems of an embarkation station the port office served a special function in connection with the Commission and resettlement agencies stateside. They needed accurate advice about the identity and number of the immigrants to be expected on each ship or airplane. The sponsors needed advance alerts in order to face their responsibility for reception and inland transportation and the Commission had to be especially forewarned on nonagency cases.

Commission headquarters had to reconcile all the conflicting elements in the departure operation in its coordination with the IRO or PICMME. It therefore had to follow up problems in the departure operation which affected the flow of business, in particular "hold cases" which prevented departures either from the areas or from the

embarkation point. They were pressing enough for the Commission from a straight administrative point of view, but their human aspects were not negligible and were stressed by the sponsoring agencies as well as by the people waiting to leave.

If, in spite of all the involutions of these operations, hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children were brought to the United States in one consecutive movement between 1948 and 1952, the result is a monument to American public and private enterprise and to international cooperation, and a triumphant demonstration to the peoples of the world of United States foreign policy and of a democracy in action.

Resettlement

The Resettlement Division was established in August 1949. Until that time the functions concerned with resettlement work were carried out by Commissioner O'Connor.

Although one of the Commission's two major operational areas, the resettlement operation did not have the clarity of legislative sanctions, the support of administrative appropriations, or the scope of staff made available to the oversea operation. For the most part, the Resettlement Division served as a liaison instrumentality. It supervised port reception, coordinated operations with voluntary agencies and State committees, directed national and regional resettlement conferences, and maintained close ties with the overseas operation through its work on Commission or nonagency cases and its relations with sponsors.

The lack of an early, expressed, legislative recognition for the resettlement functions was later remedied by clearly expressed Congressional mandates, which indicated that Congress had always contemplated such Commission function. The uncertainty arose, in part, out of the fact that during the legislative hearings and discussions prior to the enactment of the 1948 Act the voluntary agencies stated that they were sufficiently organized to provide all essential reception and resettlement services to displaced persons arriving in this country. On the strength of this, little or no consideration was given to the necessity for funds and personnel for the Commission to take care of cases which the voluntary agencies were not able to sponsor for one cause or another.

One of the early difficulties was a difference of opinion within the Commission as to the propriety and desirability of an active Commission resettlement program. Finally, after some delay, one was set up, but the delay itself had prejudiced its success by establishing an inadequate program and financing pattern. The House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, at one time, expressed dissatisfaction at the delayed institution of this resettlement program.

The lack of financial support for this activity did not constitute a serious problem during the first months of the Commission's operation. The number of arrivals was relatively small and the voluntary agencies, in accordance with the religious affiliation of the applicant, were willing to absorb the cost incurred on the few cases which needed help in resettlement. By the summer of 1949, however, the cooperative arrangement between voluntary agencies and the Commission had to be adjusted to some degree because the number of cases outside the agencies' interest had greatly increased. At the same time the growing case load of the voluntary agencies for their own cases had reached such a peak that the agencies could not afford to give any time to these other cases. It became necessary for the Commission to provide all basic services to cases not directly sponsored by the agencies.

In August 1949, the Commission appointed a director of resettlement. The Resettlement Division brought together several operating activities in the resettlement field which had been operating as individual units reporting directly to the Commissioner. These functions included the debarkation port activities in New York, Boston, and New Orleans, personnel on detail, the handling of nominal rolls from Europe, the follow-up on resettlement, and the correspondence work on these matters. The orientation function was later assigned to the division for a period. Following the passage of amended legislation in 1950, the orphan section was added to the division.

In funds and personnel the operation was limited. At its operating peak, the port reception activity covering two ports full time and one port part time had only two full-time port officers and one clerk assigned to it. The nominal roll function never had more than two junior officers and two clerks assigned to it, while the resettlement field service covering all of the United States and its Territories was manned by three field men at peak.

Because of the paucity of the resources available, these efforts at resettlement operations, and especially those directed at post-resettlement surveillance and assistance, were completely inadequate for the task at hand. The small staff assigned to the resettlement field service could not possibly maintain adequate liaison with State bodies, and obviously could never hope to survey the resettlement of displaced persons and German expellees located in every State and in the Territories of the United States.

Port Service

The port services in operation in the United States were directed by Commission port officers permanently stationed in New York and Boston to coordinate the port activities of voluntary and cooperating agencies.

A nominal roll unit already in existence was incorporated into the Resettlement Division and was charged with responsibility for duplicating nominal rolls, distributing them to voluntary agencies, State committees, and individuals concerned with meeting the ships and completing reception and inland transportation arrangements. Distribution was made from Washington to the port agencies at least 5 days prior to ship arrival to give time for all necessary preparations. Information on air flights was usually directed to the Commission at the port rather than to Washington because transoceanic cable service was more rapid by this channel. The port officers had direct responsibility for the dissemination of passenger lists pertaining to all flights. Whether in connection with flights or ships, when problems arose with respect to rules and policies, it was the responsibility of the Commission port officers to assist the voluntary agencies with respect to complaints or recommendations to Federal departments at work at the port, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Customs Office, and the Public Health Service.

Although numerous cities of the United States requested to be designated as ports of reception, only three ports were selected: New York, Boston, and New Orleans. These ports provided an adequate accommodation of facilities and fitted best into the most economic ship turn-around schedule. A schedule was developed that assured the embarkation of passengers on the right boat for the right port. For example, passengers destined for Southern States or for some Western States were approved for New Orleans, while those destined for the eastern seaboard and for the central part of the United States came to either New York or Boston. This selection of States was made on the basis of the most economical inland transportation charge.

In addition to the specific port operations noted above, the Commission was represented on the voluntary agency pier committees. The American Red Cross also was active in the port program and provided first aid service, care of children, and canteen service. In July 1951, the New York Red Cross discontinued this service after which it was operated by the Salvation Army at the New York Port.

After the fall of 1949, several new activities were added to the port program. The first concerned reporting services in connection with cases detained at Ellis Island for special reasons. The names of such persons and the causes for detention were forwarded to Washington and to the voluntary agencies for follow-up action and assistance in expediting the clearance of unaccompanied and unclaimed baggage.

Nonagency Cases

The second new port function developed when the voluntary agencies found it impossible to continue to provide services for nonagency assurances filed direct with the Commission. The inability of the voluntary agencies to continue this function led to an agreement between the Commission and the Travelers Aid Society to perform the services necessary for so-called nonagency Commission cases. Different arrangements prevailed according to whether the sponsorship of an arriving immigrant remained stable or whether the sponsor changed his mind at the last minute and refused to accept the family after arrival. In the first instance, where the sponsorship was in complete order, the Travelers Aid Society dealt directly with the sponsor in the matter of travel arrangements and forwarding the applicants to their destination. In those relatively few cases when a sponsorship was withdrawn after visa issuance, the Commission itself undertook to find new placements, while the Travelers Aid Society would take care of all travel details and if necessary hold the family at the port of reception at the Travelers Aid Society's expense until the Commission succeeded in arranging a placement. These costs of port maintenance became heavy for Travelers Aid. In October 1949 the Commission arranged for an IRO grant of financial assistance to the Travelers Aid Society in the amount of \$40,000. These funds were exhausted approximately with the termination of the displaced persons phase of the program on December 31, 1951, but the Ford Foundation provided another \$10,000 with which the Travelers Aid Society was able to carry through to the end of shipping for German expellees in the summer of 1952 and the Commission granted the Travelers Aid Society a loan of \$35,000 under section 14 of the law. The number of so-called breakdown or sponsor-withdrawal cases for which the Commission arranged new placements never was very large.

The Commission or nonagency cases, at the end, grew from an average of 10 percent per boat to 25 percent. In addition to this service, Travelers Aid Society also serviced some of the small voluntary agencies which brought their peak to 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent of the total cases in the terminal months of the program.

Responsibility for effecting new placements for break-down or sponsor-withdrawal cases rested with the Resettlement Division. When a sponsor withdrew his assurances, notice of the fact was dispatched to the Commission's European headquarters. If the applicant's case was visa-ready, the applicant was permitted to embark for the United States for assignment against a backlog of assurances for unnamed persons. The Washington office maintained a special file of other sponsors who had been disappointed for one reason or

another and who were ready to accept a substitute family. A system of record and reception control avoided sending such a case to the wrong sponsor.

Such sponsor-withdrawal cases presented another operational problem. To replace the sponsor-displaced persons relationship created in the assurance, a letter of responsibility containing much the same phraseology as the assurance was sent to the person to whom such case was assigned with the request for his signature of acceptance. Notwithstanding the fact that such a letter of responsibility was not enforceable, the practice was a desirable one in educating persons in their mutual responsibilities to each other and to the community.

The Commission attempted to make this practice uniform for all such cases whether agency or nonagency sponsored. The voluntary agencies reassigned such cases to new sponsors on an oral agreement between the voluntary agency social worker and the sponsor.

Compassionate cases required special treatment. The compassionate case was defined as "any individual or displaced persons family, one member of which was classified as compassionate, because of advanced pregnancy, infancy, or excessive frailty as in the case of the very aged people." Passage for such persons on the ships used in the program was prohibited by maritime regulation. Because of the probability that a pregnant mother, for example, might require hospitalization upon arrival or some other type of special attention, it was necessary to obtain from the sponsor acceptance of responsibility for any extra expenses that might accrue.

Resettlement Location

If all the displaced persons arriving in New York, New Orleans, or Boston had gone directly to the destinations given on their visas, an accurate record of their whereabouts could have been available automatically from the nominal rolls listing their destinations. However, in an increasingly high percentage of the cases, the actual resettlement address was different from that contained on the ship's nominal roll. There were a number of reasons for this. Many persons coming to work on farms arrived during the off-season. The farmers, therefore, cancelled their assurances. Some new interim assignment had to be developed for such arrivals. More fundamentally, however, the reason was the preferability from a resettlement point of view of the blanket assurance; the accredited and responsible voluntary agencies could assign the most suitable jobs and housing actually available for the immigrants after their arrival. Under this arrangement, thousands came into the United States under the care of the accredited agencies and were assigned to specific resettlement addresses, sometimes not until several days after their arrival. Another important reason was that with growing frequency the

address and destination on the nominal roll was a forwarding address for the hundreds of actually known addresses to which the people were destined to go. This device was used for purposes of administrative economy and efficiency. Thus the nominal roll did not always contain the actual latest address.

Under other laws, displaced persons are required to report any change of address directly to the Immigration and Naturalization Service every January. A period of 12 months might elapse, therefore, before the Immigration Service would be able to provide accurate information on the person's whereabouts.

The Displaced Persons Act stipulated that each principal applicant was to present four semiannual reports required by the Commission, but this material was not immediately correlated with the location index maintained by the Immigration Service.

The lack of a most recent address caused complications. For example, it meant that the Immigration Service did not always have an actual address to which to send the necessary permanent alien registration receipt card. In consequence, persons seeking employment, where such an identification card was a prerequisite, especially in defense plants, encountered serious delays in obtaining appointments. To rectify this situation a system of reporting called disposition reports was devised. The voluntary agencies were asked to give 72-hour reports on every case in which an assignment to a permanent address was finalized during the debarkation proceedings at port. A delayed disposition report, due within 3 months, was to provide most recent addresses. These reports were to be completed after local community organizations had completed their resettlement of persons who had come to their particular community. In spite of this improvement, however, many displaced persons went without identification cards for months. The Commission recommended to the Immigration and Naturalization Service that temporary alien registration cards having the same validity as the permanent cards be issued until the permanent alien registration card was ready. These temporary cards were issued for the first time in Europe and certified to by an immigrant inspector at the port of arrival.

Readjustment Services

A subsection of the Resettlement Division was established to handle complaints, to make adjustments, and to deal with miscellaneous problems. All types of problems were directed to the Commission. Where possible, the Commission would refer the matter to the appropriate sponsoring religious or nationality agency. When the problem concerned persons who had been processed on a Commission assurance without the endorsement of a religious agency, the Commission depended largely on State displaced persons committees, or in the

absence of State committees, on suitable departments of State government.

Whereas the bulk of the adjustments were handled by this referral method, a certain amount of case work of this kind had to be performed by the Commission itself if it were to be done at all, such as where sponsors or displaced persons personally called at the Commission offices, or where some emergency situation developed. For example, a displaced person dropped dead on a farm in Virginia from overexposure, and an investigation by the Commission officers of charges that exploitation was involved led to the relocation of several families working under the sponsor concerned. Settlement of some displaced persons under a sharecropping type of assurance in Mississippi accepted overseas in the first weeks of the program produced such dissatisfaction that Commission intercession was necessary. Resettlement in the area involved was temporarily discontinued, until more satisfactory employment opportunities were provided, and later there were very successful resettlements in Mississippi under audits supervised by the Mississippi State Commission.

Although agricultural situations created a more frequent need for readjustments, industrial projects developed some difficulties in respect to sponsor-displaced person relationships.

A large foundry in the North Central States, hiring hundreds of displaced persons, called upon the Commission to assist when other companies began to pirate their DP workers with purportedly better pay offers. The Commission representative's meeting with the workers seemed to correct some mistaken conceptions and to stabilize the situation.

In connection with a southern paper mill employing 35 DP families, the workers threatened to leave en masse after 2 or 3 months on the job. A direct investigation by a Commission officer revealed that the mill officials had attempted to set up a self-sustaining woodland community for the workers. Simple and sanitary housing was provided but no facilities for recreation. The people were completely cut off from the normal community where they could participate in religious services, see motion pictures, and engage in the general community life. As a result of the Commission's investigation, a building was set up for recreation activities and chapel services were conducted on a semimonthly basis. Periodic transportation was also provided to the nearest city.

On very few occasions, some questions were raised by local labor unions as to the use made of displaced persons by sponsors. Such cases were always referred to the State commission for appropriate action.

There were occasional unfortunate situations in connection with commercial travel agencies which sought to charge sponsors fees on

the claim that as experts they could expedite the arrival of displaced persons and expellee families from Europe to the United States. The Commission made it clear that no commercial agency could do anything to expedite any case beyond that which could be done through official channels without cost.

The Commission also sought to advise the immigrants of their obligation to register for selective service as required by law. Materials setting forth this requirement, in the language of the applicants, was distributed in Europe so that the applicants could be better advised as to the obligation on this point after arriving in the United States.

A continuing problem had to do with the difficulty encountered by displaced persons and expellees seeking employment in defense industries. Although there was no prohibition against the employment of aliens in defense industries where classified material was not involved, this erroneous idea prevailed in many industrial areas. In cooperation with the Department of Defense, the Commission disseminated accurate information on this subject throughout the country, pointing out that alien displaced persons were eligible for defense employment where no classified materials were involved.

With regard to the employment of aliens in defense industries classified for security reasons, little progress was made because the waiting period, until necessary security clearance was obtained from the proper military authority in the United States, was generally too long and employers were not willing to bother or incur the delay. The Department of Defense at headquarters level seemed disposed to accept the Commission's security clearances of displaced persons and expellees completed in Europe as equivalent to any preliminary clearances required for such employment purposes, but complete concurrence of opinion of this point was never reached by Army, Navy, and Air.

A frequently recurring inquiry related to health and cases involving public charge. The public charge provisions in the United States were administered by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Sponsors had only a moral obligation on this score and could not be legally compelled to assume financial responsibility for immigrants who became dependent because of a breakdown in health.

Although the number of displaced persons and expellees who became public charges was infinitesimal, whenever such a case arose, it caused complications. This rare situation was met in one way or another, generally by the sponsoring religious or nationality agency, the local private institution rendering the medical or welfare services, or by some other local manner which obviated the necessity to deport the alien himself.

Resettlement Conferences

The private and public cooperating agencies repeatedly felt the need for comprehensive conferences, attended by all cooperating parties,

which would permit an interchange of experience and would make it possible to clarify points of law and procedure and to improve resettlement placements. Consequently, the Commission called a series of national and regional conferences periodically from 1949 to 1952. There were three national conferences in Chicago, Ill., April 5-7, 1949, June 23-24, 1950, and January 18-20, 1952. Eight regional conferences were conducted: Four in 1949; at Philadelphia, Pa., on October 25; New Orleans, La., October 28; St. Paul, Minn., October 31; and Sacramento, Calif., November 3; and four in 1950: At Milwaukee, Wis., on November 20-21; San Francisco, Calif., November 27-28; New Orleans, La., November 30-December 1; and Wilmington, Del., December 11-12.

In addition, four special conferences were held in connection with the German expellee program. These took place in Chicago, Ill., on January 24, 1951, and on January 18-19, 1952; in Cincinnati, Ohio, on May 17, 1951; and in Buffalo, N. Y., on September 6 and 7, 1951.

State DP commissions held occasional State conferences in some of which a representative of the Commission participated upon invitation of the State commission—22 specifically, in Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Michigan, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Virginia, South Carolina, Delaware, and Tennessee.

For the first time, these conferences brought together public agencies and the principal American voluntary agencies, representing the main religious faiths and major nationality groups in the United States in a cooperative effort that cut across sectarian and nationality lines.

The emphasis of the Commission's national and regional conferences was upon resettlement. The theme was set at the first conference by one of the Commissioners: "We are gathered here today for the purpose of developing a unified and complete national resettlement plan. We can accomplish this broad objective only if we understand the problem and then harness our resources to solve it." Speaking of the real problems of resettlement which were jointly to face the Commission, the voluntary agencies, and the State committees he cautioned that the displaced persons would need assistance from time to time in adjusting to the American way of life.

Aside from the general as well as the specific values accruing from the exchange of technical, operating and policy information, the conferences produced concrete results in six principal areas of activity:

(1) Increased the stability of resettlements. The conferences strongly recommended that the Commission undertake an educational or orientation program in Europe, through which the prospective immigrants could be made effectively acquainted with their obligations

to the sponsors in the United States. Such an orientation program was instituted, and is described elsewhere (page 200). After the 1950 amendments prescribed a "good faith" oath, under which each applicant would agree in good faith to accept and abide by the terms of the employment contained in the assurance under which he was processed, the conferences helped to develop a common understanding of this additional aid for resettlement stability.

(2) The development of the preassurance processing program to simplify overseas processing so that the period of lag, between submission of assurances and arrival of the displaced persons and expellees involved, would be reduced. This system is described elsewhere in greater detail (p. 191-196).

(3) A more concerted effort to obtain the necessary additional assurances to cover all available visas for displaced persons and German expellees authorized by law.

(4) The special conferences concerning the German expellee program offered a channel through which representatives of the various German-American organizations could pool their resources in behalf of German expellees. As a result of these conferences, a central committee was formed consisting of representatives from the main German-American agencies in the United States, which selected their representative on the Commission's Advisory Committee.

(5) The conferences requested the Commission to issue a periodical through which the persons interested in the program could be kept posted on current developments. This resulted for a short time in the simple biweekly publication called the DPC News Letter. In general, the conferences insisted upon a more regular and full schedule of field visits from the Commission and of informational bulletins, than staff and finances permitted. The conferences themselves had to serve in partial substitution for the services constantly requested by the State commissions and voluntary agencies.

(6) Revision of Commission policy and procedure, and that of the cooperating agencies, came about in the light of experience and mutual discussion, to the end of more effectively carrying out the Congressional purposes of the act.

Preassurance Processing

One of the most trying aspects of the program for the sponsors was the length of time that elapsed between their submission of an assurance and the arrival of the sponsored alien.

Sponsors were disappointed because (1) the processing of an applicant from the time the assurance was submitted to the emigrant's arrival involved an average of 8 months in duration and much longer if any complications arose and (2) selections by voluntary agencies made in behalf of sponsors too often proved occupationally inappropriate for the job to be done.

The voluntary agencies raised the subject at the Regional Resettlement Conference held in Milwaukee, Wis., in November 1950, under the auspices of the Commission. Upon motion of representatives of two voluntary agencies, the conference unanimously adopted a suggestion to the Commission that it permit the preprocessing of displaced persons and expellees up to the consular stage in the pipeline so that the assurances could be submitted more or less immediately prior to the issuance of visas. This would mean a shorter period between submission of an assurance and the departure of the displaced person or expellee for the United States.

Under this plan, the preliminary processing, including personal documentation, physical examinations, security investigation, would be completed in advance so that there would not be the long waiting period involved when these steps had to be taken in addition to the consular interview, health examinations and immigration check subsequent to the receipt of the assurance.

The Commission agreed to set the proposed plan in motion provided there were no mechanical difficulties that would prohibit its operation. The law required that there must be an assurance prior to the issuance of a visa; it did not specify that the assurance must be received before the processing may begin. It was, therefore, felt unnecessary to delay the preliminary time-consuming processing steps until a case was covered by an assurance.

Within a week of the Milwaukee conference, on November 27, 1950, the European coordinator and the International Refugee Organization reported that the plan was feasible and it immediately received the official approval of the Commission in Washington. The Commission limited the plan to those persons whose work skills were in short supply in the United States and who obviously would be requested by American sponsors because of that fact.

Other regional conferences held during November and December of 1950, evidenced the same feeling about speeding up processing, and the same agreement, generally, by industrial, agricultural leaders, and employment service groups, that the United States was experiencing a shortage of labor and that every indication pointed to increasing needs for manpower. Confidence was expressed that the skills of displaced persons could be used to advantage, but there was insistence that improved and more rapid methods should be used to bring them to this country. Many potential employers indicated they could use many displaced persons, provided they had some assurance that they could look forward to their arrival within a reasonably short period of time. In both industry and in agriculture, the desirability of speeding up the processing of displaced persons was stressed. Agricultural employment had seasonal peaks and it was important to have workers at particular periods if they were to be assured full-time jobs; and in industry, the impracticability of holding jobs for long

periods of time, when workers were needed immediately, was emphasized.

In order to meet the objection to displaced persons arriving in the United States who proved to be unable to do the work for which they were selected, the Commission returned to one of the original concepts proposed by several Commissioners in the early days of the Commission planning, to send abroad teams of occupational selectors. Two teams were sent abroad. The first was composed of 14 occupational analysts, all of whom were employed by State employment services; their job was to screen and pass upon occupational qualifications of those being selected for industry. The second team was composed of six agricultural specialists who were county agents, farm extension workers, and farm specialists who spoke German; these specialists were recommended by the United States Department of Agriculture. Their job was to screen and select farm workers. Every candidate who was preprocessed to fill a job in short supply would be examined by one of these interviewers to make certain that he could truly qualify.

These officers were appointed, briefed, and sent to Europe in January and early February 1951. Their duties, which included occupational interviewing and testing, can be broken down into three phases—(1) the special projects plan; (2) the general preselection plan; and (3) the displaced professional's plan.

The special projects plan entailed the interviewing of displaced persons and the subsequent selection of occupational skills to fulfill the labor needs of a particular industrial concern. The special project cases were not to be given priority over cases already outstanding. The processing of existing cases was not to be halted, but was to run parallel with the special service cases.

Under the general preselection plan the United States Employment Service specialists verified the ability of applicants to meet the general occupational skills needed in accordance with the demands of industrial and agricultural interests in the United States. The displaced professional plan called upon these specialists to determine the capacity of applicants for assignment to professional opportunities in the United States.

By this time, Chairman Gibson had been appointed to the Commission. In view of his wide labor background, it was agreed in early January 1951, that he assume the primary responsibility for the collection and evaluation of this material, and for the implementation of the preassurance system.

The Commission conferred with the United States Department of Labor to determine what industries in particular were in great need of labor. Eleven principal categories were named by the Department of Labor and the Commission instructed the European office to begin the preprocessing of displaced persons and expellees in these class-

ifications. Similarly, the Department of Agriculture verified the already quite obvious need for at least 5,000 farm workers. This number was later increased to 10,000.

An advance alert system from Washington headquarters notified European headquarters of the job opportunities in this country for which displaced persons with special skills were needed. Advance Alert No. 1 was sent on January 16, 1951. It read in part as follows:

The system of advance alerts, as you know, is the Displaced Persons Commission's program for integrating our activities into the general pattern of mobilization for the present national emergency. It is a device whereby we shall all try as best we can to meet some of the new national manpower requirements. From the point of view of the refugees, it is a way of opening new job opportunities for them—jobs we hope will use to the fullest possible extent their skills and training.

A series of publications were sent to the European office and a pattern of coding critical skills was established. A system of statistical reporting was set up to ascertain the numbers of cases within each occupational classification, according to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles used by the United States Employment Service. Thus, qualifications and standards used by the United States Employment Service and by industry were applied by the Commission in the selection of displaced persons and German expellees to fill needs in industry and in agriculture.

At the Milwaukee regional meeting in November 1950, the conference adopted a resolution requesting the governors of the 11 North Central States to initiate statewide meetings of all interested public and private agencies, together with leaders of industry, agriculture and labor, to determine means of meeting labor shortages which might arise within the immediate future. Such meetings took place not only in the Middle West, but in other areas of the country.

The effect of manpower shortages in the national defense mobilization brought an increasing interest in the DP program from industry and agriculture. Recognition of the reservoir of vital skills among the displaced persons and expellees, of the Commission's preprocessing plan, and of the Commission's desire to integrate its activities with the defense efforts of the Nation, resulted in requests of a wide and varied nature from all parts of the country.

The total number of cases preprocessed under this project was 7,954. This number included farmers, machinists, tool and die makers, machine-shop operators, tinsmiths, molders, welders, miners, terrazzo workers, lumbermen, foundry workers, trained nurses, cooks, weavers, shoe repairmen, electricians, bricklayers, carpenters, painters, and mechanics.

Approximately 3,000 of these preassurance cases were not visaed prior to the exhaustion of the legislative visa maximum, in spite of the fact that they were selected to meet compelling labor needs and

had the advantage of the preprocessing arrangement. The explanation for this fact was to be found in the following:

(1) The preliminary processing steps, namely, documentation and security investigation, continued to be complicated and many of the cases had not been fully security investigated even when appropriate assurances became available and visas could have been issued. This weakness was not the fault of the preprocessing system; the plan had been started too late to assure the full benefits that otherwise would have been possible.

(2) The voluntary agencies erroneously misunderstood the Commission to limit the use of cases in the preassurance pool to assignments against strictly Commission or nonagency assurances, and as a consequence, stopped matching these preprocessing cases to their agency assurances. This misunderstanding was clarified so that agency representatives in Europe could draw to the fullest upon the preassurance pool to fill their assurances. But the delay prevented full effectiveness of the preassurance system.

(3) Despite the availability of the preassurance cases for the voluntary agencies, the cases preprocessed could not all be used to fulfill the agencies' particular kinds of assurances. Some agencies were better able to use the preprocessed cases than others whose inability to adjust the scope and pattern of their operations made it impossible for them to participate in any substantial degree in the preprocessing project. Therefore, in the last months of the program, it became necessary for the Commission to initiate large-scale projects independent of the voluntary agencies to absorb the unused preassurance cases. The number of cases benefited was small because the last visa allowed under the law was issued just when these new efforts had begun to materialize in substantial new resettlement opportunities.

To assist voluntary agencies in securing assurances for preprocessed cases and to obtain assurances for other preassurance cases, the Resettlement Division worked out several additional projects.

The State Commissions were encouraged to submit blanket assurances containing job opportunities and housing accommodations for these cases. Three States submitted such assurances. Nebraska asked for 500 farmers and 250 skilled and semiskilled industrial workers. Wisconsin provided an assurance for 500 expellee farmers and Michigan submitted a miscellaneous blanket assurance for farmers and miners totalling 35 family units.

Pennsylvania did not submit a blanket assurance but agreed to conduct a survey among the industries of the State through the State Employment Service in an effort to locate placement for the skilled workers awaiting an opportunity to emigrate from Europe and who were in the preassurance pool.

Although a number of individual placements were effected as a

result of this effort, generally speaking these employers refused to wait six or more months or any other length of time until the person would arrive in the United States.

The Commission, in conjunction with the United States Department of Labor, decided to undertake a national program for the placement of the preassurance cases. Each of the State employment offices, particularly the Farm Placement Division, was asked by the Department to bring to the attention of farm and industrial employers the labor resources to be found through the program.

The Agricultural Extension Service of the United States Department of Agriculture expressed interest and suggested that the Commission be represented at the annual meetings of the county agent organizations throughout the States. Commission representatives attended such meetings in the States of Missouri, Kansas, Colorado, Wyoming, and Pennsylvania.

A more individualized placement program was also devised in January 1952, and turned out to be highly successful. With descriptive biographical information on persons in the preprocessing project, Commission resettlement officers personally visited industries and individual employers who had previously written or telephoned the Commission expressing interest in the program. The fact that these employers were able personally to examine the qualifications of the candidates enabled them to make up their minds readily. Many of these employers immediately filed assurances nominating the individual person whom they had themselves selected by means of the biographies. Were it not for the fact that the available visas as authorized by law were exhausted within a few months after the inauguration of this project, it is likely that all preassurance cases would have been placed. In the course of 5 weeks, 102 selections were made in this manner covering 32 different companies. In addition to these placements, the personal contact of the resettlement officers led to the filing of assurances by many industries with various voluntary agencies. An estimated minimum of 1,400 occupational placement opportunities were found in this way during a 5-month period.

From the preprocessing program, the Commission was able to make vitally needed labor available to crucial industries in various parts of the country. However, the uncertainties involved in shipping schedules and in the pipeline process, the inability of the voluntary agencies to carry out their commitments as to the preassurance cases, the quickly changing needs of individual employers and the difficulty of matching available overseas skills with overly precise occupational prescriptions in the United States, all contributed to preventing the preprocessing program from being as full a success as possible. The idea and plan is a sound one and, given the time and staff, it should be able to work out satisfactorily in the best interests of the United States.

Special Projects

No hard and fast pattern for the assimilation of over 370,000 displaced persons in 4 years could be followed. Each resettlement project, small or large, had its peculiar characteristics. Resettlement was the process of adjusting to these peculiarities by devising constantly new programs that would result in successful resettlements. There could be nothing fixed or static in the resettlement program—it was dynamic and changing. There were few precedents to be followed. Therefore, in addition to the services heretofore described, the Commission was engaged in the initiation of new projects and in cooperating with others who developed such programs. A few of these special projects are described to show the nature of the problem facing the Commission.

Student Projects

The law required that principal applicant be admitted on the basis of assured employment. The Commission recognized school work as equivalent to employment. A special project was carried on by the National Coordinating Council for the Placement of Displaced Persons Students, composed of the Church World Service, United Service for New Americans, and the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and various national student organizations. The World Students Service Fund, New York, acted as operating agency for the council. Over 100 colleges and universities in the United States gave several hundred displaced persons students the opportunity to complete their education. The students were of all religious faiths and represented all nationalities and were displaced by war or political persecution. Reports from both the displaced person students and the sponsoring schools reported mutual satisfaction—from the former an expression of deep gratitude and from the latter, an expression of the contribution being made to the campus community.

Physicians for the Trust Territories

The Commission was able to develop a special plan for the Departments of the Interior and Navy to employ displaced persons physicians in connection with the Government of Guam and other Pacific Territories as immediate replacement for the naval medical personnel who were being transferred to other duty. Reimbursement was guaranteed for transportation costs from port of debarkation to San Francisco, including reasonable allowances for living expenses while in transit and while in San Francisco waiting for transportation onward.

The agency selectors were guided in their work by the preliminary interviewing done by a member of a mission from the Department of Interior who had investigated the qualifications of the medical

applicants and had narrowed the choice down to a maximum of 100 physicians.

The National Catholic Welfare Conference and Church World Service, upon the Commission's request, agreed to undertake the nomination of competent physicians from among their displaced persons constituents in Europe.

Seven physicians were resettled in Guam, two in Puerto Rico, three in the Virgin Islands, three in Samoa, and four in the Trust Territories. The governors of these areas have commended the performance of the displaced physicians most highly. One recurring comment brings out that these physicians are very proficient specialists rather than general practitioners.

Project for Kalmuks

In 1951 the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service found Kalmuk refugees from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics eligible for admission into the United States. Only a few weeks remained before the terminal date for assurances, with little time available to complete resettlement arrangements in the United States. The Church World Service requested the Commission to help locate resettlement opportunities. The Commission convened representatives of the United States Department of Labor and Agriculture, and Church World Service. As a result, a survey was conducted and New Mexico was recommended as a suitable place in which to begin the resettlement of these people. After a period of adjustment, the entire group of 532 Kalmuks was finally resettled by April 1952, the largest group being located near Philadelphia. A second group was placed in New Jersey and the third in New Mexico.

Project for Physically Handicapped Displaced Persons

Among the displaced persons were the handicapped. This group of people known as the "hard core" was made up of persons maimed in one way or another by the war, or of such advanced age as to make them unemployable in normal industrial or agricultural jobs. The voluntary agencies jointly established a United States Committee for the Resettlement of the Physically Disabled, which received financial grants from the International Refugee Organization to defray the original costs involved in resettling handicapped cases. Basically, the project worked out through the cooperation of rehabilitation agencies which accepted the handicapped for retraining and through which the applicant was finally placed in remunerative work. It is estimated that 450 handicapped cases were successfully resettled in the United States through this project alone.

A like project for blind displaced persons under the same committee effected the resettlement of some 30 blind persons.

Not all of the Commission's special projects were successful. Of course, this was to be expected in an experimental program such as this was. Some of the less successful ones were the following:

Project for Professionally and Technically Skilled Displaced Persons

The American sponsor was willing to accept unskilled laborers from Europe without knowledge of the specific qualifications of the individual emigrant under consideration. However, sponsors hesitated to accept technical or professional workers without more precise information as to their qualifications. It became necessary, therefore, to work out a system whereby a potential sponsor could be provided with information on the applicant's educational and occupational background.

The voluntary agencies, with a special grant from the International Refugee Organization, organized the National Committee for Displaced Professionals, Inc., early in the fall of 1950. The method of operation called for the preparation of files in Europe giving necessary personal data on professional and technically skilled displaced persons. These files were presented by the committee's field officers in the United States to prospective employers. The committee's work in locating resettlement opportunities had considerable success. Many employers filed applications for professional and technical workers.

However, no special plans had been undertaken in Europe to parallel those undertaken in the United States. The searching out and interviewing of qualified candidates remained a part of the ordinary selection process and no officers within the voluntary agencies were assigned to pursue the professional and technical cases, as a first obligation. The demands for mass migration and the growing rate of processing resulted in giving primary attention to the ordinary cases involving less personalized attention, with the result that the detailed work required on professional and technical cases was left undone. The Commission's budget and personnel situation made it impossible to assign staff full time to handling professional and technical cases. Another factor causing difficulty was that the general rate of resettlements of displaced persons had become so rapidly stepped up that by the time the case files had been compiled, transmitted, and studied, the persons had gone to some other country of resettlement or were otherwise no longer available.

The project was thus unable to produce sufficient candidates to fill the assurances of American sponsors for professional and technical workers. Between 80 and 90 cases of this type were completed. This was an opportunity missed. However, it must be remembered that large numbers of professionally and technically trained displaced persons did come into the United States under the normal process of selection under the Act.

Alaskan Project

Several proposals were submitted to the Commission to resettle groups of displaced persons in Alaska. For example, it was suggested that the Kalmuks be resettled as a colony in Alaska. This idea and others like it did not get very far. A few assurances from individual sponsors in Alaska were received, were approved and completed. Aside from this, nothing special developed in Alaska.

Orientation

This subject is included here although it was not solely the function of the Resettlement Division, nor in fact was it mainly a continental United States operation. Its inclusion here attests to the fact that fundamentally orientation is a resettlement operation, irrespective of where and by whom conducted.

The elements of an orientation or educational program were originated not long after the passage of DP legislation. The difficulties and maladjustments often experienced by immigrants might be minimized if some effort were made to prepare them with a few basic facts and a little better understanding of the life to which they were going. The voluntary agencies, both overseas and in the United States, requested the Commission to establish an education service in behalf of displaced persons. After considerable study and consultation, the Commission obtained the services of a consultant from the United States Office of Education, Federal Security Agency, to go overseas and study the situation. His report of May 1949 recommended a minimum program of \$100,000. Such funds were not available. Furthermore, a difference of opinion among the commissioners as to the legality of such a program and the pressure of other affairs led to a deferral of action on the matter. Later the general counsel submitted his opinion to the effect that the orientation project could be legitimately undertaken, and the Commission, by majority vote, accepted the opinion and established a modest orientation program.

During the period of deferred decision, the special committee on orientation of the voluntary agencies continued its research and composed a pamphlet entitled "Guide for New Americans," with the cooperation of the Commission. The actual publication of this study was made possible by a grant of funds from the Carnegie Foundation of New York. This pamphlet was distributed in Europe to every displaced person immigrating to the United States. It was a practical effort to assist the immigrant to understand what he had to do to become an American citizen, how to use American currency, his obligation to report under the Alien Registration Act and to register for military service, and helpful hints on what the government was like, and the privileges open to a new resident. Simultaneously with the preparation and dissemination of the Guide for

New Americans, four organizations were developing independent orientation projects in Europe. The American Friends Service Committee, one of the first active units in the field of orientation, directing its efforts entirely in behalf of immigrants destined for the United States, set up classes at the point of embarkation in which they attempted to acquaint every interested immigrant with the elements of life in the United States.

The International Refugee Organization instituted English language classes, leaning heavily on the Linguaphone record system. The World YMCA/YWCA supervised reading rooms in some of the refugee camps in which the displaced persons could read about the United States and have access to atlases, maps, and other visual aids. The American Red Cross, while not carrying on an orientation program as such, was a source of materials and provided films, maps and magazines for agencies. Apart from their restricted coverage, the weakness of at least some of these various efforts consisted in the fact that these programs were not necessarily directed to the United States situation since some of these organizations had responsibility for a world program.

In July 1949 the problem was referred to the Resettlement Division, which proposed a limited program through the full-time assignment of a Commission orientation officer to coordinate existing programs, as a starter, and to utilize available materials and resources. By a majority vote the Commission approved this limited orientation program.

The Commission set up an orientation program in Europe, first under the direction of a single special Commission officer and finally under a director of orientation with headquarters in Frankfurt, supported by a staff officer in each of the 10 primary resettlement centers throughout Germany, Austria, and Italy.

In preparation for the new program, a new committee on orientation developed an orientation outline. This contained indexes of all available material, including films, posters, and maps, which were to be collected and made available to the orientation units to be established in Europe. It also contained an outline of purpose, function, and techniques to be employed in the execution of the program. This committee also wrote the original text for six lectures to be translated into at least three or four basic foreign languages found among the displaced persons, to be addressed to potential immigrants in their resettlement centers and at the port of embarkation.

Substantial progress was made under the Commission's leadership because it was generally recognized by all who participated in the program that orientation programs promoted by specialized agencies, whether sectarian or international, had not developed a program suitable to the total national needs of the United States. Everyone concurred in the logic of the Commission leadership and with the

assumption of responsibility by the Commission all parties worked cooperatively and rapid progress was made.

The real impetus to this orientation program, however, came from the debates and discussions leading up to the 1950 amendments. This legislative history reflects the Congressional conviction that something had to be done to show the immigrant that he had an important responsibility in his employment obligations and to fulfill them. The amended Act, therefore, contained a provision known as the "good faith" oath, which required that each displaced person and German expellee promise that he intended to fulfill his commitments to his sponsor. Behind this provision of law was the explicit Congressional direction that the Commission set up an educational or orientation program through which this oath and its meaning would be made clear to the prospective immigrant. To clarify the legislation the Commission's regulations were amended to require the Commission to:

Disseminate among persons selected by the Commission through orientation courses, lectures, films, and other appropriate means, facts and data concerning the history, customs, traditions, and geography of the United States, better to enable such persons to understand the obligations they assume under the Act and to become adjusted to life in the United States, and seek the cooperation of public and private agencies to achieve this objective.

Each of the 10 overseas orientation units operated in cooperation with a central steering committee, made up of representatives from the World YMCA/YWCA, American Red Cross, the International Refugee Organization, HICOG, and the American voluntary agencies. There were four main elements to the education program itself:

I. *Lectures.*—A series of six lectures were given in both German and Polish language:

1. How to become an American citizen.
2. United States money, weights, and measures.
3. American customs and correspondence.
4. Employment conditions in the United States.
5. History of the United States.
6. Government of the United States.

II. *English classes.*—The centers offered 4 hours of English daily. Special phonographic records were an effective means to improve the prospective emigrants' understanding of English. The World YMCA/YWCA printed and made available to the class instructors and class members an English phrase book containing everyday phrases in most common usage.

III. *Visual aids.*—The orientation centers depended in this connection largely on films. A wide variety of films displaying the various aspects of American life was provided by the American Friends Service Committee, American Red Cross, and the Department of State.

IV. *American house.*—Each center set up an American house or reading room in which was gathered reference material, magazines, posters, charts, maps, photographs, displays of model farms and cities, together with a wide variety of pamphlets and books, constituting a small library. The American house became a very active center for both adults and children concerned enough about their future lives in the United States to want to read more widely, especially in subjects of particular interest to them.

The impression should not be created that immigrants under the Act obtained a thorough orientation through this limited program. Approximately 25–30 percent of the displaced persons population took advantage of these opportunities. Once the DPs left their place of residence by being called into the processing resettlement centers, the extent to which they would be free to take the orientation work depended on complications encountered in relation to their physical examination, administrative and security investigations, and the many other technical problems attending their processing in the centers. They might have the opportunity to attend lectures in English classes over a period of 2 or 3 weeks. Again the processing might be completed in a shorter time with very little chance to profit from any of the orientation work. Similarly, in Camp Grohn, Bremerhaven, before their embarkation, shipping schedules might cut their stay in the camp very short so that they would fail to engage in the orientation program conducted in Camp Grohn.

There is little question, however, that the more conscientious emigrants found the lectures, films, English classes, reading rooms, and other aspects of the program very helpful. Had an orientation program been started at the outset of the program, before consolidation of camps occurred to any appreciable degree, the project could have been far more successful for all concerned.

V. The orientation program in Europe put great stress on the "good faith" oath. Three statements were translated in the several languages involved and distributed to displaced persons at appropriate stages in the processing for immigration to the United States. In addition to the translations an effort was made to interpret the meaning of the "good faith" oath in the course of the orientation lectures. The first statement was distributed at the time the applicant was selected to fill an assurance. The second statement was given out when the applicant was called in for consular interview in connection with his visa. The last was distributed as the applicant was embarked for the United States.

As a last effort to help the displaced persons feel at home, upon arriving in the United States a statement was prepared for publication in the final ship's paper of each voyage. The statement read:

The Displaced Persons Commission takes this opportunity of welcoming you to the United States of America, and to assure you that the Commission and the voluntary agencies have a continuous interest in your welfare until such time as you become firmly established. If after your arrival you have problems and questions on which you feel that you need advice, communicate with the voluntary agency which sponsored you or, if you were not sponsored by an agency, communicate with the Federal Commission or the State commission of the State in which you reside. Either the voluntary agency or the Commission will try to refer you to someone who will be able to advise you. We hope that all of you will find happiness in your new home in the United States of America.

Consideration was given to the advisability of establishing in the United States a counterpart to the orientation program conducted in Europe. In view of the existence of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's Americanization unit, and the Commission's limited resources, this was dropped. However, the Commission did attempt to encourage educational endeavors, particularly through the State Displaced Persons Commissions. These State commissions cooperated in assembling all types of materials such as maps, industrial and agricultural pamphlets, and other useful data describing life in the respective states to be forwarded through the Commission to Europe for use in connection with the orientation classes being conducted there. In addition, State commissions were encouraged to prepare material for distribution to the displaced persons and expellees resettling in their own states. An example of the kind of activities so developed is the very valuable informational pamphlet entitled "Welcome New Neighbor to Minnesota," published by the Minnesota State Commission. The pamphlet contained such helpful material as:

1. A glossary of common English terms translated into German, Latvian, Polish, and Russian.
2. General information as to the naturalization laws.
3. Information dealing with the procedure of filing official reports to attain alien registration cards.
4. Deportation and public charge laws.
5. List of local offices of the Minnesota State Employment Services.
6. List of agencies to which application for help or advice may be submitted, such as Travelers Aid, health services, legal advice.
7. Hints on how sponsor and displaced person can help each other.
8. List of voluntary agencies working in the displaced persons program having specific nationality and religious interest in the immigrants.
9. The story of Minnesota.

10. A map of the United States showing distances between the largest cities.

11. A statement of welcome.

Occasionally pertinent material was procured without cost from other Government departments, such as the Department of State and the Department of the Interior, which could be made available for use in the overseas orientation courses.

The Resettlement Division also undertook a program to implement the "good faith" oath in the United States. The primary purpose of this was to cut down on the number of displaced persons leaving their first place of employment before a reasonable time had elapsed. Some religious groups encouraged some of the immigrant constituents to leave their employment and to move into areas where they could more readily participate in the life of their church. Action of this sort was proposed by the religious leaders, of course, with the best intentions, namely, to improve the spiritual status of their constituents. It became necessary for the Commission to point out to the national offices of such religious agencies that leaders who were influencing immigrants to break faith with their employers were jeopardizing the displaced person's status and the whole program. The Commission stressed the mutual responsibility of the displaced person and his sponsor.

Some nationality groups sought to bring persons of like national origins into homogeneous communities where the new Americans could enjoy the company of persons having like language and social and cultural interests. The problem became so serious that the Commission called several conferences of foreign language newspaper editors to win their help in reminding immigrants of the good faith obligations toward their sponsors. Although the foreign language newspapers cooperated in this effort, the urge of immigrants to be among persons of their own kind rather than on lonely isolated farms or in communities devoid of fellowship with people of their own tongue, often proved stronger than the appeal, and the problem continued. In fairness to the displaced persons, however, the fault was as often that of the sponsor as that of the displaced person, Candor requires the observation that some sponsors forgot their obligations to the displaced person, and some even sought to exploit the new immigrant. The sponsor-displaced person relationship is a two-way street, and there has been in some quarters a tendency to blame the displaced person for any and all breakdowns in the relationship. This is neither fair nor accurate—both sides need orientation.

The Commission's experience warrants the conclusion that the whole program suffered by the delayed institution and limited scope of the orientation project. A full and vigorously operated orientation program will not only benefit the immigrant personally but will also bring great advantages to his sponsor, the community to which he is

coming, and the nation as a whole. Orientation is an integral part of a well-rounded resettlement program.

Orphan Program

Because of the continuous relationships with State and voluntary agencies, and for administrative convenience, the orphan program was placed within the Resettlement Division.

Through the first 2 years of the displaced persons program, until July 1950, responsibility for initial processing of orphans was channeled by the Commission through the United States Committee for the Care of European Children, Inc. This committee operated under the terms of the Federal law and of the Commission regulations but otherwise performed its services completely in line with well-recognized child-placement practices as approved by the Children's Bureau of the Federal Security Agency and in accordance with the standards of the various State governments. The Commission's objective in this arrangement was to assure first that adequate protections would be provided both child and prospective adoptive parents, and second that the various State and local laws applicable to adoption would be properly followed.

The 1948 Act authorized 3,000 visas to be issued to United Nations orphans. The 1950 amendments increased this to 5,000 visas for United Nations and Greek orphans under section 2 (e).

United Nations orphans were those who were in Italy, the United States, British, or French sectors of Berlin or Vienna, or the western areas of Germany or Austria, on or before June 16, 1950.

Greek orphans were natives of Greece who were displaced from their habitual residences, between January 1, 1940, and January 1, 1949, as a direct result of military operations in Greece by the Nazi Government or by Communist guerrillas, and who resided in Greece, on January 1, 1950.

Both of these groups of orphans must have been 16 years of age or under on June 25, 1948.

The 1950 amendments to the Act also provided for 5,000 nonquota visas to an entirely new group of orphans, war orphans. The intent of this provision, section 2 (f), was to provide homes for children who had lost one parent or both parents as the result of Nazi and Communist aggression and who resided in western Europe. Visa issuance to war orphans terminated on June 30, 1952. The act required that the child must have been a resident prior to June 30, 1950, of one of the following countries: Germany, Luxembourg, Austria, Italy, the United States-United Kingdom Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste, the United Kingdom, Finland, Turkey, Ireland, Portugal, France, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Greece.

A war orphan, as distinguished from a United Nations and Greek orphan, was a younger child. At the time of visa issuance, he must have been under 10 years of age.

Following the passage of the amended legislation, and after conferences with all private and Federal agencies involved, the United States Committee for the Care of European Children, Inc., was authorized to continue its activities in behalf of the displaced orphans and any other orphans. However, the Commission decided not to have a single channel for the war orphan program. It would be administered by the Commission itself cooperatively with all voluntary agencies. The Commission established within the Resettlement Division an Orphan Section, under trained supervision, to deal mainly with the 5,000 war orphans. Appointment of a staff was delayed because financial appropriations were not available until October 1950. Consequently, the child welfare officers who were to serve in Europe as well as in the United States were not appointed until November 1950 and very little actual processing occurred until the beginning of 1951.

The first step concerned the governments of the countries in which the orphans lived. Upon the Commission's request, the Department of State had the United States embassies approach the various governments concerned regarding their attitude toward releasing orphans for adoption. By and large, these governments did not express sympathy toward the effort. Only a few agreed to the release of orphans. Italy and Greece proved to be two countries where orphans could be found in the greatest number. The assumption made earlier that innumerable orphans would be available from Germany and Austria proved an error, and assurances from American sponsors for orphans out of Germany and Austria were received in considerable excess over the number of orphans available from those two areas.

The Commission adhered to the principle that all orphans, whether sponsored by individuals or agencies, should be placed for adoption only in accordance with the child welfare laws applicable to the State in which the child was to reside. The Commission would not authorize the admission of the child until a licensed child welfare agency performed a home study or examination of the potential parents, as required by state law. The only cases which were exempted from this rule were those in which the child was too old for adoption, where the State itself waived the requirement, or where the child had already been legally adopted overseas. A network of agreements and working arrangements was developed with all the States. Like many other novel situations under the Act, this development required wholly new arrangements. For the splendid cooperation of the various State departments of public welfare, the Commission is grateful. They, like the Commission, faced new and untried paths. For example, many administrative difficulties were encountered in the State of New York

because that State lacked any central child welfare authority. It became necessary for the Commission to deal through independent and private child welfare agencies, which in many cases were not disposed or equipped to participate very actively in procuring the required home studies on Commission cases due to the burden of work already upon them. New Jersey did not conduct home studies on any but named and related orphans; therefore, when a prospective parent asked for an anonymous child rather than someone known to him, the New Jersey Children's Department would not conduct the home study. Maryland never agreed to participate in this orphan program; therefore in this State the home study was waived, particularly in view of the fact that the State authorities did not in any event require studies when the child was related to the prospective parent.

In spite of the generally favorable attitude with which the various States dealt with the overall problem of foreign orphans, it became increasingly evident that as orphan cases submitted for consideration, multiplied, State child welfare divisions expressed more and more uncertainty as to their ability to carry on. The number of cases was so heavy that the States often lacked the staff to undertake these new and heavy cooperative burdens.

The Commission's organization to deal with orphans included three child welfare specialists at the Frankfurt headquarters in Germany who were responsible for an itinerant service in the adjacent countries as well as in Germany itself; one child specialist in Naples, Italy, with part-time duties at Trieste; three child specialists at Athens, Greece, and indigenous personnel throughout assigned to assist in the clerical aspects of the work. These officers reported to the European coordinator. Their specific duties embraced: (1) Locating the orphans, (2) determining eligibility, (3) composing a personal history of the child for transmission to the United States, (4) obtaining exit and other clearances from the appropriate foreign government, (5) securing necessary releases where a remaining parent was involved, (6) presentation of child to consul for issuance of visa, (7) arrangement of escort service for ocean trip, (8) completion of physical examination, (9) all correspondence and case control work required.

In the United States, the staff consisted, for a period, of a supervisor, two officers, and a clerical staff. The Orphan Section was one of the most autonomous units in the Commission. It handled all work related to its program, including: (1) Validation of orphan assurances, (2) referral of home studies, (3) negotiation of agreements with State welfare departments, (4) securing placement approvals after the appropriate child welfare agency was able to consider the prospective parents in the relationship to the personal history of the children supplied by the European office, (5) Congressional inquiries, (6) setting up the reception and inland transportation arrangements. Owing largely to the unavailability of sufficient orphans in Europe

for adoption and in part to the fact that a sufficient staff was never made available, the program ended June 30, 1952, with a total of 4,182 visas issued to the orphans, leaving 5,818 unused visas. The orphan provisions of the Act were the only ones which were not completed to the full extent of visa authorization. In all other cases, the Commission ran out of visas before it ran out of eligible persons.

General Observations

In resettlement terms, the displaced persons program differed in several important respects from that of normal immigration.

(1) For the first time the resettlement of immigrants in the United States was planned in accordance with a national pattern rather than left to work itself out as chance dictated. The displaced persons program is the first planned resettlement program, under Federal auspices, in American history.

(2) Each applicant nominated for admission into the United States was given the advantage of overseas orientation concerning the facts of United States history, customs, and geography. The purpose was to enable the displaced persons better to understand their obligations under the Act and to enable them more readily to adjust to life in the United States.

(3) The program encouraged the migration of displaced persons by providing free ocean transportation, either through the International Refugee Organization or Commission funds. In addition, interest-free loans were provided for inland transportation from the port of entry to ultimate destination. The purpose of these loans was to encourage a reasonable geographic distribution of resettlements throughout all parts of the United States.

(4) The law was conceived in the expectation that there would be a maximum participation of private and public agencies in the reception and resettlement of displaced persons. It was assumed that displaced persons would not be set adrift but would rather be assisted by such agencies to find the most constructive outlet for their abilities through the directed use of the collective resources of the community in which they resettled.

In other words, the displaced persons program was administered as a resettlement effort designed to serve the best interests of the United States instead of merely an immigration project without any particular design or coordinated plan. In this respect, the displaced persons program transformed immigration into a social welfare program.

However, these resettlement objectives were not fully achieved. The effectiveness of resettlement was impaired by a series of developments:

(1) One of the first problems which complicated resettlement of the displaced persons in the United States was the rather inadequate selection method used in Europe, particularly at the start of the program,

to nominate candidates against the job opportunities given in the assurance. The sponsor designated specific occupational requirements, and delegated to one of the American voluntary agencies the right to choose someone for him. Such agencies, however, were claimed by some to be more concerned with humanitarian considerations and less with whether or not the nominated person's occupational skills were actually appropriate to the particular assurance.

This nomination process was a difficult one. And as the program developed the voluntary agencies improved their selection technique in Europe. Some of the agencies required the applicant to sign an employment contract. Nevertheless, the fact remains that most of the voluntary agencies made no concerted or continuous attempt for strict occupational placements. This is not said in a spirit of criticism because the voluntary agencies did a magnificent job. It is said merely in objective analysis.

The Commission attempted to correct this situation by appointing occupational analysts and agricultural experts to verify the job abilities of applicants so that the right selections could be made and dis-appointments to sponsor-employers reduced to a minimum. A more extensively applicable and more adequately staffed program in this regard would obviously have served a useful and necessary purpose.

(2) The orientation or educational program in Europe, which gave the applicants basic facts on American life in advance of their arrival, should be treated as a basic part of the program and given a real opportunity to function. This is equally true on the American side, particularly in respect to advising the sponsor about his relationship and responsibility to the immigrants. Trouble between the sponsor and the displaced person often resulted because the sponsor expected too much for too little. The sponsor, as well as the immigrant, needs this kind of orientation program.

Much difficulty could be avoided if every sponsor could be fully apprised of the mutual obligations involved before an immigrant is selected to fill his assurance. Many sponsors completely misunderstood the purpose of the program and if they had been properly informed before submitting an assurance, would either have changed their minds about sponsoring an immigrant or would have changed their plans and expectations.

(3) Perhaps one of the basic reasons why the resettlement operation did not reach fuller effectiveness was that its legal status was in question for a while. The Commission's experience warrants the conclusion that there should be a clear legislative mandate of Government responsibility in resettlement, together with funds to enable a reasonable program to be nationally available for service to all State commissions, voluntary agencies, and immigrants under the law.

A mass resettlement program of this character must—if it is to be of maximum benefit to the people of the United States—include an adequately staffed resettlement force. Countless requests for advice, guidance and on-the-spot help from unpaid State commissions and from voluntary agencies all over the country had to go unanswered for lack of staff to deal with them. Inquiries from Congressional committees or Members of Congress could never get the full degree of attention they merited, for the same reason. All other countries operating mass migration programs assume the resettlement program as a governmental responsibility. The very least the United States should do is provide adequate staff, located perhaps on a regionally distributed basis, to assist the voluntary and State and local governmental efforts to aid the new immigrants become integrated into American society.

It would be unfair to leave this subject on a negative note. While the Commission's resettlement program did not reach all of its possible goals, it far exceeded what anyone expected of it at the start. It developed a new pattern of immigration, focused a coordinated community approach to immigrants, and welded together religious, nationality, and welfare groups, and public and private agencies. In general it can point to a highly successful resettlement of some 370,000 displaced persons and expellees. Future special immigration into the United States should greatly benefit from this experimental program and its lessons.

How the DPs Made Out in the United States

The real test of the program is in the success of the resettlement of the persons whom it brought into the country. A substantial key to this success, in the last analysis, revolved about the displaced persons-sponsor relationship. Success in each individual instance would be indicated by a happy resettlement, involving a mutually beneficial relationship between the sponsor and the displaced person and the eventual absorption of the immigrant into the community.

The overwhelmingly successful character of the hundreds of thousands of resettlements under this program was accomplished in the face of great difficulties. Here, sponsors in America were taking into their own homes, their business establishments and their farms, their churches and their associations, people who lived thousands of miles away, sight-unseen. There were differences of language, culture, mores, work patterns, religion, and personal experiences. What is surprising is not that some small percentage of the cases did not work out too well in the first instance, but rather that the vast preponderance did succeed. It is a testimonial to the American faith in

people, and a tribute to the immigrants who entered the United States under the Displaced Persons Act.

What made for a successful resettlement? How did it happen that sponsors wrote as follows concerning the various displaced persons with whom they had been associated:

They are wonderful people.

It was a pleasure to have had them.

We are proud to count them among our friends.

We feel that they are making a real contribution to the community.

I am glad, thrilled, to have been able to share in the responsibility of his coming.

They are among the finest people we know.

We count it a privilege to have this family with us.

This family has won the hearts of all of us.

We wish that we could help more of this type of people.

However, at the same time, another sponsor began her letter:

As one of the gullible "sponsors" who believed in the displaced persons program, I made application for one of these "poor, homeless Europeans." After 2 months, I am a sadly disillusioned and much wiser American.

Successful Resettlements

In attempting to determine what factors contributed toward creating a successful resettlement, statements by representatives of the American voluntary agencies, unsolicited letters from sponsors and in some cases the displaced persons themselves, articles in the press, studies by university sociologists, questionnaires completed by sponsors, minutes of the Commission's regional and national conferences, and other related materials were analyzed. The questionnaires completed by sponsors probably contributed the most complete information. Out of this welter of comment and observation certain factors stand forth prominently.

Views of Sponsors

First, in commenting upon the displaced persons whom they had known, the sponsors usually listed those traits of personality which are desirable in a fellowman. These traits by which the sponsor characterized the displaced persons ranged from such specific qualities as industrious, ambitious, generous, religious, sincere, loyal, faithful, trustworthy, earnest, dependable, worthy, clean thinkers, considerate, clean, honest, conscientious, intelligent, cooperative, diligent, of good moral standards, patient, grateful, appreciative, friendly, talented, humble, thoughtful, refined, responsible, alert, resourceful, steady, competent, and efficient to the rather vague, "fine people," "a fine family," "fine folks." The listing, while somewhat reminiscent of the accepted category of virtues, indicated that both the displaced persons and the sponsors involved in successful resettlements had "made good."

Second, much of the success of a resettlement depended upon the displaced persons' being suitably employed. In those cases which worked out favorably, a combination of capacity to perform the particular job, willingness to work, and enjoyment of the work done, made for stability of resettlement. Whereas the sponsor admired the fact that the displaced person "worked steadily," "worked hard," "did his work well," "eagerly accomplishes duties," "is a fine workman," or was a "good worker," the displaced person appeared to be happiest in his preferred occupation. Favorable employment placements and personality factors probably accounted for the observations of sponsors in favorable resettlements that the displaced person was liked by his employer and by his fellow employees. In many instances it was noted that the displaced person had gained outstanding recommendations. In many instances they rose to important supervisory and other positions.

Third, attending the church of their choice or the church of the local sponsoring agency played an important part in assisting displaced persons to become a part of that community. This fact was frequently commented upon by the sponsors in questionnaires: attending a church and participating in its activities met with the approval of the sponsor. This was to be expected since so large a proportion of the assurances were submitted through religious voluntary agencies. Furthermore, attending a church served to introduce the displaced person to the members of the community who were members of that church, and thus, indirectly to the community at large. While many displaced persons were noted as taking an active part in the programs and activities within the church group, it was also noted that they sought participation in varied nonsectarian groups such as the Scouts, Parent-Teachers Association, the Red Cross, the Community Chest, adult education groups, and the National Guard.

Fourth, there was evidence in cases of successful resettlements that the sponsors, particularly church groups sponsoring displaced persons, were strongly disposed to take a lively interest in the displaced person for his own welfare and not through any desire for material gain. In these cases the reward to the sponsor was the sense of having done something useful for his fellowman, or the knowledge of a happy adjustment by the displaced person in America.

Indeed, such sponsors did not look with disfavor upon many of those very actions of displaced persons which caused sponsor criticism and dissatisfaction in unsuccessful resettlements. Many sympathetic sponsors stated that the displaced persons had already left their sponsorship. One sponsor noted with understanding, "We could see that they wanted to go to a Polish colony." Another, "We couldn't pay him what he could demand in a shop or factory." Another, "A friend wrote getting them jobs and better wages in the city. The

sponsor on the farm released them with approval." Another, "We hated to have them leave but Andrew should not have lost the opportunity in his own field of architecture."

In the successful cases such inconveniences to the sponsor as the barrier of languages or the unexpected illness of the displaced person were not given as reasons for dissatisfaction.

Fifth, the displaced persons adapted readily to the new conditions in which they found themselves. In cases of successful resettlement it was usually remarked that the displaced persons "adjusted well to life here." or that the displaced persons "fit well into community life." It was also noted that the displaced persons "are liked by the community."

Sixth, several sponsors stated that they believed that the "good results" (that is, successful adjustment to the community) were probably due to the close relations between sponsors and displaced persons. For example one sponsor wrote as follows:

Very good results with this young couple. Probably due to the fact that they live in the house with us and have been taken into the family circle and regarded as one of us. Have progressed remarkably well in speaking and learning English, considering their own limited education. Since their arrival in August 1949, they have participated and shared in all our family activities, including social and sports, and are regarded in our community on that basis. They are not treated as hired help, but cooperators and this factor has tended to their success and I believe to their own satisfaction.

The director of the United States Resettlement Program of Church World Service, National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, speaking at the Third National Resettlement Conference, held in Chicago, Ill., January 1952, and recounting the "things (we have learned) that are practicable in this program, and of value," and the "things not to try to do again," made the following statement:

* * * we have found that our own best experience in good resettlement is where a relative or a sponsor or a local group—with us a local church—has given an assurance and after the family has arrived, has worked out the details of job and home placement, with the DP or Volksdeutsche wage earner himself, participating in the decision. Such a local person or committee also frequently helps absorb or prevent the shock of local dislocations.

Seventh, the knowledge of English was an important factor, since knowledge of English was an almost indispensable tool of readjustment. Among the displaced persons entering the United States, knowledge of the English language ranged from complete ignorance to complete fluency. Sponsors noted the displaced persons' knowledge of the language, his attempts to improve his understanding of it, and his progress in such attempts. One even remembers the instance where a midwestern sponsor who had just received his displaced person called a commissioner past midnight to ask for a dictionary.

In successful resettlements the sponsor looked with favor upon those displaced persons who were studying English, with such references as the "displaced person is studying English at night school," "the displaced person has learned English rapidly after his arrival in this country." For some the "language problem has been their greatest handicap." To some "language was no barrier." One sponsor cited with admiration the instance of a young boy, who had "studied a Polish-English dictionary enabling him to take another job on his own" in the same area and with the sponsor's blessing.

In the following appraisal of her experience with a displaced person the sponsor mentioned, among other things, the progress made in learning English:

This girl came to us 1 year ago and could not speak any English at all. We took her into the family as a domestic but treated her as one of the family and she fits right into it. She was willing to learn the American way. Mrs.----- (the sponsor's wife) took special interest in the girl's dress and helps her select many of her clothes, especially when the girl is in doubt * * * She speaks English fairly well and writes it legibly. We see that she mixes with the church groups and this has helped her very much as far as American customs are concerned * * *. She is going to make a good American citizen * * *. Our own opinion of her is that we could not have received a more suitable person nor a more willing one.

The very attempt to learn English, aside from any success achieved, was a factor contributing to happy resettlements. Many difficulties between the displaced person and his sponsor early in their association have been dissolved by the simple expediency of having an interpreter act as an intermediary.

Eighth, many resettlements were made successful by the DP's opportunity to associate with others of his own nationality. Faulty knowledge of the English language was also one of the reasons impelling the displaced person to seek out his own nationality group. In cases of happy resettlement the sponsor frequently took this fact into account, sympathetically noting that "they enjoy getting together with Estonians (or Latvians, etc.) in the neighboring towns, they have been active in the establishment of a Latvian Lutheran Congregation," or that they "are active in a nationality group." Such association, as far as the sponsor and the individual resettlement was concerned, was beneficial. Such an association served as a buffer for the individual displaced person, removed the feeling of complete isolation, especially in isolated rural areas, permitted exchange of views and experiences, and afforded the displaced person an opportunity to adjust gradually to life in America. For the aged who accompanied the younger family members, who, under any circumstances, would not have accomplished a rapid adjustment to life in America, immersion in nationality groups was a natural development.

The extent to which participation in a nationality group contributed to a community feeling among displaced persons is discussed in the

study of displaced persons in Louisiana and Mississippi, *New Americans*, by Rudolf Heberle and Dudley S. Hall, a project undertaken by the Institute of Population Research in the Department of Sociology at Louisiana State University. Heberle and Hall declare:

Several factors appear to be of considerable importance in bringing about community feeling among these displaced persons (in Mississippi). First, the large number of persons in the area, all of which are Latvian, gives them the basis for the development of group feeling. Second, the United Lutheran Council sent a Latvian minister to Senatobia in October 1949, for the purpose of establishing a Lutheran church for these persons, and financed the purchase of a large house for a parsonage and an unused church building nearby. The Latvians donated their time and labor in completely renovating the church and they are quite proud of the result. In addition the process of working together on their church seemed to have intensified their group feeling.

The church serves as a nucleus for all of the Latvians in the area. There is little opportunity during the week for them to visit with one another, because of the long workday and their dispersion. On Sunday, however, most of them attend the services held in the church and have an opportunity to see and talk with all of their friends. The minister has an informal social gathering on the lawn of the parsonage after the services for the expressed purpose of affording the Latvians the opportunity to get together and talk over the events of the past week.

The parsonage is the scene of frequent visits by the Latvians during the week, as well, for they regard it as a sort of sanctuary, which they may visit when they have a problem. Such visits are, of course, encouraged by the minister, for it enables the minister to help resolve their problems before they become too serious.

In only rare instances, and in this example without rancor, does the sponsor note, for example, "they hesitate to become part of American life as hearts and hopes still lie in Estonia."

Ninth, sponsors in a number of instances indicated their admiration for the ability of the displaced person to handle his financial affairs well. Evidence of such an ability on the part of the displaced person contributed substantially towards adjustment and successful resettlement. Naturally, the displaced person's repayment to the sponsor of the money expended for travel expenses and of any loans, made for a happy relationship, but sponsors also reported favorably other evidence of the displaced persons' financial dependability. The fact that these persons "pay bills promptly," "were already self-supporting," "are saving" always seemed to elicit favorable comment. Characteristics of a similar nature among displaced persons noted by sponsors in favorable resettlements were that they were "modest in habit and food," were "thrifty," or "frugal." In some resettlements it was noted that the displaced persons had "bought and paid for a house" or are "buying a house with the sponsor's help," "with an FHA loan," or, "on contract," "have already bought a car," or "have already banked \$500 to \$600."

One sponsor noted that the displaced person "does dressmaking on the side and makes her own financial arrangements." Other displaced

persons were reported to have taken up beekeeping or raising chickens to augment their incomes.

The following report of a sponsor offered details concerning one displaced person's financial activities:

Before the war Mr. ——— was an active technical tank officer in the Royal Yugoslav Army. (He was a graduate of the Military Academy and had a law degree from the University of Belgrade.) * * *

At first he was assigned to laboring work. After 20 days, the maintenance superintendent asked him from where he came and what had been his profession. He asked for references which were given. Mr. ——— was then assigned to the office and his responsibilities was to keep the files of all new installations and repairs in mill, crane, pits, and furnaces, to make orders and change job and be expeditor. He now earns a minimum of \$410 per month with a take-home pay of \$360 plus overtime.

At first the family lived with friends. After saving \$500 to \$600 they found an apartment of six rooms through a newspaper advertisement and bought furniture. They bought a living room suite on time payment and paid cash for furniture for three bedrooms and kitchen, frigidaire and second-hand television and stove and new sweeper. Mr. ——— took a chance at the mill to help a Greek Catholic Church and won a deep freeze. He says, "The USA needs good workers. If you can work you can make a future."

When he came he spoke no English but now he speaks quite well. He studied two months in a local college.

Tenth, the extent to which a displaced person assumed civic responsibility also aided in making a favorable resettlement and in winning the approval of the sponsor and the community. Apart from the subjective opinion of the sponsor that the displaced persons with whom they were associated "would make good citizens," the fact that the displaced persons had applied for their first papers of citizenship was taken as evidence of their good faith and serious intention.

One sponsor noted that the displaced persons "make all reports to the Government." Another wrote that "unlike most of us they are glad to pay their taxes."

This eagerness on the part of the displaced persons to fulfill all such requirements and to become established in the United States is well mirrored in this detailed letter received from a displaced person, regarding the required semiannual reports:

I am very, very sorry I could not get the regular form for report. But because tomorrow it's only the 3d month I and my family are here in the United States I very beg to excuse me and do not fine me.

October 2d, 1951, 6 a. m., we arrive on the USNS *Gen Steward* in New York Harbor. Still aboard we were interviewed by press and shaken hands with you (but please excuse me very if I am wrong it was so many people around and the reporter told so fast I could not good understand all). All were so kind to us and interested in our special case (I am a young medical doctor and my wife a dentist—we both have German diplomas). But then suddenly we were held and sent to Ellis Island. It was like cold water after fine sunbath. Luckily the European stories about this so famous Island were not true. We got there a separate room with nice view of Manhattan and plenty of good food. Our baby all extras what needed and I can say there was all, but freedom.

After two days the mistake was cleared (my wife X-ray) and my aunt who is our sponsor, greeted us on the Ellis Island ferry as freed. It was Oct. 4, 1951, 4:30 p. m.

We went then all to Baltimore where my aunt lives since 28 years. She and her husband over there a house. We spent there about two weeks. So the fine I disclosed that it'll be heavy for us to stay in the little rooms all together and because I want to learn and get the American M. D. degree we decide that we should live together with my mother-in-law, Mrs. ———, who should look after our baby in time my wife is working. With the help of my aunt we arrived (from Baltimore) in Kalamazoo, Mich., where my mother-in-law was living together with her other single daughter since August 1951. We planned to rent for all a house and mother has already found one. Then we decided to get a cheaper apartment and save money for my studies. I got one for \$5 monthly, upstairs—3 rooms, electricity and heat included. I got a position as maintenance cleaner at Fuller Manf. Co., Kalamazoo. My job is to wash the factories floors. They are dirty and oily and I have to work nights from 11 p. m. to 7 a. m., but I am happy to be free and to receive a salary what is it work. It got regularly \$66.20 weekly for 40 h work (less taxes). My wife is working at Fitch Dental Laboratory and receiving \$25 weekly. At present, I have no debts except \$30 for a new sewing machine for which I am working days at a local sewing machine company.

My wife is very happy now to have a home after 7 years of nomadian life in different camps and hostels in Germany. And we both are happy over to have a chance to begin our living at all, so this short time we have bought a gas range, a washing machine, a fine console sewing machine and a good radio, all cash except the sewing machine for which I am working. We have some good American friends here, they invited us many time to the local Baptist Church. Once there was a nice concert. Then we visited their home and were very pleased about the simple art and friendship and kindness of the people here. At work too, all are very friendly and nobody laughs about my broken English and until now, nobody has said me something negative about my being here in the U. S., the same says with my wife and mother-in-law.

My Mother-in-law is now living with us and looking after our little baby girl. She now is paying her debts to LWF (Lutheran World Federation) for transportation, and as I know next week she'll pay the last term. Then she is attending night school in purpose to learn English.

We are planning after a time I'll be able to attend a U. S. medical school and get the required training needed for the medical State board examination.

I and my wife filled the application forms for the intention to become U. S. Citizens in November. Now we are awaiting the courts hearing in this case. I am registered with the Selective Service local Board 40, Kalamazoo, Mich., and have the group 5A.

Our sponsor, my aunt, writes in her last letter, she is very glad to hear that we are making out fine and I hope I have written all what is of interest to you, and I get still a time please forgive me for not being in time. We have no connections with any agencies or organizations so I got the idea about the report in the last minute. I could get no official forms so I decided to write this letter.

Please forgive me for the extra trouble I made.

Many displaced persons served in the Armed Forces of the United States. They had dreamed and prayed for a chance to live in a democracy and were ready to fight to protect it. Some were killed in Korea. Out of one displaced family, in 1952, two sons were in the Army, one in Germany and the other in Korea, both reported to be "good soldiers."

Another sponsor's friend observed from outside the sponsor-displaced persons relationship:

This young man was located with a fine young farm family. They appreciated his good work and his very fine character. He was treated with every consideration, paid current wages, taken with them to church and community activities, etc. He liked the farm and hoped sometime to have his own. He was inducted into the army in October, but the family with whom he stayed made it home for him and he eagerly came to them on his Christmas leave.

One Estonian orphan, resettled in the Midwest, enlisted soon after the outbreak of the Korean War with the declaration:

My brother was tortured and killed by the Russians. My father and mother were put into Russian concentration camps, and the Russians took everything we had. Now you can understand why I wanted to join the U. S. Air Force.

A displaced persons mother, in a letter to the editor of a northern New York newspaper, reflected the pride of displaced persons parents:

My oldest son is 21, and expects to be called for military service soon. I am proud that he wants to do his duty. When he first came to this land he said he would like to enter the Army if possible to oppose communism, for we know what communism is and what it does.

The first of the displaced person orphans to give his life in Korea was a Jewish lad from Poland who had survived the Russian occupation. Resettled in Minnesota in 1948, he enlisted in the Army a year later as an infantryman, and was killed in action in August 1950.

Eleventh, most of the displaced persons availed themselves of the opportunities to pursue some form of education. Some took short courses to improve their English. Others took refresher courses in the trades and fields of their former experience. Those who could, enrolled in colleges and universities, taking full-time or part-time courses. Several displaced persons enrolled in schools of architecture. One displaced person wrote that he was majoring in international relations, while others indicated that they were taking geology, English, and political science. Some who had had no previous schooling were taking formal courses for the first time.

The children attending elementary and grade schools apparently made good adjustments quite easily and frequently were cited as doing well in school, being good students, and being liked by their schoolmates.

In a report from one sponsor concerning his displaced person's ambitions for education, he declared:

Brought ——— from DP camp, paying transportation and expenses from port of entry. Found full time work for him, June '51. Received half scholarship (\$165) from Ind. Central College for him. Kept him in Christian home at minimum cost until Sept. 15 when he went into dorm. Immediately became active in church of his choice. Ambitious to become graduate student in Chemistry after 4 years of college. Speaks excellent English and top grade student among 60 freshmen. We are very proud of ——— and we are seeking 2 more similar students.

— is about as ideal a DP as one could find anywhere. This is based on knowledge of some 200 DPs in Indianapolis.

The Ventura County Citrus Growers Committee of California submitted this following report of a displaced person who was acting as an interpreter for them:

This worker, —, was brought to Ventura County as a citrus picker. He was assigned to picking oranges and lemons, which work he did very satisfactorily. His willingness to learn his job and doing it very well called our attention to this worker and after several interviews was found to be a person who got along very well with his fellow workers and was well liked by the people in the camps. Upon this show of leadership in the man, this committee decided to hire him as interpreter and field contact man. We found him a very responsible person, doing his work to the fullest extent and creating good will toward the committee with the proper handling of difficult situations. We are sure that Mr. —, through his understanding of the problems, has helped many of the displaced persons get adjusted to their new surroundings with more ease than if they did not have his help to explain to them our American way of doing things and requirements. With his high moral sense of obligation toward his family, his employer, and to the community, we are sure that he has inspired many people to continue when they would have been tempted to quit. We feel that he is a decided asset to this community and would not hesitate to recommend his services in any position of responsibility.

Another sponsor wrote:

Of the large number of DPs to come to Ripon (Wisconsin) the — family have been the most recent, arriving the last of June 1951. They were not sponsored for any specific jobs, but it was possible for Mr. — to begin work on the night shift at the cookie factory after just two days in Ripon. Mrs. — would like very much to have a job also, but her duty at the present is plain to care for the baby boy, who is having a serious infection of the middle ear (in both ears). The couple is an educated couple, he having taken work in philosophy and theology in the university with the idea of the ministry; but he is perfectly willing to do the work at hand, and is almost overly conscientious; so much so that his superior at the factory has been trying to get him to relax while he works rather than to be so tense. He seems to be succeeding at it. Mrs. — borrows our copies of the Milwaukee Journal, a week's issues at a time, and covers them thoroughly. She also takes books from the library; American poetry, history, customs, etc. He last was reading two volumes of Toynbee's histories. Both are friendly, talented, conscientious, humble, willing. A week ago they joined the local Congregational church, having after consideration (and attending more than one church, each Sunday) decided that they felt most at home there. They take it very seriously. I feel that Ripon has been most fortunate in the grand people who have come to the community as DPs, and I believe the — couple are among the finest.

In another report on a displaced person and his younger brother who went originally to Wisconsin:

Dr. — learned English in 3 months—refused to accept financial assistance in order to finish his education and instead found himself a job in a factory as manual laborer until he had repaid his passage money. Because of Wisconsin law, Dr. — cannot practice medicine in our State unless he has graduated from an American school. He was finally induced to move to Illinois, where requirements are less rigid. He entered internship in a Chicago hospital, took

the necessary examinations, and was granted a license to practice medicine in Illinois. He is presently practicing in partnership with another young doctor.

His first act in our country was to apply for first citizenship papers of which he is very proud.

His younger brother who came with him is in the United States Army serving overseas. His letters indicate he is homesick for his newly adopted country. Prior to his military service he was employed and studying to become a tool and die maker.

His employer was sufficiently pleased with his services to raise his salary three times in less than 2 months.

These are obviously good citizens. They have adapted themselves to their new country in a manner that reflects credit upon themselves and upon the agencies that made possible their immigration to America.

I am afraid that very few Americans of natural birth appreciate their country as sincerely as do these people. We can be proud to stand beside them as citizens.

Views of State Authorities

These have been pictures of individual resettlements taken at close range. If we step back and view the same picture from a broader perspective, for a whole State's experiences, the picture is equally satisfactory.

In order to obtain reliable information relative to resettlement, assimilation, and adjustment of displaced persons admitted into the United States for permanent residence, the Immigration Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee addressed letters to all the State governors requesting them to share with the Congress the benefit of their "experience obtained while dealing with the problem with which the subcommittee is concerned" and included a questionnaire to be completed and returned. This questionnaire contained the following question, "Are they adjusting themselves economically, socially, fraternally, and for the better?" Some of the answers from State officers which were published in 1950 in a congressional report, are as follows:

(Some answers are reproduced here only in part.)

CALIFORNIA

There are some very few isolated instances where individuals have found it difficult to make these adjustments, but the percentage would not be larger than a similar number of citizens anywhere. We have found the vast majority industrious, honest, willingly cooperative, and appreciative. It is our belief that the contribution to the local community life far outweighs any difficulties created. If there have been any difficulties or resentments created by the coming of the DP's to any community they have not come to our attention. Most communities assume a degree of pride in the human service rendered and begin to feel they are having a close personal part in alleviating a world problem.

COLORADO

We believe that it is too early to evaluate the orientation and adjustment of these people. There is no evidence that they are not fitting into our way of life and again we may assume that the sponsorship is following through in the matter of fulfilling responsibility for promoting this adjustment. On the basis of

early and incomplete information, it would seem that these people follow the same pattern as our own citizens, differing only in that they may have an additional incentive of new opportunities in a new world.

CONNECTICUT

Most DP's have been placed very well into communities and are adjusting themselves readily to the American life. In most cases church groups have taken an active part in educating and assimilating the newcomers. All arrivals are extremely thankful for having been able to come into the United States, most naturally they are still wondering about abroad, but given time and opportunity they should make good Americans.

ILLINOIS

Adjusting excellently in most cases, though as in any cross section of humanity, some score higher than others. But their eagerness to learn English and the American way of life is marked. In Chicago a New American Day program brought forth a large attendance of DP's. And their interest in attending nationality group meetings; their initiative in seeking out English and citizenship classes; their philosophy of the wisdom of first learning English, getting accustomed to American procedure, and keeping going until they have established themselves; and their reported eagerness to pay back their transportation debts all lead us to believe that they are, by the large, excellently adjusting themselves economically, socially, fraternally, and for the better. From all quarters it is reported that successful and satisfactory DP cases far overtop the problem cases which, in the main, can be solved by patience and case work.

INDIANA

I can say this with some assurance, that where local facilities and organizations enable the DP to learn our language and where they are extended friendly assistance in learning the homely details of our way of life, they respond and demonstrate their desire and need to feel they are a part of the community life. There seems to be no tendency to seclude themselves or to be reluctant to adjust themselves to our customs and habits.

MINNESOTA

In regards to adjustment, agencies report in general "yes." Because of language difficulties, there is a natural tendency on the part of displaced person immigrants to prefer living among their own language-speaking groups. After the initial period of adjustment, given encouragement and understanding, they are able to successfully adapt themselves economically and socially. As a group they are appreciative, industrious, and anxious to succeed.

NORTH CAROLINA

It appears that they are adjusting economically; that is, where adequate wages are earned, they make a satisfactory adjustment economically. Socially and fraternally, they are handicapped on account of lack of common language. Generally speaking, communities are receptive and want to help them.

PENNSYLVANIA

Generally, the people who have come to us have shown a great readiness to begin a new life in America. We have found them of good intelligence and with a willingness to accept the hardships which are necessarily part of beginning

a new country. Within a very short time they seem to become a part of the community and are outstanding in their drive toward Americanization. They are eager to learn the language and become Americans, and have used community resources, such as schools, clubs, etc., to achieve this. They seek citizenship as early as possible after settling in the new community and are the most eager participants in celebrations which point up freedom, such as Independence Day, I Am An American Day, etc.

WASHINGTON

The adjustment economically, socially, and fraternally by and large seems to be quite successful. Church groups, service clubs, and other local agencies have taken the initiative in providing opportunities to these displaced persons for development of some social assimilation.

Various State commissions submitted official reports, from time to time, to their own governors. These reports are significant in stating their general view of the program.

In submitting its first annual report, the Washington State Committee voiced the unanimous opinion that—

The displaced persons who have arrived in Washington have been and are still a decided asset to the State. They are individuals of excellent character, loyalty, industry, and skill. They are employed in a wide variety of pursuits and their employers praise their efforts * * *

In its report to the governor for 1949, the Michigan Commission made the following observations:

It is the unanimous opinion of our State commission that the displaced persons have been a decided asset to the State of Michigan. They are, by and large, persons of excellent character, health, loyalty, industry, and skill. They are employed in a wide diversity of occupations * * * They include highly trained technicians * * * They have shown remarkable flexibility and good will in giving their best efforts to the work at hand * * * They have made a signal contribution in the field of the arts * * *

Since more displaced persons are in agricultural pursuits than in any one occupation, the State commission has made a special effort to obtain the opinion of Michigan farmers regarding the quality of these workers. We have had a large number of letters from satisfied farmers, particularly in the vicinity of the following communities to which farm workers have gone in the largest numbers. * * *

Residents of Michigan who have had an opportunity to interview newly arrived displaced persons are impressed by their flaming zeal for democratic institutions and their bitter hatred for communism and all forms of totalitarianism * * *

The speed with which displaced persons apply for a declaration of intention (first papers) is noteworthy * * *

The social adjustment of displaced persons has been excellent. It has been best in those communities where the voluntary agencies accredited by the Federal Displaced Persons Commission have active local programs, and where the State has an approved adult education program. The State superintendent of public instruction has forwarded us a list of 50 communities in the State of Michigan which have approved adult education programs. These are the municipalities to which displaced persons have gone in the largest numbers. The presence of displaced persons has influenced the character of the curriculum in many places, particularly the introduction of more advanced courses

than those required by old time immigrants and the organization of courses in English for educated foreigners * * *

There is no widespread feeling in Michigan that displaced persons are competitors in a tight labor market. Persons who allege that they are dangerous competitors represent a very small element in the population. The organized labor movement in Michigan, both the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations were definitely on record as in favor of the admission of displaced persons and are still actively in favor of their continued admission and their employment in industrial as well as agricultural pursuits * * *

The great preponderance of the testimony which we have received is favorable to displaced persons. It is felt that the relatively few failures are more than offset by the great body of workers with whom there are no difficulties. The vast majority of the displaced persons not only cause no difficulties, they actually make a definite positive contribution to the life of the communities in which they live.

From the California State Committee comes the following estimate:

The over-all success of the program, the resettlement of the majority of displaced persons having come to California has been wholly satisfactory. The displaced persons brought to California through the program have proved to be desirable as future citizens. They have been brought to California strictly in accordance with the Federal law which requires that jobs and houses be available for them without injury to our own citizens. Investigation of unpleasant incidents involving displaced persons revealed they were victims of mismanagement and themselves in no way responsible for any disturbances.

Delaware's report is interesting:

Practically all of the DPs quickly take out their first papers to become American citizens. A few are now being drafted to serve in the Army. The first person drafted for military service in Delaware was a DP who might have claimed exemption. Some are buying small farms and beginning businesses of their own. They are sending their children to our schools. They are generally affiliated with some church. Apparently the average DP is more devoted to his church than the average American. In another generation, they will be amalgamated in our melting pot and will be responsible American citizens with American children * * *

The Massachusetts Commission, in the spring of 1952, submitted to the governor a report on 3½ years of its operation. Its over-all conclusion is illuminating at this point:

We know some success stories, as well as some sadder ones * * *. Fortunately success is more common than failure * * *. By and large, however, the Commission believes that most of our newcomers have met some small degree of success. We feel certain that they are and will be contributors to the Commonwealth in industry and character.

Views of Voluntary Agencies

Another State-wide viewpoint comes from a Midwestern voluntary agency's experience. A resettlement worker speaking from her experience with the Lutheran Resettlement Service said that the resettlement service of the Lutheran Welfare Society of South Dakota had been instrumental in securing job and housing assurances which

had brought 941 individuals to the United States. Many of these accepted farm assurances, but their past training and experience proved to be such that few of them remained on the farms. However, they had made good adjustments and a large number of them were getting into skills and professions for which they were trained. This report found that the displaced persons applied for citizenship almost as soon as they received their alien registration receipt cards. A large percentage of them had protected themselves and their families by purchasing hospital insurance. Where the opportunity was given, they attended classes in English and many of them were taking refresher courses in order to learn the American way of doing the particular work for which they were trained in their own countries. Some of the young men and women had entered colleges and universities and, almost without exception, had graduated with honors. The children in the grades and high schools also were doing exceptional work, according to the reports of their teachers.

It was also discovered that physicians, dentists, and veterinarians had the most difficult time finding employment in their professions. However, three doctors set up their own private practice in South Dakota and three more passed their basic science examinations. The dentists and veterinarians were in a different position for South Dakota laws permit the dentists and veterinarians to take examinations for licensure. This report indicated that many of the displaced persons were joining churches in the community and the children were attending Sunday schools. It also informed the Commission that a few of the displaced persons had bought their own homes, farms, and businesses.

The report concluded, "On the whole we have found them to be industrious, dependable, and extremely eager to take care of themselves and their families and in no way be dependent on the community. This, we believe, is the picture of the displaced persons program in South Dakota as we have experienced it."

It would appear then, that there were successful resettlements when both the sponsor and the displaced persons entered in good faith into the relationship created by the assurance. That good faith meant for the sponsor an interest in the welfare of the displaced person instead of strictly and wholly in personal, monetary, or material gain. At the same time, it frequently meant for the sponsor giving temporarily, at least, money and material things. The sponsor also found it necessary to have great patience, tact, and understanding, to be a guide, teacher, and counselor.

Good faith for the displaced person meant an assumption of responsibility, abiding by his agreement, working hard, gaining financial independence, repaying his debts, learning English, learning American customs and traditions, contributing to or taking part in com-

munity life as best he could, assuming the duties of citizenship, and seeking education. In the vast preponderance of cases there was joint good faith and successful resettlement.

Unsuccessful Resettlements

To assess the picture accurately we must also look to the unsuccessful resettlements. In a program involving over 370,000 people, under the circumstances herein involved, it would be foolish to assume 100 percent efficiency and happiness—such was not the case. Although the vast preponderance of the persons did make satisfactory and successful resettlements, there were less fortunate ones also. Although the number of these unsuccessful ones was considerably smaller than one would have reasonably expected under the circumstances, frequently the publicity attached to them ballooned them out of all perspective in the whole picture.

No one factor can be ascribed as the cause for these relatively few unsuccessful resettlements, although in general the reasons may be grouped into a few main categories. A review of actual cases, as reflected in letters of complaint or in case studies handled by the Resettlement Division, will serve as illustration of these major factors leading to unsatisfactory resettlements in a small proportion of cases.

Views of Sponsors

(1) The unsuccessful resettlement cases which received the greatest publicity were those in which the displaced person for various reasons left the sponsor a short time after arrival, without fulfilling the obligations expected of him by the sponsor under the terms of the assurance.

Perhaps the greatest number of these cases involved displaced persons who were not qualified to perform the assured occupational duties. One of the factors leading to this development was the discriminatory provision in the original Act which gave priority to farmers. This factor coupled with an inadequate occupational review, during the early days of the program especially, by the voluntary agencies who had been deputized by sponsors to nominate their displaced persons, caused many complaints.

Take the complaint of a Virginia farmer:

I don't think it is a very sound program. If we apply for farmers, and get such things as civil engineers and electricians, and aviators; I don't think it is a very sound program * * *

For example, a case near Washington, D. C.:

From experience I have had dealing with the farmers and DP families, it is evident that something needs to be done regarding the present system of placing displaced persons on farms.

Abrupt departures, without notice, caused irritation and inconvenience to sponsors. A sponsor whose displaced persons couple was

working out favorably related his experience with the mother-in-law of the couple.

Our experience has been limited to one family so perhaps this observation is not too valid. The DP families come to the U. S. A. under classifications of domestic, farmer, etc. which are not always their normal occupations. The sponsors arrange work opportunities in these fields and then find the DP in conflict with the plan. Through long correspondence the mother-in-law of the wife agreed to be a domestic in one of our church member's home. With a language handicap it was a difficult adjustment for both the housewife and the DP to make. Within 6 weeks the plan had blown up and the mother-in-law was working the night shift in a hamburger shop.

Some sponsors went to great expense and preparation and were inconvenienced and suffered loss by these abrupt departures, and such departures were noted by others who might have sponsored displaced persons.

A young friend of mine sponsored a couple from the Ukraine and they recently, after 5 months I believe (I understand that your requirements call for a year) they skipped out without so much as a beg you leave, thank you, go to hades, or any word whatsoever, which is a clear violation of whatever regulations if they are to conform to immigration laws—it made my young friend very bitter about the DP program. He had plans to attend medical school in the fall; his parents operate a farm with him, and these DP's left him high and dry in the middle of a particular season, leaving the area for parts unknown or unrevealed with their young son.

This comment exemplifies one of the difficulties which arose from inadequate orientation of sponsors. There never was any requirement for the DP's to stay 1 year, as this sponsor seemed to think, but his expectation of that period undoubtedly unknown to the DP, probably contributed to this sponsor's bitterness.

For the religious agencies, most programs for the orientation of sponsors were handled through local religious leaders who were dependent on national denominational headquarters for information. Some agencies felt that an initial lack of coordination among themselves was responsible for a few of the early problems and for the inadequate education of sponsor and the general public to the realities of the program.

Some such experience prompted a sponsor, or other sponsors, to cancel other assurances, causing delay and change at the processing levels in Europe.

Originally, I had asked the relief committee for experienced men in lumbering, logging, and land clearing, for work I have here. When this man arrived I was appalled when I found he not only was inexperienced and did not even know how to properly handle an axe but that he really was an office worker as a bookkeeper and accountant.

On January 9, 1950, this man demanded his immediate discharge pay and when I told him he owed for his board among other items since he ate at my place, he then showed me a paper written in ——— by the relief committee which he stated said that he was to receive a minimum of \$80 per month, free living quarters, and free meals. I never did agree to offer any free rooms and board

to anyone. I wrote immediately on January 9, 1950, to the relief committee stating my position; I have received no answer to this letter; I am writing them another letter on this matter.

On January 11, 1950, I wrote to the relief committee again, canceling all my assurances of housing and offer of employment that I have previously signed for, affecting 25 individuals.

This case illustrates another difficulty which sponsors charged to the DP, but which in all fairness was not their fault. Here, for example, the DP had been led by his church "relief committee" to believe he was to receive certain payments and conditions of work; apparently the sponsor was unaware of them. Who had been misled, the DP or the sponsor?

Perhaps before leaving the complaint that DP's did not stay on the job, it would be well to consider the following comment in the report for the Washington State Displaced Persons Committee for December 1, 1950–November 30, 1951, concerning the mobility of displaced persons:

The often discussed nomad tendencies of displaced persons are not entirely a result of their discontent or restlessness. A more important factor is the deep psychological reason for the desire to move. Displaced persons, as we know them now, were, before the onset of nazism and other totalitarian ideologies, self-sustaining, respected individuals and family units within their own communities. Since these normal years, most of them have been subjected to a sharp degree of regimentation in practically every day-to-day living function.

They lived in restricted areas and restricted circumstances for 2, 4, and 6 years. They have lived an entirely abnormal life, gaining their prized privacy only in their hours of sleep. When our soldiers first returned from years of camp life they too evidenced what appeared to be great restlessness on their first return to civilian life. Part of the restlessness of the displaced person, like that of the newly returned soldier, is the normal reaction of the individual to want to move under his own decision—using his new freedom—without regimentation.

(2) Some resettlement difficulties arose because sometimes the displaced person had gained many misconceptions about American life or the locale of his resettlement.

One sponsor offered this explanation in a letter:

The criticism which I would offer is not toward the displaced person family whom I sponsored but rather the displaced persons program in that, generally speaking, the displaced persons are not properly orientated before they come to the United States in understanding living conditions in our cities or rural areas. Their conception of life in America seems to be gained from Hollywood rather than from actual living in the United States. They did not fully understand their responsibility toward their sponsor when the sponsor was satisfactory. A program of this type could be of tremendous help to farmers and ranchers if the displaced persons were carefully selected with an agricultural background and if they were made to stay on a ranch sufficiently long enough to be of service. Farmers and ranchers are desperately in need of agricultural help if agricultural production is to be maintained.

The program as a whole should be valuable not only from the point of view of the labor supply but from the cultural and international point of view also.

Another sponsor blamed bad instructions for the attitude of displaced persons:

I have sponsored several displaced persons and have assisted displaced persons where their sponsors had canceled before the displaced persons arrived in this country. I have got to know some of them very well. Most of them are ambitious and nice people. The only objections I have with your program are not with the individuals but the mistaken theories that most of them receive before they leave their DP camps in Europe. They are led to believe they work 40 hours a week and time and a half for overtime on a farm (in this regard whoever heard of a farmer or farm laborers only working 40 hours a week). I think a part of the fault lies in the instructions given the displaced persons before they are processed or else upon their arrival in the United States. It is my opinion they will make good, loyal Americans but I feel nine-tenths of them have the wrong impression when they first arrive.

As indicated elsewhere the Commission agrees fully that an effective, thorough, and stable orientation program for DPs overseas is a necessary part of a good resettlement program.

One complaint heard from sponsors was that displaced persons expected to make too much money once they arrived in the United States. This resulted in misunderstandings about wage scales. On the other hand, some voluntary agencies reported that some such sponsors expected to pay too little and were irked when the displaced persons refused to be exploited. Take, for example, the following report from Louisiana:

The family I am sponsoring are very slow in learning American language and work, particularly the man. This family has been with me for 2 years, but there are too many DPs that expect too much for the little they can do. As an American I believe that we have enough Americans of that type without bringing more.

In another instance from Wisconsin, a sponsor reported:

We the sponsors of three displaced persons regret to say that a great mistake has been made in guaranteeing wages to them. Due to their inability in knowing about our way of farming, they cannot operate machinery and therefore it is a problem to instruct them how to operate said machinery. They expect high wages, and are not in capacity to earn it.

The lure of the large city was that it seemed to offer high wages.

Mrs. ——— and son came to us in September 1949 and left in February 1951. We tried to interest the son in finishing school and planning for his future while doing work around our country home. His mother helped in the house. The son was not able to make the adjustment necessary. The big city, big pay, excitement, and adventure were the will-of-the-wisp he pursued. The mother would have been willing to stay longer except for the son. There were distant relatives who had come to Chicago so they left.

Again:

These folks are hard working people, but so fault-finding with everything. They didn't like our church or the singing. They had a good three-room house, gas stove, electricity, lights, a frigid box, everything free, we paid them good wages. But like all of them, they want to go to the big city. We have tried it for the third time; but no more DPs for us. These came in September and left in December.

(3) Personality clashes between the displaced person and his fellow workers sometime caused a breakdown.

I wanted this man for dairy work, and I have no objections to his work, but he can't get along with my men that have been with us for years, nothing we do seems to satisfy him. He said that he was finished, and wants to leave here as soon as possible. This I want him to do. I am not firing men that have stayed with us for years to satisfy him.

Isolation of the displaced persons as a result of the placement often contributed to the breakdown of the resettlement.

They don't have enough contact with other people. There is only one white family on the farm with whom they can associate. I think it probable that they will want to move from Louisiana after a year or two.

At times the sponsor and the displaced person reached an impasse in their relations with one another just as other employers and employees do. To blame the DP alone is unreasonable, as is shown in this case study by the Commission.

Corporal ———, Maryland State Police Sub Station at ——— called stating that two DPs were at the station complaining that their sponsor ———, had ordered them off the farm by sundown. The DPs had \$1,000 worth of tobacco in the shed and ——— refuses to let them sell it.

In the interview with Mr. ——— I learned that the DPs on the farm requested him to increase their wages. He explained to them that it was impossible for him to do so and they told him they would no longer work for him for \$3 a day. They demanded that he give them the \$1,000 for the tobacco which they believe is their due. Mr. ——— explained that he made a verbal contract with the DPs that they would get their share of the money if they stayed with him and put out another crop. Mr. ——— had four DP families on his farm. The work of the DPs had been satisfactory with the exception of one family whom Mr. ——— rated "not much."

For the last month Mr. ——— said the DPs were talking about going to Chicago. ——— is the spokesman for them and now in the last couple of weeks has been complaining a great deal.

Mr. ——— stated that he has been good to the families and he feels that they have not appreciated what he has done for them. He pays them \$3 a day. Hours of work are from 7 a. m. to 8 p. m. in the summer and from 8 a. m. to dusk in the other seasons. He provides housing which in my opinion was adequate, garden space, hogs, milk, butter, and started each of them off with chickens. They now have ducks and geese which they themselves have added.

In the interview with the heads of the families in Mr. ———'s presence, the only thing they had to say about the work was that Mr. ———'s son "drove them hard at times." They feel that \$3 a day is not enough at the present time for their work and that if Mr. ——— would have increased their salary they would have continued working for him.

They have made up their minds to go to Chicago and will not accept any kind of deal with him. They are convinced that he owes them \$1,000 for the tobacco which they worked.

——— as spokesman stated that they would be agreeable to stay with Mr. ——— until a tobacco crop is planted, but would not stay any longer. In planting a new crop they feel that Mr. ——— should give them their share of the tobacco in the shed, which he refuses to do.

A sincere effort was made to show these DPs that if a compromise could be effected they would fare possibly better than in the city.

(A very touchy matter with them was the fact that on their Christmas, they took the following day off. Mr. ——— refused to pay them for that day.) Mr. ——— gave each family a radio for Christmas as well as presents for the children. With Mr. ———'s stand that he is unable to increase their wages and the DPs determination to leave, this situation could not be resolved.

Ultimately, this matter was resolved to the mutual satisfaction of the DPs and the sponsor.

(4) Cases came to light in which there was exploitation, abuse of the immigrant and alleged mistreatment by the sponsor. Often the methods were not extreme but the attitude toward the displaced persons was the motivation for filing assurances. One man wrote from New York:

My niece and nephew as displaced persons have been brought to this country through the IRO from Germany. They live on a chicken farm in South Carolina. They live under very bad conditions, as far as housing is concerned. Both people have to work 12 hours for \$50 a month, which is to take care of food, clothing, etc.

A substantial project was developed early in the program for Mississippi. Here is a statement to the Commission about it.

It seems that last September a large number of families who had come over here under blanket assurances of the ——— committee landed in New York City where they were told that their original sponsorships in Pennsylvania and other States had fallen through. Consequently 68 families, including a number of babies, were loaded on buses and shipped to ———, Mississippi, a place of about 400 people. They traveled for 14 hours before the buses stopped and the people had an opportunity to get some food and water. Upon arrival at ——— Plantation in ———, they were assigned to a number of substandard shacks; a promise that better housing would be made available was not kept. The families, including a number of children, were immediately put to work as cotton pickers and it seems that their daily earnings ranged from 75 cents to somewhat less than \$2. The people never received any cash but were encouraged to buy at the one company grocery store. Mr. ——— told me that in order to maintain some balance between income and expenses the families purchased less food than they needed. In other words they went hungry most of the time.

There is provision for children to go to school in ——— but they cannot participate in the school lunch program because their parents are unable to pay 25 cents a day. The Plantation has organized some sort of kindergarten or nursery school for small children so that the mothers can go to work. As far as medical care is concerned a doctor is available in ———. The DPs are charged \$5 for home visit which is entered on the debit side of their account. I am enclosing the copy of a letter which Rev. ——— received from the ——— company, the owners of the ——— Plantation. You see from this letter that the families are charged \$100 per head for transportation, food, and some equipment. Rev. ——— reports that the displaced persons are desperate about this situation and are appealing for help. The ——— Committee promised them to send a person to investigate but apparently such a person never came.

The letter from the representative of the Mississippi plantation involved, releasing two of the displaced persons in question, read in part as follows:

Upon receipt of your telegram we released Mr. ——— from farming contract with us, loaded his family and effects on our truck and transported them

to ———, for departure on the bus. Mr. ——— had difficulty in understanding just what his account consisted of, therefore we will outline it so that you can explain to him and to his sponsor.

Account of -----, and -----	
Debit	Credit
\$200. 00 (Transportation, food en route, food on arrival, luggage, moving on place from one location to another, all supplies including axe, lamp, beds, mattresses, blankets, utensils, etc., processing and administration, house rent for period on place, etc.)	\$2. 55 Work.
5. 00 Doctor.	12. 00 Work.
10. 00 Trip to ----- 25 mile haul of 2 persons and luggage.	5. 00 Bonus.
3. 64 Food.	2. 47 Work.
4. 25 Food.	7. 50 Work.
4. 04 Food.	1. 96 Work.
. 15 Postage.	1. 89 Work.
3. 79 Food.	1. 20 Returned goods.
1. 89 Paid in cash for work already credited.	7. 00 Work.
1. 15 Food.	3. 50 Returned goods.
	3. 23 Returned goods.
	3. 00 Work.
	22. 83 Paid in cash.
	30. 00 Paid in cash.
	17. 25 Returned goods.
<hr/> \$237. 83	<hr/> \$120. 38
	Balance due, \$117.45

In regard to the charge of \$100 per person for transportation, etc., we wish to explain that when a family stays the first year with us and farms as they are supposed to do to conform to their contract, we give them a credit of \$100 total. We do the same thing the next year thereby wiping out all transportation charges in 2 years. Mr. ——— seemed to think that \$100 per person was too much for our function and expenses in this matter. As a matter of fact, our books reflect that we have spent over this amount in cash per person; this does not take into account the fact that our farming program is upset when a family trades with us then moves before the year starts. Our houses and facilities have been tied up, our money spent, our organization thrown out of gear, etc. We cannot charge for this but feel that we should get our money back at least. We are sure that you agree and ask that you fulfill your responsibility in this matter by seeing that we receive our payment of \$117.48 as promptly as possible.

In this connection it is well to note that the Mississippi State Commission made a careful study of the suitability of resettlements, as a result of which there were many mutually agreed upon transfers and adjustments.

A sponsor, after asking a series of questions relative to what length of time displaced persons were obliged to remain with their sponsor, wrote:

As you can gather from the above questions my people are displaced persons who feel that they are not being properly treated in this country. Their employer seems to be making slaves of them and completely controls their leisure time as well as their time at work. They are very discouraged.

In another case an interested party wrote:

I wish to bring to your attention a tragic case concerning a displaced person family living in my community. Their name is ———. They have five children of various ages. They reside on the ——— farm. These people have come here through ——— organization.

The man and his 14-year-old son work on this farm for the sum of \$7.50 a week. Out of this amount they must pay 15 cents a day for school lunches for four of the children (\$3 per week). One dollar is to be paid for water. That leaves them mighty little for all other expenses.

This matter has been taken up with the priest and the employer promises to do better but when the time comes to pay, he claims that he cannot afford any more. The priest has admitted to me that the employer is of unstable mind. Why we should allow such people to have control over these people is what I can't understand.

These people have appealed to me to do something about their plight as they see nothing before them than starvation.

An interested citizen from Massachusetts reported:

* * * One of the provisions which made it possible for this girl to come to this country, as I understand it, was a contract she signed in which she agreed to work and live with this doctor's family for a period of 1 year. Already, after 3 weeks, she has found herself in an unbearable situation. She is made to sleep in a damp basement. To do the house, she is paid \$10 a week, including her board, and has been threatened with deportation by the doctor if she doesn't do everything she is told to do. She wants to leave this family but wants to remain in the United States. She apparently is a refined and well-educated girl. She is desperate but sees no alternative but to stay 1 year.

This situation to me smacks of involuntary servitude, contract or no contract. She has, of course, no money to try to gain her freedom in court.

From New York came the report of another case.

* * * They are in America 3 months. The woman is a cook for 14 men that work on the farm. Her husband and son work every day. Even her younger son washed the car and does different things for this so-called boss * * * they haven't received any salary since they are there. They are afraid to say anything because they think he would send them back to Europe.

Another sponsor wrote from Rhode Island of the successful resettlement of a family who had been exploited by a man in another State.

The ——— family was originally brought into America through the United States Displaced Persons Commission, and not through recognized church agency. They were sent to ——— where a farmer took advantage of them and used them as "slaves." There was no pay, and the diet consisted of potatoes and bacon fat for weeks on end.

The displaced persons became seriously ill, but were without any possible medical attention because they were so far from the town and because the sponsor cared nothing about their needs.

(5) Another cause for unsuccessful resettlements of displaced persons, which is not in any sense the DP's or anyone else's fault, was unexpected illness or death among them. From Virginia came the following report:

Mrs. ——— phoned to advise she received a ——— couple about 1 month ago from Philadelphia, * * *, presumably sent her by an agency. The prin-

cial applicant has not been well and the ——'s had him see a doctor who stated an operation would be necessary in 3 weeks. As the man is unable to do heavy farm work, the ——'s request either another —— couple which will make the work lighter for this man, or removal of this couple.

The following case was from Minnesota :

A displaced person husband and wife were sponsored to this country. The sponsor advanced money for transportation, food, rent, complete bed and express on belongings sent from Europe. After working for three months the DP husband took sick and subsequently died. Before his death the DP returned some of the money that had been advanced to him. After his death his wife received a substantial amount of life insurance, more than enough to pay all his debts, but to date has refused to pay the balance owed to the sponsor.

(6) Interference of the friends of displaced persons, often at some distance from the particular resettlement and almost always with the best of intentions and noblest purposes, frequently tended to harm the satisfactory relationship being built up between the sponsor and displaced person. The Lutheran Resettlement Service, in its annual report for 1949, stated :

An interesting problem arising in resettlement is that of the activities and attitudes of emotional and possessive sponsors. Sometimes it is difficult for these people to give the resettled persons freedom of choice and the right to personalities of their own. There have been few pastors who, although they have given generously of themselves to the program, have presented similar problems. The number of overemotional sponsors and pastors is small but they can create serious situations for the families in whom they are interested.

This problem was not confined to any one group or denomination :

It seemed well to call your attention to the attached complaint in that it focuses on a problem that has made its appearance quite frequently. You will note that the sponsor has requested the cancellation of his assurances on the score that each time he sponsored a displaced persons family a Catholic priest has influenced the displaced person to take up new association.

Another example of such interference :

Mr. —— says he has 14 families—very satisfied with them; but a German who has been in this country approximately 20 years constantly visits the DPs and is a disturbing influence—has threatened them unless they join his church (Protestant). Mr. —— is fearful of ultimate trouble and desires a trouble-shooter to come down and straighten things out.

(7) In many instances, unsatisfactory resettlements were due to causes completely beyond the control of either sponsors or DPs. Although sponsorships under normal immigration sometimes take 4 to 5 years to materialize, for some inexplicable reason everyone expected the DPs to come to the United States within a few days after filing their assurances. The delays, almost always incident to the length of the security investigation, the large number of United States Government agencies through whose hands the DPs had to pass, or the delay of nominations on the part of the voluntary agency designated by the sponsor to nominate the displaced person, caused irritation and bit-

terness. Many people were very careful of their obligations to provide housing and jobs, in many cases they built or renovated homes, reserved jobs, and made plans based on early arrivals, only to be held waiting for periods averaging about eight to nine months, and in complicated cases even longer. In some cases, sponsors held on despite the delay even when it meant that the actual arrivals came at very unpropitious time for them. In other cases, the delays resulted in canceled assurances and unfavorable local publicity.

The attitude of an individual sponsor experiencing such delays was clearly shown in the excerpts from this letter from Wisconsin.

All of us are completely sold on the objectives of the program, but all of us are thoroughly and completely disappointed with the length of time that seems to elapse between the signing of the assurances by the sponsor in our community, and the actual time of arrival of the displaced person in our community. There are instances in which 2 years have gone by, and still no results. I believe you are aware of the fact that our farmers are in dire need of help. Most of the assurances that I was successful in obtaining in this community are from farmers. Their work begins in April or May each year. They cannot wait for 2 years for help to arrive. The same applies to the city people. We know that it does take time, and for that reason we have been patient. But it is rather difficult and perhaps impossible for us to understand or to recognize the necessity of so long a time being necessary to process these people before they can come to our country.

Yesterday I had two farmers call on me to inform me that if their displaced person families would not arrive by May 1 at the latest, they would ask that their assurances be canceled. That is only one instance. Many other people, in the past 6 or 8 months, have done likewise, namely, asked that their assurances be canceled because of the length of time it had been taking to get the people to this country. It is an injustice to the sponsors in this country, and likewise it is an extreme injustice to the displaced persons themselves * * *

A letter from Colorado was much in the same vein :

May I add that our constituency has been greatly disappointed in the extended delay involved in the processing and transporting of the displaced persons. Assurances sent in more than a year ago still have not been filled. Farmers, especially beet and vegetable growers who had counted on such help in March and April, are at a loss, as once they fill houses with migrant or other labor, they cannot vacate them when the DPs arrive. Some have been compelled to decrease their acreage due to the nonarrival of DPs. Is there anything that can be done to expedite this processing and transportation?

And a letter from Ohio expressed the same concern :

Approximately 1 year ago, our Methodist church here decided to sponsor a displaced person family and application was made accordingly. Provision was made for furnishing housing and employment. We were advised that we might expect a family within a few months. Some time later, arrangements were made to take care of a second family consisting of mother and daughter, and employment with living accommodations was promised. Our minister has had considerable correspondence with various agencies, and directly with one of the families allotted to us but to date no one has been sent. Neither has any valid reason been given for the delay.

Occasionally the displaced person arrived in the United States, but did not go to the sponsor who was waiting to receive him.

Some months ago, we put our application in through the local Catholic Church for a man and his wife as domestic servants. In about May of this year, we were advised that the above-named couple had been assigned to us and we communicated with them in Germany, and we were advised by them that they would arrive in this country about the first of July. There was some delay, and we were then advised that they would not reach here until about August.

In the course of the correspondence, we were advised that they had a daughter, in Massachusetts. This couple arrived in New Orleans on or about August 15, but instead of coming to us they were routed to their daughter in Massachusetts.

While several of the categories overlap, most of the relatively small number of unsuccessful resettlements can be ascribed to one or the other of the following reasons:

- (1) Occupational maladjustment (principally in the farm cases);
- (2) Misconceptions of their responsibilities by the displaced persons;
- (3) Personality clashes;
- (4) Misconceptions or exploitation by sponsors;
- (5) Unexpected complications (death, illness);
- (6) Interference on the part of well-meaning "outsiders"; and
- (7) Causes beyond the control of either the DP or the sponsor.

These categories cover only those cases where the displaced person was finally placed with his sponsor. There were some other instances of difficulties because (1) the assurances were belatedly canceled due to the delay in the DP's arrival and (2) the sponsor changed his plans.

We must remember that in these complaints by sponsors, we have heard only one side of the story. As often as not, when the other side was heard, the incident had a completely different tone. Therefore, even as to the quotations cited above, one must constantly bear in mind that it is characteristic of the American sense of fair play and justice to hear both sides of a controversy before coming to conclusions.

Take, for example, the case of the Pennsylvania banker who was worried about a displaced person's loyalty to the United States because he frequently carried a brief case. "Why would he do that?" was the basis of his worry. Or take the case of the Kansas farmer who, after having gotten along well with his farm couple, suddenly frantically informed Washington that his DP's were "Communists." Upon investigation, it turned out that he reached this conclusion as a result of the DP's inquiry how he got "his social security" and how long the workday was. These sponsor complaints were investigated and found to be unreasonable.

In many instances, there is an inclination, perhaps, to take the word of the sponsor without hearing the DP's version of the incidents. When both sides were heard, it often, if not frequently, turned out that the unsuccessful resettlement was the sponsor's rather than the DP's fault.

Views of State Authorities

Earlier citation has been made from governors' reports to the House Judiciary Committee's request for resettlement information, and to the very large proportion of satisfied replies. Three States, however had comments indicating some dissatisfaction on this score.

Louisiana, which experienced considerable difficulty in the early days of the program reported that most of the applications for the 1,500 displaced persons who had come to that State had been for farmers, agricultural workers and domestics, but that few of them had actually qualified for these occupations. But the State's report went on to say that those persons who were farmers had assimilated into the community life with no difficulty and were adjusting socially and economically.

In fairness it must be pointed out that there is another side to the Louisiana story. The very voluntary agency which sponsored most of the Louisiana cases itself found that many sponsors were not providing suitable employment or satisfactory housing, and itself carried out a substantial re-resettlement program because of unsatisfactory sponsorship conditions.

In a report subsequent to the comments sent to the Congressional committee, the Louisiana Commission came to the following conclusion:

* * * the adjustment of persons who have settled in Louisiana is satisfactory on the whole. It is to be expected that in a mass movement of this kind a few instances will be found in which difficulties of varying extent arise. These should not lead, however, to minimize the success of this program.

Maryland also experienced difficulty with respect to farmers. The governor said:

The selection of displaced persons in Europe and their fitness for the occupations for which they were sponsored by our Maryland citizens have not been entirely satisfactory. Approximately 80 percent of the displaced persons arriving in Maryland * * * have either been experienced farmers or have had some agricultural experience and have shown a willingness to learn our farming methods.

The remaining 20 percent approximately have either had no agricultural experience whatsoever or else have had a minimum of agricultural background and have shown themselves to be unwilling to perform agricultural duties. This latter group have been a constant irritant to the sponsoring farmers and the majority of them have left the farms without notice.

Yet the governor tempered his remarks by adding:

On the over-all basis, the displaced persons have added something to local life, and except in a few instances, have created little difficulty. * * * The fact that approximately 80 percent of the displaced persons families have been satisfactory would indicate that the program has been successful so far, and that those individuals who have proved to be disappointing are overbalanced by the larger majority who have turned out satisfactorily.

The report of the North Carolina Commission on Displaced Persons also indicated some degree of dissatisfaction. But here also, the criticism was leveled, not so much against the displaced persons, as against the flaws in the program itself. The chairman of the State Commission reported:

Problems result not so much from the type of people as the procedure followed in getting them over here. * * * Specifically, there is lack of proper (occupational) screening and prompt action * * * the unlimited time—6 months or longer—which a sponsor may have to wait presents a drawback. * * * The tendency of those persons who have been located in North Carolina to leave placements in rural area and go to larger cities has also been a complicating factor.

The report went on to indicate that more thorough vocational and employment screening of displaced persons was necessary to effectuate a more satisfactory resettlement program.

In a subsequent report, dated May 1951, the North Carolina Commission gave the results of a study of displaced persons who had come into the State. Its conclusions were, in part:

The displaced persons who settled in North Carolina listed occupations from farmer to physician. Most of them were offered jobs suited to their occupations, though there were a few misfits * * *.

The comments concerning the displaced persons show, in many cases, how the person and his sponsor got along together. In many cases the relationship worked out very satisfactorily, but in a few there was dissension and unhappiness. * * * The ones included in this particular study seem likely to remain here as permanent citizens and to prove an asset to North Carolina.

Views of Voluntary Agencies—Pro and Con

Before concluding this assessment of the resettlement success achieved by the program, it is well to consider the views of the various voluntary agencies who were, after all, responsible for the major part of the resettlement program. Unlike the individual sponsor or displaced person, they could take a broadscale view of the operations, weighing good and bad, and drawing generalized and objective conclusions.

One nationality group wrote of the work:

At the end of our displaced persons projects we can say that the displaced persons have proved already to be an asset to the United States.

Politically, they have proved to be very strong and impressive propagandists against communism and fascism since they have suffered under the rule of both.

Economically, they came as a good help in good time for the growing American industry where they proved to be good and hard workers. They worked, earned, and paid their taxes, helping the national income as well as enlarging American consumer groups.

Socially, they brought with them a first-hand knowledge of various peoples, their customs and usages, and thus have enriched the American knowledge of the world.

Militarily, the displaced persons, whose age requires them to serve in the United States Armed Forces have answered readily their call of duty and, in our opinion, will do that always in the future when and if needed.

The agency has never received complaints from the employer who takes displaced persons for work. We have been given many nice praises for the stability and soundness of displaced person workers who were handled through our employment office. Though we do not have a definite statistical record on the mobility among the displaced persons, according to the estimate made by several large Chicago and Gary industries, the regular turnover percentage of DP workers has been as low as 7 percent. The stability of the DPs on their first job, in our experience and opinion, has been mostly due to their lack of knowledge of language, customs, and ideas, rather than the effect of the good faith oath. It might be added that a large number of DPs do not even know that they have made such an oath.

Another agency, in reviewing its work, wrote:

This report is being written 9 months before the program initiated under the Displaced Persons Act has been completed. Therefore, one can give only tentative evaluations of its strength and weaknesses. At the present time the general comments below seem appropriate. * * *

The program has been successful in that more than 300,000 homeless people have been admitted to the United States. Not only has this meant opportunity for the people concerned, but it has also given the United States world leadership in a program to help distressed people * * * family groups have been enabled to resettle together * * * the great majority of the people have prospered * * * more than 300,000 valuable potential citizens have been admitted.

The program has failed to become integrated with other government programs in welfare, health, housing, etc., because the United States Government assumed a minimum of responsibility for the welfare of the people after their arrival.

While the general public has not been well educated on the program, genuine effort has been made to keep them well informed. The tendency of the Displaced Persons Commission, the International Refugee Organization, and sometimes the voluntary agencies, to "glorify" the program rather than share with the people the real status of the program is understandable, but has not been helpful.

Nominations and assistance from Displaced Persons Commission overseas were sometimes excellent, particularly in November and December of 1951.

Another agency declared:

The value to the free world of the combined talents that have been transplanted to these shores through the campaign is something that cannot be computed in statistical or monetary terms. What is the worth of a distinguished cancer research specialist? Or of a highly qualified nuclear physicist? Or of an internationally famous sculptor? Or of a well-known political leader who risked his life many times to oppose both the Nazis and the Communists and whose personality is part of the limited spiritual capital of our times?

And again:

Our records show that not only have DP's sponsored by the ——— become useful citizens of the United States, but also a number of these people, most of whom were former Soviet citizens and who are now scattered in practically every State, are spreading anticommunist propaganda by word of mouth, lectures, articles in magazines, newspapers and books, * * * A number of students sponsored by the ——— have been very effective in countering all forms of Marxist propaganda on campuses and in factories by the simple recital of eyewitness testimony. Therefore, the usefulness of these DP's and escapees from

Soviet Russia, who are definitely counteracting Communist propaganda in the United States is self evident, not to mention the symbolic significance of this token of friendship to the Russian people who escaped from the terror inflicted by their government.

At the Commission's Third Resettlement Conference in January 1952, the executive director of the War Relief Services of the National Catholic Welfare Conference had this to say of the immigrants admitted:

I think their record is very bright, and the only thing about it people around the country hear of this little breakdown, or that breakdown—they only hear about the ones that breakdown. They don't hear about the hundreds of thousands of successful placements * * *.

At the same meeting, the supervisor of the resettlement service of the National Lutheran Council said:

I would like to present one other general principle along this same line, and it is this: It is not to be hoped that 100,000, 200,000 or 300,000 people, who have been homeless for 4, 5, 6 or 10 years, can be expected to cross the ocean and to find, in their first place of resettlement, always a permanent place of resettlement. That is unreal; it is unreal in our own immigration history. It is unreal in the history of man wherever he is.

Indeed, these people are here because they have had a tremendous will to survive. They do not sacrifice that will when they hit the American soil; rather they reinforce that will with the wish not to be ungrateful for the least we can give them, but a wish to be worthy American citizens, making the most of their opportunities that they can.

We have not brought to this country, and we should not bring to this country people whose only wish is to survive in the simplest way they can, with no energies; no ambitions; no wish to realize their full potentialities. We cannot hope, not being omniscient, that we can select for them across the seas, or as they enter the New York port, just the right place all the time. Those things we must keep in mind.

We can, however, if we will, limit the difficulties that attend resettlement.

In the summer of 1951, the executive director of the United Service for New Americans made this fuller appraisal:

On the whole, they have been willing workers, have taken jobs Americans would refuse, have learned our language and our ways, have sacrificed to give their children an American education, have tried to understand us and our bewilderingly heterogeneous culture pattern, have contributed to progress in agriculture, science, art, music, learning, medicine, literature and all other fields of endeavor. In business and in industry they have brought over new ideas or have improved on old ones. If a survey were made today, I am confident we would find that the newcomer enterprises have made jobs for more Americans than the combined total of all newcomers arriving since 1933. Many have distinguished themselves on the battlefield, knowing better than we for what they are fighting. Having known the evils of totalitarian doctrines, they have an acute appreciation of our democracy—they do not take democracy for granted as do most of us.

The difficulties encountered by the voluntary agencies in helping the newcomer to satisfactory resettlement were found to be much the same by all groups participating in the general effort.

Farm resettlements which proved unsatisfactory served to furnish the grounds for the most vocal and widespread criticism and publicity against the program. Although there were cases of exploitation, poor matching of immigrant's skills with available jobs, opportunism among the displaced persons, and inadequate education of both sponsors and immigrants, four main reasons were given by the voluntary agencies as the underlying causes for unsatisfactory farm resettlements. These were: (1) The vast differences between European farming methods and those employed in the United States; these differences revolved around the primitive, hand-farming methods still employed in parts of Europe and the highly mechanized farming practiced here; (2) language and cultural differences, particularly the language hazard which imposed a hardship on sponsor and displaced person alike, but which also served to prevent the displaced person from participating fully in community life and made him seek out persons of his own background; (3) the feeling of isolation that came from being on a farm several miles from the nearest neighbor in contrast to the custom of living in farm villages in Europe; and lastly, (4) the great mobility of the displaced persons, founded on their new-found freedom from a restraining force, the ease of movement in the United States, and comparative living standards in some farming communities and nearby industrial areas, which tempted the new arrivals to seek employment in industry.

General Observations

It appears evident that the misconception of both sponsors and displaced persons were in many cases responsible for the breakdown of a resettlement. As several of the case histories have pointed out, much of the fault seemed to lie in the lack of orientation given the displaced person before he left Europe and to the even more substantial lack of orientation of sponsors. As the displaced persons program progressed, an attempt was made to acquaint the displaced persons with the type of life they might expect in their new country and an effort was made to emphasize their obligations to sponsors and to the community. What was done, if anything, in orientation of sponsors was accomplished by the State commissions, committees, and the voluntary agencies. A more successful effort in both areas of orientation would have substantially improved the resettlement process.

Unexpected complications such as illness understandably would affect a placement but as we have seen in considering successful placements the illness itself need not necessarily be the cause of the breakdown, but the reaction of the sponsor to it frequently was.

Interference on the part of persons outside of the sponsor-displaced person relationship, although frequently well intended, often hampered the resettlement.

In general, one sees the displaced persons trying their best to make a new start on a life long shattered by totalitarianism of one kind or another. Even those whose first resettlement may have proved unsuccessful, soon adjusted, and there were many reports of highly successful second resettlements.

After all, if it was difficult for a sponsor to take a DP, sight unseen, from a different culture thousands of miles away, so was it difficult for the DP, too. False expectations by the DP, false expectations by the sponsor—these and other factors contributed to the relatively small number of unsuccessful resettlements. But even these, in time, with new sponsors or in new circumstances, proved in most cases to be satisfactory and in many cases highly effective for all concerned.

Perhaps we ask too much if we expect a family to settle down in a groove we prepare for them, without readjustments. The astonishing thing is that so few readjustments were necessary. Considering the some 370,000 people who migrated to the United States under the program administered by the Commission, it can safely be said that the vast and overwhelming preponderance of them have not only made successful resettlements, but also that in doing so they have made substantial and continuing contributions to the economy and culture of the United States.

Who They Were and Where They Went

The displaced persons, German expellees, Italian refugees, recent political refugees, orphans and others admitted into the United States under the Displaced Persons Act are now New Americans. Who were they? Where did they come from? What was their background? Where did they go in the United States? What are they doing here?

The previous chapter concerned itself with specific individuals in personal terms. This chapter deals with the group as a whole, in statistical and analytical terms.

Who They Were

Persons Admitted Into the United States

Some 395,000 were admitted to the United States when the last DP ship arrived on July 21, 1952. Some 5,000 persons, who were issued visas, will not arrive for several reasons: Death after the issuance of the visa, emigration to some other country, or rejection by the Immigration and Naturalization Service before embarking for the United States. Of those immigrants admitted to the United States by June 30, 1952, the largest proportion, or 90 percent, were processed under the program administered by the Commission. Final

tabulations as to number of refugees admitted to the United States in the 4 years of the program's operation are not available as this report goes to press.

By June 30, 1952, a total of 393,542 immigrants had been admitted under the Displaced Persons Act. (It is to be noted that this number includes only those actually admitted and not those visaed.) Eighty-five and seven-tenths percent of all immigrants admitted under the Act by this date were displaced persons; 13.6 percent were German expellees and less than 1 percent were orphans and adopted children of German ethnic origin. (See table 2, appendix 2.)

Country of Birth

Over 70 percent of the immigrants admitted to the United States under the DP Act, by May 31, 1952, were born in countries now occupied or dominated by the U. S. S. R. For the various combined programs the largest single group were Polish born immigrants, 34.0 percent. The second largest group was born in Germany, 15.0 percent. The third largest group included those who were Latvian born, 9.3 percent.

Within the IRO DP program itself, the three major countries of birth were Poland (including the Ukraine), with 37.0 percent; Germany, with 14.7 percent; and Latvia, with 10.4 percent. The proportions for Germany included German-born children of displaced persons of other countries.

Within the German expellee group admitted under the DP Act, the largest number was born in Yugoslavia, 31.4 percent. The next largest group was born in Germany, 16.5 percent. The third largest group was born in Poland, 12.1 percent. (See table 3, appendix 2.)

The country of birth distribution based on the number of immigrants admitted to the United States differs somewhat from that based on the country of origin of persons issued visas. (See table 30, appendix 2.)

Residence

Immigrants under the DP Act had first residences in every State in the United States and in the Territories and possessions.

Ten States included 78.2 percent of the immigrants, who came to the United States under the Act. These States are, in order of rank: New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Michigan, Ohio, California, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Wisconsin.

Seven of every 10 immigrants under the Act had first residences in the Middle Atlantic and East North Central States. (See table 4, appendix 2.)

Immigrants under the Displaced Persons Act were distributed as follows according to the type of area in which they were resettled:

Type of area	Percent		
	All immi- grants	Displaced persons	German expellees
Cities of 100,000 population and over in 1950.....	58.6	53.4	58.9
Cities of 2,500 population but less than 100,000.....	23.5	26.3	23.3
Rural areas with less than 2,500 population.....	17.9	20.3	17.8

Forty-three and two-tenths percent of all immigrants under the DP Act had first residence in the 10 largest cities of the United States, according to the 1950 census.

10 largest cities	Percent of all immigrants
All.....	43.2
New York City.....	24.3
Chicago.....	7.8
Philadelphia.....	2.9
Detroit.....	2.7
Cleveland.....	2.1
Los Angeles.....	1.1
Baltimore.....	.8
Pittsburgh.....	.7
Washington, D. C.....	.4
St. Louis.....	.4

First Occupations

By May 31, 1952, a total of 187,925 immigrant heads of families and single adults had been admitted within all the various groups under the Act. The largest number were assured employment in farming. Semiskilled employment was in second place. In third place, was work as domestic and household workers.

Among the IRO displaced persons, of the 172,101 heads of families and single adults, the largest proportion received assured employment in farming, with employment in semiskilled work and in laboring occupations following in that order.

The occupations of the 15,741 German expellee heads of families and single adults were first in farming; second, in domestic work; and third, in semiskilled work. (See table 5, appendix 2.)

Age

The age composition of immigrants under the DP Act exhibits some of the characteristics of a young and growing population. Twenty-nine and five-tenths percent were below the age of 20, while 87.6 percent were below the age of 50. The DP Act brought to the United States a population younger than the average age of people in the United States. There was a relatively high proportion of children under 5 years. The greatest concentration of people was in

the age groups 25 through 49 years. And the number of people over 50 was considerably lower than in the United States population. This group is a productive one because of the concentration in the labor force ages.

Several factors appear to be responsible for the age structure of this group admitted under the DP Act: (1) The largest group of those admitted were displaced persons who were the victims of the Nazi labor program. The young and strong were selected, and were 20 to 40 years at the time they became slave-laborers for totalitarianism. (2) Opportunity for bearing children and for marriage in this DP group was lacking during the period of persecution and forced labor. This accounts for the gap in the 5 through 24 year groups. (3) Increased postwar births account for the large proportion of young children under 5 years of age. (See table 6, appendix 2.)

Sex

Immigration under the DP Act had a higher proportion of men, as against women, than the population in the United States. There were 119.3 males for each 100 females among immigrants admitted under the DP Act. In the United States population on April 1, 1950, the sexes were more evenly distributed, 98.1 males for each 100 females.

The proportion of females in the United States population has been rising since about 1910. This process of a decline in the sex ratio is attributed by the Bureau of the Census, in large part, to reduced immigration. Before the quota system was imposed, the majority of immigrants to the United States was males. The following percentages of immigrants were males and females:

Fiscal year	Male		Female	
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
1901-10.....	69.8	30.2	30.5	69.5
1911-20.....	63.5	36.5	44.4	55.6
1921-30.....	55.6	44.4	56.6	43.4
1931-40.....	43.4	56.6	66.2	33.8
1941-50.....	33.8	66.2		

The above percentages indicate the increasing proportion of female immigrants, especially since the enactment of restrictive immigration legislation. However, since the admission of postwar refugees the proportion of males in total immigration has shown a gradual increase. The sex ratio of 54.4 percent males to 45.6 percent females in the group of immigrants under the DP Act is similar to that of the pattern of prequota system immigration. The proportion of males and females in total immigration, including the DP Act and normal immigration, for the fiscal years 1946-51 is as follows:

Fiscal year	Male		Female	
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
1946.....	25.1	74.9		
1947.....	36.5	63.5		
1948.....	39.5	60.5		
1949.....	42.7	57.3		
1950.....	47.8	52.2		
1951.....	48.3	51.7		

The IRO DP group had more men than women whereas the German expellees included more women than men. The larger proportion of women in the German expellee group was in part due to the number of widowed women in this group. The following proportions of males and females are included in the group of immigrants under the DP Act:

Immigrants admitted	Males		Females	
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
All immigrants.....	54.4	45.6		
Displaced persons ¹	54.9	45.1		
German expellees.....	49.7	50.3		

¹ Includes orphans and Italian refugees from Venezia Giulia.

Family Size and Composition

About three of every four immigrants admitted to the United States under the DP Act were a part of a family group. The rest were single adults.

The average (median) size of families of two or more persons was 2.9 persons. The average (median) size of families among the DP's was 2.8 persons, and 3.2 persons for German expellees.

More than half the families under the DP Act were single adults. For the DP group, 52.2 percent were single adults; for the German expellee group, 44.8 percent.

Under the DP Act, a "family" included only the father, mother, and minor dependent unmarried children. Unattached persons and non-married children over 21 years of age were classified as single adults. They are accounted for statistically as single adults under the Act. Therefore, these figures underestimate the proportion of families of two or more persons, since many persons listed as single persons, under the law, were really part of a family, sociologically speaking. (See table 7, appendix 2.)

Education

Each immigrant who entered the country reported what schooling he had completed. However, this information must be used with some caution in making comparison with the educational achievement

of the native population in the United States. The reason for this necessary caution is the difficulty and the lack of precision in transforming those reports as to the overseas education of immigrant displaced persons into American educational equivalents.

Further consideration must be taken of the interruption of schooling for a decade or more of the group under 25 years of age. These young people were the victims of totalitarian aggression and of World War II.

In spite of this shortcoming in the data, the number of years of schooling reported by immigrants admitted by May 31, 1952, gives a rough measure of their educational attainment. For the entire group, 5 years of age and over, 96 percent reported some schooling. (See table 8, appendix 2.)

Immigrants who have come to the United States under the Act reported schooling as follows:

Age group	Percent with some elementary	Percent with some high school	Percent with some higher	Median years of schooling for group ¹
5 to 9 years.....	54.3			1.2
10 to 13 years.....	98.9	0.1		5.2
14 to 17 years.....	79.2	20.6	0.1	7.8
18 to 19 years.....	62.7	35.2	2.1	8.3
20 to 24 years.....	65.5	27.4	7.1	8.2
25 years and over.....	61.1	23.2	14.8	7.9

¹ Includes those with no schooling.

The average (median) years of schooling completed by the adult immigrant group, 25 years of age and over, was 7.9 years. The whole population of the United States in 1950, had a median of 9.3 years of schooling completed for the adult population.

The median for the DP group, 25 years of age and over, was 7.9 years of schooling completed, as compared with a median of 7.5 years for the German expellee group.

Marital Status

Twenty-nine and six-tenths percent of those immigrants, 14 years of age and over, who entered the United States under the DP Act were single, as compared with 21.6 percent for this age group in the United States civilian population in 1951. Married persons in this age group comprised 62.6 percent of the immigrant group under the DP Act, as against 68.1 percent for the United States population; widowed persons, 6.2 percent of the immigrant group, as against 8.4 percent for the United States population; and divorced persons, 1.6 percent of the immigrant group under the DP Act as against 1.9 percent for the United States population.

For the group 14 years of age and over the marital status was as follows:

Marital status	All immigrants 14 years and over	Displaced persons	German expellees
	Percent	Percent	Percent
Single.....	29.6	29.6	30.1
Married.....	62.6	62.8	59.9
Widowed.....	6.2	6.0	8.4
Divorced.....	1.6	1.6	1.6

Religion

Forty-seven percent of all the immigrants under the DP Act were of the Catholic faith; 35 percent of the Protestant and Orthodox faith; 16 percent of the Jewish faith, and the remaining two percent of other faiths.

Displaced Persons, as a group, had 47 percent of the Catholic faith; 34 percent of the Protestant and Orthodox faith; 18 percent of the Jewish faith; and one percent of other faiths.

More than half of the German expellee group, 51 percent, were of the Catholic faith; the remaining 49 percent were of the Protestant and Orthodox faith.

Where They Went

The Displaced Persons Act required that each displaced person, other than an orphan, who entered the country under section 2 report semiannually as to his place of residence, place of employment and current occupation. The group required to make reports comprised the majority of displaced persons under the Act—those from Germany, Austria, and Italy, as well as Italian refugees from Venezia Giulia, and recent political refugees. Reports were not required from expellees. Four reports were required, one every 6 months over a 2-year period on July 1 and January 1. The head of the family must submit a report for his spouse and for children who were unmarried, dependent, and under 21 years of age at time of immigration.

The Displaced Persons

Findings

(1) The major movements were out of the South and into the North Central region. The net movements in and out of the North East and Far West were small, but have been increasing.

(2) The major movements were into urban areas and from rural areas.

(3) The number of persons entering the labor force has been very high, averaging about 60 percent of the total number reporting.

(4) Employment of those in the labor force has been very high, averaging about 95 percent.

(5) The major changes in occupations were reflected in a decreasing proportion of farmers and an increasing proportion of semi-skilled workers.

These findings and the substantiating material which follows incorporate the results of the semiannual reports of DP's for December 1950 and December 1951. The group reporting in December 1950 primarily consisted of those DP's who entered the country prior to the amended Act of 1950. The group reporting in December 1951 principally included those DP's admitted under the amended Act.

Residence

Movement of people from one area to another is a characteristic feature of American life. It has been the most important factor affecting the distribution of population within the United States. Americans as a group are extremely mobile and from colonial times have pursued opportunity about the country.

Between 1940 and 1947—a war and postwar period—about 21 percent of the United States population as a whole were migrants, as compared with 13 percent between 1935 and 1940—a depression period. Between 1940 and 1950, data from the census indicate about one of every five persons had changed residence within the United States.

Net migration patterns for the United States population, unrelated to the DP immigration, exhibited the following characteristics:

(1) The major movement was out of the South and the West was the principal receiving region. Net movements out of the North Central and North East regions were small.

(2) The country to city trend continued.

(3) The farm population continued to decrease; and the rate of movement away from the farm accelerated during the wartime periods.

(4) The principal reason for migration within the United States was economic opportunity.


The DP's have adapted themselves to this characteristic American pattern of mobility. The fact is revealed by a comparison of the region of first residence and the region of current residence for the groups reporting in December 1950 and 1951. Charts 1 and 2 reveal the regions of significant shifts to be the South and the North Central States. The West and the Northeast show changes of a lesser degree.

The regional distribution of displaced persons differed somewhat from the distribution of the United States population. DP's who reported in December 1950 and 1951 were somewhat more concentrated in the Northeast and the North Central States than the rest of the population of the United States. (See charts 3 and 4.)

Several characteristics of the DP group reporting in December 1951, which differ from those of the earlier group should be noted. This group left the Northeast region in greater proportion as a result of a movement from the Middle Atlantic States, especially New York.

This group showed a greater tendency than the earlier group to move into the North Central States, especially Illinois.

CHART 1.—Net change from first to current residence of displaced persons reporting in December 1950, by geographic regions.




Note.—See table 9, appendix 2.

The proportion of this group remaining in the South, after movement, was smaller.

Finally, this group moved to the West, in larger proportion, assuming the migration pattern of Americans for moving into the Pacific States of Washington, Oregon, and California.


The December 1950 reports of immigrant displaced persons were studied by type of area of first and current residence as defined in the

CHART 2.—Change from first to current residence of immigrant displaced persons reporting in December 1951, by geographic regions.




NOTE.—See table 10, appendix 2.

CHART 3.—Percent distribution of displaced persons reporting in December 1950, by current residence, and of United States population.



1940 census. Changes in the definitions of rural and urban areas in the 1950 census limit the possibility of making a precise comparison of the United States population and displaced persons on the basis of 1950 definitions. However, the preferences of both native Americans and displaced persons for urban living is indicated by a comparison of percentages. Sixty-four percent of the United States population in April 1950 were classified as urban. About 89.6 percent of all displaced persons reporting in December 1950 were in urban areas.

CHART 4.—Percent distribution of displaced persons reporting in December 1951, by current residence, and of United States population.



Twenty-nine and six-tenths percent of the United States population resided in cities of 100,000 population and over as against 65.0 percent for displaced persons. (See charts 5 and 6.)

The number reporting current residence in 1950 in a city of 100,000 population and over when compared with those reporting first residence, increased some 24.2 percent. Rural areas on the other hand show a 56.1 percent net loss. This net loss for rural areas and net gain for large cities occurred in all regions, except the South—the region of most significant change—which shows a loss for every type of area.

There were 26.1 percent more displaced persons reporting current residence in 1950 in 1 of the 10 largest cities (ranked according to the 1940 census) than reported first residence. Those cities in the North Central States showed the greatest percent net gain—70.9 percent—from first to current residence in one of the ten largest cities in 1940. (See table 11, appendix 2.)

The DP group reporting in December 1951 continued to move into urban centers. As the definitions of rural-urban residence for this group are the same as those used in the 1950 census, the United States population and DP's can be compared as to rural and urban living. Sixty-four percent of the United States population were urban residents as against 92.6 percent of the DP's. In cities of 100,000 popula-

CHART 5.





CHART 6.



tion and over, 29.6 percent of the United States population were residing as compared with 68.0 percent for the DP group.

The number in this group residing in a city of 100,000 population and over in 1950 increased 17.0 percent over that number originally residing in a city of such a size. The number in rural areas decreased by 58.1 percent.

The movement into the 10 largest cities (as defined in the 1950 census) declined somewhat in the case of this 1951 reporting group as compared with the 1950 group. The net increase in the number moving into such cities was 5.1 percent. (See table 12, appendix 2.)

Special tabulations of the December 1951 reports were made to indicate the distribution of this group according to the area of the country in which they were residing and their country of birth.

In every area except the Middle Atlantic States, the two largest groups were Poles and Latvians. In the Middle Atlantic States, Polish-born DP's were largest group, with German-born DP's in second place. See table 13, appendix 2.)

Labor Force Status

The high proportion of males, single adults, and of people in the productive ages, together with a high degree of educational attain-

ment accounted for the high labor force participation of the DP group. Sixty and five-tenths percent of the entire group of displaced persons reporting in December 1950, inclusive of children, were employed or seeking employment. The labor force participation of the group reporting a year later was substantially the same—59.3 percent.

Those in the labor force included family heads, spouses, and children in the following proportions:

Family status	Group reporting in December 1950	Group reporting in December 1951
	Percent	Percent
Family heads, including single adults.....	94.6	92.5
Spouses.....	42.9	39.1
Children (up to age 21).....	9.3	7.4

Under the Displaced Persons Act, each family head or single adult was assured a job in this country before immigration. The number of family heads and single adults entering the country constituted a minimum but immediate addition to the labor force. Once the immigrant family became settled, wives and older children of labor force age sought employment and became active members of the labor force.

For the group 14 years of age and over, 75.4 percent were in the labor force in December 1950 as compared with 73.5 percent in December 1951. In contrast, in this same month in 1950, 56.2 percent of the noninstitutional population of the United States were in the labor force; and a year later, 57.4 percent.

The incidence of unemployment among displaced persons in the labor force in December 1950 was slightly higher than for those in the United States civilian labor force in this same month—4.3 percent against 3.6 percent. In December 1951, the incidence of unemployment for DP's was 5.2 percent of the labor force as against 2.7 percent for the United States civilian labor force. The unemployment rates of heads of families and single adults, of spouses, and of children for the two groups reporting were as follows:


Family status	December 1950	December 1951
	Percent	Percent
Heads of families and single adults.....	4.3	5.4
Spouses.....	4.2	4.4
Children (up to age 21).....	8.9	4.2

The educational attainment of those in the displaced persons labor force in December 1951 compared very well with that of most American workers. The average (median) years of schooling completed for employed DP's in December 1951 was 8.3 years.

The average educational attainment for the DP workers in the labor force in December 1951 was as follows:

	Median years of schooling
Professional and technical workers.....	14.8
Clerical workers.....	11.6
Sales workers.....	10.4
Managers, officials, and proprietors.....	10.1
Service workers.....	8.6

CHART 7.—Distribution of DP heads of families and single adults reporting in December 1950, by current and sponsored occupations.




Note: Occupational categories based on 1940 Census classification

	Median years of schooling
Private household workers.....	8.4
Skilled workers.....	8.0
Semiskilled workers.....	8.0
Laborers.....	7.3
Farmers and farm laborers.....	6.5
Workers seeking employment.....	8.0

Of the employed workers reporting in December 1951, all but six-tenths of 1 percent had some schooling. (See table 14, appendix 2.)

CHART 8.—Distribution of DP heads of families and single adults reporting in December 1951, by current and sponsored occupations.



NOTE.—Occupational categories based on 1950 census classification.

Occupations

Heads of DP families and single adults made adjustments in employment since coming to this country. Principally, this change was reflected in a decrease in farming and related agricultural pursuits and an increase in semiskilled work. (See tables 15 and 16 appendix 2.) (See charts 7 and 8.)

Current occupations of displaced persons—inclusive of heads of families and single adults, spouses, and children—indicated that a large proportion of those employed were engaged in semiskilled and laboring occupations. Further, a number of these people were finding employment in professional, managerial, and business occupations. (See tables 17 and 18 appendix 2.)

Adjustment

Movements of displaced persons, in the early stages of resettlement, were intended for the most part, to better their living standards.

In the period of adjustment, the immigrant was likely to work temporarily in his sponsored employment—that is, the job he was brought over to perform—and then to seek work in those jobs in which his immigrant status did not present a handicap. The unskilled worker was better able to move from a job, which was of a manual nature in his homeland, to a similar position in the United States. The requirements of knowledge of the English language and of American labor conditions were not of overwhelming importance in the case of the unskilled worker. However, for the businessman, the teacher, the writer, and for various other business and professional positions, knowledge of professional and business life, facility in language use, financial resources, and social connections were of great importance. These factors probably accounted for the small proportion of displaced persons in the professional, managerial, and the proprietary occupations, although as they became better adjusted, more of them were becoming established in these occupations than were originally assured employment in them. The majority of DP's reported employment in semiskilled and laboring occupations.

The occupations that displaced persons followed, once they become established, in this country, were naturally affected by the demands of the labor market. This accounted, in part, for the marked shift of displaced persons from assured employment in farming to other jobs, particularly those of a semiskilled type. In considerable part, the DP's employment was a factor of the competition among American employers for his services.

Displaced persons, like native Americans, moved from farming areas and sought jobs in urban areas. In the United States, the long term trend of the farm population has been downward. The number of farm residents has been reduced by about 25 percent over the past four decades. Migration from the farm increased in tempo in war-

time. This was our experience during World War II, when the number of persons living on farms fell by some 5 million between 1940 and the peak of the war in 1944-45. This seems to be the experience of the Korean war, with a decline of about 1 million in the farm population between April 1950 and April 1951.

Another trend in American agriculture has been a decline in the average employment of the hired farm worker since World War I as a result of mechanical and technological developments. Hired farm workers make up slightly more than a fifth of the total farm employment in the United States. In 1950, only about 775,000 of the 5½ million farm wage workers were the regular hands who worked as much as 6 months continuously on one farm. An additional 600,000 did sufficient farm wage work during the year to make it their chief occupation. About 1.6 million did less than 25 days of farm wage work.

In addition to declining employment in farming in the United States, several other factors affected the resettlement of displaced persons on farms in this country—the relative isolation of farms, the apparently higher wages in the city, and the financial arrangements of farmers in some areas of the country.

The failure of farm wages to rise relative to those of workers in the city has been a factor in encouraging native workers to leave farms. No doubt this has also been a factor in inducing immigrant displaced persons to seek opportunity in the city. Although in 1951, cash farm wages were 10 percent higher than those of 1950, real farm wages did not rise. In only one State were cash farm wages as much as 60 percent of hourly earnings of manufacturing workers. Even where allowance is made for services, food, and other noncash income furnished farm workers in addition to their salary, in only two States were farm wages 80 percent or more of manufacturing wages. In some States, particularly the North Central States, noncash income, including housing and board, is high for hired farm workers. However, the inducements of vacations with pay, unemployment insurances, workmen's compensation, welfare services, retirement pensions, and shorter working hours have been powerful influences for both native and immigrant farm workers to migrate to industrial areas.

One of the major factors affecting the movements of DP's from one area of the country to another or between cities and rural areas within the same State was the opportunity to improve their standards of living. A study of the interstate movements of DP's reporting in 1950 indicated that where the DP has only limited opportunity to better his social and economic status he will move to a State where such opportunity seems to be available. This is substantiated by the fact that where economic opportunity is low, as indicated by income payments per inhabitant of the State, DP's have moved away. The reports show that the lower the economic status, the greater the move-

ment. DP's moved out of 33 states—27 of these had per capita incomes in 1950 below the national average. DP's moved into 15 States—14 of these had per capita incomes in 1950 above the national average. (See table 19, appendix 2.)

In general, the movement of DP's followed the same patterns as the movement of native Americans in the United States.

The German Expellees

German expellees who entered the country were not required, as were displaced persons entering under section 2, to report semi-annually to the Commission. As a result, information as to their adjustment in the United States was not available. In order to provide information on aspects of their adjustment the Commission made a sample survey of the group of expellees entering the country between June 16, 1950, and March 1, 1952. As a result of this special survey, more detailed information is available on expellees than on DP's.

What are the facts? How has this group adjusted? Has it made resettlement adjustments in quest of higher living standards as have native Americans and displaced persons? What progress have the members of this group made toward assimilation? What contributions are they making to our economic and cultural life?

To provide answers to these questions, information was elicited from respondents as to residence, occupation, labor force status, housing, applications for citizenship, and adjustment problems.

In order to have as representative a sample as possible of this group, with the limited time, funds, professional and clerical staff at hand, a random sample of those admitted by March 1, 1952, was taken from the nominal rolls. Questionnaires were mailed directly to those immigrants selected.

In spite of the difficulty in communicating with some of these people, the return was remarkable. Of 644 questionnaires sent out, 599 were returned by the cut-off date. This is a return of 86.8 percent.

The population group from which the sample was taken included 16,994 persons and 7,425 heads of families and single adults. The sample return covered 1,888 persons (or 11.1 percent of the total number admitted by March 1, 1952) including 650 heads of families and single adults, or 8.8 percent of the total number of heads of families. This survey covered 559 families including single person families. The 45 families who failed to respond were, for the most part, living in cities and included a number of single adults. The failure of these families to respond, or the inability to communicate with them, has weighted the sample toward rural families, and accounts, to some extent, for the large proportion of heads of families and single adults with first occupations in farming.

In general, however, this sample study is representative of the group of expellees admitted, under the amended Act, by March 1, 1952, in terms of area of birth, sex and religion, although as indicated it may be somewhat less representative as to urban-rural resettlement.

Findings

(1) The German expellee group moved into the New England,

Pacific, and East North Central States. It moved away from the South, and to some extent from the Mountain, and the West North Central, and Middle Atlantic States.

(2) The German expellee group moved out of rural farm areas and into urban and rural nonfarm areas.

(3) The number of people entering the labor force has been very high, some 64 percent, which is higher than that of our native population.

(4) The major changes in occupations of heads of families and single adults were reflected in a decreasing proportion of farmers and domestic workers and an increasing proportion of skilled and semi-skilled workers.

(5) For the most part, this group was able to secure satisfactory employment and housing.

Residence

About 75 percent of the expellee immigrant group reporting in the sample survey were located in the Middle Atlantic and North Central States. (See table 20, appendix 2.)

German expellees, like displaced persons, moved into New England, the East North Central, and the Pacific States of the United States. They moved out of the Middle Atlantic, the West North Central, and the Southern States. (See table 21, appendix 2.)

Three of every ten persons (30.1 percent in the sample study resided in rural areas. Two of every ten (22.3 percent) resided in a rural farm area; and 1 of every 10 (7.8 percent) in a rural nonfarm area. German expellees, like displaced persons and native Americans, reside for the most part in urban centers.

In the East North Central, Middle Atlantic, Pacific, and East South Central States, approximately 7 of every 10 persons reporting were living in urban areas. In the Mountain, South Atlantic, West South Central, and West North Central, and New England States, more than one-third of those reporting were living in farm areas. (See table 22, appendix 2.)

Labor Force Status

As questionnaires were returned during May 1952, the labor force status of those responding in the sample study is for that month. Of the group 14 years of age and over, 64 percent were in the labor force—employed or seeking employment. For those in the labor force, 99 percent reported they were employed.

Thirty percent of those employed were semiskilled workers. In second place, were farmers, who comprised 17 percent of the employed group. In third place, were skilled workers who made up 16 percent of those employed. (See table 23, appendix 2.)

Information as to wages earned a week was requested for each member of the respondent's family who was employed. Ninety-five percent of those employed responded and reported wages earned during the last week in May.

For the entire group, 14 years of age and over, reporting wages, the average (median) wage was \$41.99. The range of wages was from no wages for the last week for one agricultural employee to \$130 a week reported by a skilled worker in the North Central States.

The largest proportion of the group earned between \$30 and \$40 a week. About 7 of every 10 workers earned between \$20 and \$60 a week. Less than 1 of every 10 workers earned \$70 or more a week. (See table 24, appendix 2.)

In the East North Central and Pacific States the average (median) wage earned by employed expellee immigrants was above that for the entire group. In all other areas it was lower than the average for the group. (See table 25, appendix 2.)

The average (median) wage of those employed varied according to major occupational group. The lowest average (median) wage was that of household workers, the highest that of professional and technical workers. (See table 26, appendix 2.)

The average (median) weekly wage of the major occupational groups varied according to the area of the country in which expellees resided.

For the farming group, it was highest in the Pacific and Mountain States—averaging \$40 a week, while it was lowest in the East South Central States, averaging \$23.33 a week.

For the private household worker group, it was highest in the Pacific States where the average was \$31.25 a week and lowest in the West South Central States where the average was \$17.50 a week.

Semiskilled workers on the average earned the highest weekly wage in the East North Central States—\$49.26 a week; and the lowest weekly wage in the West South Central States—\$27.50 a week.

Laborers, on the average, earned the highest wage in the East North Central States—\$55.93 a week, and the lowest wage in the Mountain and West South Central States—\$45 a week.

Skilled workers, on the average, earned \$67.50 a week in the South Atlantic States, the highest average wage for this group, as compared with \$45 a week in the East South Central States, the lowest average wage for this group.

Service workers, other than domestics, earned on the average \$55 a week in the Mountain States—the highest average wage, as against the lowest average weekly wage for the group of \$17.50 in the West South Central States.

Clerical workers had an average weekly wage of \$65 in the West North Central States, the highest average, as compared with an average of \$27.50 in the Mountain States.

Sales workers earned on the average \$55 a week in the New England States, the highest average wage for the group, as against \$25 a week in the West North Central States, the lowest average weekly wage.

Professional and technical workers earned on the average the highest weekly wage, ranging from a high of \$75 a week in the New England and West North Central States to a low of \$45 in the East North Central States.

As with displaced persons, movements and changes of residence by expelles reflected efforts to improve their economic conditions. The average (median) weekly wage was related to the net movements in and out of groups of States. Expellees moved into States where the average (median) weekly wage was above or close to the over-all average wage among all the States. On the other hand, expellees moved out of States where the average (median) wage fell markedly below this over-all wage average.

About 23 percent of the families surveyed (including single-person families) reported that they were receiving some kind of cash or noncash income in addition to wages. About two of every three families (including single-person families) reporting additional income were receiving free housing or rent. The next largest group was receiving food or board. (See table 27, appendix 2.)

Occupations

Information was collected concerning the occupations of employed heads of families and single adults—jobs for which sponsored, and current jobs.

Attempts were made to adjust sponsored occupations of immigrant heads of families and single adults in terms of what the immigrant head reported as his first job. A substantial number of heads of families, listed by the nominal roll as laborers, actually were placed as farm laborers. This accounted for some variation in the proportion of farmers as tabulated from the visa and the proportion in the sample study.

The distributions of the occupations of those heads of families and single adults reporting employment showed some differences between sponsored and current occupations. Forty percent of the heads of families were sponsored for farming employment; about 20 percent were currently practicing farming at the time of the questionnaire return. Twelve percent were sponsored for semiskilled work and 26 percent reported such work as their current occupation. Opportunities for better jobs in this field seem to have induced heads of families to move into this type of employment. In the case of skilled workers, 10 percent were sponsored for that kind of work, and 20 percent reported their current employment as skilled. (See table 28, appendix 2.)

Heads of families and single adults were asked whether or not they were employed at their sponsored occupations, and if not, what their reasons were for leaving.

Of the 650 family heads and single adults covered in this survey, 93 percent responded to the question. Fifty-five percent reported

they had left their sponsored occupation, and 45 percent reported that they were still employed at their sponsored job.

Of the number of heads of families and single adults who reported they are no longer at sponsored jobs, over one-third (35 percent) gave as their reason for leaving that they received a better offer of a new job. About one-fourth (24 percent) gave as their reason that the sponsor's plans had changed before the expellees arrived. (See table 29, appendix 2.)

Housing

A total of 559 families, including single-person families, reported in this survey. Ninety-eight percent provided information as to whether or not they were living with relatives.

Of those responding, 69 percent were not living with relatives as compared with 31 percent who were.

According to the type of area in which expellees were currently residing, the following proportions of those responding were not living with relatives.

Type of area	Percent not living with relatives
Cities of 100,000 population and over.....	65
Cities of 2,500 to 99,999 population.....	67
Rural nonfarm.....	67
Rural farm.....	86

Ninety-eight percent of the families surveyed (including single-person families) reported as to whether, in their opinion, their current housing was satisfactory. Of those responding, 96 percent reported their housing satisfactory as against 4 percent, unsatisfactory.

Forty-six percent of the expellees responding were living in private dwellings; 29 percent in unfurnished apartments; and 25 percent, in furnished apartments.

Heads of expellee households were requested to provide information concerning housing facilities. Of the 559 families surveyed (including single-person families), 548 (98 percent) provided information on heating facilities. Ninety-seven percent of those who responded reported having heating facilities.

Five hundred and fifty families (including single-person families) provided information as to whether they had toilet facilities, mechanical refrigeration, use of a telephone, electric lighting, and running water. The responses were as follows:

Facility	Number of families with facility	Percent of those reporting
Inside toilet.....	455	83
Mechanical refrigeration.....	440	80
Telephone or use of telephone.....	222	40
Electric lighting.....	544	99
Running water.....	499	91

In general, those who did not have running water in the house or lacked inside toilet facilities were residing in rural farm areas.

For the most part, the housing facilities provided for expellees were satisfactory.

Adjustment

Information was elicited from respondents in the sample study as to application for citizenship, attendance in schools since coming to this country, and difficulties in adjustment encountered since arrival.

The results gave some evidence of the extent to which expellees were adjusting to the American scene.

An immigrant who enters the United States may immediately make his declaration of intention toward becoming a citizen of the United States. This declaration of intention is his "first paper" and may be applied for only if he is 18 years of age and older. The immigrant is not required to speak English when he applies for his "first paper."

Of a total of 1,182 immigrant expellees 18 years of age and over, 1,170 (99 percent) responded to the question concerning application for citizenship. Three hundred and thirty-eight (29 percent) of those responding had taken out their first papers while 71 percent had not. Twenty-eight percent of the males and 30 percent of the females had taken out first papers.

The proportion who applied for citizenship increased as the number of months of residence in the United States increased.

Number of months of residence in United States	Number in group	Number applying for citizenship	Percent of number in group
1 to 3	53	14	26
4 to 6	446	81	18
7 to 9	486	160	33
10 to 12	118	53	45
13 to 15	66	29	44
16 to 18	1	1	100

Heads of families were requested to reply to a question concerning the kinds of schools they or members of their families had attended since coming to the United States. About one of every three families had some member, besides children normally enrolled in school, who was in elementary school, high school, college, business school, trade school, or citizenship school. One of every ten heads of families reported someone in the family attending citizenship classes. Less than 1 percent reported anyone completing college education. About 5 percent reported some member of the family attending a trade school.

Two of every five families (including single-person families) reported no problems of any scope since coming to this country.

The attitude of these families was exemplified in the following response of a family head in Philadelphia, who is working as a carpenter:

I did not have a great difficulty or problem in this country. I have had work from the first day, also an apartment. Both of my children are going to school.

A foundry worker in Milwaukee reported:

The American way of life is indeed a most gratifying experience to my family—I shall do my best to become a good citizen of this greatest land in all the world.

A highly skilled high-frequency technician, whose sponsor helped him secure a better job, reported from Pennsylvania:

Our sponsor is a wonderful person; I'm living in a country of great freedom and wide opportunity as chance of work for anybody willing to work. I am trying to live as to go along the so-called American way. I'm well-liked as respected at and in my work * * * We are here in America—just eight months * * * I have more than I would ever have in Europe. Why should I be not satisfied?

Half of the families reporting indicated language as their greatest difficulty; many indicated that they were making great progress toward overcoming this handicap. Sixteen families (3 percent) of those surveyed indicated that they had housing problems when they arrived in this country. Difficulties of a financial and economic nature were reported by 3 percent of the families surveyed. Difficulties which have arisen because of job misplacements were reported by 1 percent of the families. About 1 percent of the families responding reported homesickness and unfamiliarity with customs in the United States as sources of difficulty.

Some other difficulties reported by families included: (1) Learning to operate farm equipment; (2) isolation on the farm; (3) illness and poor health; (4) alleged mistreatment by the sponsor; (5) separation from friends and family; and (6) inability to secure assistance when in financial difficulties.

In general, the expellee group showed progress in becoming a part of the American community. This was evidenced by its contribution to the economic potential of this country by its high labor force participation and high levels of employment. This was evidenced by the tendency for this group to increase its applications for citizenship as the length of time in the country increases. This was evidenced by its attempt to better its status by becoming facile in the use of the English language, and its tendency to take advantage of educational facilities. This was evidenced by the small proportion of families reporting problems of major scope since coming to this country. This was evidenced by the eagerness of these people to cooperate as in the case of this survey where the response was remarkable in view of the difficulty of communicating in and understanding English.

Observations

The studies of the DP group and the German expellee group presented in this chapter are not all conclusive. However, they do provide sufficient information concerning these newcomers to the

United States to evaluate to some extent their resettlement and gradual integration into the American community.

(1) *Residence*.—In the case of both the DP and German expellee groups, the movements were away from the South and into the East North Central States, the Pacific and the New England States. The pattern of movement was similar for both the DP and German expellee groups.

Both tended to reside in the cities and to move away from farm areas.

Neither of these tendencies was different from those of the whole American population.

(2) *Occupations*.—Both the DP group and the German expellee group changed jobs in response to better wages and higher standards of living. The major occupational changes for both groups were from farming to semiskilled and skilled work.

(3) *Labor force participation*.—Both the DP group and the German expellee group entered the labor force in greater proportion to their numbers than the native American population.

(4) *Adjustment*.—Both the DP group and the German expellee group showed progress in becoming a part of the American community. This was evidenced by their resourcefulness and their ability to make a living for themselves, by their high employment levels, and their attempts to learn our language and to take advantage of our educational facilities. They applied for American citizenship; a few gave their lives for our defense; some made contributions to art and literature and to other cultural enterprises. As a group, they were contributing inestimable value to our culture and economy.

Who Made It Work

This was the American citizen's own program—and he made it work. He started by expressing his demand to Congress for the displaced persons program and by insisting on a fair, decent, and generous law and administration. And he continued by sponsoring displaced persons, expellees, Italian refugees, recent political refugees, orphans, and others, and by making the resettlements successful. The displaced persons program was the American people's own program in a very personal sense, since the American people took these new Americans into their own homes and communities.

On their behalf, public and private agencies of all kinds participated in almost every phase of this program. In staff and funds, the contributions of these public and private agencies far exceed those of the Commission. The displaced persons story is not complete without some outline of their magnificent contributions to this combined operation.

American Voluntary Agencies

The American voluntary agencies played an indispensable part in the success of the DP program. They had a leading role in planning, in operations in Europe and the United States, and in general relations with the public.

These agencies, representing religious, nationality, nonsectarian, welfare, and immigration interests in the United States, developed or expanded relief and rehabilitation programs in foreign countries to provide immigration and resettlement services to refugees.

Included among these organizations were the immigration, relief, and resettlement agencies of the three major faiths and the organs of numerous nationality groups in the United States. The religious bodies included the Church World Service of the National Council of Churches of Christ, the National Lutheran Council, the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society, and the United Service for New Americans. These organizations carried the greatest load among all of the voluntary organizations. On their staffs, as on the staffs of the other voluntary agencies, were persons who performed services in all the major operations of the program except those relating to security analysis and eligibility determination, which, of course, were solely the responsibility of the United States Government officials.

These private organizations had affiliates on the local and area levels throughout the United States. These local groups participated in the displaced persons operation at the initial and terminal stages of the program. Church groups worked through the parishes, churches, and synagogues; nationality organizations called upon their affiliates in hundreds of cities throughout the country; interested volunteers and other representatives of these groups sat on State and local displaced persons committees and made an inestimable contribution in this joint effort.

The activities of the voluntary agencies, for the most part, fell into the following categories: (1) Locating resettlement opportunities by obtaining assurances of housing and employment; (2) making overseas nominations against assurances; (3) performing auxiliary services of all kinds overseas; (4) operating port, embarkation, and debarkation services; (5) directing inland transport within the United States; (6) effecting and following up on resettlement; (7) public liaison with their own constituencies; (8) rendering miscellaneous post-resettlement services; (9) advising and counseling with the Commission and other governmental and international agencies involved in the program; and (10) in general representing both the American sponsor and the prospective immigrant in their dealings with the Government.

Although every agency did not necessarily engage in all phases of the displaced persons program, the joint contribution to each of several phases was enormous and was crucial to successful operations. The extent of this work and its importance in making for the successful completion of the program is indicated by the single fact that of the 311,645 assurances filed, almost 90 percent were submitted through voluntary agencies. The resettlement program established by the Act and the Commission's regulations, necessitated close cooperation between the Commission and the voluntary agencies.

This substantive relationship of the American voluntary agencies to the very operation of the displaced persons program was recognized during the Congressional debates leading up to the original enactment and the subsequent amendments of the Act. In fact, certain provisions of the Act, such as the loan provisions in the 1950 amendments, were couched in terms specifically devised and related to the voluntary agencies and their accepted role in the program.

The role of the relief worker in the war stricken areas of the world was not a new one for many of the voluntary agencies. Established as many of them were on strict nationality or religious lines, they had been giving assistance in the form of relief supplies even before the outbreak of World War II. Some indeed, were veterans in the field of immigration work, having been instrumental in helping earlier refugees to immigrate to other countries as well as to the United States.

Of the older established agencies, having affiliates or chapters in cities across the country, some were equipped to do follow-up work of a social welfare nature and to assist the alien in every way possible to become assimilated into American society and adjusted to his new life. The role of the agencies in this line of the program was also anticipated by one of the Commissioners several months before the displaced persons legislation was passed:

Civic and welfare groups, as well as the representatives of local government, are at work in this field and have already conducted surveys and laid plans which reflected in very encouraging reports. This work is being advanced at a rapid pace and further details will be made available to you as it progresses. Satisfactory progress has been made by agencies representing the three largest religious groups of our country. Many resettlement plans have already crystallized. I say with confidence that resettlement of 100,000 people per annum as prescribed by the Stratton bill, though involving a tremendous amount of work, can be accomplished. The offered and expected cooperation of State and municipal governments, of public and private welfare agencies, and of religious groups assures this. We are suggesting to these cooperatives the establishment of a central committee to act in close concert and liaison with the representatives of the Federal Government who will be charged with the administration of the hoped-for legislation.

Accreditation

The Commission was faced with the problem of deciding which voluntary agencies were to be active members of this partnership.

The need for Government registration of overseas voluntary relief work was begun in 1939 under the terms of the Neutrality Act which required all such relief agencies to register and submit monthly reports if they planned to engage in relief activities in belligerent countries, the purpose of the registration being to prevent activities which might be inimical to the United States.

The President's War Relief Control Board operated from July 25, 1942, until May 15, 1946. The Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid was formally organized on July 10, 1946, to "guide the public, and agencies seeking the support of the public in the appropriate and productive use of voluntary contributions for foreign aid * * *." The committee undertook liaison and consultation between appropriate Federal, International, and other public authorities and private bodies of related interests to facilitate policies and procedures, appraisals of relief needs, their appropriateness to voluntary agency programs, the adequacy of American programs abroad, maintenance of a public record of the programs, and evaluation of the programs, budgets, and operations, with an eye to possible correlation between programs.

When the Commission started operations, it limited its accreditations and recognition to agencies which were registered by the Advisory Committee, and who had had experience in resettlement work. On October 21, 1948, nine agencies were granted temporary accreditation by the Commission, on the condition that their programs would be registered by the Advisory Committee, and that they have established working relationships with the International Refugee Organization. At that time the following agencies were accredited: Church World Service, Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society, International Rescue Committee, Mennonite Central Committee, National Lutheran Council, National American Federation of International Institutes, United Service for New Americans, United Ukrainian American Relief Committee, and War Relief Services of the National Catholic Welfare Conference.

In February 1949, registration with the Advisory Committee was required of all voluntary agencies desiring accreditation to work with the Commission overseas, by virtue of an agreement with the Advisory Committee. Under the terms of that agreement it was stated:

1. The Commission will consider for recognition only those voluntary agencies which have registered with the committee and whose programs have been approved by the committee pursuant to its conditions of registration published September 1, 1948, or any amendments thereto.
2. Voluntary agencies applying to the Commission for initial recognition must be registered and their programs approved by the committee in order for them to receive recognition by the Commission for overseas work.

However, the Commission retained the authority to accredit an

agency which was not recognized by the Advisory Committee, although it planned to use this power sparingly, if at all.

The conditions of registration with the Advisory Committee required that the applicant be "a United States voluntary nonprofit agency engaged in, or which desires to engage in, an operations program overseas for the relief of human suffering or related forms of aid arising from or connected with World War II;" and further that "the operations overseas when supported by the granting of United States Government facilities are supervised in the countries of operations or participated therein by United States citizens." Registrants were also required to file fiscal reports and to supply information relating to relief supplies distributed by the agency.

Thus, the reliability of the Commission's accredited voluntary agencies was attested to and supervised by a special United States agency set up for that purpose.

By the end of the program, 19 agencies had received accreditation:

- American Committee for Resettlement of Polish D. P.'s.
- American Federation of International Institutes.
- American Friends Service Committee (withdrew 1949).
- American National Committee to Aid Homeless Armenians.
- Church World Service.
- Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society.
- International Rescue Committee.
- Mennonite Central Committee.
- National Catholic Welfare Conference—War Relief Services.
- National Lutheran Council.
- Order of A. H. E. P. A.
- Serbian National Defense Council—Division of Displaced Persons.
- Travelers Aid Society.
- Tolstoy Foundation.
- Unitarian Service Committee.
- United Friends of Needy and Displaced People of Yugoslavia.
- United Service for New Americans, Inc.
- United States Committee for the Care of European Children.
- United Ukrainian American Relief Committee.

Although registration was required only of those agencies which were actively engaged in relief operations and maintained American staffs in foreign countries, many voluntary agencies which normally did not maintain such overseas staffs registered with the Advisory Committee in order to participate in the displaced persons program. The basic reason for this was their desire to file assurance with the Commission as the sponsor rather than merely as an expediting agency. One of the Commission's basic requirements with respect to the acceptance of blanket unnamed assurances was that the agency would maintain sufficient staff overseas to make the nominations for the sponsor against assurances.

Assurances

The sponsorships through assurances were the life blood of the program—no assurance, no displaced person in the United States. The bulk of this aspect of the program fell on the many religious and nationality organizations, only some of which were already actively participating in the field of immigration and resettlement when the Displaced Persons Act was passed. It was always anticipated that the voluntary agencies would make one of their greatest contributions to the program through submitting assurances. To this end, and because of their reliability and unquestioned responsibility, the Commission waived notarizations of their assurances, and established special so-called blanket assurances, whereby the assurance need not specifically identify job or housing accommodation until the actual visa stage in the pipeline.

The first step in the cooperative operational relationship revolved about the assurance. From or through their own constituencies, the voluntary agencies filed assurances with the Commission. These assurances were transmitted to the Commission headquarters in Washington from the agency's headquarters instead of being sent from their local offices.

Thus, through sponsorships, the voluntary agencies pumped life-blood into the program and got it going.

In addition to the individual named assurances which agencies submitted on behalf of relatives or friends, several agencies also submitted named and unnamed blanket assurances which did not specifically identify the housing or employment facilities. In connection with the blanket assurances, the agency itself assumed the responsibilities of sponsorship with respect to the assurance of housing, employment, inland transportation, port reception, and against the immigrants' becoming public charges. Agencies maintained their own records of their cases and established their own procedures for reporting status on cases to their own sponsors.

An incidental, but highly important, result of the submission of assurances by voluntary agencies was a much broader base of geographic distribution than otherwise likely, owing to their widespread chains of local, affiliated, and associated organizations. This geographic distribution was one of the Congressional objectives set forth in the Act.

The Commission accepted assurances submitted by accredited voluntary agencies, without a requirement for an audit by the appropriate State commission on the explicit assumption that the voluntary agencies would, through their local committees and representatives, make appropriate checks on the reliability of the sponsor and the desirability of the resettlement opportunity. In the vast majority of the cases, such checks were made in one form or other. However, in prac-

tice some of the voluntary agencies accepted assurances on their face value without specific attempts to check up on the situation. In some instances, it even became necessary for the Commission to post-audit such agency assurances. Closer and more effective attention by the voluntary agencies to this responsibility would have resulted in fewer unsatisfactory agency resettlements.

One of the problems that arose in connection with the assurance activities of voluntary agencies was whether or not they should charge fees to the sponsors. In April 1949 the Commission polled the accredited agencies on their views as to the assessment of fees for services rendered and the charging of interest on funds advanced against inland transportation. The agencies agreed that neither fees nor interest should be charged. However, the consensus of opinion was that it would be a desirable practice to require a promissory note or judgment note covering the amount of inland transportation costs from the displaced persons. Later, however, with the additional costs of the German expellee program and the other programs in the amended legislation, some agencies charged a fee to the sponsor in some categories of cases, this money being unreturnable if the displaced person should be found ineligible. The Commission deemed it desirable not to establish any binding rule in this regard, although it preferred to see no fees charged.

Reception

The voluntary agencies assumed responsibility for the reception and inland travel of their cases when the immigrants landed in the United States. To avoid confusion, and to make possible the rapid movement of the immigrants from the port cities, the Commission furnished the participating agencies with the nominal roll of each ship or air flight.

The reception of immigrants was not a new job for many of the agencies. Some of them were old hands at it, and were familiar with the accompanying problems. Others, however, had never engaged in port or reception programs. It was necessary for them to establish the closest cooperation to avoid confusion on the piers. The members of the Port and Dock Committee of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service met in September 1948 to make plans for reception.

The Commission set up port and dock committees in each port of entry composed of agency representatives who actually worked at the pier and had experience in this work in the reception of persons immigrating under the Truman Directive of 1945. The committees, augmented as occasions required, performed yeoman service in port reception and justly earned not only the gratitude of the immigrants, the sponsors, and the Commission, but also of the American people as a whole. Assistance in moving people from the dock to bus and train

terminals was an important factor. In New Orleans the American Women's Volunteer Service operated a fleet of some 120 cars to transport the people from the pier to terminals or reception centers. In Boston the port facilities permitted passenger trains to await on sidings close to the pier.

The Red Cross and Salvation Army made important contributions at the pier in furnishing canteen service to the immigrants and the dock workers.

The Commission did not have sufficient staff to handle Commission or nonagency cases or to notify sponsors of the pending arrival of their displaced persons. This task was assumed by the Travelers Aid Society. In addition to servicing Commission or nonagency cases, Travelers Aid Society also undertook, on a reimbursable basis, the servicing of cases for some of the smaller agencies whose volunteer staffs were insufficient. Travelers Aid made no service charge to the sponsor, but drew its funds for operating expenses from money granted by foundations and IRO, donations, and local community chest drives.

In connection with reception, the agencies disbursed loan funds provided by the Commission for inland transportation. Under regulations approved by the President, the Commission made non-interest-bearing loans to the voluntary agencies, which in turn loaned the money to the DP's, without interest, to cover the costs of inland transportation. (See p. 125.)

Committees

The voluntary agencies coordinated their activities through their own special committees. Prominent among these committees were the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, the Technical Committee on Resettlement, the National Social Welfare Assembly, the New England Resettlement Committee, the Council of Voluntary Agencies (United States Zone), and the Council of Voluntary Agencies Working in Germany.

In 1943, a group of established welfare agencies organized the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service to promote joint planning and action. The council's work was carried out largely through committees. Council or committee actions did not bind the members and did not limit their activities. Through its proceedings, the council endeavored to obtain coordinative and cooperative effort among voluntary, governmental, and intergovernmental agencies.

One of the council's committees was its Displaced Persons Committee. This committee had evinced its interest in coordinating activities with a Government program as early as December 1947, and continued to keep in close contact with the progress of the Government program. While he was overseas in the fall of 1948, the chairman

met with members of the Immigration and Resettlement Committee of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies.

Using the core of the Displaced Persons Committee of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies, the Commission appointed an advisory committee, whose major functions were:

(1) To bring about close coordination among cooperating private and public agencies;

(2) To enable periodic and regular exchange of views as to basic policies and operating procedures; and

(3) To enable the Commission to obtain the advice and guidance of interested agencies for improvement of the program.

In addition to representatives of Church World Service, National Catholic Welfare Conference, United Service for New Americans, and National Lutheran Council, comprising the three major faiths of the United States, this new advisory committee to the Commission included at the outset the Travelers Aid Society and the National Social Welfare Assembly. The Commission itself designated which organizations were to be represented on the advisory committee, but each agency designated its own representative.

The membership of the advisory committee was expanded in July 1949, through the inclusion of the chairmen of State displaced persons commissions or committees, who were chosen on the basis of geographic distribution and scope of interest in the program. In this regard the Commission acted upon the recommendation of the State committees themselves following the first National Resettlement Conference in Chicago in April 1949. The commissions designated were California, Mississippi, New York, and Wisconsin. Their alternates were the commissions in Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, and Texas. After the 1950 amendments, transferring to the Commission responsibility for the German expellee program, the advisory committee's membership was again enlarged by addition of a representative of a group of agencies interested solely in the expellee program.

The Technical Committee on Resettlement was set up by the voluntary agencies for interchange of strictly operating information with the Commission and other cooperating Government agencies. It was composed of representatives of some 17 or so organizations. The technical committee met with the Commission monthly, whereas the advisory committee met with the Commission only on call when it was deemed necessary.

The National Social Welfare Assembly, which was a member of the advisory committee, had a membership comprised of representatives of social welfare organizations on a national level, Government agencies whose work is tied in with social service, and charitable organizations. At the Commission's request, the National Social Welfare Assembly organized a Committee on Resettlement of Dis-

placed Persons which embraced "representatives of national agencies and organizations and typical local organizations concerned with resettlement of displaced persons." The functions of this committee included the channeling of information concerning official procedures and policies; the facilitating of "joint planning of services to aid assimilation of resettled persons"; serving as spokesman for domestic agencies to the Commission with respect to problems of resettlement; maintaining contact with the Committee on Displaced Persons of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies; and supplying affiliates with information and suggestions on community services for resettled cases.

The Council of Voluntary Agencies in the United States Zone of Germany had been in operation when the displaced persons program got underway in Europe. It consisted of the overseas representatives or associates of organizations which were members of the advisory committee or the technical committee. This council undertook to coordinate the activities of the various religious and nationality organizations in the United States zone.

In September 1951, the non-German voluntary agencies established the Council of Voluntary Agencies Working in Germany, with the membership open to "national and international agencies working in Germany which are of a voluntary private, nonpolitical nature, and which are engaged in operating programs for relief, welfare, resettlement, rehabilitation, community services, and legal and political protection for refugees, expellees, and indigenous populations." The purpose of the council included the improvement of services to the people being served by member agencies, and coordination of the services.

Individual Voluntary Agencies

An important policy consideration was inherent in the close and important participation of voluntary agencies, the majority of which were sectarian groups, in a governmental program. Some of these very agencies themselves felt that it overemphasized sectarian differences among people by segregating them overseas and in the resettlement program in religious terms. Other organizations, on the other hand, pointed to the tremendously important development which resulted from the high degree of practicing cooperation among agencies and peoples of all faith and nationalities. In Europe, in Washington, and more importantly, in the local communities throughout the length and breadth of the United States, agencies of all faiths were brought closer together, through the resettlement program and the various State and local commissions and committees. As one sectarian agency described it:

They have shared their own experiences, knowledge, and techniques wherever possible, and joined in nonsectarian activities. There is no doubt that the displaced persons program, which brought agencies of all faiths, and citizens of

all faiths, into activity to care for newcomers, has made a change in community reaction.

This interfaith and intercultural development arising out of the program was not one of its objectives. However, the Commission takes pride in having been a part of so important a development in true Americanism.

Against this background, the Commission here very briefly records the activities of some of the major voluntary agencies. The following data, relating to the individual agencies, come from reports which they have submitted to the Commission.

Church World Service (CWS)

The Protestant and Eastern Orthodox Church groups engaged in the displaced persons program through participation in the work of Church World Service of the National Council of Churches of Christ in America. CWS had been active in resettlement work prior to the establishment of the Commission, having taken over in 1947 the program from its predecessor, the American Christian Committee for Refugees. This earlier committee had been giving assistance to refugees in the form of welfare, immigration, counseling, and location services since 1934. The resettlement responsibilities for persons immigrating under the President's directive and for refugees in Camp Oswego, N. Y., were taken over by Church World Service in 1947. In addition to submitting two corporate affidavits covering 2,011 persons under the President's Directive program, CWS also gave a corporate affidavit for 100 White Russians in China.

With the passage of the 1948 Act, CWS extended its activities in behalf of refugees in Europe. The activities included resettlement promotion in other countries as well as the United States, material relief and other welfare programs. CWS continued administration of the European operations until July 1, 1950, when its European activities were taken over by the World Council of Churches, an organization active in the refugee field since 1948. The previously temporary and independent CWS was integrated, as of January 1, 1951, within the structure of the National Council of Churches of Christ in America and became a permanent department of that organization.

Feeling an especial responsibility toward the estimated one-third Protestant and Eastern Orthodox groups among the displaced persons in 1948, CWS began to build an organization to cope with the problem. A major undertaking was the coordination of the refugee activities of all the non-Lutheran Protestant and Eastern Orthodox churches. The joint efforts of the various organizations were coordinated and CWS embarked on an assurance procurement program. Assurance forms were developed which provided for local church and national denominational participation. To assure the localization of resettle-

ment, and to guarantee the backing of cooperating units, CWS required that sponsors have their assurances certified by local ministers or other reliable persons.

In order to meet its responsibilities to the Protestant displaced persons under its care, CWS adopted the use of the blanket assurances early in 1949, thereby placing the sponsorship directly in the hands of its cooperating agencies. These organizations included:

- American Friends Service Committee.
- Assemblies of God.
- Baptist World Alliance.
- Baptist World Alliance—Southern.
- Brethern Service Committee.
- Buffalo and Erie Council of Churches.
- Cincinnati Council.
- Cleveland Church Federation.
- Congregational Christian Service Committee.
- Detroit Council of Churches.
- Eastern Missionary Covenant.
- Evangelical and Reformed Church.
- Mennonite Central Committee.
- Methodist Committee.
- Moravian Church.
- Pennsylvania Council.
- Presbyterian Church in the United States.
- Presbyterian Church of the United States of America.
- Protestant Episcopal Church.
- Serbian National Defense Council.
- Seventh Day Adventists.
- Tolstoy Foundation.
- United Christian Missionary Society.

With two exceptions, all these agencies were religious organizations. These exceptions, Tolstoy Foundation and the Serbian National Defense Council, were authorized to represent their nationality orthodox church. Several of these agencies were also separately accredited by the Commission and also functioned independently of CWS.

CWS participated not only in the original displaced persons program, but also in the program resulting from the 1950 amendments, including the German expellee, Greek displaced persons, Polish soldiers in England, Shanghai refugees, out-of-zone refugees, and war orphans. In participating in the orphan program, CWS cooperated with the United States Committee for the Care of European Children. As of June 30, 1952, 50,794 D. P.'s and German expellees and 216 children had immigrated under the auspices of CWS.

Although refugee relief was not administered on a strict denominational or sectarian basis, the division of responsibility among the

Protestant, Jewish, and Catholic agencies was mutually accepted. Because of this division along religious lines, a problem was sometimes presented in cases of mixed marriages. CWS provided assurances for 200 of the mixed marriage families and for 200 Moslem families.

One of the larger projects undertaken jointly by Church World Service and Tolstoy Foundation was the immigration and resettlement of some 600 Kalmuks, last survivors of a once numerous people gradually exterminated by Soviet aggression. Under the terms of an agreement with the International Refugee Organization, Tolstoy and CWS undertook the Kalmuk resettlement, receiving \$10,000 for administration and operational expenses, a resettlement grant of \$80,000 for resettlement, on the basis of \$200 per person, and an additional \$10,000 if the minimum requirement of 400 could be resettled. Additional grants were given for "hard-core" cases. By April 1952, 532 Kalmuks had been resettled in the United States. The Kalmuks were Buddhists and had a community organization centered in their religion. This project was unique in many respects and those who sponsored it are to be complimented for undertaking its especially heavy responsibilities.

One of the most difficult problems facing the IRO was the resettlement of "hard core" cases, the aged, infirm, physically handicapped, who required special attention. With the assistance of special grants from IRO, CWS undertook the resettlement and rehabilitation of 330 such persons, with an IRO grant of \$500 per family unit. These persons and their families were selected by the staff of CWS from persons eligible for IRO resettlement assistance. CWS was charged with the responsibility of providing assurances, rehabilitation, and location after their arrival in the United States. The Commission cooperated fully in this project.

National Catholic Welfare Conference—War Relief Services (NCWC)

The War Relief Services of the National Catholic Welfare Conference was authorized in 1947 by the Board of Bishops to establish a National Catholic Resettlement Council to serve as a principal operating agency in aiding refugees from Germany, Austria, and Italy to enter the United States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere.

The Resettlement Council was originally composed of representatives of NCWC, National Catholic Rural Life Conference, National Conference of Catholic Charities, National Council of Catholic Men, National Council of Catholic Women, and 24 other Catholic and nationality organizations throughout the United States. The membership also included a Diocesan Resettlement Committee director from each of the 120 dioceses in the United States. War Relief Services was charged with administrative responsibility for the program of the resettlement council.

The functions of the National Catholic Resettlement Council included the following: (1) Promotion of interest in the problem and distribution of information concerning the displaced persons program to Catholic individuals and groups throughout the country; (2) developing a system of sponsorship under which the names and addresses of all Catholics who were prospective sponsors would be catalogued; and (3) providing plans for follow-up care for the displaced persons after they had arrived in order to promote satisfactory resettlements.

One estimate made during 1948 placed at 52 percent the proportion of Catholics in displaced persons camps and other centers in Europe. The original target set by War Relief Services was for the resettlement of a minimum of 100,000 Catholic displaced persons plus as many non-Catholic displaced persons as directly or through their sponsors, requested the services of National Catholic Resettlement Council.

The diocesan resettlement committees worked at the community level to procure job and housing assurances, and assurances against public charge. The national office in New York acted as a clearing house for the diocesan committees and coordinated the work between Europe and the United States.

NCWC conducted an overseas orientation program after visa issuance. Upon the embarkation of a displaced person ship for the United States, the national office of War Relief Services was notified by cable of all its cases aboard. The national office advised the affected local committees in advance of the arrivals in order that the committees and sponsors might make the final arrangements for placement. Inland transportation arrangements were made well in advance of arrival in most cases as a result of this system. This communications network also greatly facilitated the arrangement of substitute opportunities for displaced persons whose sponsors had withdrawn their assurances after embarkation of the D.P.'s.

The wide dispersment of the 120 diocesan resettlement committees and the large number of Catholic parishes in and outside of the large cities permitted an effective follow-up system in carrying out the resettlement aims of the National Catholic Resettlement Council. Reports from the diocesan resettlement directors indicated that successful resettlements resulted in from 80 to 85 percent of all cases sponsored by the agency with the first resettlement placement.

At the height of the displaced persons program War Relief Services-NCWC employed about 650 persons directly concerned with all phases of the displaced persons operation, both in Europe and the United States. About 380 of these were in Europe, the remainder in the United States. In addition, many hundreds of volunteers aided on a part-time basis at the ports of reception and at the points of final destination.

As of June 30, 1952, War Relief Services-NCWC, acting through the National Catholic Resettlement Council, had brought into the United States a total of 135,350 displaced persons, 15,387 expellees and 957 orphans. Continuing resettlement activities occur largely at the diocesan level.

National Lutheran Council (NLC)

The National Lutheran Council had been active in the field of migration since 1939. From small scale participation in refugee programs, carried on in cooperation with the American Committee for Christian Refugees and its successor, Church World Service, the program has grown considerably. In 1946 a European program of pastoral care and rehabilitation was inaugurated under the Lutheran World Federation. When responsibilities toward Lutheran refugees assumed larger proportions, a separate agency, the Lutheran Resettlement Service, was established in the fall of 1948 to meet the increased workloads on the division of welfare of the National Lutheran Council.

NLC's refugee immigration program was handled by two separate arms, in Europe by the Service to Refugees of the Lutheran World Federation, and in the United States by the Lutheran Resettlement Service. Registered by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid for participation in the displaced persons and orphan programs under the 1950 law, in the specified areas, the spheres of participation of these two bodies expanded after the 1950 amendments to include the German expellees, out-of-zone refugees, Venezia Giulians, European refugees in the Far East, and other groups.

To meet the needs of the program, 36 Lutheran area and State resettlement committees were organized. The primary functions of these local committees were to obtain assurances and to assist in resettlement activities. The national staff, from a modest beginning of 3 persons, increased to a high of 125 during the first 6 months of 1950, and paid staff in the area and State offices reached a maximum of 75 during the same period.

Of an initial goal of 35,000 displaced persons to be brought to the United States under NLC sponsorship, approximately 32,000 were brought into this country. However, instead of the estimated 10,000 assurances to accomplish this project, 21,000 assurances were necessary. Under the amended Act, new goals for the sponsorship of 10,000 German expellees were established and by March 1952—the closing date for filing—2,500 assurances for expellees had been sent to the European office.

Throughout the program the Lutheran Resettlement Service operated on an individual rather than blanket assurance basis, in the belief that better placements could be made in this manner. This agency preferred to work in terms of its "dossier" program, whereby actual

descriptions of the displaced persons were submitted stateside before final action was taken on nominations. Refugees entering the United States were advised of the assurances covering them before leaving Europe and were afforded follow-up case work service. Facilities were available for displaced persons requiring special attention because of illness, poor social adjustment, or unsuitable employment.

Late in the program, NLC developed a plan of charging a fee of sponsors of named persons, as a means of conserving its resources to process unnamed assurances.

Inland transportation was furnished to the immigrants on a loan basis by the Lutheran Resettlement Service and the loan was collected from them when they were able to pay. Of the some \$1,250,000 loaned by NLC, approximately 76 percent had been repaid by June 30, 1952. The Lutheran Resettlement Service found the repayment of these loans to have a valuable byproduct in that the correspondence exchanged with the immigrants with regard to the payment of loans led to periodic reports from them telling of their progress in resettlement. Individual records were kept on each arrival at the national office, and in some instances case records were kept at area offices.

United Service for New Americans (USNA)

United Service for New Americans and its predecessor agencies had a history of 14 years of active work in the immigration, resettlement and integration of Jewish refugees in the United States by the time the Commission's program began. USNA evolved from the consolidation of the National Refugee Service and the National Service to the Foreign Born Section of the National Council of Jewish Women in July 1946. Both organizations had been very active in immigration work, particularly in assisting immigrants in all phases of this work from premigration planning to the point of final integration. The National Council of Jewish Women especially had been active in the actual resettlement and integration of the aliens into the community life. Local sections of this body remained in existence and continued working with local welfare agencies and resettlement committees.

Building on this structure, USNA was instrumental in forming a network of community welfare agencies throughout the country to accept resettlement responsibility for the newcomers. Volunteer committees were organized in communities where none previously existed and trained field staffs gave professional guidance.

In Europe, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC), an overseas agency organized in 1914 to render aid to Jews in all parts of the world, handled much of USNA's European field services.

In October 1948, USNA and Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society reached an agreement whereby USNA would handle all the blanket assurances from Jewish community groups, while HIAS

would limit its activities to named cases. Overseas HIAS and the American Joint Distribution Committee pooled their lists of displaced persons and their staffs to provide a consolidated service. USNA sent two specialists overseas to work with the AJDC-HIAS staffs.

Already familiar with the program under the President's directive of 1945, USNA found the change-over easy to make when the Displaced Persons Act was passed. USNA's aim was to aid every Jew eligible for immigration to the United States either as a displaced person or a quota immigrant. Particular attention was paid to reuniting families and keeping family groups together. USNA brought into the United States 38,327 persons and 197 orphans under the Act.

Believing that the community-type sponsorship better served the interests of the refugee, USNA concentrated on the blanket type of assurance. Jewish community groups provided these blanket assurances on the basis of estimates of the housing and job opportunities available in the localities. Lists of skills available among the displaced persons were in turn circulated about the communities. Actual matching of assurances and jobs was done by AJDC-HIAS overseas.

During slowdown in immigrant movements, the time was put to full advantage by setting up additional community programs, improving adjustment programs, and in developing English language and vocational training projects.

Following the 1950 amendments, USNA undertook a national campaign to obtain assurances necessary to bring about the resettlement of those families who had become eligible through changes in the law. The additional assurances were available within 6 weeks after the new Act was signed.

Through its special contribution in voluntary agency committees, and special committees such as the technical committee, USNA was able to make its experience available for the benefit of displaced persons and refugees of all faiths and nationalities.

American Committee for the Resettlement of Polish Displaced Persons (ACRPDP)

The American Committee for the Resettlement of Polish Displaced Persons had its origins at the second national convention of the Polish-American Congress in May 1948. Membership of the committee was drawn from among the officers of the Polish-American Congress.

The ACRPDP refugee assistance program was approved by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid of the State Department in September 1949. Local committees were formed in 14 states and a representative was assigned to duty in Europe.

ACRPDP's purposes included two aspects of the Displaced Persons Act: assisting Polish displaced persons to immigrate and assisting the entry into the United States of Polish soldiers in England.

ACRPDP operated and planned its program through its central office in Chicago, Ill. That office was the channel for submission of assurances, and for liaison with cooperating public and private organizations.

American Federation of International Institutes (AFII)

The American Federation of International Institutes was long active in the field of immigrant service. As early as 1944, AFII was engaged in lending assistance to refugees before their arrival in the United States through the operation of a searching service; i. e., helping refugees in Europe to locate relatives or friends in the United States. Its program expanded in keeping with the planned resettlement project authorized by the 1948 Act. It was one of the first agencies to be accredited by the Commission.

AFII had affiliates in all the major cities of the United States. It established an office in Munich, Germany. The organization was non-sectarian, nonnationalistic, and nonprofit in character.

Upon the receipt of three grants from the International Refugee Organization, AFII undertook to resettle "hard core" and other cases difficult to relocate. Of a total of 494 such families, AFII resettled 290 in 20 cities.

American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA)

The American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association was founded in 1927. It is an association of Americans of Greek origin with 384 chapters located throughout all the 48 States.

With the 1950 amendments to the Displaced Persons Act, AHEPA established two special working committees to cooperate with the Displaced Persons Commission and the Department of State in carrying out the new provisions of the Act. One Committee was to concern itself with the resettlement in the United States of the internally displaced Greeks as provided in section 3 (b) (4) of the Act. The second committee was charged with the responsibility for management of the orphan programs provided by section 2 (e) and 2 (f) of the act.

Working through its 384 chapters, AHEPA established a system for securing assurances, providing reception facilities, and special services for orphan placements. At the outset, the Committee on Orphans worked through the established facilities of the United States Committee for the Care of European Children. In the later stages of the program this relationship was terminated and AHEPA used the Commission's child welfare workers in Greece and established its own reception facilities in the United States.

American National Committee to Aid Homeless Armenians (ANCHA)

The American National Committee To Aid Homeless Armenians was one of the few agencies organized expressly to aid refugees in

displaced persons camps. Incorporated in 1947, ANCHA's purpose as expressed in its constitution was "to engage in relief work in aiding all needy or homeless Armenians anywhere in the world * * * the removal of homeless and needy Armenians from Europe and Asia, and especially those Armenians now found in displaced persons camps in Germany, Austria and Italy, to the Western Hemisphere."

ANCHA assisted 4,000 Armenian refugees who were resettled in the United States, South America, Australia, and other countries. It was voluntarily operated. In locating resettlement opportunities, ANCHA worked through local committees. ANCHA also assisted Armenian refugees in Shanghai, out-of-zone displaced persons, and Iron Curtain escapees in Trieste.

Faced on a number of occasions with the difficulty of separating families because of illness of some member who was consequently prevented from immigrating, ANCHA arranged with other nations to accept these immigrants for hospitalization.

ANCHA had overseas representation, and branch offices were maintained in 14 cities in 10 States, including the District of Columbia.

Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS)

The Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society was the oldest of all the accredited voluntary agencies in terms of experience. It was formed in 1884 to prepare Jewish immigrants for resettlement, to assist and to protect them en route, to maintain reception facilities, and to provide temporary shelter and aid in rehabilitation, and had offices on every continent.

During its many years of service HIAS cooperated with all governmental and intergovernmental bodies concerned with refugees, including the Nansen office, the High Commissioner on Refugees from Germany, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, and the United States War Refugee Board.

With other agencies HIAS participated in the care of the refugees in Camp Oswego, N. Y., who entered the United States prior to the Displaced Persons Act.

One of the first agencies accredited by the Commission, HIAS concentrated on the submission of individual assurances, having reached an agreement with United Service for New Americans in October 1948, to the effect that the latter organization would service the blanket assurances. Between October 1, 1948, and March 1, 1949, assurances covering 15,943 persons were filed through HIAS. From the beginning of the program through 1951, HIAS was instrumental in effecting the immigration of 20,788 persons.

Although its main concern was with those refugees classified as IRO displaced persons, HIAS was also registered by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid for participation in the European refugee in the Far East and out-of-zone refugee programs.

HIAS was maintained by contributions from individuals, community federations, and welfare funds, and from labor, religious and fraternal groups.

Its overseas joint operation with the American Joint Distribution Committee was described in the section on the United Service for New Americans.

Because of its long experience, HIAS was able to play an especially important role in aiding all displaced persons of all faiths through its participation and leadership in the port and dock committee set up by the Commission.

International Rescue Committee (IRC)

Active in resettlement work prior to the enactment of displaced persons legislation, the International Rescue Committee, formerly the International Rescue and Relief Committee, was instrumental in resettling more than 1,200 refugee professionals. It dealt with cases requiring a great deal of personal attention and follow-through, and with a wide variety of problems not suitably handled by other agencies.

A nonsectarian, international agency, IRC was one of the first group of agencies to be accredited by the Commission. When the Act was amended in June 1950, IRC broadened the scope of its activities to include not only German expellees but also former members of the Polish Army in England, the out-of-zone refugees, and recent political refugees.

In addition to its program to assist refugee professionals, IRC cooperated with the United Lithuanian Relief Fund of America, Inc., and the Detroit Lithuanian Resettlement Committee on two projects. In cooperation with the former, IRC resettled approximately 200 families mostly Lithuanians, as farmers in Vermont. The second endeavor undertaken was the resettlement of 30 families, again mostly Lithuanians, in Michigan.

Although a majority of the displaced persons sponsored by IRC were accepted on the basis of individual applications for sponsorship, a substantial number of displaced persons were recommended by other national and religious agencies with which IRC cooperated. By arrangement with the Jewish Labor Committee, IRC resettled many displaced persons of concern to that committee. A large number of these refugees were placed as needle-trade workers in the garment industry, in collaboration with the International Ladies Garment Workers Union.

IRC sponsored all cases recommended during the period 1949-51 by the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees, and sponsored other cases recommended by the Polish Political Council, the Hungarian National Council, the Bulgarian National Committee, the Yugoslav National Committee, the International Federation of Free Journalists, the International Peasant Union, the International

Congress of Free Trade Unions, the Polish Association of Ex-War Prisoners, the Estonian National Council, and the Association of Former Political Prisoners of Soviet Labor Camps.

In addition to processing both individual and blanket assurances for displaced persons, German expellees, and other refugees, IRC provided reception and resettlement services.

One of IRC's major specialized contributions under the displaced persons program was the resettlement campaign for exiled professionals, officially launched in September 1950. For this project IRC received an initial grant of \$100,000 from the Lessing J. Rosenwald Foundation, and additional grants of \$500,000 from the Ford Foundation, and nearly \$300,000 from other foundations. The IRC states: "The initial estimate of the cost of resettlement per professional case was \$800, this figure covering preresettlement relief in Europe, intensive English training, inland transportation, initial relief, medical and dental care, further intensive instruction in English in the United States, and the provision of technical text-books. An additional item of major importance was the servicing necessary to effect placement." In this project the Commission cooperated as fully as its limited funds and personnel permitted.

Many distinguished scientists, artists, industrialists, diplomats and other professionals were thus enabled to come to the United States under the Act.

Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod

The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod elected to participate formally in the program after the 1950 amendments authorized the admission of 54,744 German expellees. The Board of Social Welfare of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod was designated as the operating agency.

Working through over 400 church congregations throughout the country, it developed a plan to secure assurances, prepare the reception arrangements, and follow-up work after the immigrants arrived. Emphasis was placed on individual case placement rather than on the community type of enterprise used by some other agencies. The Director of the program made several trips to Europe in connection with the nomination of cases to meet the requirements of resettlement opportunities developed by the Committee in the United States. The vast majority of cases nominated and resettled by the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod came from the preprocessing procedure established by the Commission. The Director of the agency reported that their resettlement program was unusually successful and that only approximately 3 percent of the cases required special services after their arrival in the United States.

Mennonite Central Committee (MCC)

Established in August 1937, with headquarters in Akron, Pa., the Mennonite Central Committee was instrumental in resettling Mennonite refugees in both Canada and Paraguay as well as the United States. Following World War II, there were approximately 13,000 Mennonite refugees from Russia or Russian occupied territories in western Europe.

MCC was registered with the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid for welfare and emigration services in the British and American zones, and for participation in the emigration of German expellees.

Primarily concerned with assisting Mennonites, of whom a total of more than 200 families came into the United States under the program, the Committee also undertook, in cooperation with Church World Service, the resettling of some 663 farm families, mostly of Ukrainian origin and of the Russian Orthodox faith. The Committee obtained sponsorship from Mennonites throughout the United States; and there was far more sponsors than available refugees.

Operating with a staff of four salaried persons in the United States and four in Europe, supplemented by 25 voluntary workers, the Committee had no formal field offices, but operated through interested individuals and ministers in Mennonite communities. Sponsorships were checked through local church facilities for reliability of the sponsor, soundness of employment opportunities, and adequacy of housing. A complete file was maintained of each agency case, and resettlements requiring adjustment were reported to the Akron headquarters for satisfactory arrangements. Cases requiring extended medical care or hospitalization were handled by the local community or church group.

National Travelers Aid Society (TAS)

The National Travelers Aid Society performed a unique role among the voluntary agencies, being the only one specifically requested by the Commission to undertake a particular role in the program. This role was unusual also in that it was concerned entirely with resettlement.

Under the terms of an agreement reached in 1949 between TAS and the Commission, in consultation with IRO, TAS accepted primary responsibility for the "reception and transportation services having to do with all nonagency cases of whatever religious affiliation, including those commonly termed compassionate cases, whether sent by plane or ship."

After late registration with the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, TAS was accredited by the Commission, late in the program, to render resettlement services. In connection with these serv-

ices, TAS performed such duties as were necessary to inform the sponsor of the arrival of his displaced person or expellee, handle inland transportation arrangements and port reception as requested by the sponsor, assist the immigrant at the pier and attend to his entraining, and receive the newcomer, if necessary, at the final destination. In addition, TAS rendered valuable service to the Commission in assisting its port officers in finding new resettlement opportunities for cases on which there had been last-minute sponsorship cancellations.

Representatives of TAS were members of the Advisory Council of Voluntary Agencies in America as well as the Commission's Advisory Committee and other advisory groups.

The load of additional work undertaken by TAS in rendering assistance to the resettlement program constituted a heavy drain financially on that organization. To further this necessary work and assure that it would be carried on, IRO and the Ford Foundation made grants to TAS.

Serbian National Defense Council of America (SNDCA)

The Serbian National Defense Council of America was incorporated under the laws of the State of Illinois in 1942 for the purpose, among others, of fostering loyalty among American Serbs to the United States and "to help Serbian war victims outside Yugoslavia."

Maintaining no overseas staff, the SNDCA worked in close conjunction with Church World Service, and filed its assurances through that organization.

Primarily concerned with displaced persons who came from the Serbian provinces of Yugoslavia, SNDCA was responsible for the resettlement of more than 10,000 refugees under the Displaced Persons Act. With a staff of nearly 300 persons, of which more than 200 were volunteers, in 42 field offices, the agency maintained an extensive resettlement program.

From the time the SNDCA-sponsored displaced persons arrived in the United States until he was firmly resettled, SNDCA directed their activities. The refugees were met at the pier by SNDCA representatives, and were sent to localities where local committees had provided employment and housing.

About 75 percent of all SNDCA cases were processed for employment through the Chicago headquarters office. In every larger Serbian community in the United States a displaced persons committee was formed to assist displaced persons to adjust themselves to life in the United States. The newcomers were encouraged to take an active part in community affairs and in local social activities.

According to the council, the majority of the Serbians who immigrated under the displaced persons program were professionally and

technically trained persons whose employment proved stable. The turnover from first jobs was relatively small, except in the case of farmers, where the same problems were to be found with resettled Serbian farmers as with those of other nationalities.

The SNDCA program operated on capital borrowed from the organization's members or affiliates. Each displaced person was expected, once he became self-supporting, to repay the council the amount which the agency spent on him, plus \$25 to cover the costs of operating expenses.

Tolstoy Foundation

The Tolstoy Foundation, Inc., was organized in April 1939, to help "Russians outside of Russia," in memory of the famous Russian novelist and humanitarian, Count Leo Tolstoy.

It operated as an integral part of Church World Service, under the terms of an agreement which designated the Foundation as having specific responsibility toward those of the Russian Orthodox faith. Under this combined operation, Tolstoy Foundation staff were assigned to Church World Service unit overseas but retained their identity. Tolstoy Foundation was registered in its own right with the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid of the Department of State for reception and resettlement services in the United States. Overseas it was associated with Church World Service.

The Foundation was supported almost entirely by private contributions and membership, etc., and was assisted to some extent by the East European Fund of the Ford Foundation.

The Tolstoy Foundation brought about the admission of over 5,000 former Russian Soviet citizens and 600 former military men who had fought the Communists in Yugoslavia, and cooperated with CWS in the Kalmuk resettlement project.

As part of their resettlement service, Tolstoy Foundation maintained a reception center at Reed Farm, Valley Cottage, N. Y., where new arrivals were temporarily accommodated until they went on to their new employment and homes.

Unitarian Service Committee (USC)

The Unitarian Service Committee was active since the outbreak of World War II in the field of refugee relief.

With the passage of the 1948 Act, USC recognized the special need for assurances for professionals and established the necessary contacts with universities, scientific institutes, provided *curriculum vitae* of the displaced professionals, and evaluated training and educational experience by American standards. In cooperation with other agencies, USC resettled 164 persons, Unitarian and non-Unitarian.

Although the welfare services, for which USC was approved by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, were distributed impartially, the committee did make a special effort in the case of a group of some hundred Unitarian displaced person from Hungary.

The USC undertook to complete its program through community churches and ministers. The headquarters supplied directions and the case histories of the displaced persons; the main job in connection with the assurances fell to the local committees of the churches.

United States Committee for the Care of European Children

The United States Committee for the Care of European Children was the only participating voluntary agency concerned exclusively with refugee children. The Committee was established in July 1940 to effect the evacuation to the United States of European children threatened by the dangers of war. Under the Truman Directive of 1945 the Committee took responsibility for the removal of children from the zones of American occupation in Europe and for their transportation to the United States. It continued its activities both in the United States and abroad in cooperation with the Commission and the International Refugee Organization.

The Committee established European offices in the United States zones of Germany and Austria, the main European office being in Munich. The overseas operations of the Committee consisted of screening of children, temporary care of children during processing, arrangements for debarkation in the United States, and the selection of escorts for the children while en route to this country. The screening activity was chiefly a matter of determining the completeness of the child's documentation before submission to Commission officials for processing.

The Committee submitted blanket assurances to the Commission on the basis of its agreements with National Catholic Welfare Conference, United Service for New Americans, Inc., National Lutheran Council, Church World Service, and American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA). These agreements provided that the costs and responsibilities of placement planning and child care would be borne by the voluntary agencies.

Until the 1950 amendments, the Commission channelled all individual sponsorships through the Committee, which in turn routed them to the local agencies cooperating with the national sectarian organizations, for investigations and review, after which the assurances were resubmitted.

The Committee's reception and placement activities constituted an important phase of the entire orphan operation. Children sponsored by the Committee were taken upon arrival to the Committee's reception center in New York City for a period of orientation, which included English lessons, geography, and general instruction in United States

history. At the reception center a study was made of each child by social workers of the participating voluntary agencies, in order to determine the most appropriate placement for the individual child. Further medical examinations were also conducted at this point.

After arrangements were made for the inland transportation of the child, the Committee transferred direct care of the child to a particular child-care agency of the locality in which the child was to be settled. The Committee required a report from the local agencies semiannually on the health and social adjustment of the child. This report was required so that the Committee could in turn discharge its responsibility undertaken in the assurance submitted to the Commission. Furthermore, these individual reports served as a basis for the semiannual reports from the Committee to the Commission required by law. As of June 30, 1952, there were 1,439 children in the United States under the supervision and general control of the Committee. On that date there were 233 local child-care and social work agencies cooperating with the Committee in making home reviews and supervising placement.

The Committee's responsibility for the children continues until they reach the age of 18 or until it was otherwise terminated, such as by legal adoption. In furtherance of the cooperation between the Committee and local organizations, the former sent to State welfare departments a monthly list of all children placed in the State for the first time.

The Committee continued its overseas operations and reception center activities until March 31, 1952, by which time it had received and cared for 2,798 children under the Truman Directive and the DP program. The expenditures of the Committee under the DP program for the handling of 1,407 children through March 31, 1952, totaled \$647,148. The reporting, record keeping, and supervisory functions of the organization are to be continued indefinitely.

United Friends of Needy and Displaced People of Yugoslavia

The United Friends of Needy and Displaced People of Yugoslavia was registered by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid of the Department of State on November 1, 1950, for activity in connection with the German expellee program. It was accredited by the Commission in December 1950 for the submission of blanket and individual assurances for expellees. On January 12, 1951, the Commission gave recognition to assurances submitted by United Friends without the requirement for submission to state commissions for audit.

The organization entered into full-scale activities late in 1951 and continued in operation throughout the remainder of the program.

United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (UUARC)

The United Ukrainian American Relief Committee, incorporated as a charitable organization in June 1944, was active in relief work for Ukrainian refugees in Europe even before it was officially recognized for such work by the United States Government.

Representing several hundred civic, religious, educational, and fraternal organizations composed of American citizens of Ukrainian descent, the UUARC was organized for the purpose of providing aid to Americans of Ukrainian extraction and the Ukrainian war refugees. Its resources were derived from membership dues, voluntary donations, and contributions in money and kind.

In addition to immigration services, UUARC engaged in an extensive relief operation providing medicines, food, clothes, and other supplies. An estimated 138,622 Ukrainian displaced persons in Austria and Germany at the beginning of 1948, became the immediate problem of UUARC. Since repatriation was out of the question, and resettlement was the only possible solution, UUARC had been encouraging immigration to South America, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, prior to inauguration of a United States displaced persons program.

In an effort to interest the American public and specifically American farmers in the merits of Ukrainian farmers, UUARC called meetings in Maryland, Virginia, Wisconsin, Texas, South Dakota, and Oklahoma. These meetings resulted in farmers in Maryland and Wisconsin making early applications for over 500 farm families. Other states also indicated an interest in the program.

Registered by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, for participation in the displaced persons program and relief and immigration of German expellees, out-of-zone refugees, European refugees in the Far East, UUARC had, by June 30, 1952, sponsored almost 33,000 immigrants who had come to the United States under the Displaced Persons Act. These refugees were met at the piers by volunteer workers and were assisted on their journeys to more than 70 reception centers located throughout the country.

In Europe, UUARC inaugurated a program of vocational training, supplementing this with instruction in the languages of the several resettlement countries. The Ukrainian language newspapers were used extensively to inform displaced persons on life in the United States and to help sponsors with the problems of adjustment by the displaced persons.

Other Voluntary Agencies

Other American voluntary agencies which participated in the program were as follows:

- American Aid Societies.
- American Banater Relief Society.
- American Fund for Czecho-Slovak Refugees.
- American Hungarian Federation.
- American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee.

- American O. R. T. Federation.
- American Relief for Germany.
- American Relief for Poland.
- Estonian Aid, Inc.
- Gottscheer Relief Society.
- Jewish Labor Committee.
- Latvian Relief, Inc.
- Lutheran Relief Committee for Transylvanian Saxons.
- National Association of Evangelicals.
- Polish Immigration Committee.
- Relief Association for Germans of Prewar Poland.
- Slovak Catholic Federation of America.
- Steuben Society of America.
- The Federation of Russian Charitable Organizations in the United States.
- United Lithuanian Relief Fund of America.

General Accomplishments of the Voluntary Agencies

The voluntary agencies were united in the common goal of integrating the displaced person into the American community and assisting him in the attainment of independence. Their methods of achieving this goal differed according to their objectives, immediate facilities, and financial resources, but all combined their resources to make it possible to reach this goal. At the local community level the greater part of participation was by volunteers of the religious or nationality groups who gave their time and talents to assist the newcomers to adjust to the American scene.

Throughout the history of the displaced persons program, the agencies served as focal points of public expression in connection with the need for a displaced persons law, prior to its enactment, and later for the necessity for amending its undesirable and discriminatory provisions. During these various phases, their views and judgement were sought by Congress and by administrative agencies.

The voluntary agencies participated at all points and levels, except in security investigation and eligibility determination. It was a continuous chain of efforts, starting with the assurances and resettlement activities in the United States, moving over to Europe in the nomination of people against assurances, in following up their cases, in seeking to protect the rights of the prospective immigrants, in providing necessary specialized services, and in aiding them through the complex pipeline; coming back to the United States, providing port and transportation services, then following them to their assured jobs and homes, aiding in the readjustment process, helping correct it where necessary, providing sound and friendly advice and guidance.

Without the voluntary agencies, there never would have been a displaced persons program to begin with. Without their continuous and active participation, the program would never have been able to succeed. The success of the resettlements under the Act are in large proportion due to their efforts, planning and follow-up. This was an experiment in new relationships between Government and private agencies, and it worked because both sides of the partnership were motivated by the same purpose, to fulfill the highest purposes of the Act.

The Commission's 4-year experience amply justified the public prediction made at an early stage of the program by one of the Commissioners that:

The voluntary agencies' role in the displaced persons program is to make that program work * * *. The displaced persons program * * * would fall flat on its face without the active and vigorous cooperation of the voluntary agencies.

All this is a record which the United States as a whole and the voluntary agencies in particular can view with great pride. It is also an accomplishment concerning which the Commission wishes to pay public tribute as having been indispensable to the achievement of the purposes of the Displaced Persons Act, and as having been performed in the highest American traditions of public-spirited private enterprise.

State Commissions and Committees

The State Displaced Persons Commissions and Committees appointed by the Governors of various States played a significant part in the DP program and contributed immeasurably to its success.

Some of these committees had originally participated in the attempts at developing interest in the program in communities throughout the country in the months before the passage of the 1948 Act. For the most part these committees had been established on the local levels and represented the interests of religious, nationality, and other groups in developing such a program. Membership on the committees also included representatives of various States and local governmental agencies and business, labor, agriculture, and consumer organizations. Serving on a voluntary basis, members of these groups had contributed time, talent, and funds to the general effort of initial self-education and the education of others about the displaced persons problem. To the United States Commission, these State bodies seemed to afford a natural opportunity to obtain State-wide coordination and assistance in the resettlement program within their States.

Even before the Commission came into being, the committees had already had considerable experience compiling statistics on housing and employment opportunities, in informing the public and prospec-

tive sponsors as to the nature of the program, and in other significant aspects of work to be undertaken by the Commission. As early as February 1948, efforts had been undertaken by several of the voluntary State groups to obtain information on the availability of employment and housing opportunities for prospective displaced persons. The program in Minnesota, directly under the sponsorship of its Governor, was an example. In February 1948 a survey, covering every area of the State, had indicated a tremendous interest among the people of Minnesota in providing opportunities for immigrants under a prospective displaced persons program. The committee in Minnesota had obtained information from the various county welfare boards, and had actually operated its survey through the local religious groups in every community of the State. The pattern of action in Michigan, Iowa, California, and other States was similar in a great measure to that of Minnesota.

In other States, the displaced persons program was given considerable support by the State industrial and development boards in their search for skills for various industries and needed skilled and semi-skilled manpower. In Indiana, Maine, and other States the State development and economic commissions played leading parts in these activities, and as early as June 26, 1948, a day after Public Law 774 had been signed, one such agency requested information on how to assist displaced persons to resettle in its State.

From the very beginning of its operations, the United States Commission appreciated the fact that limitations on funds available for its operation would prevent the establishment of a full field force. Therefore, in addition to all the other valuable functions State Commissions could perform, the United States Commission conceived of State displaced persons commissions as a partial substitute for Commission field offices.

In the first week of September 1948, the Commission sought to discover where such committees were still operative. Once this information was at hand, the Commission communicated with the heads of existing commissions and other key officials and outlined the manner in which State commissions could participate in the program: (1) by sending directly to the Commission requests which they had in hand offering assurances for home and employment; (2) the inauguration of State-wide canvasses, if such had not already been done, on available home and employment opportunities; (3) those commissions which had already completed a preliminary canvass of available employment and housing opportunities could continue this phase of work; (4) by preparing arrangements within the State for the reception of displaced persons; and (5) coordination of public and private agencies within the State so as to take care of all eventualities that might arise after the arrival of the displaced persons.

It was emphasized that there were additional activities which the State commissions and committees would engage in when the displaced persons began to arrive in great numbers in the United States and emphasized that the above-indicated suggestions were only to be considered as preliminary ones.

The Federal Commission requested State commissions to indicate how they believed the American voluntary agencies could best work with the State commissions, and sought comments on the best manner in which individual requests coming directly to the United States Commission could be referred back to the State commissions for rechecking. The Commission declared:

From our point of view we would feel more assured in such individual offers if your Commission had looked in on the matter and had written directly to us giving us your opinion as to whether this was a reasonable opportunity for the resettlement of a displaced person or family.

This was the beginning of the audit system.

Responses to these first inquiries in general showed a definite receptivity to the proposals, a holding back for further information as to Commission policy and legal interpretations, a concern about the relationship between State and voluntary agencies, and a desire to get moving quickly and to get displaced persons in as fast as possible.

The Commission's resettlement efforts during the next few months were directed in large part to complying with requests for information from States desiring to set up new committees or reactivate existing ones. By November 22, 1948, the Governor of Minnesota had designated the Division of Social Welfare as the State certification agency for displaced persons. By the turn of the year, the Governor of Michigan established a commission in Michigan on a firm basis.

Other significant State bodies in these earliest days included the California State Committee, which was established on July 12, 1948, and which like the commissions in Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin, and elsewhere, was composed of members of the several religious groups, and leaders in civic, patriotic, labor, social welfare, and other bodies.

By early 1949, 21 commissions or committees had been formally established by the respective Governors or other official authority in the several States. This number grew steadily, until there was a total number of 36 State committees.

Not every State commission performed a vigorous service, but in almost every instance, no matter how limited its activities, the existence of such a body was important because it was a point of contact with the people of its State and an opportunity for coordinated localized action.

State Commission Membership

The State commissions were formally established governmental bodies. They usually consisted of representatives of the several denominations who participated also as representatives of the major religious voluntary agencies such as Church World Service, Lutheran Resettlement Service, National Catholic Welfare Conference, United Service for New Americans, and similar bodies of other denominations. Various nationality groups were frequently represented. In addition, membership usually included representatives of the State welfare department, State employment service, and State agriculture department, and representatives of industry, labor, agriculture, consumer groups, and leading citizens.

Almost uniformly, service on the State commissions was unremunerated and in most instances not even travel or other expenses were reimbursed. In a few cases persons were assigned on a salary basis to serve as the administrative officer or the secretary of the State commission, but these instances were rare. In most cases the secretary or administrative director of the State displaced persons program was a State officer who for a period of time was placed on detail in this post and was provided with secretarial, clerical or similar help. Only rarely did the paid staff of the State commission consist of more than two persons. For the most part the State provided office space, equipment, materials, supplies and miscellaneous housekeeping service for the administrative officer or secretary of the State commission. The main business of the commission or committee was carried on by the administrative officer or secretary who served as the communication point for the United States Commission on assurances, and on the many other activities in which the Federal organization and the local community had joint interests.

The chairman or presidents of the several State commissions or committees were citizens of prominence who gave their name, time, and energy to direct and support of these activities.

Organization

Thirty-four State displaced persons commissions were established by executive order of the Governor or by appointment under his general powers. The commissions of Rhode Island and Maine were created by specific action of the State legislatures. In Minnesota the commission was first appointed by the Governor in 1947, and confirmed by the State legislature in 1949.

Finances and Staff

Of the 36 State commissions, 22 had some funds made available directly to them, in one way or another. Five State commissions,

Rhode Island, Louisiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Oklahoma, were financed in a typical year, 1950, from Governors' contingency funds, in amounts ranging from \$500 to \$6,000.

The Indiana State Committee was authorized to draw upon funds already appropriated to an existing agency. Minnesota's agency received a legislative appropriation of \$10,000 to cover operations over 2 years ending June 1951. The Vermont committee was appropriated \$10,000 by the State legislature for the exclusive use on cases involving medical and hospital services. Another 14 State commissions had funds otherwise made available to them to pay administrative assistants working on the program. Of these, seven, Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Illinois, Indiana, and Tennessee, were on a full-time basis; and seven, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Vermont, New Jersey, and Virginia, were on a part-time schedule. In States where there were no administrative assistants, administrative activities were usually carried out by the chairman of the commission or by an executive secretary on a voluntary basis.

Of the 36 State commissions, 14 had no special funds at all, and had to manage their affairs through personnel made available by existing public agencies. In these States, no specific amount of money was designated for defraying expenses connected with displaced persons' work, but one or more staff members or officers of regular Government departments were assigned full or part time to such work. If the time contributed by these officials were measured in terms of salaries, the financial contribution of such States would be considerable.

With some exception, the most active State commissions were those with full-time executive officers and those with part-time staff showed greater strength than those without any special personnel assigned to them.

Budgetwise, the committee in Michigan received the most substantial aid. The Community Chest of Metropolitan Detroit contributed \$12,000 in 1950 for salaries and incidental expenses (postage, telephone, and the like). The Governor made available \$1,000 from his contingency fund. In addition, State personnel were assigned to assist the commission whenever there were resettlement and related problems requiring specialized treatment.

The various Governors designated different State departments to serve as the clearing house for the displaced persons program: State departments of welfare, planning and development commissions, employment services, a bureau of migrant labor, industrial and labor commissions, State personnel boards, and State departments of agriculture.

Functions

At the outset, State commissions were not conceived as social-service agencies established to provide support and guidance to individual displaced person immigrants coming into a State. It was assumed that the voluntary agencies representing organized religious and welfare groups, would render whatever case service an immigrant might require in the way of social, religious, and employment adjustments.

With the expansion of the program, it became clear that the voluntary agencies acting separately could not fully utilize all the important resources available in the community outside their respective organizational facilities. A central State agency became a necessity in order properly to utilize the national and State opportunities existing in public education, health, employment, and general community services.

Furthermore, a certain percentage of displaced persons—and, in some States, a very large proportion—did not come within the sponsorship concern of any voluntary religious agency, and the attention of a nonsectarian State body became essential for these immigrants.

The various voluntary agencies also recognized that they could improve the quality of their endeavor by arranging to share their experiences and coordinate their services. For these and other reasons, the State commissions logically assumed a permanent role in advancing the program for displaced persons.

In an unofficial sense, the State commissions and committees were operating and coordinating arms of the United States Displaced Persons Commission. The functional relationship between the United States and State commissions started in connection with the audit of assurances. The Commission had no way of independently verifying the reliability of assurances from individual sponsors and of checking to see that they were sufficient to enable the immigrants to have a fair start in the United States. Where an accredited voluntary agency submitted an assurance, the Commission relied upon the agency staff to check on these items. When an individual sponsor submitted an assurance, therefore, the Commission requested the appropriate State commission to undertake an examination of the sponsorship to determine its validity with respect to employment and housing and in connection with public charge. A report from the State commission to the effect that a sponsor was not capable of such responsibility led to the almost automatic cancellation of the assurance. Under the law, the final responsibility for such determination remained with the Federal Commission. But only in rare instances, and for sound reasons based on the full evidence, did the Commission find it necessary not to accept an adverse recommendation of a State commission.

The Commission tried to protect the State bodies against difficulties in such circumstances by taking the responsibility for such cancellations. The commission in Pennsylvania, however, asked the United States Commission to advise each sponsor in Pennsylvania that he would be examined by a representative of the State commission.

In States where the audit plan was applied conscientiously, results were beneficial to the program, protecting displaced persons from unsatisfactory placements and protecting the community from a prospective unsatisfactory resettlement. This protection was not fully available, however, since in the 12 States without State commissions there was no alternative but to accept assurances on their face value or except on the basis of other available evidence. Staff limitations prevented full participation by some agencies. The audit examinations conducted by some of the State commissions were purely nominal, and did not always involve an actual review of the sponsorship conditions.

Many State commissions acknowledged this deficiency of their audit work and claimed that they could remedy the matter only if financial assistance were granted from the Federal Government to cover the cost of maintaining an office and qualified personnel.

The number of such unaudited cases was negligible compared to the vast majority of cases which did receive this important State commission audit. Better resettlements would have resulted had there been no gap in such audit process. However, the Commission does not believe that it is necessary for such audit to be required by law.

Although never fully able to comply with all requests for field visits, owing to limitations of staff, the Commission's Resettlement Division provided representatives to visit the State commission and clarify questions on the law, regulations, procedures and other aspects of the program.

The Commission's field representatives assisted the State committees in meeting particular problems by advising of successful plans, programs, and devices used in other States. Upon specific request, they also consulted directly with State officials including, sometimes, the governor, on the need for and the technique to be used in forming a State commission and carrying on appropriate projects.

These occasional visits of field representatives, and the several national and regional resettlement conferences, were supplemented by visits of Commissioners to address public meetings, and by constant correspondence and telephone communications.

Sample Commission Activities

The **Minnesota** Displaced Persons Committee, which was originally established in November of 1947, made special efforts to coordinate all the resources of the State. It sent out thousands of questionnaires

to appropriate agencies within the State who had agreed to participate on a cooperative program to resettle displaced persons in Minnesota.

The so-called "Minnesota plan" was a guidepost for other State commissions which were created later. The basic points of this plan were:

1. The State agency, through its State certifying officer, would be responsible for the applications or assurances originating in Minnesota with the understanding that the cooperating religious agencies should have responsibility for their own operations; the State committee only acted in a coordinating and referral capacity.

2. The State committee was to act as central agency for information and clearances within the State.

3. The State committee was to provide service and necessary forms for individuals and organizations not associated with nor desiring to work with individual private agencies.

4. The State committee was to assure good social planning for displaced persons and for the community, particularly in reference to the utilization of official State agency services.

The State committee exercised the usual control in assuring that only the right types of sponsorships were approved. The committee followed up all cases after the arrival of the displaced persons, to assure that the resettlement was satisfactory. Through the public welfare agencies, the committee was able to give case service even in the remotest areas. The committee sought through this means to assist the private agencies with the following services:

1. Reception service in the local community.

2. Family budgeting.

3. Adjustment of children to a new school.

4. Information on how to obtain legal advice and medical care.

5. Arrangements for Americanization and citizenship.

6. Counselling on problems and conflicts.

7. Referral to employment agencies.

8. Help to meet the problems of loss of income.

9. Translation and interpreter service.

One unique contribution of the Minnesota State Committee was made in the area of medical practice. Many of the outlying communities made requests for displaced person doctors to come to their communities to practice. In Minnesota there were many large areas without doctors. At the request of the Minnesota committee, the Governor called a meeting of the State Medical Examining Board. As a result, an arrangement was worked out covering DP doctors.

An example of the actual functions performed by an active State commission can be seen in the following partial list of the **Michigan**

commission's activities: (1) Maintaining central file of the list of names and addresses of displaced persons in the State; (2) seeking out employment opportunities for displaced persons, especially in occupations in which there were job shortages, in cooperation with State employment service; (3) pooling information of available housing, both temporary guest homes and permanent housing, in cooperation with church and civic bodies; (4) acting as central information bureau relating to the provisions of the Act; (5) calling meetings for the exchange of experience between the local units of the accredited voluntary agencies; (6) calling case conferences on difficult individual cases; (7) arriving at a common community understanding of prevailing wage in order to guard against exploitation of displaced persons on the one hand and the making of unrealistic wage demands on the other; (8) setting minimum standards that would be respected by all the agencies for safe and sanitary housing; and (9) raising scholarship funds and seeking out existing scholarships for talented youths among the displaced persons. The commission met periodically, and reported formally to the governor annually.

Another example of State commission activity is from **Illinois**: Job finding, arranging for placement of displaced persons, tracing lost baggage and lost relatives, investigating reports of instances of exploitation in rent and employment, investigating eviction proceedings, informing displaced persons of required immigration and selective service registration, sending news releases of human interest stories to newspapers, keeping abreast of legislative developments, interviewing prospective sponsors and assisting them in filling out assurances, and channeling and coordinating many other matters that arose in accordance with their operations.

In some States there were especially troublesome resettlement problems even where the State and local committees participated fully in the development of the program. In **Maryland**, in the summer and fall of 1948, a great need for farm labor on farms throughout the State made for considerable interest in the program as a possible source of manpower. Even prior to the formal establishment of the State commission, plans were developed for the utilization of such labor. Late in September 1948, the governor established a county DP committee in each of the counties in the State.

There were five representatives on each of the several county committees, including the county agent, a county representative of the State Department of Employment Security, and three citizens who represented the farmer, merchant, industrial, labor and other groups.

Maryland's experience was especially interesting in that it developed a very close cooperative relationship with one particular voluntary agency, the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee, through whose overseas facilities it sought to channel farmers into

Maryland. A leading Maryland farmer, who had been chosen for the purpose by various farm organizations in the State, went overseas with the voluntary agency representatives and actually assisted in making farm nominations for the farmers of Maryland, in cooperation with the Commission's overseas staff. However, despite the overseas nomination by their own farm representative, the failure of some resettlements in the State brought considerable criticism. The inability to predict arrival time for DP's caused difficulty especially since there is reason to believe that the very vigor of the Maryland program itself "oversold" the sponsors as to the immediacy of the arrival of the people they had sponsored. Nevertheless, the Governor reported to a Congressional committee that 80 percent of the resettlements in Maryland were successful.

In **Louisiana** a vigorous State committee focused interest in the local communities. However, despite the fact that most assurances had been submitted by one of the major voluntary agencies, there was misunderstanding of the mutual responsibilities of displaced persons and sponsor. This soon led to considerable irritation and widespread publicity of an unfavorable character. So unfortunate was part of the experience in Louisiana that the State legislature passed a resolution opposing further immigration of displaced persons. Nevertheless, these unsatisfactory developments related only to a small proportion in the State, and the Louisiana State Committee was able as the program progressed to report a much more generally satisfactory resettlement program within the State.

Although the **Washington** State Displaced Persons Committee was not formed until a year after the displaced persons program had been established, it was an active committee. An 11-member committee was named by the Governor in October 1949. Thirty county displaced persons groups also were organized, the majority of which were headed by county agents.

Since the county committees directed nearly all the resettlement work, very few cases of poor resettlements had to be brought before the entire State committee. County committees found new resettlements for displaced persons, arranged for medical expenses when necessary, assisted sponsors in making applications, and generally covered the situations in their respective counties.

In order to have a close working relationship between the committee and other State government departments, the Governor named every State department head an *ex officio* member of the committee.

Several contributory factors in the effectiveness of the Washington State program, in the State committee's own judgment, were: (1) The philosophy that the State committee function as a coordinating policy-determining body and not participate actively in the resettlement work; (2) the rapid establishment of county committees to

handle cases on a local operating level; (3) recognition of the fact that the voluntary agencies were the actual operating agencies; (4) development of close working relationships between existing State departments and other interested private agencies.

The **Pennsylvania** Commission on Displaced Persons came into being on August 18, 1948, with the Governor's appointment of 23 members, including representatives of the voluntary agencies, Government departments, nationality and labor groups, and other interested citizenry.

One of the first tasks the commission undertook was to conduct a survey of employment needs and housing possibilities. Although the Pennsylvania Commission drew up its own assurance forms, assurances were for the most part channeled through the voluntary agencies. Its dominating aim was to serve the voluntary agencies in an intermediary capacity between prospective sponsor-employers, displaced persons, the United States Commission and such departments within the State as were interested in or could be of service to the Commission project. Both the State Employment Service and the State Department of Agriculture assisted the Commission in carrying out its work.

One of the main functions of the Pennsylvania Commission was the location of job opportunities for the incoming displaced persons. The State Employment Service carried the bulk of this load, and according to the Pennsylvania State Commission, achieved a record of harmonious relations between sponsors and displaced persons. An accurate record of vital information on every displaced person who came to Pennsylvania was kept by the State Employment Service.

The Pennsylvania Commission undertook a pilot placement project for skilled workers, at the request of the United States Commission.

The **Wisconsin** Committee on the Resettlement of Displaced Persons was organized in February 1948 and immediately undertook a survey of the State to determine the extent of resettlement possibilities and the attitude of the populous. The Governor approved the continuation of the committee after the passage of the 1948 Act.

The committee later undertook the actual sponsorship of displaced persons and carried on its own placement service to a degree beyond that of most other State commissions. Only two other States, Michigan and Nebraska, organized such an operation. The Wisconsin Committee submitted an assurance to the commission for 500 farm families. In substantiation of this State assurance, a successful drive was conducted in the rural areas to find actual farm job opportunities from farm operators in the State. The voluntary agencies' representatives having membership on the State committee took an active part in this State-wide program. The Wisconsin Committee designated one of

the United States Commission's selection officers, who was a county agricultural agent, to make nominations for the project in Europe. The majority of the farm families were therefore preassigned to a given farm. In a number of instances, however, the matching of job and applicant could not be completed in Europe and was finalized by action of the State commission after matching the immigrant workers after arrival with the type of farm opportunities available in Wisconsin.

The Wisconsin Committee took an active leadership role among the State commissions early in 1950, and called several of the midwestern States together to discuss the problems of the displaced persons resettlement program. At this meeting, several principles were enunciated which were the forerunner to some of the better practices employed in the satisfactory adjustment of displaced persons.

The **New Jersey** State Displaced Persons Commission, created on May 15, 1949, was especially interested in ascertaining whether sponsors were really in a position to fulfill their responsibilities. Individual studies were made of each sponsorship. Recommendation to the Commission to validate assurances was based not only upon the State commission's estimate of the ability of the individual sponsor but also in terms of the over-all employment situation of the area from which the assurance originated.

Union officials were consulted along with the department of labor and industry and the entire matter of displaced persons employment was discussed. The unions reported no instances of American workers being displaced by the immigrants and, in fact, encouraged the hiring of skilled workers from among the immigrant group.

Conferences were also held with representatives of the department of institutions and agencies with reference to public assistance for these new immigrants. The problem was not a serious one because only a handful of such cases developed. The State board of child welfare and the interagency services were able to render most valuable assistance in supervising the resettlement of displaced persons who encountered such difficulties. In the matter of education a ruling was obtained by the State commission to facilitate the registration in public schools of displaced persons' children who encountered difficulties because of the lack of birth certificates which had been lost or destroyed during the war. With the support of the State commission, citizenship classes were greatly enlarged. In the 36 school districts enrollment in citizenship classes increased fourfold. Fourteen out of the 21 counties instituted naturalization and citizenship classes which were attended by thousands of immigrants.

One of the most extensive single projects for resettling DP's in the United States was a farm and food processing project developed in the State of New Jersey, employing nearly 1,000 displaced persons.

The **Massachusetts** Displaced Persons Commission was appointed by the Governor on October 3, 1948, to survey employment opportunities in Massachusetts as available to displaced persons and to cooperate with private and public welfare agencies in providing necessary housing and to handle all inquiries as to details of the program.

The State commission was aided by the State's Division of Naturalization and Americanization with its experience dating back to 1917. The Boston office of the Division of Immigration and Naturalization Service supplied office space for the headquarters of the State commission. Necessary case work throughout the State was performed by staff members of the four branch offices. In connection with the State commission a boat and pier committee was set up in Boston which supervised the debarkation of 38 boats.

Through the State Immigration and Naturalization Service, it is estimated that over 5,000 families received orientation, assistance including not only interpreter service, counseling on business, social and personal problems, but also naturalization and Americanization classes. Sixty communities maintained evening classes for the foreign born. Some five communities had day classes for adults, both for mothers, fathers and single persons who worked at night.

The **New York** State Committee was organized in June 1948. Representatives of the major religious agencies were appointed to the committee by direct nomination of those agencies. Labor unions, agriculture, housing and business interests were also represented. Local displaced persons committees were established in major areas of the State. Even before enactment of the 1948 law, this State conducted a State-wide survey of employment and housing opportunities.

The State of New York absorbed about 30 percent of all displaced persons and German expellees entering the United States. It is estimated that three-quarters of this number settled in New York City and the remainder in up-State communities.

Although the services performed by the New York State Displaced Persons Committee were similar to those described for other States, a greater volume of immigrants coming into New York naturally increased and intensified the committee's work. A staff of six professional investigators from the State's Department of Labor was assigned to conduct the investigations necessary for audit recommendations. These audits were based upon a uniform set of criteria including the following:

1. Will the displaced person receive the same rate of pay as other workers performing comparable work?
2. Why is the present worker being allowed to go and a position offered to a displaced person?
3. What arrangements for schooling have been made?

4. Description of dwelling unit, including number of rooms, rental costs, facilities available.

As a result of careful audits, some 10 percent of the assurances were rejected.

Through the resources and intervention of the State Committee, difficulties between sponsors and employers were avoided where otherwise major controversies may have arisen.

These were only some of the most active State committees and commissions. There were other active commissions also, and many other commissions which participated, if somewhat on a less active and continuous basis, in the cooperative effort to assist the displaced person become adjusted in the United States.

The absence of a clear definition of authority, the lack of funds to carry on a full scale program, and the complete dependence on volunteer help hampered fully effective State commission operation in some of these latter instances. Notwithstanding this, these less active State commissions also made a considerable contribution in the realization of the goals set by the Congress in the program.

General Accomplishments of State Commission

The State commission or committee was a unique development in American immigration, thus far associated principally with the displaced persons program. Its official position despite its voluntary origin and its joint public-private composition, attests to the vigor of a nation ready to experiment with new ways of accomplishing national objectives.

The Displaced Persons Commission wishes to record its gratitude and appreciation for the unselfish and untiring efforts by these State commissions and committees, and to their chairmen and members and their secretaries and executive officers for their indispensable cooperation in making the displaced persons program work successfully.

The operations of the State commissions have taught much that could be useful for the future. Their accomplishments have been very significant and their contributions manifold.

In the first place every State commission afforded the Displaced Persons Commission an opportunity for official State liaison. Second, each State commission was an avenue for communicating important operational information concerning the program to people throughout the State. Third, the various State commissions contributed an important influence in developing public opinion concerning the program and proper resettlement. Fourth, many of the State commissions cooperated in finding employment and housing opportunities and in developing the sponsor relationship to a degree even greater than that hoped for in the planning stages of the program.

Fifth, in performing the audit and review function the State committees were the only check available to the Displaced Persons Commission for determination of the validity of the individual sponsor's assurances on employment, housing, and his responsibility concerning public charge. Sixth, through the State commissions the Displaced Persons Commission was able to adjust the potentialities of the program to the realities of resettlement opportunities throughout the country. Seventh, the State commissions were most important in the postarrival process and helped in smoothing difficult resettlement situations and in making possible a satisfactory adjustment for both the displaced person and the sponsor. Eighth, at the local level the State commission was the coordinating force for the local representatives of voluntary agencies, religious bodies, nationality groups, and other public and private organizations. Ninth, the State commissions were among the key participants in regional and national resettlement meetings and in the dissemination of information on these meetings. Tenth, both individually and in a representative character through membership on the Commission's advisory committee and in other ways, the State commissions were important participants in the mutual and joint development of policy and policy interpretations which were the basis of the program's operations.

Without the aid of the State commissions the Displaced Persons Commission could never have performed its necessary functions in the field. The daily correspondence between the Commission's headquarters in Washington and the various State commissions is a reflection of the tremendous part played by these State bodies in matters relating to individual assurances, to inland transportation of displaced persons, to their settlement in the State, to their life during the very critical first 6 months of their residence in the United States, and their complete assimilation in the local community. In these and in numberless other ways the State commissions performed the function of a volunteer Displaced Persons Commission field staff. Without funds for the creation of a field staff, the Displaced Persons Commission would have been completely cut off from the actual resettlement enterprise. The State commissions made it possible for the Commission to undertake a resettlement program and to follow through on that program. Without their on-the-scene coordination of all the public and private forces operating in this complex program, the Commission feels certain that the program never would have accomplished the high degree of resettlement success which did develop. Without in any way intending to underestimate the magnificent role played by the American voluntary agencies in all parts of the United States in the resettlement program, it is still only fitting to say that the tremendous number of satisfactory resettlements and the rela-

tively few unsatisfactory resettlements bear witness to the vital and effective role played by the State commissions and committees.

Cooperating United States Government Agencies

The displaced persons program was not a "one-man job." It was a "team" operation. The program involved the activities of several other agencies of the United States Government, particularly the agencies which administer the regular immigration laws. These united efforts were further bolstered by other agencies in whose hands rests the security of the United States and which were called upon to lend their assistance to the enforcement of the provisions of the Act.

The Foreign Service and the Visa Division of the Department of State, the United States Public Health Service of the Federal Security Agency, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice, were all entrusted with specific duties in implementing the normal immigration laws and all participated as cooperating parties in the displaced persons program. In addition, intelligence and security investigations and activities were conducted by the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army. This highly important aspect of the work was further strengthened by the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, and the Central Intelligence Agency, among other security agencies.

Security Investigations—CIC, FBI, CIA

The Displaced Persons Act provided that—

No eligible displaced person shall be admitted into the United States unless there shall have first been a thorough investigation and written report made and prepared by such agency of the Government of the United States as the President shall designate, regarding such person's character, history, and eligibility under this act.

The same provision applied to German expellees.

By Executive Order 10003 the President designated the Commission as the agency thus provided for in the law, and on October 4, 1948, enjoined upon the Commission the strictest possible standards of security, with the following instructions:

The highest standards of security shall be observed at all times in order to guard against the entry into the United States of persons who may be undesirable from the standpoint of national security.

As specific guides, the Commission had the clear Congressional indications in section 13, both as originally enacted and as amended in 1950, and by collateral effect by the Internal Security Act of 1950 and Public Law 14 of 1951. As has already been indicated, a basic principle established by the Commission at the very beginning was that any doubt relating to security would be resolved against the applicant for admission under the Act.

In the performance of its security duties, the Commission called upon and relied heavily on all the intelligence and security agencies of the United States Government. Overseas the principal security activity was undertaken by the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army. Other governmental agencies were also called upon such as the Provost Marshal of the United States Army, and the United States embassies (especially in Italy). In the United States, the principal security roles were played by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency.

These various security activities have been described more fully elsewhere. (See pages 99-102, 133-135, 142-147.)

The resultant Commission report attesting to the "character, history, and eligibility" of the displaced person or expellee applicant and the family members, was incorporated into the immigrant's permanent file which was submitted to the consul for use in connection with the issuance of an immigration visa and to the immigrant inspector.

Foreign Service—State Department

The Foreign Service of the Department of State is charged by the immigration laws with the responsibility of issuing visas to applicants for immigration. These laws specify the conditions and eligibility terms for visa issuance, the manner of visa application, forms to be used, establishment of preferences, the setting up of quotas, the assignment of quota numbers, and other relevant matters.

Under the Displaced Persons Act, the applicants had to meet the requirements not only of that Act but also of all the normal immigration laws except as affected by the Displaced Persons Act.

The consular officer, upon receipt of a visa application from a prospective immigrant, examined the accompanying supporting documentation, and upon the basis of his findings, determined the applicant's eligibility to receive a visa.

The Visa Division of the Department of State played a basic role in this process. It served in a technical supervisory capacity, including the preparation and promulgation of visa issuance regulations. The Visa Division, which functions as a centralized clearing house, interprets immigration laws for consular officers, maintains uniform standards of examination, is responsible for granting waivers and for the maintenance of liaison with the Immigration Committees of Congress and with other branches of the Government charged with duties in connection with the entry of aliens into the United States. The Visa Division also is responsible for the investigation of frauds in connection with the procurement of visas abroad.

A displaced person or other refugee seeking to enter the United States under the provisions of any section of the Displaced Persons Act, as amended, was required to make application for a visa just as

any other immigrant. For those cases processed by the Commission, the entire file of the applicant was sent by the Commission to the sub-office in the appropriate resettlement center and the refugee was advised to appear before a consular officer for an interview to determine his eligibility for a visa. The Act specifically states that no visa shall be issued by a consular officer who has reason to believe that the applicant will be excluded from the United States or is inadmissible under any provision of the immigration law, or that he is not a displaced person, or is not eligible under the terms of the Displaced Persons Act.

Under its regulations, the Commission was directed to assist

in every way practicable in the expeditious and efficient processing of applications for immigration visas, and to that end shall make appropriate arrangements with the Department of the Army, the Department of State, the Public Health Service of the Federal Security Agency, the International Refugee Organization, and other agencies concerned.

In cases where the Commission found an applicant eligible under the specific provisions of the Act, other than the normal immigration laws, but where a consular officer denied a visa or an immigration inspector excluded the applicant, a written report setting forth the reasons for rejection and the evidence upon which it was based, was sent to the Commission.

In addition to its regular immigration duties, the Visa Division actively participated in the displaced persons program through direct implementation of section 3 (b) of the Act which came under the administration of the Department of State, and for which the Commission had no administrative responsibility. The State Department programs covered the ex-Polish soldiers in England; the so-termed Shanghai refugees or European refugees in the Far East; displaced persons who fled to areas other than Germany, Austria, and Italy, the so-called out-of-zone refugees; and Greek displaced persons within Greece.

These programs were conducted by the Visa Division through the regular consular officers. The procedure was different from that followed by the Commission in the processing of displaced persons and expellees. Under the State Department's programs, it was necessary for the immigrant to make application directly to the consulate for a visa.

The voluntary agencies carried on their work with respect to these classes of refugees in procuring assurances for them, assisting them with transportation when necessary, and acting as liaison with the consulates, in much the same manner as for those persons immigrating under the Commission programs.

In connection with the national interest cases provided for under section 2 (d) of the amended Act, the Visa Division was the coordinating agency for providing the necessary recommendations from the

Departments of State and Defense. In this sense, the Visa Division was the initiating agency in connection with the processing of such cases.

The Visa Division had a difficult role to play in the DP program, and its continued cooperativeness and helpfulness was not only an important factor in the program's success but was also a source of deep satisfaction to the Commission for which it wishes to express appreciation.

Public Health Service—Federal Security Agency

The Public Health Service, a constituent unit of the Federal Security Agency, is charged by law with the prevention of the introduction of communicable diseases into the United States and its possessions, and the prevention of their interstate spread, and with the enforcement of medical quarantine regulations covering sea, land, and air traffic. It conducts medical examination of immigrants and prospective immigrants to this country and of crews and passengers arriving at sea and airports and border stations in the United States.

Under normal immigration, an immigrant need not be interviewed by the Public Health Service prior to receipt of his visa. However, in any case he is subject to its medical inspection at the port of entry. In the displaced persons program, however, every prospective immigrant was given an examination by the Public Health Service, or under its direction, prior to consular consideration for a visa. In addition, each person arriving in the United States under the Act was given another examination at the port of arrival prior to determination by the immigrant inspector as to the immigrant's admissibility under the immigration law. The Public Health Service was the complete judge of compliance with the health requirements of all applicable laws.

Certain physical conditions or maladies, such as tuberculosis, are mandatory causes for exclusion from the United States. Other physical conditions, while not related to mandatory exclusion, affected admissibility in terms of the likelihood of the immigrant becoming a public charge. In such circumstances, the Immigration and Naturalization Service might require the posting of a bond against the liability of the immigrant's becoming a public charge. In such instances either the sponsor or the voluntary agency posted the required bond, because the displaced person was himself unable to make a cash deposit which is acceptable in lieu of a bond. The Public Health Service examination report is contained in the file of the person applying for a visa and in the file reviewed by the immigrant inspector.

The displaced persons program was a substantial part of the Public Health Service's overseas visa operation. In its 1949 report, the Service stated that the displaced persons "accounted for 42 percent of examinations overseas of persons applying for visas." In some in-

stances these examinations were conducted by local physicians specially selected by the Public Health Service because of their experience in psychiatry and their ability to read tuberculosis X-ray pictures.

Immigration and Naturalization Service—Department of Justice

Possession of a visa is not a guarantee of admission into the United States. Under the immigration law, two separate agencies are set up to determine eligibility under that law, first the visa issuing agency (the Foreign Service) and then the admissibility determination agency (the Immigration and Naturalization Service.)

Under normal immigration, this examination by the Immigration Service is conducted at the port of entry. It usually includes a security check, a literacy test, the checking of documents to be certain they are genuine and in order and that passports, visas, or other travel permits, have not expired—in short, making certain that the alien meets all the qualifications which render him admissible.

A change in procedure was instituted for the displaced persons program. With the original purpose to facilitate and expedite the entry of displaced persons and refugees applying under the Displaced Persons Act, immigrant inspectors were assigned to conduct their inspections at Camp Grohn, in Bremerhaven, the port of embarkation in Europe. Later this inspection was decentralized to the resettlement centers in which the Commission's area offices and the consular suboffices were located. It was the duty of these inspectors to determine admissibility under the immigration laws before the refugee embarked.

After the 1950 amendments the immigrant inspectors were also authorized to review both the International Refugee Organization's determinations of status under the IRO Constitution and Commission's determinations of eligibility under the specific provisions of the Displaced Persons Act. In this connection, for example, persons visaed by the consuls were ruled excluded for reasons apart from the immigration laws, as was the case with the Venezia Giulians under section 2 (b) of the Act, until the Commission's interpretation was finally confirmed by the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Another innovation in immigration procedure which resulted directly from problems arising in connection with the resettlement of displaced persons was the issuance of temporary alien registration cards. Ordinarily, an alien receives his alien registration card from the Immigration Service's field office in the district to which his file is transferred according to the destination given in his visa. This process normally takes several months. Since the immigrant has no official United States document during this period with which to establish his identity or legal entry, other than a form letter of welcome from the Commission, he often experienced difficulty in accepting

employment which had been assured for him. To offset this contingency, the Immigration Service accepted the Commission's proposal for the issuance of a temporary alien registration card. This temporary card, valid for 30 days from date of entry, was issued to the immigrant at the embarkation center before his departure by immigrant inspectors. The card remained with the displaced person's visa file, and upon his admission to the United States was stamped with the date of entry. In the case of a refugee who is detained, the card is not stamped until he is released and is legally admitted into the United States.

Under the Displaced Persons Act, as amended, a new responsibility fell upon the Immigration Service. Through the Attorney General, it was the enforcement agency for the "good faith" oath, to which the displaced person and the expellee must subscribe, concerning his intention to accept and abide by the terms of the assurance which was the basis of his immigration under the Act.

In addition to its statutory duties under the law, the Immigration Service performed other important services directly for the Commission upon request, such as statistical tabulations on the sociological background of the immigrants, and the recording and analysis of the semiannual reports submitted by the displaced persons themselves.

Other Agencies

In addition to the Federal agencies already mentioned, others contributed their support and counsel in the program.

The Department of the Army, and later the Department of the Navy, were involved in the shipping arrangements, and rendered invaluable service at all times. The Army's logistic support overseas was an indispensable operational aid. The Customs Bureau of the Department of the Treasury was involved in customs and baggage clearance, and cooperated in all possible ways with the port and dock committees at the ports of Boston, New Orleans, and New York.

The Departments of Agriculture and Labor continuously cooperated in connection with resettlement opportunities and at all times were helpful in assessing assurance potentialities, in channeling operational information to their field offices, in counseling with the Commission on important factual and policy determinations, and even in recommending occupational specialists for overseas assignments.

The Federal Security Agency, in addition to the statutory operations of the Public Health Service, made available general advice and assistance from its other constituent agencies. The United States Office of Education assigned a staff member for the initial overseas survey of orientation needs. The Children's Bureau was a constant cooperator in connection with the various orphan programs, not only in original planning but also in the necessary continuing relationship with State agencies. The Bureau of Public Assistance played an

important coordinating role for the various State departments of public welfare in providing assistance and guidance to immigrants throughout the country.

The Public Buildings Service of the Federal Works Agency also earned the gratitude of the Commission for its efforts in providing quarters.

The Bureau of the Budget was in constant touch with the Commission and made many valuable contributions in various ways, to the efficiency and economy of operations.

The President and the Congress

No account of the Commission's activities would be complete without grateful acknowledgment of the indispensable roles played by the President and the Congress.

The President personally was a constant source of inspiration to the Commission and to the program. His detailed personal knowledge of the problem, his constant support for a vigorous and enlightened administration of a liberal and decent law, and his personal encouragement were among the high lights of the entire program. The Commission cannot adequately convey to the President, and his staff, its appreciation for his part in this magnificent venture in true Americanism.

The Congress played a continuing and important role in the program, of constructive benefit to the administration of the law and to the immigrants admitted under its terms. The subject matter was so controversial in nature that throughout its entire history the program was under continuous Congressional scrutiny. This scrutiny took various forms: Hearings on the confirmations of the commissioners, hearings on proposed legislative amendments, appropriation hearings, reports on specialized problems, status reports on individual cases, overseas investigations of the operations, personal consultations with committees of the Congress and individual Members, and all the other forms of Congressional study.

As a general conclusion, the sum total of this continued Congressional interest and surveillance—quite apart from the desirable legislative amendments which resulted from it—were in the long run an advantage to the program and to the people it served. Congress became better informed of the operations; in some instances this meant that it was able to dispel preconceived notions held in some quarters based on erroneous information, and was able to view the operation on the actual state of facts. In other instances, it resulted in highly desirable administrative as well as legislative changes. In all, it was an illustration of American democracy at work, and of the effectuation of public opinion and public policy through informed, intelligent, and humane legislation. To the Congress, its committees and their staff, the Commission is deeply indebted for invaluable cooperation in making this program successful.

What's Next

A great experiment in foreign policy and immigration has come to a close. The displaced persons program is over, and the Commission has sought in this report to give some inkling of why it came about, how it worked, who made it work, and what its results were.

Mission Completed

The DP program had many facets. It was a far-reaching development in our foreign policy. It was a liberalized immigration law. It was a pioneering venture in mass resettlement. It was a widespread cooperative enterprise with National, State, and local private organizations, with State and Federal agencies, international organizations and many foreign governments. In all of these things it was an experiment—and it succeeded. It advanced our foreign policy, strengthened our NATO allies, and improved our own domestic economy.

It also proved several important conclusions: First, it proved that immigration is good for the United States. Second, it proved that immigration is no longer purely a domestic matter but is an important and vital part of American foreign policy. Third, it proved that our normal immigration laws, based upon quotas and national origins of prospective immigrants, prevent effective American participation in an international migration program. Fourth, it proved the necessity and desirability of international cooperation in dealing with the mass resettlement of refugees and persons from overpopulated areas of Europe. Fifth, it proved the value of a concentrated effort, by a specially created agency, in fulfilling the congressional purpose of such emergency legislation.

This is the success story of a mission completed.

Mission Ahead

Although the displaced persons program was a success, although it substantially completed all the goals set for it by the Congress and the President, the Commission believes that the general problem has only barely been touched.

Three critical problems still face the United States in the area in which the Commission operated. These three are:

(1) The unfinished business within the Displaced Persons Act itself;

(2) The problem of refugees from Communism; and

(3) the tragic condition of overpopulation in Europe.

Each of these problems is important in itself. All three of them,

together, form a mandate for the free world, a mandate to find a solution in the interests of freedom and peace.

The Unfinished Business Within the Displaced Persons Act Itself

The Displaced Persons Act, as has already been indicated, contained a combination of separate programs. Congress committed administration of the following programs to the Commission:

IRO displaced persons.

German expellees.

Italian refugees from Venezia Giulia.

Recent political refugees.

IRO, Greek, and war orphans.

To the State Department were committed the following programs:

Ex-Polish soldiers in Great Britain.

Greek refugees and preference cases.

European strandeers in China and the Philippines.

Out-of-zone refugees in Europe.

To the Department of Justice was assigned the following program:

Displaced persons legally resident in the United States.

By June 30, 1952, all legislative authority for these programs had terminated, except for the very limited out-of-zone program of the State Department which continues until June 30, 1954. However, while authority lapsed, the people did not. At the closing dates for all of these programs, there were people still in the pipelines, under consideration, who could have been visaed and admitted into the United States, and were equally as desirable as those who did come, except that either the visa authorization or the time limit ran out.

In the Commission's largest programs, the visas ran out before the eligible and admissible people did. In the IRO-displaced persons program, when the last quota number authorized was used, there were still 11,643 displaced persons in the Commission's pipeline. Of these 5,443 were active cases which could have resulted in at least an additional 6,100 persons being visaed immediately thereafter had the statute authorized the additional quota numbers. As a matter of fact, the Commission issued a total of over 312,000 visas in this group, or some 11,000 more than originally planned, owing to the availability of reverter visas from other groups under the statute.

In the Italian refugee program, for Venezia Giulians, all 2,000 visas were issued, the maximum allowed under the law, but some 1,600 more people in the pipeline could have been visaed had they not been cut off by the statutory limit on quota numbers.

In connection with these two groups, although all the authorized visas were issued, some 7,500 were lost in the sense that they were not used for one reason or other. In some cases, the person died after the visa was issued, or decided to go elsewhere or not to migrate at all. In other cases, the visa became unusable because the Immigration and

Naturalization Service ruled the visa holder inadmissible into the United States.

Thus, there remained some 7,500 unused visas, which if made reusable could take care of those persons caught by the complete exhaustion of the statutory quotas allowed for visas.

Visas also ran out for German expellees before people did. Although the law authorized visa issuance until June 30, 1952, the last of 54,744 visas authorized by the law for German expellees was issued on May 6, 1952. At the time there were some 50,000 German expellees still left in the Commission's overseas pipeline. On the basis of the Commission's experience with the expellee program, in terms of loss rate of cases and family size per case, it is likely that the actual overseas pipeline would have yielded another 28,414 visas had more quota numbers been authorized under the law. In addition to this number, the Commission had on hand in Washington over 3,000 additional assurances, of which some 75 percent were for named persons, which could not be validated because visa authorization had expired. Based upon past experience, these 3,000 assurances would have yielded some 3,863 visas.

Thus, among the expellees, the pipeline at the end of the program had somewhere in the vicinity of 32,000 persons who were likely to have been visaed but were cut off because of lack of quota visas under the law.

In general, the same situation prevailed for the other programs. Visas did not run out, but time did, for the Commission's program—based upon recommendations from the Department's of State and Defense—for recent political refugees, and also for orphans. In the three State Department programs which have ended, the best general information seems to be that some 3,000 ex-Polish soldiers, some 9,000 Greek refugees and hundreds of European strandeers in the Far East were caught either by the time or visa limit.

Thus, at the end of the displaced persons program, there were over 50,000 people—displaced persons, German expellees, Italian refugees, Greek refugees, Poles, and European strandeers in the Far East—who would have received visas but for the lack of quota numbers or time cut off.

This is the scope of the unfinished business under the Displaced Persons Act itself.

The Problem of Refugees From Communism

One of the most serious problems in Europe today is the treatment of those people who have escaped or defected from behind the Iron Curtain. These people are refugees in every accepted sense of the term. They constitute the symbol of the cold war between the forces of totalitarianism in the East and the forces of democracy in West.

The Congress realized the importance of doing something about this problem by the 1950 amendments which advanced the eligibility date under the law from December 22, 1945, to January 1, 1949. This change made it possible for a number of these Iron Curtain refugees to find asylum in the United States. The International Refugee Organization realized the importance of providing shelter and facilities for these victims of totalitarianism by advancing the eligibility dates for care and maintenance in its camps and for legal protection for such persons. Both of these developments are now gone; the Displaced Persons Act has terminated, and the International Refugee Organization is liquidated.

The refugees from communism are, therefore, part of the Mission Ahead.

The Tragic Condition of Overpopulation in Europe

The Congress, in its 1950 amendments, realized the intimate relationship between refugees in Europe and overpopulation in Europe. The 1950 law gave eligibility to refugees in three major European countries suffering from overpopulation. The German expellees were one aspect of Germany's overpopulation. The Italian refugees from Venezia Giulian were one group encompassed within Italy's surplus population. And the Greek refugees figured in that country's overpopulation problem.

In addition, the Congress in the 1950 amendments to the Displaced Persons Act called for a conference of concerned nations to deal with the problems of expellees in Germany and Austria. The Congress followed up this far-sighted move with active participation in such a conference, which resulted in the creation of the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME). PICMME's existence came out of vigorous and continuous Congressional insistence, in authorizations, appropriations, and conference participation, that European overpopulation was a problem that demanded immediate efforts at solution.

This problem of overpopulation in Europe is also part of the Mission Ahead.

The President's Message to the Congress, 1952

President Truman felt these three aspects of the mission ahead were of such great importance and seriousness that he submitted to the Congress a special message, on March 24, 1952, urging appropriate action in each of these above-noted three fields. He recommended enactment of an emergency program for the admission of 307,500 people into the United States, over a 3-year period, in order "to alleviate the problems caused by Communist tyranny in western Europe."

In his message, the President declared that one of the gravest problems arising from the present world crisis was created by overpopu-

lation in parts of western Europe. This situation, aggravated by the plight of refugees escaping from Communist tyranny behind the Iron Curtain, was of great practical importance to the United States because it affected the peace and security of the free world. It was also of concern because of the long-established humanitarian traditions of the United States.

In brief, the President's proposed program would:

(1) Provide aid for refugees from Communism escaping from Communist tyranny behind the Iron Curtain;

(2) Authorize special immigration into this country of 300,000 persons over a period of 3 years, to aid in alleviating the problems created by Communist tyranny and overpopulation in western Europe;

(3) Continue this Government's participation in the present international programs for migration and resettlement; and

(4) Complete the unfinished business under the displaced persons program by allowing admission of 7,500 displaced persons left in the pipeline when the visas were used up.

The President reemphasized the position he had taken in 1945 in the Truman Directive and in subsequent messages to the Congress. The solution to these problems was not solely the responsibility of the United States. It was an international responsibility, "an integral part of the world crisis which the free nations must meet together." Cooperative effort was essential, but it was imperative that the United States give leadership in this effort as it had in previous attempts at international aid to refugees and other displaced persons.

The President pointed to the accomplishments under the Displaced Persons Act, and commended the Displaced Persons Commission, the voluntary private agencies, and the State commissions for their achievement. The President declared, "* * * by doing our share and by acting together with the other countries of the free world, we have been dealing successfully with the major dislocations caused by Hitler's policies of brutality and aggression." But, he added, "the movement of large masses of distressed people across international boundaries is by no means over. Communist tyranny has taken up where Hitler's brutality left off. We are, therefore, now turning our attention to the innocent and unhappy victims of Communist oppression."

The President estimated that between 15,000 and 20,000 Germans were escaping across the border from the Soviet zone of Germany into Western Germany every month and that approximately 1,000 were arriving into free Europe from behind the rest of the Iron Curtain every month. These new refugees, seeking asylum, came into areas where the local economy hardly was able to support the population already there. Western Germany was overcrowded with

9 million people of German ethnic origin who were expelled or fled from eastern Europe after the war. Trieste was badly overcrowded. Italy was deep in a struggle with a serious problem of overpopulation and Greece faced difficulty in absorbing refugees of Greek origin who had been driven out of the Balkan satellite countries by the Communists.

The President declared the Congress had taken a forward step in enabling the United States to establish the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe, but he indicated that more needed to be done. He called for the provision of specific aid to those who were fleeing the Communist tyranny in southern and eastern Europe. These fugitives from communism needed supplemental care and maintenance after their arrival in Western Europe and assistance in financing overseas transportation. For those who wanted to remain in Europe, the President felt opportunity should be given them for "further education or training so they can prepare themselves for useful and productive work in the North Atlantic community." Others might find an answer in military service, either in the United States Army or the NATO military forces.

"Overpopulation," the President maintained, "is one of the major factors preventing the fullest recovery of those countries where it exists. It is a serious drag on the economies of the countries belonging to the North Atlantic Organization. A solution to this problem, therefore, becomes vitally necessary to strengthen the defense of the North Atlantic community."

He added that common defense required the best possible use "not only of the material resources of the free world but of our human resources as well." He maintained that men and women who could not be productively employed in the free countries of the world were a net loss to the strength of the free world. Accordingly, such people should be aided to migrate to other countries where they were needed. Left in idleness, as they now were, "they become an easy prey to the demagogues of totalitarianism, both left and right."

The bulk of emigration would be taken care of by countries other than the United States, but the President felt it essential that the United States should take some of the migrants. He emphasized that we were a nation of immigrants, that we "have been made strong and vigorous by the diverse skills and abilities of the different peoples who have migrated to this country and become American citizens." He referred to the growing manpower needs and made special mention of those in the industrial and agricultural fields.

To meet the present emergency the President specifically urged the Congress to authorize the admission of 300,000 additional persons over a 3-year period. On an annual basis, these included:

(a) 7,000 religious and political refugees from communism in Europe;

- (b) 7,500 Greeks from Greece;
- (c) 7,500 Dutch from the Netherlands;
- (d) 39,000 Italians from Italy and Trieste; and
- (e) 39,000 Germans and German expellees.

In addition to this emergency 3-year program, the President recommended that steps be taken to admit the 7,500 IRO-displaced persons in the pipeline who had been unable to gain admission because visas authorized for displaced persons were exhausted.

The President called for the same kind of security, resettlement, and employment safeguards that had proved successful in the displaced persons program, and indicated that there should be no religious, racial, or other discrimination in the selection of the immigrants. He believed the new immigrants might be able to repay their transportation costs, thereby keeping down the cost to the Government.

Scope of the Mission Ahead

In this message to the Congress, the President fully outlined "What's Next." He pointed out that, apart from the pipeline cases, by and large, the original displaced persons—those displaced by the tragic upheaval Hitler and Stalin brought upon the world—have been resettled through the efforts of this country and other free nations of the world. Through the Displaced Persons Act, Congress indicated public recognition that immigration is a facet of our foreign policy.

However, as the President observed in his message, "Communist tyranny has taken up where Hitler's brutality left off." Refugees have continued to pour westward from Soviet oppression into the free world. These refugees are fleeing from eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union, as a direct result of the tyranny of Communist dictatorship. By virtue of their geographic location, the already overpopulated countries of Western Germany, Western Austria, Italy, Trieste, and Greece have become, in the main, the countries of first asylum for these refugees. Despite the severe condition of overpopulation in each of these countries they have stood fast in support of a basic principle of western civilization: Asylum for the religious and political oppressed. At present there is a large pool of such refugees residing in these areas. Entirely apart from the approximately 18,000 to 20,000 German refugees fleeing into Western Germany from the Soviet-occupied zone each month, there is a continuing inflow of almost 1,000 non-German refugees monthly. Due to the condition under which these refugees are forced to flee, they arrive destitute in areas which are already overpopulated and where facilities of every kind are strained. With the termination of the International Refugee Organization, the problems of reception and temporary care have become desperate.

The desperate condition in which these refugees from communism find themselves, and the present lack of opportunity for emigration to new homes and new lives, are being exploited by communist propaganda. Opportunities for them to emigrate from the areas of first asylum should be provided as an essential part of our struggle against communism and of our hope for a strong and self-reliant western Europe.

Our world leadership for peace and our very own national security are at stake here. We, a peaceful people, are now engaged in a cold war—for us, an effort to preserve freedom and democracy, decency and human dignity, individual liberties, and individual conscience. We have geared our national economy and our foreign policy to the end of strengthening the free nations of the world in our mutual resolve to protect our freedom and peace from aggression.

In this cold war we find ourselves being joined by people whose personal experience with life behind the Iron Curtain leads them, at the peril of their lives, to flee to the free world. Here, the free world has won the first skirmish.

But we may lose the cold war if our policies permit frustration and hopelessness to grow in the minds and hearts of these refugees from communism. We may lose the victory if we neglect them and crush the spirit of freedom and hope which our foreign policy seeks to encourage everywhere. We must show them that their faith in freedom is not fruitless. We must prove to them—by acts, not words—that democracy is better than communism. We must give them the hoped-for opportunity to start life anew as self-respecting individuals living a free man's life. This is one of the most crucial problems facing us today.

Communist aggression has also brought to the fore the serious consequences of overpopulation in certain countries of western Europe whose security, productive capacity, political, economic, and social stability are vital to the defense of the free world. Our common defense requires that we make the best possible use of our material resources. It is even more important that we make full use of the valuable human skills which cannot, under present conditions, be productively employed.

A problem of overpopulation, aggravated by large concentrations of refugees, exists in Western Germany, Greece, Italy, and Trieste, and in the Netherlands. In its present acute form this problem is a result of special circumstances. An emergency international effort in which the United States shares in making productive use of their excess population, would serve to reestablish a relatively manageable situation in which their natural increase in population can be readily absorbed for useful purposes within their own economies. The solution to this problem can be found through cooperative effort by inter-

ested countries if the United States continues to provide the necessary leadership.

What these countries of overpopulation need is to reestablish the balance between their populations and their economies. Our programs of foreign, economic and other aid are designed to help them boost their domestic economies to a more stable and productive level. Simultaneously we must help them deal with the other side of this equation, their population. In our own national interest and security we must join Canada, Australia, the Latin American countries and other nations in helping the overpopulated countries of Europe to encourage people to migrate. The economies of these western European countries are such that people must leave. Our own economy is such that we need more people. This is also true of other countries. This program, therefore, is more than humanitarianism; its more than sound foreign policy; its more than strengthening our own national defense. It is also a practical example of enlightened self-interest.

As an aid to public understanding of these problems, the Commission presents some of the essential facts with regard to each of these countries where a special overpopulation problem dominates the scene:

(1) *Western Germany*.—About 10 million refugees and expellees, mostly German and persons of German ethnic origin, have been forced since the war to flee into Western Germany from areas now dominated by Soviet Russia and her satellites. This inflow continues at the rate of 18,000 to 20,000 per month, mostly from the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany. Recently as many as 1,000 a day have been fleeing into western Berlin. In addition to these German expellees and refugees, hundreds of non-German refugees flee each month from behind the Iron Curtain to Western Germany as a country of first asylum.

Refugees constitute about 20 percent of Western Germany's population today, a situation that took place in 5 years. One of every five people in Western Germany is an expellee. There are two ways, both of which must be employed, to solve the problem with which Western Germany is confronted: (1) Economic integration of this population group within Western Germany and (2) emigration elsewhere.

The refugee problem is significant from an economic standpoint quite apart from the tragic situation created for many families. The difficulty of absorbing these German refugees heavily strains German resources, and constitutes a threat to the growth of stability of democratic institutions. According to the Bonn Ministry for Expellees, in the spring of 1952, although every effort has been made to absorb the expellees into the economy, only 30 percent of the expellees had permanent employment, another 40 percent were in an unstable wage earning position, and the remaining 30 percent lived on public assistance and relief. Over 340,000 expellees still lived in mass camps.

Although expellees constitute one-fifth of Western Germany's population, one-third of the total number of unemployed in Germany

are expellees. The government of Western Germany is striving to integrate them fully into its economy; but for many who cannot be resettled and integrated into the economy there, especially a large agricultural group, emigration would provide a new chance for productive life. The potential emigrants, according to Bonn Government statements, numbered 1,200,000.

The small program under the Displaced Persons Act, providing for only 54,744 visas, has now been completed, although there were some 32,000 people likely to receive visas who were left in the Commission's pipeline, still hoping for American visas which were not available because all authorized visas had been issued.

Canadian and Australian special immigration programs together provide for about 50,000 German immigrants per year. However, much greater opportunities must be provided if emigration is to play its required role in the solution of this acute problem.

The Commission has earlier pointed out the relationship of the solution of this problem to European stability and Western defense against communism. The point has particular relevance in Germany. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in September 1951, said:

The refugee population in Germany shows increasing inclination towards political adventure. The younger generation of the refugee population faces the future with little confidence in the effectiveness of democracy and its capacity to solve their problems.

This is the challenge to the free world. We cannot afford to imperil our own security by failing to meet this challenge successfully.

(2) *Italy and Trieste*.—Large-scale emigration has traditionally played a significant role in relieving Italian overpopulation, which has been a source of economic and political instability in Italy. Although the rate of increase of the Italian population has now declined to the level of other western European countries, the pressure of population remains great and has been intensified by the cessation of emigration during the World War II period and the repatriation of some 480,000 Italians from former colonies and other areas in the Mediterranean not presently open to Italian emigrants. The situation has been further aggravated by the loss of the province of Venezia Giulia to Yugoslavia, resulting in the flight of some 125,000 Italians from that territory to Italy.

Italy poses the most acute problem of overpopulation in western Europe. It is no mere coincidence that the largest Communist Party in western Europe is found in Italy, nor that the largest growing neo-Fascist vote is in the grievously overpopulated southern part of Italy.

As with Germany, the situation in Italy is of utmost sensitivity. Italy's geographic position in the Mediterranean makes it of utmost importance to our own physical safety. Italy is crucial to peace in

Europe, and therefore to world peace. An overcrowded Italy which cannot give real hope and opportunity to its people, invites Communist or Fascist takeover. Communism breeds on poverty and frustration. Unless Italy can offer hope and opportunity to its people, the western world runs the risk of real trouble.

As witness of American determination to enable Italy to stand as a full partner in the free world is the 2½ billion dollars of aid to Italy during and since World War II. This is too big an investment in stability and peace to let go now. Any contribution to the relief of Italy's overpopulation will be a substantial step toward Italian political, economic, and social health and to western European security against Communist aggression. It is especially significant that at the Lisbon conference in the spring of 1952, NATO adopted a resolution concerning "the importance of emigration particularly for Italy, but also for other countries."

The United States has therefore encouraged international solutions for the Italian overpopulation problem. It has also, through the Marshall Plan, assisted the Italian Government in making surveys of land settlement possibilities in Latin America. President Truman expressed the deep concern of the American people with this problem, to Prime Minister de Gasperi during their conversation in Washington in September of 1951. However, with the exception of the programs for 2,000 Venezia Giulia refugees and approximately 7,500 non-Italian refugees under the Displaced Persons Act, the United States has as yet taken no direct steps to provide relief for Italian overpopulation. Italian quota immigration into the United States is limited to 5,677 annually, and is obviously totally inadequate to deal with this problem.

Every effort is being made to develop productive employment for surplus manpower in Italy and to encourage a greater absorption of Italian emigrants by other European countries; but greater emigration opportunities must be found if progress is to be made in achieving the required migration from Italy. If an annual movement of 350,000 to 400,000 should be achieved, considerable progress could be made toward alleviating the serious conditions resulting from overpopulation in Italy. The present rate of Italian emigration to all countries is approximately 180,000 per year. The free world's welfare requires a minimum additional flow of 170,000 people from Italy each year.

Trieste presents a special problem in an area where the United States shares with Great Britain occupation responsibilities. In addition to Italian refugees from Venezia Giulia, who may be considered as part of the Italian problem, there are in Trieste about 5,000 non-Italian displaced persons from eastern Europe, living in

overcrowded camps. Since this flow of refugees from eastern Europe still continues, emigration opportunities are needed for 2,000 a year.

The magnitude of Italy's overpopulation creates a very serious problem. And, just as in Germany, it is not easy to separate the refugees from the total problem of overpopulation. Almost three-fourths of a million people in Italy are refugees in one way or another, as repatriates from the former Italian colonies or as people dislocated from Venezia Giulia because of the Italian Peace Treaty.

In trying to find a solution for this problem, the United States must avoid the easy temptation to slough off the Italian problem with a pat distinction between refugees and overpopulation. Neither should we be primarily concerned with making a superficial distinction between refugees and other persons who through no fault of their own are just as homeless, and just as devoid of economic opportunity as the refugees. Such attempts only confuse the issue with regard to the over-all problem. In some instances this distinction is being used to mask the ugly face of religious prejudice.

This problem should be tackled from the point of view of traditional American humanitarianism. This aspect should apply just as well to Italy as it does to Germany or any other country. It should make no difference what religious faith predominates among these people. The primary aim of the United States must be to help human beings, and thus to write an insurance policy for peace.

In connection with Italy, an especially touchy subject arises. Some well-meaning people have been heard to say: "Why try to do anything about Italy's overpopulation? The birth rate is so high that you would get nowhere."

This is a delicate subject, and the Commission brings it to the fore only because it believes that such people are wrong on their facts. An unclassified report of the Department of State's Office of Intelligence Research, entitled *Italian Population Growth* (Information Paper 95, March 27, 1951), starts out:

One of the prevailing myths about contemporary Europe is the legendary fertility of the Italian population. The view is widely entertained that the Italian birth rate is so high as to preclude any lasting solution to Italy's economic problem.

There is little demographic evidence to support this point of view. Neither the Italian birth rate nor the rate of population growth set Italy apart from her European neighbors, and both are low as compared with current rates in the world at large.

The facts in this study show that Italy's birth rate has been declining for two generations and that at the present time the Italian population is barely replacing itself, and that population growth in Italy will eventually disappear.

It may surprise many people to learn that Italy's birth rate is now lower than France's, the Netherlands' and even than that of the United States.

At this stage, therefore, an effective international migration program from Italy to Australia, Canada, Latin America, the United States and elsewhere can and will have a lasting and successful effect.

(3) *Netherlands*.—In the Netherlands the development of sources of livelihood, especially since World War II, has lagged behind the population increase owing to national and international economic dislocation and the changed relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Owing to its dense population, opportunities for productive employment have been especially limited for young men and women in the agricultural areas. The Netherlands has, therefore, been faced with serious problems in maintaining and raising its level of prosperity. Its Government estimates the desirable level of emigration at 60,000 to 65,000 persons per year and has embarked on a vigorous program of encouraging emigration, under which more than 40,000 a year are now emigrating abroad, particularly to Canada, Australia, and Latin America.

The Netherlands Government has faced its emigration problem in a practical and realistic manner and has developed a program to promote the emigration not only of farmers' sons but of all those whose work is not indispensable to the Netherlands economy. Aid is given to the individual emigrants toward their transport expenses and other forms of subsidies are employed. Bilateral agreements have been negotiated principally with Australia, Canada, Brazil, and New Zealand. As a result of this concerted policy overseas emigration from the Netherlands increased from 504 in 1946 to 13,837 in 1948, 21,330 in 1950, and over 40,000 in 1951.

Agricultural and colonization projects have been developed in Brazil and Argentina, and there has been a steady growth of emigration to South Africa and New Zealand.

In the President's letter of October 18, 1951, responding to Queen Juliana of the Netherlands, he indicated the deep and abiding concern of the American people with the grave problems presented by overpopulation and refugees.

Considering the emigration target set by the Netherlands Government and taking account of the existing movement, under arrangements already made between the Netherlands and various countries of immigration, the resulting additional emigration requirements are 25,000 per year.

(4) *Greece*.—Greece has undergone three upheavals in the past generation, seriously affecting its population structure and resources: The exchanges of population with Turkey in 1922–24; the German and

Italian occupation in World War II; and the civil war against the Communist guerrillas in the postwar period.

The dislocation of population, the wiping out of entire villages and towns, and the devastation of land and physical resources which resulted from these aggressive acts during World War II and the Communist guerrilla terror that followed have heavily strained this small, but free, nation. The all-out effort at reclaiming land, the rebuilding of the villages and towns still falls far short of the basic requirements of the native population.

There are three main groups of surplus population which give rise to the present need for emigration from Greece: 750,000 refugees from the interior of the country, victims of the guerrilla war; 40,000–45,000 refugees of Greek and foreign nationality of the countries of southeast Europe; and the annual surplus population of approximately 30,000 persons.

Of the 750,000 internal refugees most have been resettled, partly with American aid, but there still remain 140,000 uprooted people whose resettlement has been almost impossible. Of the 40,000–45,000 refugees from other countries, 1,100 were alien refugees whose care became a charge on the Greek budget which was also true of most of the refugees of Greek origin. Although the IRO has assisted in repatriating some of these refugees, many still remain as public charges in Greece. As for the approximately 30,000 annual surplus population, these arise from the inadequacy of Greek resources, and the Greek Government would welcome the assistance of any other government which would be willing to receive them.

The interest of the United States Government in this problem was evidenced by its program for the admission of 10,000 Greek persons into this country under the 1950 amendments to the Displaced Persons Act. Owing to disturbed conditions in Greece, postwar emigration has been negligible but the Canadian Government embarked in 1951 on a program of recruitment of 2,400 Greek emigrants per year and Greek emigration to Australia is also increasing.

United States aid is designed to increase employment in Greece. However, greater emigration is essential to healthy recovery. Opportunities are now required for a backlog of 40,000–45,000 refugees, Greek and non-Greek, of whom the Greek Government desires the largest possible number to emigrate. In addition, the Greek Government sees the need for emigration of 30,000 of its surplus population per year.

International Concern

The Governments of the free world have repeatedly recognized the existence and seriousness of this overpopulation problem. The Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and France,

in their declaration at London in May 1950, described this problem as one of the major sources of unrest in the Western World. The member governments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have more recently emphasized the importance of a solution of this problem to the attainment of our common defense and security.

The significance of the problem for the United States peace objectives was recently stated in a letter to the Commission by the Mutual Security Director:

The political stability and economic health of several of the European members of NATO will be greatly strengthened if effective measures can be taken to help through emigration to relieve their population pressures and associated structural unemployment. To the extent that the United States through an emergency program is prepared to accept additional immigrants from these countries for productive employment in this country, we will thus be making a real contribution to the security of the North Atlantic community.

Various countries of the Western World already have programs under way providing for the admission of needed immigrants from the countries of overpopulation, thus not only benefiting their own economies but also serving to relieve population pressures in the countries of emigration. The Australian Government has embarked, with the support of all principal political parties, on an ambitious immigration program. Its current annual intake is 150,000, and its final possible annual target is 300,000 per year. This is a very substantial program for a country with a population of 8,000,000. Bilateral agreements have been negotiated by the Australian Government with the Dutch and Italian Governments providing respectively for annual immigration through assisted passages of 25,000 and 15,000 respectively. A similar agreement is being negotiated with the Bonn Government with 25,000 the probable annual target. Total permanent immigration into Australia in 1951, was 174,540. Australia is also an active participant in the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe and plans to have 25,000 migrants transported through the auspices of that organization in 1952.

Canada, like Australia, has also embarked upon an ambitious immigration program to increase her population and working force in order to meet manpower requirements arising out of its economic expansion. The 1951 target of 150,000 immigrants was considerably exceeded by the actual intake of 194,391 during 1951—the biggest Canadian immigration flow in 38 years. This 1951 total added about 2 percent to the current Canadian labor force. Germans provided the largest single national group—32,395 compared with 5,825 in 1950. Italians were the second largest group, and accounted for 24,351 compared to 9,059 in the previous year; 19,130 were Netherlanders.

Canadian immigration includes not only those who came on their own but also many immigrants brought over on assisted passages through projects developed by the Canadian Government in coopera-

tion with private industry. Canada is also an active participant in the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe.

Latin America holds forth great economic potentialities which can lead to absorption of substantial numbers of immigrants. Substantial immigration took place in 1949, totaling over 213,000. The Governments of Brazil and Venezuela are currently evidencing real interest in immigration prospects and the Italian Government, with ECA assistance, has carried out explorations for land settlement projects and sees promising prospects, especially in Brazil and Chile, for a limited number of settlers on the land.

The twin problems of refugees from communism and overpopulation were recently described by one of the Commissioners as follows:

People without land and land without people—that is the twentieth century's cruel paradox and at the same time its great challenge. * * *

Ordinary people all over the world have simple wants—enough to eat, a decent home, a chance to work and live with self-respect, an opportunity to raise a family in dignity, and the right to hope. To leave refugee and surplus populations without hope, jobs, homes, or food is to abandon them to desperation. Such people become vulnerable to the blandishments of the tallest lie or the biggest false promise.

Mankind is torn by the struggle for the minds of men between the free world and totalitarianism. Communism thrives on hopelessness. The free world must inspire people with faith in a brighter future. An effective program of international migration will replenish the temples of peace with spiritual strength. The United States has long been a symbol of hope to the whole world. Even more than for our material or military might, people today look to us for inspiration. We must continue to give hope to people everywhere, in practical and tangible ways, that affect them individually, if we are to succeed in our world leadership for peace.

A concerted and much larger effort amongst all countries able to accept additional immigrants must be obtained if the problems of overpopulation and of refugees from communism are to be solved. United States participation and leadership will be essential, however, to the realization of such a concerted and successful effort.

Domestic Economy of the United States

Any proposed program of this kind must, of course, be judged in the light of the best interests and welfare of the United States. The evidence shows beyond question that it is in the best interests of our foreign policy for the President's proposed program to be adopted. The same situation is true in terms of our domestic economy.

Absorption of the limited number of 300,000 additional immigrants, called for by President Truman in his message to the Congress, in this period of heightened defense production, will be of positive benefit to the productive achievements of the United States. The contribution of these immigrants to American production will be increased

if they are carefully selected with a view to their qualifications and skills.

The United States Department of Labor has advised that 100,000 additional migrants a year for the next 3 years could be absorbed without foreseeable difficulty and that a real contribution would thereby be made to American production.

The defense program of the United States represents only partial mobilization. However, estimates are that a civilian labor force of almost 66,000,000 will be required by the fourth quarter of 1953. The civilian labor force in April 1952, was 61,744,000.

Defense employment has risen from 2,000,000 at the time of Korea to 5,500,000 at the end of 1951 and close to 6,000,000 at the present time.

To accomplish the national security program, almost 2,000,000 defense workers will have to be added during the rest of this year to the nearly 6,000,000 now employed.

Most of the needed workers will be obtained by shifts of workers from their present nondefense activities to defense activities, in most cases without changing their employment.

In manpower, as in other aspects of mobilization, the plateau we reach in 1953 represents the base from which full mobilization, in the event of need would take off. All of this adds up to a pretty heavy manpower demand. This demand, however, will not be uniform over the country. Much of it will be concentrated in specific geographic areas. This will necessitate the use of all available labor supply in these areas and in some cases migration within the United States will be necessary. As the general demand increases we can expect our occupational shortage problems to become more severe.

The United States has the advantage of a far larger, better trained, and more productive work force now than in 1940 but we do not have the over-all reserves for expansion that were available then. If careful selection is made in Europe, based on professional employment service interviews and occupational classifications along the lines already started by the Commission, the United States Department of Labor believes that this country can absorb 100,000 additional migrants a year for the next 3 years.

The Commission has demonstrated that the United States can obtain from Europe some trained factory workers, engineers, scientific technicians, and other kinds of specially qualified people whose skill can be put to good use in our economy.

The displaced persons program has shown also that good farm workers can be found in Europe to meet the great demand for such people in American agriculture. Farm operators and farm workers are essential to our defense effort. Since 1949 there has been a downward trend in the farm population in the United States with the resumption of the movements from the farms to the city. There is

a real danger that in the years just ahead agricultural production may be seriously hampered.

A rich pool of surplus farmers and farm workers exist in the overpopulated areas of western Europe. Among the expellees in Western Germany there are many agricultural families with no opportunity for employment on the land. In Italy and the Netherlands, too, there are large groups of agricultural workers who cannot find productive employment on the limited arable land available.

Cultural Enrichment

The persons who entered the United States under the Displaced Persons Act, or who may enter the United States under the proposed new program, strengthen the United States not only in our economy but also in our culture and our international understanding. The DPs, German expellees, Italian refugees and others, have brought us cultural, intellectual, and social enrichment.

The strength of our New World civilization has been our capacity to absorb and benefit from new ideas, cultures, and mores. The DP immigration brings to our shores the victims of conscious totalitarian onslaughts on the minds and spirits of men. Therefore such immigration has special significance in the world of ideas and moral values. Furthermore, these people come largely from the lands now under Soviet domination. The culture, knowledge, and understandings of these new arrivals is all the more important to us since the travails of our times make it imperative that we in the United States understand such foreign cultures.

The DP program provides us with a sort of permanent two-way program of international understanding: We can show to the New Americans our understanding of democracy and our capacity to build a high standard of life on a philosophy that exalts human rights; the DPs can teach us the abiding values of their own cultures, open our eyes to the dangerous ways of dictators, and help us achieve our goals in the strategy of freedom and peace.

Displaced persons bring to us the rich experience of people who have lived in several countries and under several forms and philosophies of government. They can give to us, in a very personal and dramatic way, the warm attachments to democracy of people who have witnessed the seamy side of totalitarianism of the right and of the left. Sometimes a newcomer has a clearer vision of fundamentals than do natives who take human rights and liberties too much for granted. Our national history shows that we have benefited from constant reinvigoration by successive waves of refugees fleeing from various parts of the world.

The DP program and the proposed new program can serve, in still another way, as a vehicle of education for peace and freedom. It has been closely related to UN operations and therefore affords an opportunity for illumination of the UN itself and its role in preserving and maintaining world peace.

Some 90 percent of all of UN's expenditures, apart from its banking functions, have gone into refugee operations. The problem of the refugee and the victim of overpopulation affects the peace and security of the whole world. The DP program, therefore, affords a clear example of the growing realization in international and national circles that, until we resolve these basic questions of human rights and opportunities, we cannot hope for success in the vital realm of international cooperation.

In the resettlement of over 1,038,750 refugees in 48 countries and perhaps an equal number of other areas, the international treatment of the DP problem has shown that cooperation among nations can solve problems which but a few years ago might have been looked upon as impossible of solution. The moral of this pioneering effort is clear: International cooperation in the solution of refugee problems through migration and through economic development in underdeveloped areas makes available a new and fuller life to the victims of both hot and cold wars. But this international cooperation only sets the stage for the next step, the development of mutual understanding among people in the community and the newcomer.

The stage is thus set in the United States: One-third of a million people to be integrated into our society, to broaden our cultural and sound vision as we give them surcease from flight and fear. In this process of mutual aid and mutual self-benefit, the DP program and the proposed new program can contribute to enabling the American people to grow in the understanding and wisdom necessary to fulfill our role as a leader in the free world.

Special Programs for Refugees From Communism

Thus far reference has been made principally to the needs for international migration to solve these various problems in Europe. The President's Message of March 24, 1952, included another recommendation for an affirmative program in connection with refugees from communism.

The President recommended that:

- (1) These refugees from communism be given supplementary temporary reception facilities and supplemental care and maintenance, upon their escape from behind the Iron Curtain, and
- (2) those refugees from communism who desire to remain in Europe should be given "further education or training so they

can prepare themselves for useful and productive work in the North Atlantic Community."

People who flee from communist tyranny are generally without identity papers and without funds. In addition, few of them have relatives or friends to whom they can go for shelter and assistance in reestablishing themselves. Without identity papers and work permits, they have a most difficult time in scratching out a livelihood in the countries of first reception. Therefore, they need to find a welcoming and helpful hand on freedom's border. They need a helping hand to get them started in their new life in the free world. Common decency—if nothing else—commends the President's first proposal.

The President's second proposal, for education and training of refugees from communism, is an equally important and vital part of the whole program.

One of Communist tyranny's first acts in subjugating or occupying another country is to attempt to decapitate the conquered nation of all prodemocratic leaders and traditions.

In present-day realities, the Communist dictators are making a conscious effort to sovietize the countries which they control either through conquest or by other means. The world is witnessing a deliberate attempt to destroy the national cultures and traditions of eastern Europe. The free world must help educate and train leaders who can give democratic guidance to their countrymen who have escaped to the North Atlantic Community of Free Nations, and who can give hope and vision for a possible brighter future.

The free world does not seek to impose its views upon others. Rather, its role is to help defend ideas, traditions, and cultures from aggressions. One of the principal problems facing the free world today is pure survival of these religions, cultures, traditions, national histories, arts, literatures, and science. Like all tyrannies, the Soviet tyranny cannot and will not survive the irresistible urge of people for freedom.

In discussing the importance for this country to do something positive and constructive for refugees from communism, the President said:

These men and women are friends of freedom. They include able and courageous fighters against communism. They ask only for an opportunity to play a useful role in the fight for freedom. It is the responsibility of the free world to afford them this opportunity.

The President proposed to afford this opportunity to such refugees from communism through

* * * further education or training so they can prepare themselves for useful and productive work in the North Atlantic Community.

In this way, said the President, those refugees from communism who want to remain in Europe would be "given the opportunity to make

their individual contributions to the free world." In the interest of "the peace and the security of the free world," the President urged the Congress to provide clear and adequate authority and funds to accomplish the programs of education and training which he recommended.

Such a program is of utmost importance to the very survival of the United States in the face of threats of Communist aggression. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, testified before a Congressional committee on February 18, 1952:

Too often in the past, in my judgment, when forced to take steps toward strengthening our military defenses, we have been reluctant to engage a potential enemy in a battle of ideas * * *

While we must continue the strengthening of our military forces, we must, at the same time, enter into the struggle for men's minds with every resource at our command. We must make maximum use of every medium of communication we possess. We must regain the psychological advantage. We must employ a positive approach instead of a negative defense.

* * * the battle for the hearts and loyalties of men is a fundamental part of our national security efforts. * * * We must go all out in the battle of ideas.

General Collins called for "building a spirit of unity and determination among free peoples everywhere," and for "translating that spirit into action."

The Commission has not had any operating responsibility in dealing with this problem. However, the Commission has dealt with displaced persons, with German expellees, with Italian refugees, with recent political refugees from Iron Curtain countries, and has had official and other discussions with leading American officials in the United States and abroad, and with leading officials of foreign governments. The Commission's attention has time and again been called to the fact that the free world's refugee program has lacked something in this positive area. In addition, the Commission has had the advantage of a thorough study of this particular aspect of the problem by Commissioner Rosenfield, both in Europe and in the United States. On the basis of these factors, the Commission makes the following recommendations for carrying out the President's proposal in this area:

First, the United States should provide the training and education recommended by the President for selected refugees from communism. The free world cannot afford to fritter away this resource. We must enable them to continue their education and training, in the broadest range of subjects, in order that the now-enslaved countries may not later suffer a "lost generation." The North Atlantic Community, as the President suggested in his message, will benefit by the resultant productive and useful work which such educated and trained refugees from communism can provide. In the battle for the minds of men,

which General Collins says we must wage with all resources at our command, the refugees from communism are one of our most valuable resources. The United States must, in its own national interest and security, give them the training and education which the President suggests, in order that they may play a useful role in the fight for freedom.

In particular, the Commission believes that the United States should assist in the establishment of a series of free world universities in exile, to be associated with existing universities in Europe. The United States should also establish appropriate scholarships for such refugees from communism at other regularly constituted universities, should develop a free world university of the air to supplement the formal educational programs, and should encourage student exchanges.

Some years ago, the United States Chamber of Commerce called education "an investment in people." If the United States is seeking really profitable investments, which may pay dividends in peace and world security, these free world universities in exile for the training and education of refugees from communism will be gold-edge investments in our own peace and security. These proposals are not new. They merely are extensions and expansions of existing types of activity, but with a particular orientation and purpose, the education and training of refugees from communism for the purposes suggested by the President.

The Commission's second suggestion to implement this particular Presidential recommendation is the establishment of cultural and research institutes. If we are to preserve the morale of these refugees, if we are to enable them and others to keep alive the spirit of freedom which caused them to flee to the Western democracies, these institutes can play an important role. They would enable scholars to continue their researches and publications. They would provide guidance for people seeking the ways of democracy and freedom. They would serve as a permanent bond of understanding and good will between the peoples of the free world and the freedom-loving peoples who have escaped from communism.

The free world can effectively "go all out in the battle of ideas," as General Collins urged, by providing the education and training for refugees from communism which President Truman recommended to the Congress. The United States can win the people of the world to our side, in the struggle for the minds of men, if we act to these ends, with what General Collins called, "all the American vigor, boldness, and hard common sense of which we are capable." The President's proposal for education and training of refugees from communism, and for the consequent preservation of cultural values and traditions of countries now behind the Iron Curtain, is a real example of this "American vigor, boldness and hard common sense."

Relationship of Proposed Program to Normal Immigration

The Commission's experience in the DP program leads to certain recommendations relating to the proposed program.

1. *Quota or nonquota visas.*—Perhaps the major present obstacle to the accomplishment of the objectives of the President's message is the quota requirement of the normal immigration law, which prevents the issuance of visas in sufficient numbers and to the groups affected.

The Congress was faced with this same problem in the displaced persons law. For example, our foreign policy refused recognition to Soviet annexation of the Baltic states, and encouraged their recognized pre-Soviet governments. Yet, under the normal immigration quotas, only about 2,500 people from Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania would have entered the United States during the life of the DP Act.

In order to make it possible therefore for the United States to play a reasonable part in a grave international problem affecting peace, Congress had to override temporarily previous restrictions by setting up the DP Act, which in effect charges off visas issued in 1 year to quotas for many years in the future. The Latvian quota is already mortgaged ahead for over three centuries—to the year 2274—and altogether the DP law admitted more than 62,000 persons from these states. If the United States is to admit refugees from communism and persons from countries in Europe which are overpopulated, some means must be found to deal with the quota requirements.

There are several ways in which this may be done. But they all add up to meaning that so far as the visa-holder is concerned, he is non-quota in effect. They differ in another regard, how the quotas for someone else are to be charged to make up for the person allowed in. Under the DP Act, the plan used was to mortgage the quotas, as just described, by charging the visas to the annual quotas for next succeeding years, to the amount of 50 percent of each such quota year. Under this plan, 50 percent of the quotas for at least six countries are already mortgaged to the year 2000 and beyond, and all the countries involved have 50 percent of their quotas mortgaged for decades ahead.

The mortgaging of quotas enabled the United States to do what it wanted to do under the DP Act. However, it is basically unsound: It blocks off important and useful immigration for decades and even centuries ahead. Useful as it was to get the DP program started, it is wrong in principle. The Commission, in its first semiannual report, recommended that the mortgaging feature be eliminated. The Commission reiterates this recommendation now. The mortgaging of quotas should be repealed and no new program should be burdened with further mortgaging, which would develop the perfectly ridiculous prospect of mortgaging quotas for four, five, or perhaps six centuries ahead.

A second way to deal with the problem was the manner recommended by the President, that the visa be nonquota. This the Commission recommends as the most desirable and fairest way to deal with an emergency problem. The normal quotas would thus be reserved to the kinds of use which the Congress originally intended for them.

A third way to deal with the problem is for the visas to be charged to quotas which would otherwise not be used. The quota system contemplates the admission of 154,000 quota immigrants a year. In the some 20 years prior to the DP Act of 1948, an average of less than one-quarter of that number actually came into the United States as quota immigrants. For this period, in fact, if one subtracts the number of people who emigrated from the United States from the total number of quota immigrants into the United States, the United States increased its population through immigration by only 2,043, on an average, each year. Thus, even within the maximum quota numbers authorized each year the quota numbers which would otherwise go unused each year can be used, on an emergency basis, for refugees from communism and persons from the overpopulated areas of Europe. In this event, under the present quota system, the program for 300,000 such persons could not be accomplished within a 3-year period. However, if the unused quotas are pooled over a 2-year period, as has been proposed, then the 300,000 program can perhaps be achieved within the 3-year period.

Whatever the methods used, the Commission believes that the vital objectives of the twin program for refugees from communism and victims of overpopulation cannot be accomplished within the restrictions of the normal quota limitations.

2. *Special administrative agency.*—Administrative arrangements are of crucial importance to the accomplishment of the objectives of the proposed program. The unique character of the DP program was that it was a mass resettlement operation. The same will be true of the proposed program. This means two basic things:

(1) That there is a specific congressional mandate, different from the normal immigration law. A numerical visa limitation is no guaranty that such number of people should enter into the United States; still it does establish a clear congressional purpose and mandate. It is a target for the American people to try to reach not only for their conscience but also in serving their needs and wants within the United States. It sets up a wholly different pattern of thought and of necessary administrative action from that which prevails under normal immigration.

(2) That this is a resettlement program, tied to a vast and complex coordination of religious, nationality, welfare, civic, and other organizations within the United States. It involves continuous and integrated relationships between private and pub-

lic resettlement agencies in the United States and the Federal agency administering the program, a completely different philosophy and administrative pattern from that in normal immigration.

Both of these factors call for the new emergency program to be administered by a special temporary agency, independent from that which administers the normal immigration law. The complicated resettlement responsibilities, the continuous coordination functions, the religious and nationality group pressures, the liberal Congressional purpose, all bespeak this need. The Commission believes that its own 4-year experience warrants the conclusion that some such special temporary independent agency is the most desirable form of administration for the proposed program.

3. *Unitary administration.*—The DP program was a mass migration imposed upon the legal and administrative structure of an individual immigration procedure. Generally speaking, the DP had to meet not only all the requirements of the normal immigration law but also all the additional requirements of the mass migration DP law. This factor, more than any single other one, was the cause of complaints within the United States. The delays, the irritations, the inconsistencies, and the uncertainties, stemmed in large measure from the statutory requirements either for separate United States agencies to go back over each case from the beginning (as if no other responsible United States agency had already done the same thing), or from an artificial division of labor which could more readily, and far more effectively, have been performed by one government agency.

Perhaps the point can be illustrated by quoting a comment from one of the accredited American voluntary agencies:

The program has been successful only inasmuch as the total number of the eligible IRO DPs admissible under the act arrived in the United States. However, it is felt that this total could have been achieved in a much quicker time and with much less complication, had the administration of the program been simplified. Unfortunately, Congress saw fit to divide the responsibility for the administration of the program between the Displaced Persons Commission, the State Department and the Immigration Service. There was no one individual or government agency with complete and total responsibility and authority, and this led at times to confusion and delay. There was, in many instances, no uniformity of interpretation between the various government agencies. Applicants were compelled to wait many months until these differences could be ironed out and even at the end of the program, there still existed differences in interpretation between the Visa Division and the Immigration Service as to the admissibility of DPs.

Some of the Congressional investigations into the DP program seemed to look with favor upon the rapid processing arrangements of some of the other government selection missions in the IRO program, particularly Canada and Australia. The main reason for their ability to act so expeditiously was that their entire government

selection process was under unitary administration within the purview of one government agency.

These governments had gone much further in enabling efficient and effective selection in a mass migration program. Perhaps the main administrative difficulty in our DP program was the failure of the DP Act to permit adjustment of our immigration law to the needs and efficiencies of mass migration through unitary administration. This could be done with the most rigorous security screening a basic part of the program. The Commission believes that attention to this aspect of the problem would permit the proposed emergency program to operate more effectively in the best interests of the security and welfare of the United States.

4. *Resettlement.*—A resettlement program is different from simple immigration. This has already been described in some detail (see p. 182). Advance resettlement planning, in the United States, orientation of sponsors in the United States and of immigrants overseas, reception at port of entry, widespread geographic distribution throughout the United States, guidance and help for adjustment to the American scene—all these and more are part of the resettlement function.

The Commission is not here recommending that the United States Government undertake the entire resettlement job. However, no matter how substantial a contribution the American public and private agencies play in the resettlement task, the United States administering agency must play a coordinating role, and a more extensive part than the Commission was enabled to play.

In order that the resettlement aspects of the program be fully carried out, the enabling legislation should clearly place such responsibility upon the administering agency and provide adequate resources to meet the requirements.

Congressional Consideration

In the closing days of the Eighty-second Congress, just prior to the termination of the Commission's statutory life, several measures were under consideration to effectuate the President's program recommended in his Message of March 24, 1952.

On April 3, 1952, Representative Celler, chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, introduced H. R. 7376, to implement the major portions of the President's message. Provision was made for the issuance over a 3-year period, of nonquota visas for:

(a) 117,000 persons of German ethnic origin residing in the area of the German Federal Republic, or in the western sectors of Berlin, or in Austria;

(b) 117,000 Italian nationals residing in Italy or in the Free Territory of Trieste;

(c) 22,500 Greek nationals residing in Greece;

(d) 22,500 nationals of the Netherlands, residing in continental Netherlands;

(e) 21,000 refugees residing in Turkey or in any of the other countries noted in (a) through (d).

Provisions for sponsorship of immigrants followed the requirements of assurances for employment, housing, and against public charge contained in the Displaced Persons Act, as amended, as were the references to the applicability of regular immigration laws, selection without discrimination, equitable opportunity for resettlement, investigation and report on all persons prior to admittance. Preferences were designated on the basis of employment skills and family relationships and provision was made for a good faith employment oath and for exclusion of those not qualified to pass the security check. An annual report from the immigrants, to be made for 2 years, also was required.

A Special Migration Commission of three members, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was to administer the program.

The bill also would authorize the President "to provide facilities and services for the temporary care, registration, transportation, vocational training, education and resettlement of selected refugees."

Hearings on H. R. 7376 were held before the Immigration Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee. The preponderance of testimony by public officials and representatives of private groups, including religious, nationality, civic, and labor organizations, urged immediate enactment of H. R. 7376.

The Commission recommended enactment of the bill:

Our reason is very simple: It would be in our national interest to protect our own security and advance our own welfare. Why? Because—

(1) It would strengthen our national defense potential right here in the United States;

(2) It would strengthen our national defense potential by helping to bring economic and political stability to our partners in NATO;

(3) It would alleviate dangerous menaces to democratic governments in crucial areas of Europe by relieving tensions and strains caused by overpopulation and refugees from communism;

(4) It would strength Western Europe and enable it better to resist Communist penetration and aggression;

(5) It would encourage other countries of the Free World which are in the position to do so to follow the leadership of the United States in solving this urgent problem by accepting additional immigrants;

(6) It would help to protect our own peace and freedom.

This is the program of the President's message and of H. R. 7376. It is the program of a nation grown strong since its founding on the labors of earlier immigrants, including many from Western Germany, Netherlands, Italy and Greece—persons similar in background and training to those now being considered for immigration under H. R. 7376.

It is the program of a nation proclaiming the need for tolerance and the practice of basic Christianity in offering a new life and a new hope to victims

of limited economic opportunity in countries having problems of overpopulation and refugees from communism.

It is the program of a nation secure in the knowledge of its position as the leader in the present struggle to uphold the democratic ideal.

Several Cabinet officers and leading Federal officials also testified in support of H. R. 7376. For the Department of State, the Honorable David R. Bruce, Under Secretary of State, declared that the measure "constitutes the next logical step in the continuing efforts on the part of the United States to assist refugees and to reduce surplus populations." He stated that the interest of the United States in a solution of overpopulation problems in Europe "is substantial, due to the economic burden and the social and political tensions arising from overpopulation. The continued burden of non-productive people in these countries presents serious handicaps to the successful realization of our primary effort to establish security in Europe." He felt that since overpopulation represented a threat to the political and economic security of western Europe, it had a direct and important effect upon the security and welfare of the United States. He called for emigration and for assistance to those fleeing the Iron Curtain.

The Secretary of Labor, the Honorable Maurice Tobin, called for the migration of some of Europe's surplus and refugee population so that "their skills and productive capacity can be more fully utilized in the struggle against communism." He asserted that "there is no doubt of the ability of this country to absorb into its life the 300,000 persons who would be admitted over a 3-year period under the provisions of H. R. 7376." He pointed to the experience under the Displaced Persons Act when skilled factory workers, engineers, scientific technicians and other qualified people, helped meet serious labor needs. He declared similar skills doubtless could be found among those covered by H. R. 7376.

The Secretary of Agriculture, the Honorable Charles Brannan, emphasized the value of H. R. 7376 as a possible source of desperately needed manpower for United States agriculture. The rate of decline in the farm-working force had increased since the outbreak of the Korean War. In 1951, there were 329,000 fewer farm workers than there had been in 1950, and 734,000 under 1949. Prospects for 1952 seemed to indicate a further decrease of 200,000 to 300,000 under 1951.

Production requirements in agriculture were increasing while this decrease was evident in available manpower. As a source of additional manpower, the Secretary of Agriculture declared:

We know that there are in Western Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece, and in other European countries * * * many excellent, experienced agricultural workers who cannot find productive employment on the limited agricultural land available. We have need for them and can use them productively without adverse effects on the employment conditions of our own citizens.

The Director of the Mutual Security Agency, the Honorable W. Averell Harriman, emphasized the need for United States leadership in resolving the problem of overpopulation in Western Europe. "We in the United States ought to give this help," he stated, "partly for humanitarian reasons, partly because it is in our self-interest; partly because it is a responsibility that goes with world leadership; partly because it is an example to other countries." He made special mention to the problem of refugees from communism: "One of the best ways to keep alive faith in freedom and democracy behind the Iron Curtain is to let the people enslaved by communism know that those who make the dangerous flight to safety will find a refuge in the west and will be given an opportunity to start a new life."

Both of the major labor unions of the United States supported the measure. In a statement for the A. F. of L., Walter J. Mason, member of the A. F. of L.'s National Legislative Committee, declared:

The people who would be admitted to the United States under the Celler bill are friends of freedom. They abhor communism. That is why they fled from eastern Europe. It is our duty to see to it that they do not become disillusioned as a result of lack of interest in their present plight. If we do right by these friends of Freedom, the cause of democracy will be advanced, and correspondingly, the cause of tyranny will be set back.

Mason pointed to the experience of the United States under the Displaced Persons Act and noted that the legislation "is very practical and would be unquestionably beneficial to the United States." He saw no possibility of the well-being of our people being jeopardized by the bill and called for its enactment during the current session of Congress.

Philip Murray, president of the CIO, supporting the measure, urged "that the bill be broadened and liberalized to bring within its scope displaced persons in categories not now covered by it." He stated that the DP Act "was a wise and humane measure" and commended the Commission for "a fine job." He emphasized that the success of the DP program had proved the value of special immigration legislation and said:

The Nation has been enriched by the addition of thousands of farm and factory workers, engineers, doctors, technicians and other persons possessing other needed and valuable skills. They have fully assumed their obligations as American workers and are rapidly assuming the obligations and securing the rights of American citizenship.

H. R. 7376 was not enacted prior to the adjournment of the Eighty-second Congress.

H. R. 7376 included all but one of the recommendations in the President's message, that covering the proposal for 7,500 visas for those IRO displaced persons left over after the last visa was issued under that portion of the program. This recommendation was covered by H. J. Res. 411, which was passed by the House of

Representatives on May 19, 1952. H. J. Res. 411 was never reported out by the Senate Judiciary Committee for Senate consideration.

This then, is the story of a mission completed, and a mission ahead. The United States can be proud of the fact that it has so successfully fulfilled the mission it undertook in the Displaced Persons Act. It can also be proud of the opportunities ahead of it to fulfill the mission for freedom and peace which destiny has placed in our hands as the greatest, the most powerful, and the most democratic nation in world history. Position brings power, but it also brings responsibility.

The Commission is certain that the United States will not shirk its responsibility, and will be able to write as successful a "finis" to the Mission Ahead as it has just done to the Mission Completed.

Summary

The DP Act of 1948 marked a turning point in American immigration policy, and in American foreign policy. For the first time in this century, restrictive and exclusionary legislation was relaxed in order to facilitate the admission of refugees into this country. This enactment did not result in a return, even temporarily, to earlier practices of free immigration. All the existing requirements of health, literacy, and other examination and review applied to the displaced person just as to the regular quota immigrant, and the clearance process for the former was even more thorough than for the immigrant seeking entrance through normal channels. But the temporary removal of quota limitations upon displaced persons themselves marked a momentous change in the rigidly maintained barriers against the admission of immigrants to this country.

A New Look in Immigration

The DP program was not an immigration program in the normal sense of that term. Rather it was a resettlement program. The difference is fundamental. This was immigration with a new look. Normal immigration was not interested in the contributions of the immigrant, but rather in the sponsor's financial responsibility. Here the skills, personal capacities, and the humanitarian efforts of Americans were the important factors. Normal immigration forbade advance planning for the immigrant's employment and housing. Here, advance social planning (including employment and housing) for the immigrant's integration into American life was a prerequisite. Normal immigration had only perfunctory interest in the immigrant after his arrival in the United States. Here, a comprehensive system of public and private social service agencies was established and coordinated to help the new American adjust to his new homeland. Normal immigration paid no attention to the immigrant prior to his visa

application. Here, extensive security investigations and orientation to American life was planned and carried out overseas. Normal immigration looked upon immigrants as a burden and something to suffer. Here, a return was made to the faith of the Founders of the Republic that immigrants were assets and should be welcomed as valuable additions to the national wealth. In short, normal immigration proceeded upon a negative basis of merely passing on individual prospective immigrants as they happened to show up, without relevance either to American foreign policy or the domestic economy. Here, instead, we saw a planned resettlement program, of a mass character, specifically devised and designed to further American foreign policy and to strengthen our domestic economy.

The DP Act

The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 was a product of the times but reflected a development of many years.

From the experience of the past, from the achievements, the near-successes, and the failures of private, national, and international attempts at legal and political protection, care and maintenance, repatriation and resettlement of refugees, and displaced persons, the people of the United States and the Congress were able to find guides for current action in an international effort to finish the unfinished business of World War II.

The widespread appeals throughout the United States for admission of refugees and displaced persons ran counter to the prevailing legislative trend since World War I. Special legislation was necessary temporarily to bypass existing restrictive and selective laws that had been enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the entrance into this country of just such persons for whom we are now seeking a new home and a new life.

The enactment of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 indicated Congressional recognition of the widely and jointly expressed opinions of civic, social welfare, religious, and nationality groups, and of governmental leaders, throughout the country. The movement for the enactment of legislation ran directly into the solid opposition of anti-foreign, nativist, and anti-immigration groups. The Displaced Persons Act, as eventually signed on June 25, 1948, was far less than its vigorous exponents desired and contained some highly undesirable and un-American provisions which had to be eliminated later, but it did lay the groundwork for the admission of 205,000 displaced persons during the next 2 years without regard to the quotas so far as the displaced persons themselves were concerned. Similar provision was made for German expellees.

The process of resettling displaced persons in the United States was initiated by assurances of a satisfactory resettlement opportunity,

including a job and home. In about 90 percent of the cases, these assurances—without which no one could enter the United States under the law—were provided by religious and welfare agencies in the United States.

Humanitarianism and enlightened self-interest made this first measure possible. The need for a more generous admission authorization, coupled with a national outcry against the discriminatory, un-American, and unworkable provisions of the original bill led to its amendment in 1950, after lengthy and vigorous public and Congressional debate. The amended legislation, by altering datelines, preferences, and priorities, removed the inequities and un-American discriminations, and facilitated the administration of the Act. Without these amendments, the program never could have been completed. The changes in the act included an increased total to be admitted of 400,744 and established new categories. Included in this total were 54,744 German expellees and 2,000 Italian refugees.

From a slow beginning due to operational impediments in the original legislation and to a wide variety of difficulties encountered in developing a novel program, the resettlement of displaced persons took on an accelerated pace in 1949 which was interrupted only by the unworkable and discriminatory provisions of the law. After passage of the amended law, this rapid pace was reconstructed, and the Commission made use of every single visa authorized for displaced persons, German expellees, and Italian refugees. The Commission ran out of authorized quota numbers before it ran out of eligible persons whose admission into the United States was sponsored by American citizens.

By December 31, 1951, the first phase of the displaced persons program was concluded; 339,520 persons had been visaed for admittance to the United States. They were distributed throughout the 48 States and in the Territories and possessions of the United States. By December 31, 1951, the United States received 31.7 percent of the International Refugee Organization's resettlements.

During the last 6 months of operations, the Displaced Persons Commission concentrated the major share of its energies on the German expellee program and the conclusion of its activities in connection with orphans. Two months before the target date, June 30, 1952, the mission had been completed for the entire admissible numbers of 54,744 German expellees. A total of 4,182 orphans had been cleared and visaed for entrance into the United States.

A Cooperative Venture

The accomplishment of this goal in the short period of 4 years was the result of close cooperation among private, public, and international agencies, as well as tens of thousands of individual Americans.

The Commission's European staff worked in close association with the European staffs of the other cooperating Federal and voluntary agencies and the IRO. The American voluntary agencies employed staffs for work in Europe as well as in the United States to make certain that the best interest of both the displaced persons and the American sponsors were well served. And on this side of the Atlantic the voluntary agencies, State and local commissions and committees, individuals by the tens of thousand, the staffs of other Federal agencies and of the Commission, gave themselves to the general effort with zest and a deep devotion for the program.

Processing overseas involved a complex system of cooperative relations under Commission coordination. The IRO certified status under its constitution as required by the DP Act, but selection and eligibility determination was made exclusively by American personnel of the Commission. Security investigation by the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and all other American security agencies in Europe and the United States, as well as Commission investigators, and health inspection by the United States Public Health Service followed before consideration for a visa by the Department of State. The Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice examined each person before embarkation. Transportation to the United States was in United States Army or Navy transports chartered by the International Refugee Organization or later, by the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for Movement of Migrants from Europe. Upon arrival at ports of entry, the immigrants once again underwent health examination by the United States Public Health Service and immigration inspection by the Immigration and Naturalization Service before admission to the United States. Throughout the entire European process, the American voluntary agencies played an important supplementary role.

Responsibility for resettlement in the United States was accepted in major part by the American voluntary agencies, under the Commission's general coordination. As time progressed, the 36 State commissions served an increasingly important role in this resettlement process.

Successful Resettlements

Findings on the actual resettlement of the displaced persons in the United States cannot, of course, be definitive at this very early date immediately following the close of the program. It is apparent, however, that certain definable trends are evident at this time. The displaced persons were their own best salesmen. One could almost tell where next week's assurances were to come from by spotting this

week's arrivals and resettlements. The DPs and expellees served as vitally needed replacements in critically tight manpower shortage areas. In some parts of the country, their arrival and availability saved a whole crop or industry. The general reaction to them has been amazingly satisfactory, whether from people who sponsored 1,000 displaced persons or those who sponsored only one. In the vast preponderance of cases, they have made fine neighbors and good workers. Their children have adjusted well to the schools, and the adults have begun to take their part in the normal community life. Many people have commented, seemingly with surprise, that in a relatively short time, the displaced persons are almost indistinguishable from the rest of the people in the communities which welcomed them.

In some respects, the displaced persons have become Americanized at a more rapid rate than some would have wanted. They have moved from rural to urban areas, as have native Americans. In some respects, it is reasonable to believe that this was motivated by a desire for associating with people of their own cultural background and in other respects by the vigorous recruitment campaigns of labor-short defense industries offering higher wages. In other instances, greater opportunities opened up for displaced persons with multiple skills.

A summary of all the persons admitted under the Act shows that 34 percent were born in Poland (including the Ukraine), 15 percent in Germany, 9.3 percent in Latvia, 8.7 percent in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (including people of non-Russian ethnic origin), 7.9 percent in Yugoslavia, 6.4 percent in Lithuania, with the remainder in a score of other countries. Of these totals, 47 percent were Catholics, 35 percent were Protestant and Orthodox, 16 percent were Jewish, and 2 percent were otherwise unidentified. More than 54 percent were men and 46 percent were women, as contrasted with the national percentages of approximately 50 percent for each group. Twenty-five percent of those admitted were single adults and 49 percent were heads of families. The average family group consisted of 2.9 persons. The age breakdown by group was as follows: Under 14 years of age, 23.2 percent; 14 to 24 years, 15 percent; 25 to 44 years, 43 percent; 45 to 64 years, 17.2 percent; 65 years or over, 1.9 percent. This compares favorably with the United States population of higher percentages in the older age categories.

An occupational analysis shows that 25.2 percent declared their basic skill was farming. Other major occupations were as follows: Semiskilled workers, 16.6 percent; private household workers, 14.7 percent; laborers, 14.4 percent; skilled craftsmen, 11.5 percent; service workers, 7.6 percent; with the remainder covering dozens of skills. The educational attainment of the persons admitted under the Act was somewhat less advanced than that of the United States national aver-

age. The average educational attainment was 7.9 years of schooling, as compared with the United States average of 9.3 years.

A Good Investment

The various governmental agencies administering the DP program spent approximately \$19,000,000 of appropriated funds. This amount was repaid to the United States Treasury many times over, by the close of the Commission's activities. It is estimated that the wage-earners among the 400,000 admitted to the country will have paid \$57,000,000 back in Federal income taxes alone by the end of the calendar year 1952.

But even more is involved. Reliable insurance company estimates indicate that it costs about \$10,000 for an average American family to raise a child to the age of 18 years. Of the 400,000 persons admitted into the United States under the Displaced Persons Act, some 300,000 had reached 18 upon their arrival. Therefore, the United States was enriched by some \$3,000,000,000 in productive human resources through the Act. Dick Whittington sought gold on the streets of London. The United States found wealth in these immigrants coming to its shores.

The contribution made by the infusion into the stream of American life of new skills and new talents is not measurable alone in terms of money to be recaptured through taxation nor of the energy and talent brought to agriculture, industry, commerce, the arts and sciences, or some of the professions. Their devotion to democracy grew out of their first-hand experience with what it means to live under a tyrannical form of government. Their cultural, social, and other contributions have already been shown to be enormous. The over-all impact will be significant with the passage of time and the integration of these peoples, their children, and their children's children into the American way of life.

The Problem Ahead

A mission has been completed, but there is another Mission Ahead. The beginning of planned resettlement was made in this effort by the United States Government, but to all who participated in the program it was evident long before the June 30, 1952, deadline, that this was only the first small measure of a problem that warranted the attention of all the forward-looking nations of the free world. Placed in its proper perspective, the displaced persons program was but one of several coordinated approaches to finishing the unfinished business of World War II, to attacking the problem of vitalizing the economy of less-fortunate nations and to relieving pressures of surplus populations. The efforts of the United States through its Marshall Plan, Economic Cooperation Administration, Mutual Security, and Point

IV programs were directly related, in strategic pattern, to the displaced persons program. The United States was but one of many nations in this international venture.

But the problem was not solved by June 30, 1952. There were still three problems:

- (1) The unfinished business of the DP Act;
- (2) The refugees from communism; and
- (3) The victims of overpopulation in Europe.

In the fall of 1951, it was apparent that with the International Refugee Organization's termination, some international medium for relieving surplus population in Western Europe through planned resettlement would have to be established. It was estimated at that time that the critical areas were Western Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, and Trieste, whose surplus populations were beyond the capacities of the local economies to support.

In December 1951, at the initiative of the United States Government, an international conference was convened at which the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME) was set up. Its objective was a partial solution of the surplus population problems in Europe through planned migration to other overseas nations.

To continue American leadership and participation in this program, the President submitted a special Message to the Congress on March 24, 1952, recommending an emergency program for the admission of 100,000 persons a year, for 3 years, from Germany, Italy, Greece, and the Netherlands, including refugees from Communism. The establishment of the new international migration organization and the legislative activity looking to the continuance of United States participation in a program of migration of refugees and surplus peoples, are necessary for at least partial solution to the problem of overpopulation in Europe. By the date of the termination of the United States displaced persons program, there still remained a worldwide problem of finding homes and suitable opportunity for a fuller life for such people.

What is at stake is manifold and vital to world peace:

- (1) The stability of certain European countries whose economies cannot provide satisfactorily for their overpopulation;
- (2) The political vacuum in areas where refugees from Communism find that the free world is not really interested in them;
- (3) The strengthening of the underdeveloped areas of the world, which need the manpower available in such refugees and surplus peoples; and
- (4) The very outcome of the cold war, in which the character, scope, and sincerity of the free world's treatment of refugees and remedy for the tensions caused by overpopulation may be crucial factors.

All of this adds up to a simple issue: Economic, political, and social stability of the free world depends in important part upon effective programs of international migration.

An enlightened American policy of supporting programs of international migration, coupled with a reasonable program for immigration of refugees and surplus peoples from Europe to the United States, is an essential part of our policy of seeking world peace and freedom.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

The Commission believes that the displaced persons program was a success:

First, in its specific purpose it substantially helped to clear up the displaced persons problem in Europe.

Second, in its general aims it brought hope to people all over Europe, and in certain other parts of the world.

Third, legislatively it ended up with a decent, generous and non-discriminatory law.

Fourth, administratively it used up every single visa authorized for displaced persons, German expellees and Italian refugees.

Fifth, in international affairs it proved that international cooperation can work.

Sixth, in community relations in the United States it developed new and valuable cooperative relations among the Federal Government, State governments and American private organizations.

Seventh, in the mutual defense of the free world it strengthened the economies and morale of certain crucial western European countries.

Eighth, in our own economy it strengthened us domestically by helping to meet critical labor shortages in important defense manpower areas.

Ninth, financially, it brought into the United States human resources worth over 3 billion dollars, people who in one year would pay back in Federal income taxes alone three times the entire four-year cost of the Government's DP program.

Tenth, in fundamental Americanism, it proved that it is in our national interest to enact liberal, humane, and generous immigration laws which look upon immigrants as valuable resources for the economy, culture and security of the United States.

Recommendations

The Commission recommends that the United States should:

First, liberalize its immigration laws, and adjust the national origins quota system to the realities of the United States present role as the leading nation of the free world.

Second, authorize the admission on a nonquota basis of 300,000 refugees from communism, and victims of overpopulation in Europe, over a three-year period.

Third, complete the unfinished business of the DP program.

Fourth, provide reception facilities and leadership education and training for refugees from communism in Europe.

Fifth, cooperate with other free nations in an international effort to enable people from overpopulated lands in Europe to migrate to underdeveloped or other countries whose economies can be strengthened through the admission of new immigrants.

Sixth, create a special emergency United States agency, to administer the programs for refugees from communism and victims of overpopulation, in order effectively to meet these urgent needs.

Seventh, continue to be the arsenal of hope for the free world by directing its foreign policy (including immigration) toward a peaceful solution of the problems of refugees and victims of overpopulation.

P.S.

"The DP Story" would not be complete without an answer to the question: "What did the countries most affected by this program say about it?"

On the next three pages there appears an answer to that question from the heads of the three countries in which this story began, Western Germany, Austria, and Italy—an important "postscript" to the DP Story.

GERMANY:

A letter from Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Bonn, August 5, 1952.

DEAR SIR: On the occasion of the termination of the activities of the Displaced Persons Commission of the United States in the German Federal Republic, I have the honor of expressing to you the appreciation of the Federal Government for the valuable work performed by you and for the splendid cooperation with the German authorities.

The law which formed the basis of your activities has given 54,000 expellees from the Federal Republic and from Austria the possibility of emigrating to the United States outside the general quota, and of finding a new home in your country. In this way the United States has made an important contribution toward the solution of the expellee problem. In the future as well it will prove impossible to solve the great tasks with which the Federal Government is faced in respect of that problem without international assistance. In that connection I should like to express the hope that the Federal Republic may continue to count on the understanding support of the United States.

ADENAUER.

AUSTRIA:

A letter from Dr. Leopold Figl, Chancellor of Austria

VIENNA, June 25, 1952.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On the occasion of the termination of the activities of the United States Displaced Persons Commission in Austria, I should like to express the gratitude of the Austrian Government and people for the outstanding contribution which you and the people of the United States have made to the alleviation of the burden which was created by the presence of a large number of Displaced Persons in Austria.

Although Austria has made great efforts to solve the Displaced Persons problem—she spent approximately 900,000,000 schillings and granted Austrian citizenship to approximately 175,000 Volksdeutsche—it would not have been possible to carry the burden of the entire problem without outside assistance.

The United States Displaced Persons Commission, which assisted in the removal of approximately 50,000 Displaced Persons from Austria to the United States, deserves the highest praise for the part it played with respect to this important project.

I take this opportunity to renew to you, Mr. President, the assurance of highest esteem.

FIGL.

ITALY:

A letter from the Honorable Alcide De Gasperi, Prime
Minister, Republic of Italy

ROME, *January 25, 1952.*

DEAR AMBASSADOR: I wish to express to you my appreciation and my gratitude for the brilliant work accomplished in the last few years owing to the activity of the United States Displaced Persons Commission. As you know, Italy has been and still is a country to which have flowed and to which continue to flow many refugees whom the International Refugee Organization has helped and in great part assisted in going on to other countries. It is to the credit of the United States Displaced Persons Commission that the work of the International Refugee Organization has been supplemented in a concrete way by the United States, and I sincerely hope that this Commission may be able to continue its work in the future.

Believe me, dear Ambassador,

DE GASPERI.

Appendix

APPENDIX 1

STAFF OF THE DISPLACED PERSONS COMMISSION

WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS

The Commission:

Chairman: Ugo Carusi, August 13, 1948, to December 26, 1950.
Chairman: John W. Gibson, December 27, 1950, to termination.
Commissioner: Edward M. O'Connor, August 13, 1948, to termination.
Commissioner: Harry N. Rosenfield, August 27, 1948, to termination.

Principal officers:

General Counsel:

James J. McTigue, February 11, 1949, to April 22, 1952.
George Cantor, April 27, 1952, to termination.

Executive Director: Arthur J. Hazes, August 27, 1948, to termination.
Director of Resettlement: Elliott M. Shirk, August 7, 1949, to termination.
Director, Information and Editorial Division: G. Russell Bauer, February 5, 1951, to August 1952.

Director, Research and Statistics Division:

Anita R. Kury, October 1948 to April 1951.
George Minton, April 1951 to termination.

Chief Historian:

Stuart Portner, November 1951 to July 1952.

OVERSEAS

FRANKFURT HEADQUARTERS

Principal officers:

Coordinator:

Alexander E. Squadrilli, acting, October 1948 to January 1950.
Alexander E. Squadrilli, January 1950 to September 1950.
Richard J. Dervan, acting, September 1950 to October 1950.
Robert J. Corkery, October 1950 through May 1952.
Elmer M. Falk, June 1952 to August 1952.

Deputy Coordinator:

Elliott M. Shirk, February 1949 to August 1949.
Elmer M. Falk, June 1951 through May 1952.

Associate Coordinator: Richard J. Dervan, January 1950 to September 1950.

Executive Assistant to the Coordinator:

Ben Kaplan, December 1948 to May 1950.
Carroll L. Hasler, May 1950 to termination (special assistant).

Director of Administration: Robert L. Fisher, July 1950 to May 1952.

Chief, Security Investigations Division: Mario R. DeCapua, January 1951 to February 1952. (Previous to January 1951, acting.)

Chief, Legal Division Europe: Hyman E. Bornstein, October 1950 to February 1952 (Assistant General Counsel).

Chief, Security and Legal Division: Charles T. Snavely, February 1952 through June 1952.

Control Officer (Assurances): Margaret M. Offutt, October 1948 to termination.

Chief, Planning and Production Control: Hilbert Serbin, April 1951 to termination.

GERMANY, UNITED STATES ZONE

Senior officers:

Amberg:

Augusta Mayerson, October 1948 to October 1949.
Claud C. Gilmore, October 1949 to January 1950.

Augsburg:

Richard J. Dervan, February 1949 to April 1949.
Bjarne Braatoy, April 1949 to May 1950.
Abraham Bernstein, May 1950 to April 1951.
Ernest F. Richter, April 1951 to June 1951.

Bremen:

Abraham P. Conan, February 1949 to November 1949.
Augusta Mayerson, November 1949 to January 1951.
Gerald A. Daley, January 1951 through June 1952.

Butzbach:

Meyer D. Bashein, October 1948 to January 1950.
Claud C. Gilmore, January 1950 to May 1951.

Hanau:

Alfred L. Cardinaux, April 1951 to March 1952.
Ernest F. Richter, March 1952 through June 1952.

Ludwigsburg:

Gertrude Ruskin, October 1948 to July 1950.
James B. Hurley, July 1950 to December 1950.
Edgar A. Suter, January 1951 to August 1951.
Forrest E. Burrows, August 1951 to April 1952.

Munich:

Blair Taylor, acting, September 1948 to February 1949.
Donald Main, February 1949 to August 1950.
Edward Kelly, acting, August 1950 to December 1950.
Bjarne Braatoy, December 1950 to May 1951.
Charles T. Snavely, June 1951 to January 1952.
Hendrikus G. J. Verstappen, January 1952 through June 1952.

Schweinfurt:

Samuel J. Hoexter, October 1948 to June 1949.
John J. Tarczynski, June 1949 to November 1950.
Charles T. Snavely, December 1950 to June 1951.

GERMANY, UNITED KINGDOM ZONE

Hamburg:

James B. Hurley, November 1948 to July 1950.
Abraham P. Conan, July 1950 to February 1951.
William Faucette, February 1951 through June 1952.

GERMANY, FRENCH ZONE

Rastatt:

Alfred L. Cardinaux, September 1949 to April 1951.
Forrest E. Burrows, April 1951 to August 1951.

Salzburg:

William B. Carmody, acting, October 1948 to January 1949.
 Bjarne Braatoy, January 1949 to April 1949.
 Richard J. Dervan, April 1949 to January 1950.
 Paul R. Doyle, January 1950 to November 1950.
 John J. Tarczynski, November 1950 through June 1952.

ITALY

Naples:

Louis Varrichione, January 1949 to September 1951.
 Augusta Mayerson, September 1951 to January 1952.

APPENDIX 2

STATISTICAL TABLES

REGIONS, DIVISIONS, AND STATES THEREIN OF THE UNITED STATES

NOTE.—The following are used in this appendix with special reference to the Chapter *Who They Were and Where They Went*.

Northeast Region:

New England Division:

Maine.
 New Hampshire.
 Vermont.
 Massachusetts.
 Rhode Island.
 Connecticut.

Middle Atlantic Division:

New York.
 New Jersey.
 Pennsylvania.

North Central Region:

East North Central Division:

Ohio.
 Indiana.
 Illinois.
 Michigan.
 Wisconsin.

West North Central Division:

Minnesota.
 Iowa.
 Missouri.
 North Dakota.
 South Dakota.
 Nebraska.
 Kansas.

South Region:

South Atlantic Division:

Delaware.
 Maryland.
 District of Columbia.
 Virginia.
 West Virginia.
 North Carolina.
 South Carolina.
 Georgia.
 Florida.

East South Central Division:

- Kentucky.
- Tennessee.
- Alabama.
- Mississippi.

West South Central Division:

- Arkansas.
- Louisiana.
- Oklahoma.
- Texas.

West Region:

Mountain Division:

- Montana.
- Idaho.
- Wyoming.
- Colorado.
- New Mexico.
- Arizona.
- Utah.
- Nevada.

Pacific Division:

- Washington.
- Oregon.
- California.

U. S. DISPLACED PERSONS COMMISSION
TABLE 1.—Report of loan section activities under section 14, Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended

Name and address of agency	Date of request	Amount of original request	Amount of request approved	Date of approval	Amount of repayments Aug. 1, 1952	Date final payment due	Remarks
Tobtoy Foundation, Inc., 289 4th Ave., New York 10, N. Y.	July 27, 1950	\$500,000					Withdrawn.
Serbian National Defense Council of America, 64 West Randolph St., Chicago, Ill.	Dec. 26, 1950	510,000	\$200,000	Dec. 28, 1950	\$125,000	June 30, 1953	
War Relief Services, National Catholic Welfare Conference, 330 6th Ave., New York 1, N. Y.	Nov. 29, 1950	1,500,000	500,000	Jan. 10, 1951		do.	
American Committee for Resettlement of Polish D. P.'s, 1520 West Division St., Chicago 27, Ill.	Jan. 27, 1951	198,000	75,000	Feb. 13, 1951	37,500	do.	
Central Disarmament Council, World Services Resettlement Program, 120 East 23d St., New York 10, N. Y.	Mar. 1, 1951	50,000	50,000	Apr. 10, 1951	50,000		
Serbian National Defense Council of America, 54 West Randolph St., Chicago, Ill.	Feb. 27, 1951	187,500	100,000	Apr. 16, 1951		June 30, 1953	Second loan granted.
American Committee to Aid Homeless Armenians, Inc., 207 Powell St., San Francisco 2, Calif.	Feb. 14, 1951	50,000	35,000	Apr. 17, 1951		do.	
United Ukrainian American Relief Committee, Inc., 45 DeLong Bldg., 13th and Chestnut Sts., Philadelphia 7, Pa.	Feb. 16, 1951	300,000	100,000	Apr. 24, 1951		June 30, 1953	Agency not accredited.
American Relief for Poland, Inc., Migration Committee, 211 Fairmount Ave., Philadelphia 22, Pa.	Sept. 23, 1951	15,000					
War Relief Services, National Catholic Welfare Conference, 350 6th Ave., New York 1, N. Y.	Nov. 28, 1951	750,000	210,000	Dec. 5, 1951		June 30, 1953	Second loan granted.
War Relief Services, National Catholic Welfare Conference, 350 6th Ave., New York 1, N. Y.	Jan. 28, 1952	375,000	200,000	Feb. 25, 1952		do.	Third loan granted.
Polish Immigration Committee, American Commission for Relief of Polish Immigrants, Inc., 25 St. Marks Pl., New York 3, N. Y.	Feb. 21, 1952	25,000	25,000	Mar. 11, 1952		do.	
American Federation of International Institutes, Inc., 11 West 43d St., New York 18, N. Y.	Mar. 24, 1952	10,000	10,000	Mar. 25, 1952		do.	
National Travelers Aid Association, 425 4th Ave., New York 16, N. Y.	May 21, 1952	35,000	35,000	May 23, 1952		June 30, 1953	
American Federation of International Institutes, Inc., 11 West 43d St., New York 18, N. Y.	June 4, 1952	15,000	14,970	June 9, 1952		do.	
War Relief Services, National Catholic Welfare Conference, 350 6th Ave., New York 1, N. Y.	May 6, 1952	402,000					Withdrawn.

Total amount requested.....\$4,922,500
 Total amount approved.....1,554,970
 Total amount of repayments as of Aug. 31, 1952.....262,500
 Loan balance outstanding as of Aug. 31, 1952.....1,292,500

TABLE 2.—Immigrants admitted under DP Act, as of June 30, 1952, by class of admission

Class of admission	Total	
	Percent	Number
All immigrants.....	100.0	393,542
Displaced persons.....	85.7	337,244
Displaced persons from Western Germany, and Austria, and Italy.....	78.0	306,785
Recent political refugees.....	(1)	162
Venezia Giulia refugees.....	.5	2,000
European displaced persons from Far East.....	.8	3,312
Ex-Polish soldiers from Great Britain.....	2.7	10,487
Native Greeks and preferentials.....	2.3	8,977
Out-of-zone refugees.....	1.4	5,521
German expellees.....	13.6	53,448
Orphans.....	7	2,838
IRO orphans.....	.3	1,356
Greek orphans.....	.2	550
War orphans.....	.2	932
Adopted children of German Ethnic origin.....	(1)	12

¹ Less than 1/40 of 1 percent.

TABLE 3.—Distribution of immigrants admitted under DP Act, as of May 31, 1952, by country of birth and class of admission

Country of birth	Percent				
	All immigrants	Displaced persons ¹	German expellees ¹	IRO and Greek orphans	War orphans
Total.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Poland.....	34.0	37.0	12.1	11.9	.5
Germany.....	15.0	14.7	16.5	14.6	53.0
Latvia.....	9.3	10.4	1.1	11.6	.1
U. S. S. R. ²	8.7	8.9	7.4	2.4	.7
Yugoslavia.....	7.9	5.0	31.4	13.0
Lithuania.....	6.4	6.8	2.8	3.9	.1
Hungary.....	4.0	3.6	6.7	2.0	.2
Czechoslovakia.....	2.7	2.4	5.5	1.7	.2
Estonia.....	2.6	2.9	.4	1.0
Greece.....	2.6	2.6	(1)	31.8	6.1
Rumania.....	2.5	1.5	10.8	1.0
Austria.....	2.1	1.8	4.6	2.7	6.4
United Kingdom.....	.4	.5	(1)	.1
Turkey.....	.3	.3	(1)	1.1	21.9
Italy.....	(1)	.5	(1)	1.2	10.8
Other countries.....	1.6	1.1	.7	1.2

¹ Includes IRO displaced persons from Germany, Austria, and Italy; recent political refugees; Italian refugees from Venezia Giulia; European displaced persons from Far East; Ex-Polish Soldiers in Great Britain; Native Greeks and preferentials, and out-of-zone refugees.

² Includes German expellees and adopted children of German ethnic origin.

³ Includes persons of non-Russian ethnic origin.

⁴ Less than 1/20th of 1 percent.

TABLE 4.—Distribution of immigrants admitted under DP Act, as of May 31, 1952, by class of admission and State and division of first residence

Division and State	Percent			
	All immigrants	Displaced persons ¹	German expellees	Orphans ²
Continental United States and Territories and possessions.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
New England.....	6.9	7.3	2.6	4.3

Table and footnotes continued on following page.

TABLE 4.—Distribution of immigrants admitted under DP Act, as of May 31, 1952, by class of admission and State and division of first residence—Continued

Division and State	Percent			
	All immigrants	Displaced persons ¹	German expellees	Orphans ²
New England—Continued				
Connecticut.....	2.7	2.9	1.1	.1
Maine.....	.2	.2	.1	.1
Massachusetts.....	3.3	3.5	1.0	2.9
New Hampshire.....	.2	.2	.1	.3
Rhode Island.....	.3	.3	.1	.9
Vermont.....	.2	.2	.2	(3)
Middle Atlantic.....	44.5	45.1	36.1	66.2
New Jersey.....	5.9	5.9	6.6	1.8
New York.....	31.3	31.7	24.1	61.1
Pennsylvania.....	7.3	7.5	5.4	3.3
East North Central.....	25.5	24.8	33.2	11.8
Illinois.....	11.0	10.9	11.9	6.4
Indiana.....	1.8	1.8	1.7	.7
Michigan.....	5.3	5.3	5.4	1.9
Ohio.....	5.1	4.7	9.1	2.3
Wisconsin.....	2.3	2.1	5.1	.5
West North Central.....	6.7	6.3	11.1	2.7
Iowa.....	1.1	1.0	2.3	.6
Kansas.....	.4	.3	.8	.3
Minnesota.....	2.0	2.1	1.4	.5
Missouri.....	1.0	.9	1.5	.9
Nebraska.....	1.1	.9	2.8	.2
North Dakota.....	.5	.5	1.4	.2
South Dakota.....	.6	.6	.9	(3)
South Atlantic.....	5.8	6.0	4.4	4.7
Delaware.....	.2	.2	.1	.2
District of Columbia.....	.4	.4	.4	.6
Florida.....	.3	.3	.3	.6
Georgia.....	.3	.3	.4	.3
Maryland.....	1.9	1.9	1.1	.5
North Carolina.....	.8	.9	.4	1.2
South Carolina.....	.3	.3	.2	.3
Virginia.....	1.3	1.4	1.3	.7
West Virginia.....	.3	.3	.2	.3
East South Central.....	1.5	1.6	1.1	1.3
Alabama.....	.1	.2	.2	.5
Kentucky.....	.3	.3	.3	.2
Mississippi.....	.7	.7	.2	.3
Tennessee.....	.4	.4	.4	.3
West South Central.....	2.6	2.7	1.9	3.0
Arkansas.....	.3	.3	.2	.2
Louisiana.....	1.0	1.1	.3	.5
Oklahoma.....	.3	.3	.3	.6
Texas.....	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.7
Mountain.....	1.4	1.3	2.4	1.3
Arizona.....	.1	.1	.1	.2
Colorado.....	.6	.6	1.1	.2
Idaho.....	.1	.1	.1	.1
Montana.....	.3	.2	.6	.2
Nevada.....	(3)	(3)	.1	.1
New Mexico.....	.1	.1	.1	.2
New Mexico.....	.1	.1	.1	.1
Utah.....	.1	.1	.2	.2
Wyoming.....	.1	.1	.2	.2
Pacific.....	5.1	4.9	7.2	4.7
California.....	4.1	3.0	5.8	3.3
Oregon.....	.3	.3	.6	.6
Washington.....	.7	.7	.8	.8
Territories and possessions.....	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)

¹ Includes IRO displaced persons from Germany, Austria, and Italy; recent political refugees, Italian refugees from Venezia Giulia; European displaced persons from the Far East, ex-Polish soldiers from Great Britain; native Greeks, and preferentials, and out-of-zone refugees.

² Includes IRO and Greek orphans and war orphans.

³ Less than 1/20th of 1 percent.

⁴ IRO orphans, prior to June 16, 1950, were under sponsorship of United States Committee for Care of European children in New York City.

TABLE 5.—Immigration heads of families and single adults admitted under DP Act, as of May 31, 1952, by assured occupations¹

Major occupational group	Percent		
	All immigrants	Displaced persons	German expellees
All	100.0	100.0	100.0
Farmers and farm laborers	25.2	24.7	31.1
Operatives and kindred workers ("semiskilled")	16.6	16.7	15.7
Private household workers	14.7	14.2	20.8
Laborers except farm and mine	14.4	14.7	10.5
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers ("skilled")	11.5	11.6	10.5
Service workers, except private household	7.6	7.8	4.8
Clerical and kindred workers	4.1	4.3	1.6
Professional, technical, and kindred workers	3.0	3.2	1.3
Managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm	.6	.6	.4
Sales workers	.6	.6	.6
No occupation (including students, etc.)	1.7	1.6	2.7

¹ As reported on visa.

TABLE 6.—Distribution of sex and age at time of admission of immigrants under DP Act, admitted as of May 31, 1952, and of United States population on Apr. 1, 1950

Age	Immigrants under DP Act			United States Population		
	Both sexes	Males	Females	Both sexes	Males	Females
All ages	100.0	54.4	45.6	100.0	49.5	50.5
Under 5 years	12.6	6.5	6.1	10.8	5.5	5.3
5 to 9 years	6.4	3.2	3.2	8.8	4.5	4.3
10 to 14 years	5.0	2.6	2.4	7.6	3.8	3.8
15 to 19 years	5.5	2.9	2.6	7.1	3.5	3.6
20 to 24 years	8.4	4.0	4.4	7.5	3.6	3.9
25 to 29 years	14.1	7.1	7.0	8.0	3.9	4.1
30 to 34 years	9.7	5.6	4.1	7.7	3.8	3.9
35 to 39 years	10.4	6.5	3.9	7.4	3.6	3.8
40 to 44 years	8.8	5.4	3.4	6.7	3.3	3.4
45 to 49 years	6.7	3.9	2.8	6.0	3.0	3.0
50 to 54 years	5.4	3.1	2.3	5.5	2.7	2.8
55 to 59 years	3.3	1.9	1.4	4.8	2.4	2.4
60 to 64 years	1.8	1.0	.8	3.9	2.0	1.9
65 to 69 years	1.0	.4	.6	3.4	1.6	1.8
70 to 74 years	.5	.2	.3	2.3	1.1	1.2
75 years and over	.4	.1	.3	2.5	1.2	1.3
Median age (years)	29.3	30.8	27.9	30.1	29.9	30.4

NOTE.—Percentages of United States population adjusted to add to totals.
Source: Displaced Persons Commission and Department of Commerce.

TABLE 7.—Distribution of immigrant families admitted under the DP Act, as of May 31, 1952, by family size

Family size (number of persons comprising family)	Percent	Cumulative percent of families of stated number of persons or fewer
All numbers	100.0	100.0
1 person	51.7	51.7
2 persons	18.2	69.9
3 persons	16.8	86.7
4 persons	8.7	95.4
5 persons	3.0	98.4
6 persons	1.0	99.4
7 persons or more	.6	100.0

TABLE 8.—Immigrants admitted under DP Act, as of May 31, 1952, by age at time of admission and years of schooling completed

Years of schooling completed	Age group							
	All ages	Under 5 years	5 to 9 years	10 to 13 years	14 to 17 years	18 to 19 years	20 to 24 years	25 years and over
All	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No schooling	16.4	100.0	45.7	1.0	.2	(¹)	.1	.9
Elementary school:								
1	2.3		17.1	.4	.2	.3	.3	1.9
2	3.6		19.5	2.4	.8	1.2	1.1	3.4
3	5.2		12.8	11.0	2.2	3.1	2.6	5.6
4	9.3		4.5	30.2	6.6	6.8	8.0	10.8
5	5.7		.3	26.2	10.2	8.7	7.4	5.6
6	8.8		(¹)	19.2	16.2	12.5	11.8	9.8
7	10.8		(¹)	7.4	20.1	11.3	15.9	13.1
8	9.6		(¹)	1.9	22.7	18.5	17.9	10.7
Years not reported	.2		.1	.2	.2	.3	.4	.2
High school:								
9	3.8			.1	10.0	8.5	6.3	4.4
10	5.6			(¹)	6.7	10.0	7.1	7.3
11	3.7			(¹)	2.2	7.9	6.1	4.7
12	5.0			(¹)	1.4	8.5	7.6	6.6
Years not reported	.1			(¹)	.2	.3	.3	.2
College:								
13	1.9				.1	1.5	2.6	2.7
14	1.9				(¹)	.4	1.9	2.7
15	1.4					.1	1.2	2.1
16	1.8					(¹)	.8	2.7
17 and over	2.8				(¹)	.1	.5	4.4
Years not reported	.1						.1	.2

¹ Less than 1/2 of 1 percent.

NOTE.—Information on education tabulated from the visa of the immigrant.

TABLE 9.—First residence and current residence of displaced persons reporting in December 1950, by geographic region and division

Geographic region and division	Number reporting		Percent net change first to current
	First (visa) residence	Current residence	
Continental United States and outlying areas	148,449	148,449	—
Northeast	73,259	73,139	-0.2
New England	12,647	12,630	-0.1
Middle Atlantic	60,612	60,509	-0.2
North Central	47,174	55,048	+16.7
East North Central	35,957	46,244	+28.6
West North Central	11,217	8,804	-21.5
South	19,020	10,910	-42.6
South Atlantic	11,346	7,206	-36.5
East South Central	3,183	1,471	-53.8
West South Central	4,491	2,233	-50.3
West	8,976	9,086	+1.2
Mountain	1,824	1,588	-12.9
Pacific	7,152	7,498	+4.8
Outlying areas	20	37	—
Not reported		229	—

NOTE.—This table covers 148,449 persons of a total of 188,750 admitted between Nov. 1, 1948, and Oct. 31, 1950. Semiannual reports were required of these persons.

TABLE 10.—First residence and current residence of displaced persons reporting in December 1951, by geographic region and division

Geographic region and division	Number reporting		Percent net change—first to current
	First (visa) residence	Current residence	
Continental United States and outlying areas.....	134,812	134,812	
Northeast.....	68,068	63,237	-7.1
New England.....	10,121	10,765	+6.4
Middle Atlantic.....	57,947	52,472	-9.4
North Central.....	44,750	54,301	+21.3
East North Central.....	38,094	46,501	+28.8
West North Central.....	8,656	7,800	-9.9
South.....	12,981	7,005	-46.0
South Atlantic.....	7,615	4,443	-41.6
East South Central.....	2,044	807	-60.5
West South Central.....	3,322	1,755	-47.2
West.....	8,988	9,910	+10.3
Mountain.....	1,953	1,533	-21.5
Pacific.....	7,035	8,377	+19.1
Outlying areas.....	15	82	
Not reported.....	10	277	

NOTE.—This table covers 134,812 persons of a total of 174,351 admitted between Nov. 1, 1949, and Oct. 31, 1951. Semiannual reports were required of these persons.

TABLE 11.—First residence and current residence of displaced persons reporting in December 1950, by geographic region and 10 largest cities in 1940

Region and city	Number reporting		Percent net change
	First residence	Current residence	
10 largest cities.....	55,110	69,507	+26.1
North Eastern States.....	35,130	36,789	+4.7
New York.....	28,919	28,277	-2.2
Philadelphia.....	4,337	5,819	+34.2
Boston.....	1,012	1,745	+72.4
Pittsburgh.....	862	948	+10.0
North Central States.....	17,021	29,088	+70.9
Chicago.....	10,856	18,978	+74.8
Detroit.....	3,450	5,626	+63.1
Cleveland.....	2,234	3,937	+76.2
St. Louis.....	481	547	+13.7
Southern States.....	1,793	1,636	-8.8
Baltimore.....	1,793	1,636	-8.8
Western States.....	1,166	1,994	+71.0
Los Angeles.....	1,166	1,994	+71.0

TABLE 12.—First residence and current residence of displaced persons reporting in December 1951, by geographic region and 10 largest cities in 1950

Region and city	Number reporting		Percent net change
	First residence	Current residence	
10 largest cities.....	57,715	60,654	+5.1
North Eastern States.....	36,670	28,223	-23.0
New York.....	31,514	22,426	-28.8
Philadelphia.....	4,294	4,893	+13.9
Pittsburgh.....	862	904	+4.9
North Central States.....	18,624	28,658	+53.9
Chicago.....	11,510	18,165	+57.8
Detroit.....	3,761	5,203	+38.3
Cleveland.....	2,922	4,800	+64.3
St. Louis.....	431	490	+13.7
Southern States.....	1,371	1,809	+31.0
Baltimore.....	862	1,206	+39.9
Washington, D. C.....	509	603	+18.5
Western States.....	1,050	1,964	+39.9
Los Angeles.....	1,050	1,964	+39.9

TABLE 13.—Displaced persons reporting in December 1951, by division of current residence and country of birth [Percent]

Country of birth	All divisions	New England	Middle Atlantic	East North Central	West North Central	South Atlantic	East South Central	West South Central	Mountain	Pacific
All.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Austria.....	1.6	1.2	1.8	1.2	1.8	1.8	1.2	2.5	2.0	2.1
Czechoslovakia.....	1.9	1.1	2.1	1.7	2.2	2.5	1.5	2.7	2.6	2.0
Estonia.....	3.3	3.5	3.9	2.0	3.4	5.7	2.9	5.1	2.0	5.7
Germany.....	13.7	13.4	14.3	13.7	13.1	14.1	14.9	16.8	14.0	9.6
Greece.....	1.6	2.0	1.3	1.3	.9	5.1	4.5	2.8	5.5	2.9
Hungary.....	3.4	1.9	3.4	3.5	3.1	4.5	2.6	5.1	4.8	4.7
Latvia.....	15.4	15.4	10.5	14.6	36.4	20.3	40.4	23.3	28.8	21.7
Lithuania.....	5.6	9.9	2.9	8.8	4.7	4.7	.7	.9	1.3	2.0
Poland.....	33.7	38.5	40.6	32.2	19.8	26.3	19.6	25.2	21.6	14.0
Roumania.....	1.6	.9	2.0	1.2	1.1	1.7	1.5	1.6	1.9	2.2
U. S. S. R.....	10.4	8.6	13.1	6.7	7.1	8.6	5.9	7.1	9.3	21.7
Yugoslavia.....	5.9	1.8	2.5	11.6	5.5	2.9	2.0	5.2	4.4	4.6
Other countries.....	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.5	.9	1.8	2.3	1.7	1.8	6.8

TABLE 14.—Displaced persons reporting in December 1951, by labor force status and schooling

Labor force status	Percent of group					Median years completed
	No schooling reported	Some elementary	Some high	Some college	Some graduate	
Employed.....	0.6	56.5	25.7	12.0	5.2	8.3
Professional and technical.....	.3	8.6	21.4	35.8	33.9	14.8
Farmers and farm laborers.....	.7	75.2	17.2	5.5	1.4	6.5
Managers, etc.....	.2	43.7	31.6	17.1	7.4	10.1
Clerical.....	.1	27.1	42.4	22.4	8.0	11.6
Sales.....	.6	40.1	36.7	16.7	5.9	10.4
Craftsmen.....	.3	60.0	26.4	10.1	3.2	8.0
Operatives.....	.5	60.1	26.4	10.0	3.0	8.0
Private household.....	1.1	57.0	31.6	7.9	2.4	8.4
Service.....	.8	53.1	29.4	12.5	4.2	8.6
Laborers.....	.7	67.7	19.7	8.9	3.0	7.3
Occupation unknown.....	2.8	63.3	20.2	11.3	2.4	7.3
Unemployed.....	1.2	58.9	23.8	11.1	5.0	8.0

TABLE 15.—Current and sponsored occupations of employed heads of families and single adults, among displaced persons, reporting in December 1950

Major occupational group	Percent	
	Sponsored occupation	Current occupation
All	100.0	100.0
Farmers and farm laborers	30.3	5.7
Laborers, except farm	13.9	15.8
Domestic service workers	13.8	6.4
Operatives and kindred workers ("semiskilled")	13.6	39.6
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers ("skilled")	12.1	12.0
Other service workers	7.5	9.5
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	5.1	3.5
Professional and semiprofessional workers	2.9	5.5
Proprietors, managers, etc., except farm	.6	1.6
Protective service workers	.2	.4

NOTE.—Occupational categories based on 1940 Census Classification.

TABLE 16.—Current and sponsored occupations of employed heads of families and single adults, among displaced persons, reporting in December 1951

Major occupational group	Percent	
	Sponsored occupation	Current occupation
All	100.0	100.0
Farmers and farm laborers	27.6	3.4
Private household workers	16.0	4.7
Laborers, except farm and mine	15.8	24.5
Operatives and kindred workers ("semiskilled")	14.5	30.6
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers ("skilled")	10.2	13.7
Service workers, except private household	8.7	10.3
Clerical and kindred workers	3.4	3.7
Professional, technical, and kindred workers	2.6	6.5
Sales workers	.8	.8
Managers, officials and proprietors, except farm	.4	1.8

NOTE.—Occupational categories based on 1950 Census Classification.

TABLE 17.—Current occupations of displaced persons reporting employment in December 1950

Major occupational group	Total		Heads of families and single adults	Spouses and children
	Percent	Number		
Total employed	100.0	85,475	67,866	17,609
Operatives and kindred workers ("semiskilled")	42.5	36,316	26,894	9,422
Laborers, except farm	14.3	12,187	10,724	1,463
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers ("skilled")	10.3	8,781	8,141	640
Other service workers (barbers, practical nurses, restaurant and hotel workers, etc.)	10.0	8,505	6,449	2,056
Domestic service workers	7.7	6,598	4,355	2,243
Farmers and farm laborers	5.0	4,309	3,860	449
Professional and semiprofessional workers	5.0	4,246	3,711	535
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	3.5	3,033	2,365	668
Proprietors, managers, etc.	1.3	1,151	1,050	101
Protective service workers	.4	349	317	32

NOTE.—Occupational categories based on 1940 Census Classification.

TABLE 18.—Current occupations of displaced persons reporting in December 1951

Major occupational group	Total		Heads of families and single adults	Spouses and children
	Percent	Number		
Total employed	100.0	75,463	61,844	13,619
Operatives and kindred workers ("semiskilled")	32.7	24,677	18,894	5,783
Laborers, except farm and mine	23.0	17,393	15,162	2,231
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers ("skilled")	12.0	9,070	8,480	590
Service workers, except private household	11.3	8,541	6,377	2,164
Professional, technical, and kindred workers	5.9	4,467	4,023	444
Private household workers	5.3	3,975	2,892	1,083
Clerical and kindred workers	4.1	3,111	2,317	794
Farmers and farm laborers	3.1	2,303	2,074	229
Managers, officials, and proprietors	.9	1,279	1,131	148
Sales workers	1.7	647	494	153

NOTE.—Occupational categories based on 1950 Census Classification.

TABLE 19.—State¹ of in-migration and out-migration of displaced persons reporting in December 1950 and of per capita income payments above and below national average of \$1,436 in 1950

Migration status	Per capita income payments		
	Below national average	Above national average	Total
In-migration (movement into States)	1	14	15
Out-migration (movement out of States)	27	6	33
Total	28	20	48

¹ Includes District of Columbia, but excludes Idaho in which there was no net change.

TABLE 20.—Distribution of German expellees responding in sample study, by division of first and current residence

Division	Percent	
	First residence	Current residence
All divisions	100.0	100.0
New England	2.3	2.7
Middle Atlantic	25.2	24.7
East North Central	36.5	39.6
West North Central	11.2	10.4
South Atlantic	7.5	6.5
East South Central	2.2	1.4
West South Central	4.8	4.4
Mountain	4.5	4.3
Pacific	5.8	6.0

TABLE 21.—Net change from division of first to current residence of German expellees responding in sample study

Division	First residence	Current residence	Percent net change
All divisions	1,888	1,888	-----
New England	44	51	+15.9
Middle Atlantic	476	467	-1.9
East North Central	689	748	+8.6
West North Central	212	197	-7.1
South Atlantic	142	123	-20.4
East South Central	41	26	-36.6
West South Central	90	82	-8.9
Mountain	85	81	-4.7
Pacific	109	113	+3.7

TABLE 22.—German expellees responding in sample study, by division and place of current residence

Division	[Percent]				
	All	Cities of 100,000 population and over	Cities of 2,500 to 99,999 population	Rural nonfarm	Rural farm
All divisions.....	100.0	46.0	23.9	7.8	22.3
New England.....	100.0	35.3	15.7	15.7	33.3
Middle Atlantic.....	100.0	48.6	28.9	10.9	11.6
East North Central.....	100.0	59.5	22.2	3.7	14.6
West North Central.....	100.0	31.5	16.7	12.2	39.6
South Atlantic.....	100.0	26.9	24.4	2.4	46.3
East South Central.....	100.0	50.0	19.3	3.8	26.9
West South Central.....	100.0	11.0	32.9	14.6	41.5
Mountain.....	100.0	18.5	18.5	8.7	54.3
Pacific.....	100.0	40.7	29.2	11.5	18.6

TABLE 23.—German expellees 14 years and over, responding in the sample study, by current occupation of employed

Major occupational group	Percent	Number
All employed.....	100	868
Operatives and kindred workers ("semiskilled").....	30	264
Farmers, farm managers, farm laborers and foremen.....	17	149
Craftsmen, foremen and kindred workers ("skilled").....	16	141
Private household workers.....	13	112
Laborers, except farm and mine.....	12	104
Service workers, except private household.....	8	69
Clerical and kindred workers.....	2	15
Professional and technical workers.....	1	9
Sales workers.....	1	5
Managers, officials, and proprietors.....		

NOTE.—Occupational categories based on 1950 Census Classification.

TABLE 24.—Employed German expellees, 14 years of age and over, in sample study, by wages earned during last week of May 1952

Wage group	Number reporting	Percent of total wage earners	Cumulative percent of wage earners of stated number or fewer
All.....	824	100.0	
Under \$10.00.....	5	.6	0.6
\$10 to \$19.99.....	44	5.3	5.9
\$20 to \$29.99.....	159	19.3	25.2
\$30 to \$39.99.....	175	21.3	46.5
\$40 to \$49.99.....	146	17.7	64.2
\$50 to \$59.99.....	117	14.2	78.4
\$60 to \$69.99.....	101	12.3	90.7
\$70 to \$79.99.....	42	5.1	95.8
\$80 to \$89.99.....	20	2.4	98.2
\$90 to \$99.99.....	9	1.1	99.3
\$100 and over.....	6	.7	100.0
Median wage.....	\$41.99		

TABLE 25.—Median weekly wage of German expellees, responding in sample study, by division of current residence

Division	Median weekly wage
Above median:	
East North Central.....	\$47.83
Pacific.....	45.00
Median for all.....	41.99
Below median:	
Middle Atlantic.....	41.00
Mountain.....	40.00
New England.....	37.00
West North Central.....	33.89
South Atlantic.....	32.00
East South Central.....	31.25
West South Central.....	29.38

TABLE 26.—Median weekly cash wage of employed German expellees, responding in sample study, by major occupational group

Major occupational group	Number reporting	Median wage
All.....	824	\$41.99
Professional and technical workers.....	8	70.00
Craftsmen, foremen and kindred workers ("skilled").....	137	61.81
Sales workers.....	5	51.67
Clerical and kindred workers.....	15	48.33
Laborers, except farm and mine.....	102	51.92
Operatives and kindred workers ("semiskilled").....	257	44.92
Service workers, except private household.....	67	35.94
Farmers, farm managers, farm laborers, and foremen.....	128	30.51
Private household workers.....	105	25.39

NOTE.—Occupational categories based on 1950 Census Classification.

TABLE 27.—German expellee families including single-person families in sample study reporting income in addition to wages, by type of income and current residence

Current residence	Total families including single-person families	Cash or noncash income				
		Housing	Food	Medical attention	Other noncash income	Cash
All.....	126	Percent 67	Percent 15	Percent 2	Percent 5	Percent 11
Cities of 100,000 and over in 1950.....	31	61	13	3	10	13
Cities of 2,500 to 99,999 in 1950.....	24	84	8	8		
Rural nonfarm.....	15	53	26	7	7	7
Rural farm.....	56	66	16		5	13

TABLE 28.—German expellee distribution of sponsored and current occupations of expellee heads of families and single adults responding in sample study

Major occupational group	Percent	
	Sponsored	Current
All employed.....	100	100
Farmers, farm managers, farm laborers and foremen.....	40	20
Private household workers.....	20	10
Operatives and kindred workers ("semiskilled").....	12	26
Laborers, except farm and mine.....	11	12
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers ("skilled").....	10	20
Service workers, except private household.....	6	7
Professional and technical workers.....	1	2
Clerical and kindred workers.....	(1)	2
Sales workers.....		1
Managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm.....	(1)	

1 Less than 1/4 of 1 percent.

TABLE 29.—Reasons for leaving sponsored occupations reported by expellee heads of families and single adults, responding in sample study, by sex

Reason reported	Percent		
	Both sexes	Males	Females
All.....	100	100	100
1. Received better offer of job.....	35	39	26
2. Had no occupation on arrival.....	24	25	23
3. No reason reported for leaving.....	11	9	14
4. Wages too low for adequate support.....	7	6	8
5. Sponsor helped secure better job.....	6	5	9
6. Relatives induced change.....	5	6	4
7. Physically unable to do work.....	3	3	3
8. Refused to work at sponsored occupation.....	3	2	5
9. Housing conditions too unsatisfactory.....	2	3	1
10. Married after coming to the United States.....	2		6
11. Agency induced change.....	1	1	1
12. Unqualified to do work.....	1	1	

TABLE 30.—Visas issued to displaced persons (including IRO and Greek orphans), by Dec. 31, 1951

Country of origin	Total		Displaced persons from Germany, Austria, and Italy	Italian refugees from Venezia Giulia	Recent political refugees	Ex-Polish veterans, European DPs from Far East and Greeks	IRO and Greek orphans
	Percent	Number					
All.....	100.0	339,520	312,483	2,000	170	23,486	1,381
Austria.....	.6	2,101	1,820	14	1	228	38
Bulgaria.....	.2	590	584			5	1
Czechoslovakia.....	2.5	8,549	8,379		67	70	33
Danzig.....	.1	231	223			8	
Estonia.....	3.1	10,674	10,619			34	21
Germany.....	3.3	11,200	10,784	2		221	193
Great Britain.....	.1	327	88			239	
Greece.....	2.7	9,297	247			8,859	191
Hungary.....	4.0	13,520	13,448	3	19	23	36
Iran.....	.1	202	200			2	
Italy.....	.2	755	478	230		33	14
Latvia.....	11.0	37,505	37,234		3	53	215
Lithuania.....	7.6	25,368	25,212			83	73
Poland.....	45.5	154,556	143,848	4	1	10,472	231
Rumania.....	1.8	6,008	5,862	1	77	41	27
Turkey.....	.4	1,350	1,109	1		150	
U. S. S. R.....	10.7	36,269	33,809		2	2,309	50
Yugoslavia.....	5.7	19,253	17,476	1,526		17	234
Other countries.....	.5	1,765	883	219		639	24



